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ABSTRACT
This project is the first large-scale and systematic effort to bridge the fields of commons
research and biomedical ethics, with the aim of furthering key debates in both areas of
inquiry. The aims and contributions of the project are twofold.
First, I argue that commons research is valuable to bioethics, because it provides
a language to talk about health care institutions. I critically discuss commons research’s
main conceptual tools in the context of health care: the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework, the design principles of successful commons, parallel
experimentation, and polycentric governance regimes. This conceptual apparatus can
help to advance longstanding arguments in biomedical ethics, particularly when it comes
to the challenge of governing scarce resources. The project contributes to two arguments
in particular: (1) I explore the possibility of a tragedy of the health care commons,
providing arguments in favor of such a tragedy, and considering objections against it. (2)
I integrate commons research with Norman Daniels’ theory of justice for health care and
the accompanying Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R) approach, arguing that
commons institutions are particularly suitable to put Daniels’ approach into practice.
Second, I provide a philosophical and normative analysis that advances NIE and
commons research. My contributions are the following: (1) I critically discuss the concepts
of institution, organization, and common-pool resources. (2) I provide the most detailed
analysis of the design principles of successful commons institutions available in the
iv

literature. (3) I relate the commons to the pluralist tradition in liberalism to show the role
they can play in safeguarding free health care systems. (4) I assess Ostrom’s proposal to
develop polycentric governance regimes in the context of health care. Beyond
philosophical reflection on the commons, biomedical ethics can further undertheorized
areas of commons research, particularly the development of a theory of justice for the
commons. I argue Daniels’ theory of justice for health care can supply such an account,
and show the A4R approach can be conceptualized as design principles for the
development of just health care institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
IMAGINING THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS
“The common day and night – the common earth and waters,
Your farm – your work, trade, occupation,
The democratic wisdom underneath, like solid ground for all.”1,2
- Walt Whitman “[T]he problem of limiting care in a fair and socially
acceptable way is arguably the most important
– and divisive – issue facing the design of
medical delivery systems in the next century.”3
- Norman Daniels and James Sabin -

0.1 IT’S THE INSTITUTIONS, STUPID!4,5
In the first issue of the Journal of Institutional Economics (2005), philosopher John Searle
observes, “Given the centrality of institutional phenomena, it is somewhat surprising that

1

Walt Whitman, The Complete Poems (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 565.
Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval quote Whitman in the opening pages of their book
Commun. (Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, Commun. Essai sur la Révolution au XXIe
Siècle (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2014), 9.)
3 Norman Daniels and James Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
[2002] 2008), 2.
4 Sven Steinmo and Jon Watts, “It’s the Institutions, Stupid! Why Comprehensive Health
Insurance Always Fails in America,” Journal of Health, Politics, & Law 20, no. 2 (April 1995).
5 The title of Steinmo and Watts’s paper is a reference to, and variant of, the phrase “It’s
the economy, stupid!” The catchphrase, coined by campaign strategist James Carville,
became popular in the aftermath of Bill Clinton’s successful presidential campaign against
George H.W. Bush.
2

1

institutional economics has not always been at the center of mainstream economics.” 6
Searle’s observation certainly applies to ethical and philosophical reflections on health
care. Institutions are central to health care, among others, to the management of scarce
health care resources, but they receive little attention in biomedical ethics and the
philosophy of health care. Whenever bioethicists and philosophers do acknowledge the
central importance of institutions, the concept of “institution” is usually treated as given
and the role of institutional phenomena remains undertheorized. Recent developments
in economics provide the opportunity, and the theoretical apparatus, to reflect on the
institutions of health care in ways that move forward key debates in biomedical ethics.
0.1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Institutions figured prominently in economics during the first decades of the twentieth
century, but their position as a focus of economic inquiry waned with the rise and
dominance of the neoclassical synthesis, which combines neoclassical economics with
Keynesian economics, and relies heavily on economic models and advanced
mathematical methods.7 The revaluation of institutions in economics is a relatively recent
occurrence, as is evidenced by the publication date of the first issue of the Journal of
Institutional Economics (2005) in which Searle’s paper, cited above, appeared.
An initial surge of interest in institutions occurred during the first half of the
twentieth century, with such thinkers as Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, and John

6

John Searle, “What is an Institution?” Journal of Institutional Economics 1, no. 1 (June
2005): 2.
7 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 131-132.
2

Dewey; themselves drawing on political economy with its roots in moral philosophy. The
names of the most prominent political economists whose work served as the basis for
these early institutional thinkers sound familiar to philosophers’ ears: Adam Smith, John
Stuart Mill, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx. Around World War II,
however, institutional economics quickly became marginalized as the neoclassical
synthesis with its quantitative methods rose to become the dominant approach in
economics, condemning institutionalism to a role as a minor heterodox school challenging
the mainstream economic consensus, at least for a while. Orthodox economics forgot
about the institutions (Institutionsvergessenheit).8
All of that changed toward the end of last century, with a resurgence of interest
in the importance of institutions for economics, among others, because the shortcomings
of neoclassical economics’ mathematical models were becoming apparent.9 The research

8

The term “Institutionsvergessenheit” is more than a superficial allusion to Martin
Heidegger’s concept of “Seinsvergessenheit.” Heidegger’s claim that Western philosophy
has forgotten about being is analogous to the argument that mainstream economics has
forgotten about institutions, both the rediscovery of being and of institutions require a
radical rethinking of metaphysics and economics respectively. Institutions-vergessenheit
was coined by Erik Gawel, even though it is unclear whether he intended to reference
Heidegger’s concept. (Erik Gawel, “Institutionentheorie und Unweltökonomik.
Forschungsstand und Perspektiven,” Zeitschrift fur angewandte Umwelforschung 8
(1996): 11.)
9 To give an example, the influential work of psychologist Daniel Kahneman on human
decision-making challenged the assumption of human rationality in modern economic
thought, earning him the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (shared with
experimental economist Vernon L. Smith). Institutional economists are sympathetic to
the analysis of human psychology offered by Kahneman. (Daniel Kahneman, Thinking,
Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux , 2011).) Ostrom, for example, stresses
the limits of human rationality. Moreover, she shows in her experimental research and
field work that human beings are not only the self-interested maximizers of neoclassical
economic models, but can also behave as cooperative satisficers.
3

of the so-called “new institutionalists”10 resulted in a slew of Nobel Memorial Prizes in
Economic Sciences: Ronald Coase (1991), Douglass North (1993), Oliver Williamson
(2009), and Elinor Ostrom (2009). The product of their work, and that of countless others,
served as the basis for a new school of economic thought: New Institutional Economics
(NIE).11 Still a minor current within economic research, NIE is sometimes presented as an
alternative to mainstream economics,12 but any economic “Theory of Everything”13 would
have to integrate institutional thought with the neoclassical synthesis.14 NIE and orthodox
economics should be regarded as supplements for one another rather than substitutes.15

10

In the literature, the first wave of interest in institutions is called “old institutionalism,”
and the more recent surge of interest is labeled “new institutionalism.” The peculiar term
“institutionalist” is commonly used for representatives of both movements, for example,
in the Encyclopædia Britannica’s entry on institutional economics. (Encyclopædia
Britannica, s.v. “Institutional Economics,” last modified June 14, 2016, https://www.
britannica.com/topic/institutional-economics.)
11 Robert Goodin provides a philosophical overview of NIE. (Robert Goodin, “Institutions
and Their Design,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert Goodin (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).)
12 Claims that NIE in general and commons research (Ostrom) in particular represent a
paradigm shift in economics can also be situated in this context. (Among others, see:
Derek Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom. Commons, Contestation and
Craft (New York: Routledge, 2014), 191; Massimo De Angelis and David Harvie, “The
Commons,” in The Routledge Companion to Alternative Organization, eds. Martin Parker
et al. (Abington: Routledge, 2014), 289.) As these claims often go unargued, and given the
philosophical significance of the concept “paradigm shift” (Thomas Kuhn), the defense or
refutation of these assertions is beyond the scope of this project.
13 The term “Theory of Everything,” often abbreviated as ToE (or TOE), refers to the
hypothetical all-encompassing theory in physics that can fully explain and link together
all physical phenomena. Some economists dream of a similar all-encompassing theory in
economics that would be able to explain and relate all economic phenomena.
14 Of course, the proposed integration is an oversimplification, as a new synthesis would
plausibly have to accommodate other economic schools of thought (e.g., evolutionary
economics, Austrian school, post-Keynesian economics).
15 North, Institutions, 135.
4

0.1.2 NIE, BIOETHICS, AND PHILOSOPHY
The revival of institutionalism in economics provides bioethicists and philosophers with
an opportunity and, more importantly, with a new theoretical toolbox to reflect afresh on
the role institutions play in health care and medicine. There has been a long and steady
interest in health care institutions,16 but the theoretical apparatus to analyze and reflect
upon them has been lacking.17 I briefly highlight two prominent examples. First, Edmund
Pellegrino and David Thomasma point out the need for an ethics of health care
institutions in their work A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice (1981). In a chapter
titled Social Ethics of Institutions, they write, “institutional ethics […] has not yet occupied
the professional ethicist to a significant degree, [but] is essential to address the moral
agency of hospitals and care teams.”18 Second, the opening sentence of Norman Daniels’s
influential work Just Health Care (1985) reads, “This book is about justice in the design of
a health-care system.”19 Daniels argues institutions are central to any solution to the fair

16

That being said, the level of interest in health care institutions should not be
exaggerated either. As Andrew Cassels notes in the context of health care reform,
“Institutional issues tend to be ignored because they are regarded as messy and difficult.”
(Andrew Cassels, Perspectives on Health Sector Reform (Geneva: World Health
Organization, 1993), 6.) Cassels’s remark is also applicable to ethical and philosophical
reflection on health care institutions in general. NIE promises to make institutional issues
a bit less messy, or at least to make them approachable in a systematic manner.
17 Around the turn of the century, HEC Forum drew attention to the development of an
organizational ethics of health care, among others, under the influence of a call for papers
by George Khushf, who became the editor of a section of the journal dedicated to
administrative and organizational ethics (see also 4.7 Toward an Ethics of Health Care
Institutions). (George Khushf, “Administrative and Organizational Ethics: Announcing a
New Section and a Call for Papers,” HEC Forum 9, no. 4 (December 1997).)
18 Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice.
Toward a Philosophy and Ethic of the Healing Professions (Oxford: Oxford University Press
1981), 244.
19 Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), ix.
5

allocation of health care resources and the purpose of any theory of justice in health care
is to inform the design of health care institutions.20 While both examples acknowledge
the central importance of institutions, neither is entirely successful in bringing their
institutional arguments to fruition.21 For one, Pellegrino, Thomasma, and Daniels struggle
with the concept of “institution.” They primarily understand and use the notion in the
everyday meaning of the term, i.e., referencing concrete organization. Institutionalists,
however, conceive of the concept as an abstract set of rules.22 The everyday and the
technical sense of the concept are closely related and easily confused, even in the NIE
literature. In fact, the persistent ambiguity surrounding the notion of institution is one of
the main criticisms of NIE. Part of this project’s contribution to NIE is to attempt an
explanation of the nontrivial distinction between organization and institution from a
philosophical perspective (see 0.5.1 Institution and 0.5.2 Organization). For now, it is
worth noting I will try to be consistent in my use of the term institution to refer to abstract

20

Daniels highlights the key role institutions and institutional design play in the allocation
of health care resources numerous times, especially early on in the work. (Daniels, Just
Health Care, ix-xi, 1-4, 8-10, 41, 45, 47-48, 95, 99-100, 102.) For a detailed discussion of
Daniels’s treatment of institutions, see 4.4.1 Daniels the Institutionalist.
21 Daniels, for example, focuses heavily on the role of institutions and their design in the
preface and opening chapter of Just Health Care, but does not develop his arguments
about the central importance of institutions further. One explanation is Daniels lacks the
theoretical machinery to develop his institutional argument further. Then again, Daniels
may not have considered it his task to discuss the in-and-outs of institutions and their
design, instead focusing on the development of a theory of justice in health care, at least
in Just Health Care. I will argue the accountability for reasonableness approach Daniels
later develops in collaboration with James Sabin can be interpreted as an exercise in
institutional design, even if the approach is not presented as such (see 4.4.1 Daniels the
Institutionalist).
22 At times, Daniels uses the notion of institution in the same way, i.e., referencing an
abstract set of rules rather than a concrete organization.
6

sets of rules, while I reserve the term organization to refer to concrete health care
organizations (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, Kaiser Permanente, Prisma Health, urgent care
clinics, group practices, medical schools).23
Of course, the proverbial “giants of bioethics” cited in the previous paragraph
wrote in the early days of the institutionalist revival and long before NIE gained any
prominence, so they cannot be blamed for lacking the theoretical apparatus to develop
their visionary ideas about health care institutions more systematically. To date, NIE
remains relatively little known outside its own field, something this project seeks to
remedy by providing some of the bridgework between NIE and biomedical ethics broadly
conceived, tying the latter in with a fast-developing field of economic research rooted in
institutional practice. Ultimately, the integration of bioethics and NIE may result in a fullfledged ethics of health care institutions (see 4.7 Toward an Ethics of Health Care
Institutions). While the development of such an ethics is beyond the scope of the current
dissertation, I supply and advance some of the tools that may be of help to realize such a
project (see 2. Ostrom’s Black Bag), and apply these tools to Daniels’s work on the fair
allocation of health care resources (see 4. A4R in Practice).
NIE is particularly well suited to be incorporated in ethical and philosophical
inquiry. Catherine Lawson is one of the few academics who has identified and explored

23

To say I “try” to use the terms consistently may seem weak, but the terms can be quite
difficult to keep apart. After all, it is possible to think of concrete organizations in terms
of abstract sets of rules (i.e., institutions), and at times institutions can be identified with
concrete entities (e.g., the United States government as the state). The sections below
discuss these intricacies in more detail (see 0.5.1 Institution and 0.5.2 Organization).
7

the relationship between bioethics and institutional economics,24 albeit first-wave
institutional economics rather than NIE.25 In a paper titled The Second Stage of Bioethics
and Institutional Economics (1998), she discusses some of the reasons institutionalism is
valuable to biomedical ethics. First, Lawson points out, “the dominant position of ethical
inquiry within institutionalist economics, as well as the institutionalist understanding of
ethics as both social process and individual behavior, renders it of greater value than
conventional economic theory to bioethicists searching for useful insights into the world
of business and economics.”26 Second, she believes institutionalism can provide a
counterweight to and escape from the “individualistic bias” 27 in biomedical ethics. Lastly,
Lawson rightly highlights the central importance of economics to health care, arguing
economics should be at the center of any reflection on health care, but bioethicists and
philosophers are ill prepared to engage in matters of economics.28 In comparison to socalled “cliometric economics,”29 NIE offers a more easily accessible and readily applicable
conceptual system to reflect upon institutional, organizational, and economic issues in
health care.

24

Unfortunately, Lawson’s contribution is limited to just one paper, possibly because her
work came too soon, and thus did not profit from the surge of interest in institutionalism.
25 Of course, this raises the question whether Lawson’s argument are also applicable to
NIE? Without going into detail, I believe they are. After all, NIE builds on many of the first
institutionalists’ ideas (e.g., Commons is an important influence on Ostrom).
26 Catherin Lawson, “The Second Stage of Bioethics and Institutional Economics,” Journal
of Economic Issues 32, no. 4 (December 1998): 985.
27 Lawson, “The Second Stage of Bioethics,” 987.
28 Lawson, “The Second Stage of Bioethics,” 988.
29 The term “cliometric economics” is used to reference orthodox economics with its
emphasis on economic models and advanced mathematical methods. (North, Institutions,
131-132.)
8

At the same time, NIE can benefit from entering into a dialogue with bioethics and
philosophy. First, philosophical reflection can elucidate some of the key concepts of
institutionalist economics, among others, the ambiguous distinction between institutions
and organizations. More generally, philosophers can aide in the process of critically
reflecting on the assumptions, methods, and arguments of a nascent branch of economics
(see 2. Ostrom’s Black Bag).30 Second, and closely related to the previous point, ethicists
and philosophers can bring a normative perspective to the table that is notably absent
from NIE, despite the field’s emphasis on rules (see 0.5.3 Rules), which are normative. The
prescriptive nature of institutions as sets of rules is assumed, and thus undertheorized. A
possible explanation is that, even though NIE is an alternative to orthodox economics, the
field is still within the discipline and represents biases in economics at large, for example,
a preference for empirical research and for mathematical methods.31 As a result,

30

In commons research in particular, the figure of Ostrom still looms large (see 0.1.3
Ostrom and the Commons), as anyone who has ever attended the biannual meeting of
The International Association of the Study of the Commons (IASC) can attest. As the
founder of commons research, Ostrom’s writings weigh heavily on current work in the
field. While Ostrom’s influence is understandable, given her brilliance and the field’s
indebtedness to her, it risks stifling critical reflection within commons research.
31 A few remarks are in place: First, economists’ predilection for empirical research should
not be exaggerated either, as one can just as easily accuse economists of an overreliance
on theoretical models. As I argued above, the inability of neoclassical models to
successfully explain real-world economic phenomena is one of the reasons for the rise of
heterodox economic schools in the first place (see 0.1.1 A Brief History of Institutional
Economics). Regardless, normative analysis is absent from both empirical and theoretical
economics. Second, Ostrom’s preference for mathematical methods and empirical
research is especially apparent in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources (2006).
Finally, it is worth noting the central importance of normative analysis and moral
philosophy in the work of the earliest modern economists (e.g., Smith, Mill). While
economics has returned to political economy in some ways (e.g., the emphasis on
institutions), the moral component has not been recovered.
9

normative analysis is largely absent from NIE in general and commons research in
particular, a lacuna that bioethics and philosophy can fill.
My work bridges NIE and philosophy, with a focus on Ostrom’s work on the
commons and Daniels’s theory of justice for health care (see 4. A4R in Practice). More
generally, my project sits at the intersection of economics and philosophy, highlighting
ways in which these fields can interface fruitfully with each other. Since this dissertation
is the first large-scale, systematic effort to provide such bridgework, the project as a
whole is an important contribution both to philosophy of health care and to NIE.
0.1.3 OSTROM AND THE COMMONS
NIE is a large, growing, and diverse area of inquiry.32 To give an example, the work of the
aforementioned Nobel laureates, who laid much of the basis for current research, must
be situated within NIE, but the overlap between their research agendas is nonetheless
limited, as is the degree to which they draw on one another’s work.33 As a result, there
are numerous ways to explore the relationship between NIE and biomedical ethics, all of
which may be valuable and fruitful avenues of inquiry. Since this project developed from
an interest in the allocation of health care resources, Ostrom’s research on the commons
forms the basis for the present research. In her work, Ostrom discusses institutional
arrangements that allow for the cooperative governance of scarce resources, among
others, developing tools enabling resource users to do so successfully (see 2. Ostrom’s

32

As Robert Goodin puts it, “’new institutionalism’ is not one thing but many.” (Goodin,
“Institutions and Their Design,” 2.)
33 To give an example, Ostrom and North, the institutionalists whose work I am most
familiar with, reference each other’s research only a handful of times.
10

Black Bag). As such, commons research may be able to help averting a so-called “tragedy
of the health care commons” (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons). Despite
the focus on Ostrom, the project provides an introduction to the key ideas of NIE, of which
Ostrom and North are preeminent representatives, and their application to bioethics and
philosophy of health care. At the same time, the project is an invitation to other
researchers to further explore the relationship between NIE and biomedical ethics (see
0.4 The Double Aim of the Project).
0.2 MARKET AND STATE: FALSE DICHOTOMY
Ostrom outlines her research program by situating her work vis-à-vis a useful fiction: the
market-state dichotomy. In the opening chapter of Governing the Commons (1990), she
argues that decisions about the “right” governance model for the management of scarce
resources oftentimes are presented as a choice between the institutions of market
(privatization) and state (Leviathan).34,35 Ostrom then introduces her own work on
commons institutions as an alternative to the classical policy prescriptions of market and
state (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons).36
The dichotomy is a useful fiction precisely because it allows Ostrom to position
her work in relation to the institutions of market and state, as is evidenced by the title of
her Nobel Prize lecture, titled Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of

34

Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 8-15.
35 For more on Hobbes’s influence on Ostrom, see 3.4.1 Rationalism, Pluralism, and
Freedom.
36 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 15-21.
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Complex Economic Systems (2009).37 However, the dichotomy is not just some theoretical
construct Ostrom uses to introduce and situate the commons. On the contrary, the
institutions of market and state are time-honored and influential policy prescriptions for
solving a host of institutional challenges, including the governance of scarce
resources.38,39 The dominance of market and state institutions, and their successful track
record, explains how the concept of the dichotomy originated in the first place, a point I
return to shortly.40 Ostrom acknowledges the central importance of the dichotomy, and
recognizes the strength of the institutions of market and state as policy prescriptions,
provided these institutional solutions are developed in sufficient detail. All too often,
however, market and state are used as “metaphors,”41,42 but used in this manner they are

37

Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex
Economic Systems,” The American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June [2009] 2010).
38 The adjective “time-honored” is appropriate because the institutions of market and
state are self-reinforcing over time. The well-known phenomenon of path dependence
applies to institutions (see 4.3.1 Market and State Experiments and 5.8.1 Path
Dependence).
39 Garrett Hardin, for example, proposes either privatization (market) or a Leviathan
(state) to solve the tragedy of the commons (see 1.3 The Tragedy of the Commons).
40 Moreover, the dichotomous contrast between market and state usually arises in certain
particular contexts (e.g., tragedy of the commons, prisoner’s dilemma, and collective
action) that elicit a stark contrast between these classic policy prescriptions. (Ostrom,
Governing the Commons, 2-7.)
41 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 21.
42 Ostrom’s use of the word “metaphor” to characterize the use of market and state as
policy prescriptions is in need of further explanation. She discusses the “metaphorical use
of models” in the context of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons (see 1. The Tragedy of the
Health Care Commons), the prisoner’s dilemma game, and Olson’s logic of collective
action. Ostrom argues these three models have often served as the basis for policy
prescriptions, “but those attempting to use these models as the basis for policy
prescriptions frequently have achieved little more than a metaphorical use of the
models.” She continues, “When models are used as metaphors, an author usually points
to the similarity between one or two variables in a natural setting and one or two variables
in a model. If calling attention to similarities is all that is intended by the metaphor, it
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deficient solutions to complex issues.43,44 This explains why Ostrom warns and argues
against the dichotomy as an over-simplification throughout her oeuvre,45 repeatedly

serves the usual purpose of rapidly conveying information in graphic form.” The three
aforementioned models have often been used for a different purpose, however, namely
to “invoke an image of helpless individuals caught in an inexorable process of destroying
their own resources.” (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 7-8.) Policymakers use the
models, or popularized versions thereof, to show the same processes occur in all settings,
“an empirically incorrect inference.” (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 9.) Ostrom then
applies the same notion of metaphor to policy prescriptions. Market and state can be
employed as metaphors in order to convey information, to make institutional problems
discussable. But the concepts are often used as vacuous policy proposals to rouse the
members of the polity (e.g., the use of the dichotomy in political discussions surrounding
health care in the United States). The concepts must be given content in order for them
to be valuable as policy prescriptions. As Ostrom puts it, “Many policy prescriptions are
themselves no more than metaphors. Both the centralizers and the privatizers frequently
advocate oversimplified, idealized institutions – paradoxically, almost “institution-free”
institutions.” (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 22.)
43 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 23.
44 The criticism that metaphors make for poor policy solutions does not only hold true for
the institutions of market and state, but also for the commons, as long as these
institutional arrangements are presented and used as adequate off-the-shelf solutions to
real-world resource management problems. Ostrom seems to acknowledge the fact the
criticism applies to the commons by discussing the problem of using policy prescriptions
as metaphors after briefly introducing the commons as “an empirical alternative,” even
though her main targets are market and state. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 18, 2123.)
45 A good example is the following: “The Earlier World View of Simple Systems: In the midtwentieth century, the dominant scholarly effort was to try to fit the world into simple
models and to criticize institutional arrangements that did not fit. […] A. Two Optimal
Organizational Forms: The market was seen as the optimal institution for the production
and exchange of private goods. For nonprivate goods, on the other hand, one needed
“the” government to impose rules and taxes to force self-interested individuals to
contribute necessary resources and refrain from self-seeking activities. Without a
hierarchical government to induce compliance, self-seeking citizens and officials would
fail to generate efficient levels of public goods, such as peace and security, at multiple
scales (Hobbes [1651] 1960; W. Wilson 1885). […] This dichotomous view of the world
explained patterns of interaction and outcomes related to markets for the production and
exchange of strictly private goods (Alchian 1950), but it has not adequately accounted for
internal dynamics within private firms (Williamson 1975, 1986). Nor does it adequately
deal with the wide diversity of institutional arrangements that humans craft to govern,
13

stressing the need to move past “slogan words.”46 Moreover, and maybe more
importantly for Ostrom’s project, the clout of the dichotomy makes it seem like no other
institutional solutions are even a possibility. Despite these criticisms, Ostrom’s work is
bound and defined by the dichotomy. In turn, the dichotomy exerts a profound influence
on my project. Thus, before continuing, the market-state dichotomy must be explored in
some more detail in order to gain a better understanding of Ostrom’s work and of the
arguments that are to follow. Several key points from the discussion of market and state
carry over to the next section on the commons (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons). It is
worth noting that a systematic and critical discussion of the institutions of market, state,
and, to a lesser extent, commons is absent from the commons literature. Therefore, the
following analysis of these concepts contributes to commons research.
For the sake of the upcoming arguments, I construe the institutions of market and
state as ideal types. As such, they are never fully realized in the world of “concrete
institutions,” i.e., organizations. However, all market and state organizations share
certain features, which I discuss below, with market and state institutions respectively.
Particular organizations can have a varying number of characteristics in common with the
ideal-type institution (see also 0.5.2 Organization). To give an example, the New York
Stock Exchange more closely approximates the ideal of the market than the Health
Insurance Marketplace (healthcare.gov), but both are instances of market organizations

provide, and manage public goods and commonpool resources.” (Ostrom, “Beyond
Markets and States,” 409-410.)
46 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005), 181.
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and share certain features which are associated with the market as an institutional ideal
(e.g., reliance on competition).47,48
All real-world organizations combine features of the institutions of market and
state. Hence, scholars often talk about the market-state continuum rather than the
market-state dichotomy.49 Indeed, many organizations also possess characteristics of
commons institutions, even if those features are not always recognized. The health care
system of the United States illustrates how market, state, and commons function as idealtype institutions as well as the reality of the organizational mix. Even though the American
health care system is often typified as market-based, relying primarily on private initiative
(e.g., Aetna, Tenet Healthcare Cooperation), over half of each health care dollar in the
United States is spent by what are usually regarded to be state organizations (e.g.,
Medicare, Medicaid). Thus, both market and states as ideal types are represented in the
health care system. Moreover, changing the scale from the health care system as a whole
down to individual health care organizations,50 the ideal types are simultaneously present
in virtually all health care organizations. To give a concrete example, the Centers for

47

Moreover, while organizations share characteristics with the institutional ideal type,
they can display these features to a varying degree. For example, while managed
competition (i.e., competition mediated by top-down rules) is a characteristic of both the
New York Stock Exchange and the Health Insurance Market Place, competition is freer
(i.e., less heavily regulated) in case of the former.
48 As I mention below, the Health Insurance Marketplace is run by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, a state organization, making healthcare.gov a good
example of a hybrid organization.
49 The market-state continuum plausibly can be conceptualized both at the abstract,
institutional level and at the concrete, organizational level (see 0.5.1 Institution and 0.5.2
Organization).
50 Changes of scale figure prominently in Ostrom’s work. She talks about changes in the
“level of analysis” (see 0.5.1 Institutions).
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Medicare and Medicaid Services, a state organization par excellence, designed and
oversees the Health Insurance Marketplace provisioned by the Affordable Care Act
(ACA).51 In short, the dichotomy oversimplifies a complex reality of mixed organizations,52
but that does not mean the dichotomy is useless. The concept captures certain features
of institutions and organizations, allowing researches and policymakers alike to discuss
and address institutional challenges, which is precisely the way Ostrom uses the
dichotomy.53 However, that brings to the forefront the following issue: what are the
defining features of the institutions of market and state? After all, they are broad
concepts and different people could be using them in different ways. To say the
institutions of market and state exist on a continuum does not resolve the issue, but
makes it even more poignant, because without defining features it becomes difficult to
place organizations on the continuum and to discuss their relative performance (see 0.3
A Third Way: The Commons).54

51 The law’s full name is Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), often shorted

to the Affordable Care Act, and nicknamed Obamacare.
52 As Robert Evans notes in the context of health care reform: “State and private
institutions have always interpenetrated each other, to the extent that in most national
systems it is often difficult, and inherently arbitrary, to classify a particular institution as
“public” or ”private.” In reality, there is a continuum along the line from civil service at
one end, to the privately owned, strictly for-profit corporation at the other. Most health
care, in most countries, is provided by people and organizations that fall into neither
category.” (Robert Evans, “Going for the Gold: The Redistributive Agenda behind MarketBased Health Care Reform,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law 22, no. 2 (April
1997): 430.)
53 See also footnote 42.
54 The market-state continuum can be conceptualized both at the abstract, institutional
level and at the concrete, organizational level (see 0.5.1 Institution and 0.5.2
Organization).
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Researchers and policymakers working with the dichotomy often assume an
understanding of the institutions of market and state. While mostly everyone has some
intuitive comprehension of the concepts, which testifies to the strength and influence of
the dichotomy, upon closer scrutiny it is not at all clear what is meant by market and state.
Ostrom, for example, uses the concepts throughout her work, but nowhere does she
specify what she means by them beyond the most general characterizations (e.g.,
privatization, centralization). The same is true of commons research as a whole and of the
other literatures consulted for the purpose of the present project. Of course, such an
approach may make sense in the context of commons research in general and Ostrom’s
work in particular, as it fits with the criticism that market and state frequently are used
as mere slogan words. Even so, this is never made explicit. Moreover, the institutions of
market and state are referenced regularly in ways that seem to presuppose some content
beyond them being metaphors. Given the centrality of the dichotomy, I want to provide
the concepts of market and state with some content. The table on the following page
highlights some of the characteristics associated with market and state institutions (see
Table 0.1: Features of market, state, and commons institutions). Much like the dichotomy
itself, the features listed are informative simplifications, but they nonetheless capture key
aspects of market and state institutions identified in the NIE literature broadly
conceived.55 I also include a column listing the analogous features in commons
institutions, which serves as a first introduction to the commons. While the aim is not to

55

Most of Albert Hirschman’s work, for example, predates the rise of NIE but exerts a
profound influence on the literature. Unsurprisingly, Hirschman is sometimes identified
as an institutional economist.
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provide a full description of either of these institutions, I do want to distill the listed
characteristics into a few defining features for market, state, and commons institutions
respectively that capture the key contrasts between them and can serve as a conceptual
guideline throughout the coming chapters. For this purpose, several characteristics are
highlighted in boldface, because they inform the discussion of the defining features of
market and state immediately following the table and of the commons in the next section
(see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons).

Table 0.1: Features of market, state, and commons institutions.

MARKET

STATE

COMMONS

homo

homo

homo

economicus

economicus56

sociologicus57

private

rule driven and

competitive

active authoritative

HUMAN MODEL

BEHAVIOR OF

cooperation and

AGENTS58

consensus seeking
decisions

impulse

56

At times, the human model used by proponents, as well as critics, of the state is
described as “homo dependens.” However, the homo dependens model seems to apply
to humans who have been shaped by life in a state organization, and thus have become
“dependent” on the state, but who in their “state of nature” correspond to the model of
the rational, self-interested maximizer (homo economicus).
57 The term “homo reciprocans” is also used. (Herbert Gintis, “Beyond Homo Economicus:
Evidence from Experimental Economics,” Ecological Economics 35, no. 3 (December
2000): 313.)
58 Graham Thompson, Between Hierarchies and Markets. The Logic and Limits of Network
Forms of Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 48.
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GUIDING
competition

authority

cooperation

privatization

centralization

decentralization

dispersed

hierarchical

spontaneous

competition

control

solidarity

invisible hand

active governance

PRINCIPLE
GUIDING
PRINCIPLE
(Ostrom)59
GUIDING
PRINCIPLE
(Streeck)60
GUIDING

self-organized
PRINCIPLE

ex post

ex ante
governance

(Thompson)61,62

coordination

coordination

GUIDING
deliberation or
PRINCIPLE

laissez-faire

intervention
dialogue

(Hirschmann)63
LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

micro

macro

59

meso

Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 181.
Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, “Community, Market, State – and
Associations?” European Sociological Review 1, no. 2 (September 1985): 119.
61 Thompson, Between Hierarchies and Markets, 48.
62 Thompson lists a second set of guiding principles: “price mechanism, competition, selfinterest, self-regulation” (market), “hierarchically organized/bureaucratic administration
/monitoring, scrutiny, interventions” (state), and “loyalty, reciprocity, and trust”
(networks). (Thompson, Between Hierarchies and Markets, 48.) In Thompson’s
classification, commons institutions fall under networks.
63 Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970),
19.
60
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DIRECTION OF
horizontal

top-down

bottom-up

OPERATION

Proponents of both market and state institutions depart from the assumption that
humans are rational, self-interested maximizers.64 A characterization of human beings
that has become known as “homo economicus.”65 While the origins of the model are
diverse, the concept is usually attributed to Mill, who described humans as the subject of
political economy in On the Definition of Political Economy (1836), characterizing them as
desiring solely to possess wealth and having the ability to decide upon the best means for
attaining that end.66,67 However, Mill does not use the term homo economicus, or the
alternative “economic man,” both of which emerge in response to his work.68 Market and
state can be conceived then as alternative institutional solutions to the same problem:
the need to regulate relationships between “pesky” egotistical utility maximizers in order
to pursue or avoid certain (un)desirable outcomes, for example, enabling collective action
or averting the tragedy of the commons.69 While the market relies on homo economicus’

64

Of course, markets and states existed long before the rise of the dichotomy. The
present discussion must be situated within modern reflections on the institutions of
market and state, which is the context in which the dichotomy arose.
65 Ostrom also uses the term “rational egoist.” (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional
Diversity, 101.)
66 Joseph Persky, “The Ethology of Homo Economicus,” Journal of Economic Perspectives
9, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 223.
67 Mill qualifies his abstraction of human nature for the purpose of political economy in a
passage immediately following the characterization of humans as self-interested and
rational. (Persky, “The Ethology of Homo Economicus,” 223.)
68 Persky, “The Ethology of Homo Economicus,” 222.
69 The influence of the model of the homo economicus may be the underlying explanation
for the enduring force of the dichotomy.
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egoistic impulses, using incentives and competition to regulate human behavior at the
micro-level, the state subdues homo economicus, relying on macro-level authority to
obtain the desired outcome.70 In other words, market institutions rely on dispersed
competition between actors, while state institutions are sets of rules aimed at exercising
hierarchical control from the top down.
Significantly, both institutional models assume that the only way to get humans
to cooperate is to lure or to force them to do so, for they are not capable to resolve
collective action problems and commons dilemmas by their own doing. The strength and
influence of this line of argument is considerable, as is evident in Daniels and Sabin’s
discussion of the accountability for reasonableness approach (see 4. A4R in Practice).
While their solution firmly points towards the collaborative governance of health care
resources, a possibility they explore in the development of their approach, they
nonetheless click into the logic of the dichotomy, ultimately pointing toward the state to
institute accountability for reasonableness, since cooperation between stakeholders
must be forced from the top down (see 4.4.3.4.4 The Regulative Condition). In the next
section, I show the commons as departing from an alternative human model, giving room
to the possibility of spontaneous cooperation at the meso-level (see 0.3 A Third Way: The
Commons).

70

The sentence fits firmly within logic of the market-state bifurcation, for real-world
organizations are hybrids displaying features of both market and state, but the goal here
is to formulate a workable definition of market and state institutions in order to provide
a contrast with commons institutions.
21

The influence of the dichotomy also is apparent in debates about health care
reform, where the perceived choice between market and state is central to ongoing
discussions surrounding the ACA in the United States.71 In these discussions, the
institutions of market and state are often presented as adequate solutions to concrete
policy issues, which is precisely what Ostrom warns against doing. Opponents of
Obamacare seek to get rid of the reform, which to them implies excessive government
interference, in favor of more private initiative, i.e., “more market.” While at least some
proponents of the ACA find the reform effort is a good start, but believe it does not go far
enough, instead they propose an expansion of Medicaid (“Medicaid for All”) to provide
health care to all Americans, i.e., “more state.” Even though the choice between market
and state is a false dichotomy, discussions about health care reform are all too often spun
in terms of market versus state, especially in politics and in the media.
Such arguments fit within broader discussions between advocates of market and
state institutions. A common debate is the presumed push toward market organizations,
both in health care and in other institutional arenas (e.g., higher education,72 public

71

Obamacare’s key policy decisions to increase health care coverage among Americans
also firmly fit within the dichotomy. The expansion of Medicaid and the creation of a
health insurance marketplace (under government auspices) represent the institutions of
state and market respectively. It is worth noting the ACA also explicitly made room for
health care cooperatives, but none of these initiatives were particularly successful.
72 In higher education, concepts like the “corporate university” and the “entrepreneurial
university” have become commonplace, among others, translating in a corporate
management approach and a focus on the university brand. (Herman De Dijn, Irina
Veretennicoff, and Dominique Willems, Het Professoraat Anno 2016. Reflectie over een
beroep in volle verandering (Brussel: Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor
Wetenchappen en Kunsten, 2016), 4-6.) The push toward the market is also noticeable in
scholarly publishing, which has gone through an “enclosing of the scholarly commons”
during the last quarter of the twentieth century. (Nancy Kranich, “Countering Enclosure:
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transportation). A trend that is typically traced back to the Reagan and Thatcher era. The
National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom, for example, saw the introduction
of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1980s, which within the logic of the dichotomy
implies a move toward the market (e.g., the introduction of internal markets). Rudolf
Klein argues that this push toward market organizations is undergirded by the belief that
market institutions function better than state institutions,73 especially in rapidly changing
environments.74 In response, there has been a surge in criticisms of the market, with some
arguing for a return to the state. To reference an earlier example, calls to expand
Medicaid to cover all Americans must be situated in this movement.75 If the discussion of
the dichotomy has taught us one thing, however, it is that arguments like these all too
often result in ideological battles between proponents of institutional ideal types that do

Reclaiming the Knowledge Commons,” in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From
Theory to Practice, eds. Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess (Cambridge: The MIT Press,
2011), 86-93.)
73 Rudolf Klein, “Self-inventing Institutions: Institutional Design and the U.K. Welfare
State,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 246.
74 The argument goes that markets are better at processing information and hence better
able to cope with change.
75 To give another example, calls to renationalize railway service in Great Britain fit with
the revaluation of the state ideal, this in response to failures perceived to be the result of
the privatization of much of the British railway service after the passing of the Railways
Act (1993). Without wanting to delve too deep into the details of railway service in Britain,
it is worth noting the following: (1) The privatization is in fact a reprivatization, as service
was nationalized with the creation of British Railways after WW II. Thus, the history of
railway service in Britain nicely illustrates the swing of the institutional pendulum from
market to state and back. (2) According to some, the British railways’ current woes are
the result of an incomplete privatization, i.e., too little market. (3) The privatization of
British railway service is incomplete, as the state continues to play an important role in
organizing railway services (e.g., Strategic Rail Authority), illustrating once again that all
real-world organizations are hybrids.
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not readily correspond or translate to a reality of mixed institutions. The ongoing polemic
between advocates of market and state institutions does illustrate the profound and
enduring influence of the dichotomy, which in turn highlights the need to move beyond
the market-state bifurcation, beyond talking about markets and states as seemingly
mutually exclusive and fully described institutional solutions to complex health care
issues. The aim of both Ostrom’s work and the current project is to take such an approach
that steps outside of the bounds of the dichotomy.
So what to make then of the dichotomy? To summarize, the market-state
dichotomy is an oversimplification, but useful nonetheless. As ideal types, the institutions
of market and state continue to play a prominent role in policy debates. Moreover, the
dichotomy does capture a feature of modern society, i.e., the de facto dominance of
market and state, which explains why they are sometimes called the “status quo
institutions.” In addition, the concepts of market and state do have some content, even
if they often remain underdetermined, and thus malleable in function of policy debates.
In short, the dichotomy has merits making it a valuable notion. However, in light of the
current project the dichotomy plays an altogether more modest double role: First, the
dichotomy serves as a warning against proposing overly simple solutions to complex
policy issues. Heedless policy recommendations based on insubstantial metaphors are to
be avoided, what matters are the organizational details and they do not neatly fit the
dichotomy. Second, the idealized institutions of market and state serve as signposts that
provide a language to compare and contrast organizations, this in the knowledge real-
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world organizations are situated somewhere along the market-state continuum.76 Adding
commons institutions to the mix, I visualize the institutions as an imaginary triangular
plane with the three ideal types (i.e., market, state, and commons) as the limits (see
Figure 0.1: The institutional plane).77 In reality, organizations are hybrids that must be
situated somewhere on the plane between the ideal types.78 Given the influence of the
dichotomy, most hybrids must plausibly be situated closer to the market-state axis, but
many institutions will possess some features of commons institutions.79 The terms
market, state, and commons make it possible to talk about real-world organizations and
their features while acknowledging these organizations are never either/or, but always a
mix.

76

To complicate matters further, when considered individually the concepts of market
and state are not uniform and neatly defined either. For example, there are several
different categorizations of the (welfare) state, the most influential of which identifies
three regimes: “liberal,” “conservative” or “state-corporatist,” and “social democratic”
(Gøsta Esping-Andersen). While a tradeoff between market and state explains part of the
distinction between the three regimes, the categories are altogether more intricate and
suggest the concept of state also exists on a continuum. (Nick Spencer, The Evolution of
the West. How Christianity Has Shaped Our Values. (London: SPCK Publishing, 2016), 170173.)
77 Much like mathematical limits, organizations may approach the ideal, but the
institutional ideal is never fully realized, even in the most archetypical examples (e.g.,
stock market, Soviet Union). As ideal types, the institutions of market and state also have
a normative value.
78 Of course, it is possible to conceive of hybrids at the institutional level as well, i.e., ideal
types that combine feature of the institutions of market, state, and commons. To give an
example, polycentric governance systems can be construed as hybrid institutions
combining features of the ideal types of state and commons (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The
Best of Many Worlds?).
79 In contrast, the institutions that are the subject of Ostrom’s research find themselves
much closer toward the commons on the plane.
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COMMONS

INSTITUTIONS
(regardless of scale)

MARKET

STATE

Figure 0.1: The institutional plane.

0.3 A THIRD WAY: THE COMMONS
Ostrom’s work breaks open the dichotomy by discussing commons institutions as a viable
institutional alternative to the status quo institutions, i.e., an institutional third way. Even
though Ostrom herself at times presents the commons as an alternative governance
solution,80 especially in her early work, characterizing commons institutions as an
alternative governance model or an institutional third way risks turning the dichotomy in
a trichotomy. Therefore, it is better to think of the commons as a complementary
governance model that can be integrated with existing institutions, both in theory and in
practice. Ostrom argues for such an integration in her later work, when she discusses the
need to develop polycentric governance regimes (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many

80

Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 2, 15.
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Worlds?).81 This intellectual evolution fits with Ostrom’s repeated warnings against
thinking in terms of simple models when trying to solve policy issues; whether the model
is market, state, or commons.
While market and state institutions depart from the assumption that humans are
rational and self-interested maximizers, Ostrom argues this is only half the story. She does
not offhand dismiss the homo economicus model, acknowledging that oftentimes humans
are primarily interested in pursuing their own profit or welfare.82 Ostrom shows through
experiments and field studies that humans also behave as “conditional cooperators,”
meaning they are willing to collaborate with others “so long as other participants also
cooperate.”83,84 The model of human beings as conditional cooperators is also called
“homo sociologicus” or “homo reciprocans.” As such, the commons departs from a human

81

Polycentric governance regimes combine features of state and commons, but they can
conceivably include features of market institutions.
82 Ostrom is more critical of the characterization of humans as rational maximizers. While
she acknowledges humans may pursue the most possible benefit, they commonly
satisfice rather than maximize when pursuing their self-interest. At least one reason for
doing so is that oftentimes the optimal (i.e., maximal) solution is either not knowable or
not known to self-interested actors, the former due to the complexity of pursuing optimal
outcomes in real-world scenarios and the latter due to the limitations of human
rationality. Ostrom argues the correct model for human rationality is that of “bounded
rationality” (Hebert Simon) rather than perfect rationality. The work of Kahneman on
human decision-making, among others, the role of heuristics and biases, can be situated
in the same context (see footnote 9). (Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker,
Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006),
34-35, 215-218.)
83 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 54.
84 A more detailed characterization is the following, “Conditional cooperators are
individuals who are willing to initiate cooperative action when they estimate others will
reciprocate and to repeat these actions as long as a sufficient proportion of the others
involved reciprocate.” (Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social
Norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 142.)
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model that allows for spontaneous or emergent cooperation between actors, rather than
“coerced cooperation” between rational egoists, whether through the use of incentives
(market) or through the exercise of authority (state). While market and state institutions
must be situated at the micro- and macro-level respectively, I situate commons
institutions at the meso-level, where they open up a space for conditional cooperators to
collaborate with one another, among others, on resource allocation issues like the
governance of scarce health care resources. This is precisely the way in which the
commons presents a distinct alternative, or third way, vis-à-vis the status quo institutions.
However, much like concrete market and state organizations are hybrids, adopting
elements from the ideal types of both market and state, commons organizations are
hybrids as well, as they incorporate features of market and state.85 In other words, the
meso-level at which emergent cooperation can take place does not operate in isolation,
but depends on and incorporates the micro- and macro-level (i.e., market and state
features respectively). Formulating the ideal types and their loci in this manner allows for
another visualization of the ideal types as existing on a continuum (see Figure 0.2: The
market-commons-state continuum). While state and market institutions depart form the
assumption that homo economicus must somehow be “forced” to cooperate, the

85

Staunch advocates of the commons paradigm may argue that there is such a thing as a
“pure” commons organization, i.e., one that does not incorporate features of market and
state. I believe, however, that is a difficult position to maintain. Commons organization
seem to incorporate certain state-like features by design (e.g., use of monitors, layered
system of rules) and, depending on how one defines the market ideal type, they also
appear to adopt certain market features (e.g., use of incentives).
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commons opens up a crucial space in between for emergent collaboration among
conditional cooperators.

MACRO-LEVEL

STATE

AUTHORITY

MESO-LEVEL

COMMONS

COOPERATION

MICRO-LEVEL

MARKET

COMPETITION

Figure 0.2: The market-commons-state continuum.

The three institutional ideal types have distinct features, but can interact with one
another in complex ways within concrete organizations. Within this constellation, the
adoption of the commons ideal allows organizations to build in explicitly the opportunity
for emergent cooperation. Thus, commons institutions are also called “self-governance
regimes” or “self-governed systems,” because they emerge at the middle-level as a result
of bottom-up cooperation by the organizations’ members, who play a key role in their
management.86 As such, the commons model empowers private individuals to solve their
own collective action problems, particularly the governance of scarce resources, by self-

86

This goes back to questions about the origins of social order: does there need to be an
“orderer” or can social order also arise spontaneously? (Jacob Levy, Rationalism,
Pluralism, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University 2015), 36-37.) Commons research
shows order can indeed arise without a Leviathan.
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organizing into commons organizations.87 A more detailed discussion of commons
institutions is to follow (see 2.3 Commons Institutions).
For now, it is important to note the commons are a resource management system
rather than an ownership system,88 as the latter is akin to communism, i.e., the public or
common ownership of all property.89 As such, the commons model can be adopted by
market and state organizations. Adding commons to the institutional mix provides
policymakers with a broader range of institutional solutions to tackle resource
governance issues. Using Ostrom’s criteria for the evaluation of institutional
performance,90 the aim is to design organizations that allow for the most equitable,

87

For example, Ostrom citing Sugden: “Most modern economic theory describes a world
presided over by a government (not, significantly, by governments), and sees this world
through the government’s eyes. The government is supposed to have the responsibility,
the will and the power to restructure society in whatever way maximizes social welfare;
like the US Cavalry in a good Western, the government stands ready to rush to the rescue
whenever the market ‘fails’, and the economist’s job is to advise it on when and how to
do so. Private individuals, in contrast, are credited with little or no ability to solve
collective problems among themselves. This makes for a distorted view of some
important economic and political issues.” (Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 417.)
88 Most commons research focuses on the management of natural resources that are not
owned by anyone or nominally owned by the state, or a private actor, but the ownership
rights are not exercised and/or the resource is not actively managed by the owner (e.g.,
a forest that is owned by the state but used by a local community who have set up a
governance regime to manage the resource).
89 Cooperatives, in which users share ownership of the organization and its resources, are
a particular type of commons where management and ownership overlap.
90 Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge
Commons,” in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice, ed.
Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 61-68.
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efficient, sustainable,91 and effective92 management of resources.93 A few remarks are in
place: First, the criteria are external to the meso-level analysis, meaning they are
applicable to all real-world organizations, regardless which of the ideal types they most
closely resemble. Second, Ostrom also uses “robustness” as a criterion,94 which at times
seems to be used as an overarching concept to evaluate institutional performance,95 but
in other places appears to be used as a synonym for sustainability. Third, sustainability
and robustness are central notions in commons research, probably because of the field’s
historical emphasis on the governance of natural resources. The concepts can refer to the
sustainability of the resources themselves as well as to the robustness of the organization
managing the resources.96 The former is close to the everyday usage of the term
sustainable, referring to the long-term availability and viability of the resources (e.g., fish,
water, money). The latter refers to the ability of organizations to adapt over time in
response to changing circumstances (e.g., environmental changes, new technology,
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Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern, “The Drama of the
Commons,” in The Drama of the Commons. Committee on the Human Dimensions of
Global Change, ed. Elinor Ostrom et al. (Washington: National Academy Press, 2002), 2526.
92 Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 436.
93 Ostrom often highlights equity, efficiency, and sustainability as key evaluative criteria
for assessing institutional performance. (See, among others, Dietz, Dolšak, Ostrom, Stern,
“The Drama of the Commons,” 25-26.) She mentions effectiveness as an evaluative
criterion in her Nobel Prize Lecture. (Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 436.)
94 Elinor Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have We
Learned?” in Property Rights and Land Policies, ed. Gregory Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong
(Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009), 31.
95 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 258.
96 The terms are not quite used as synonyms in the literature. Both sustainability and
robustness are utilized in reference to institutions, while in reference to resources
preference is given to the term sustainable.
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ageing populations).97 Robust organizations are a precondition to ensure the
sustainability of scarce resources over time.98 Fourth, with the exception of sustainability
and robustness, Ostrom does not develop or explain the evaluative criteria in much detail.
Which begs the question, what does it mean for an organization to be just, efficient, and
effective? Ostrom may not develop the criteria in more detail because within the scope
of commons research it plausibly is up to the members of a commons institution to fill in
the evaluative criteria. Alternatively, she may simply find a comprehensive discussion of
the criteria outside of the scope of her research. Of course, Ostrom’s silence on the topic
does not imply there are no general standards for these criteria, i.e., external to a
concrete commons organization, particularly in the case of justice. Philosophers can
develop and elucidate the criterion of equitableness (see 4.4.2.1 A Theory of Justice for
the Commons), while concepts from NIE can help philosophers reflect on justice (see 4.
A4R in Practice), making the topic of justice one of the most promising interfaces between
philosophy and NIE. Finally, striving for the most equitable, efficient, sustainable,99 and
effective100 institutional solution is easier said than done. While the criteria can
conceivably be maximized in experimental settings, given that one can agree on a
definition of each criterion, in real-world scenarios it is impossible to determine whether
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A good example of the ability of organizations to adapt to changing circumstances is
the (in)ability to reform health care systems in response to changes like the introduction
of expensive new health care technologies.
98 Robust organizations are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the sustainability
of scarce resources, as certain changes can conceivably destroy the available resources
regardless how robust the institution managing them (e.g., natural disaster, war).
99 Dietz, Dolšak, Ostrom, Stern, “The Drama of the Commons,” 25-26.
100 Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 436.
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institutions perform optimally. Moreover, tradeoffs plausibly exist between the different
criteria (e.g., the most efficient organization is not the most just,101 increasing equitability
lowers efficiency). Therefore, in practice institutional design is a matter of satisficing
rather than maximizing, i.e., finding a satisfactory solution rather than the optimal
solution. Of course, this does not preclude institutional designers from experimenting in
order to find better institutional solutions. On the contrary, Ostrom encourages ongoing
institutional experiments (see 4.3 Institutional Experiments).
Again, the goal is to move past the trichotomy and toward organizational hybrids
that combine features of market, state, and commons institutions (see 4.5 Polycentricity:
The Best of Many Worlds?). The reasoning is such organizations will perform better with
regards to the criteria to evaluate institutional performance. While I will not show directly
that adding commons to the institutional mix indeed results in better performing
institutions, the arguments developed over the course of the coming chapters can be
connected to the criteria for the evaluation of institutional performance. To give an
example, organizations that are able to avoid a tragedy of the health care commons (see
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For example, depending on how efficiency and justice are defined, the “principle of
efficiency” (welfare economics) and the “difference principle” (Rawls) are at odds with
one another. The principle of efficiency states an efficient arrangement is one where
nobody’s welfare can be improved without reducing someone else’s welfare (Pareto
optimal), while the difference principle requires socioeconomic inequalities must be
arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. (Norman
Daniels, Just Health (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 54.) Despite its name,
the principle of efficiency can also be conceived as a principle of justice.
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1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons) ensure the sustainability of the available
resources.102
0.4 THE DOUBLE AIM OF THE PROJECT
The reach of the current project is ambitious, attempting to bridge several burgeoning
fields of inquiry and developed bodies of literature. In order to provide focus to the work’s
arguments, I formulate two aims or theses. After each thesis statement, I briefly discuss
the aim, and relate it to the contributions in the following chapters. Where the first thesis
emphasizes the relevance of NIE/commons research to biomedical ethics, the second
thesis centers on the value of bioethics to commons research.

Thesis 1: I argue that NIE in general and commons research in particular are
valuable to bioethics for at least two reasons: (1) NIE and commons research
provide a language and concepts to talk and think about health care institutions.
(2) Commons research can further key debates in biomedical ethics by showing
he potential of emergent cooperation among resource users as a way to manage
scarce health care resources.

The first thesis breaks down into two major contributions. (1) NIE and commons
research provide a theoretical language to think and talk about health care institutions in

102 Similarly, the ability of the commons to generate parallel institutional experiments (see

3. The Polycentric Experiment) and to promote institutional change plausibly lead to more
efficient, effective, and robust institutions. To give another example, Daniels’s account of
justice in health care aims to create more just health care institutions (see 4. A4R in
Practice).
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bioethics.103 The language of NIE provides a high-level, abstract conceptual framework to
think about health care at all levels of organization, e.g., interpersonal interactions, small
group practices, hospitals, concrete health care systems, and abstract health care
institutions. Currently, biomedical ethics and philosophy of health care lack such a
language. Organizational ethics usually considers concrete examples of organizations, for
example, a hospital, insurer, and so on.104,105 Bioethics can benefit from the abstract
account of institutions NIE provides. NIE supplies a language to discuss and conceptualize
health care organizations in more general and precise terms.106 I present some of the
basic concepts of NIE in the introduction (see 0.5 A Glossary of Commons Terms). Later, I
provide a detailed, critical discussion of Ostrom’s main conceptual tools in the context of
health care, i.e., the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the
design principles of successful commons (see 2. Ostrom’s Black Bag). My analysis of
Ostrom’s conceptual tools is an important contribution this dissertation makes to both
commons research and bioethics. My discussion of the design principles is the most
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In the context of knowledge commons, David Bollier talks about “the commons as a
new language.” (David Bollier, “The Growth of the Commons Paradigm,” in Understanding
Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, ed. Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2011), 31-34.)
104 See, for example: Rosamond Rhodes and James J. Strain, “Trust and Transforming
Medical Institutions,” Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 9, no. 2 (April 2000): 205.
105 To give another example, “The design of organizations is examined by taking the
example of how professional associations might be structured. The structure of systems
is examined by looking at how an office of organizational integrity works in a corporation.
The structure of the medical institution in general receives the greatest focus and is
examined by looking at the webs of interaction among healthcare entities.” (Linda
Emanuel, “Ethics and the Structures of Healthcare,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare
Ethics 9, no. 2 (April 2000): 151.)
106 NIE and the language of rules can be seen as a socioeconomic metaphysics, as they
describe much of our social reality.
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comprehensive available in the literature. By applying Ostrom’s principles to health care,
I develop a series of concrete suggestions for the design of successful cooperative health
care institutions. The concepts of parallel experimentation and polycentricity to health
care. My criticism and refinement of these concepts goes beyond what is currently
available and it makes a contribution to the commons literature. Moreover, I develop and
criticize these concepts beyond what is currently available in the commons literature (see
3. The Polycentric Experiment).
(2) In addition to the value of the language and apparatus of NIE for theorizing
health care institutions, commons research has the potential to further longstanding
debates in biomedical ethics, particularly when it comes to the challenges surrounding
the governance of scarce health care resources. The idea that health care may be at risk
of suffering a tragedy of the commons has been around since the publication of Garrett
Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons (1968), but most discussions have been limited to
straightforward arguments from analogy. A systematic discussion of the possibility of a
tragedy of the health care commons, providing arguments in favor of such a tragedy and
considering objections against it, has been notably absent from the literature until now
(see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons). I fill that gap. I then apply Ostrom’s
work to Daniels’ theory of justice for health care and the accompanying accountability for
reasonableness (A4R) approach, which is arguably the single most influential account for
the just allocation of health care resources in the bioethics literature (see 4. A4R in
Practice). Relying on NIE, I explore and develop the institutionalist ideas that are the
implicit starting point of Daniels’ project. Furthermore, I show that the four conditions of
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the A4R approach can be interpreted as institutional design principles. My overarching
argument is that Daniels recognizes the need to cooperate when governing health care
resources, but does not fully appreciate the role the institutional meso-level can play in
realizing his approach, instead reverting to the state (macro-level) for implementation. I
argue that the commons provides Daniels with an institutional arrangement that is
particularly suitable to put his approach to resource allocation into practice.

Thesis 2: I provide a philosophical and normative analysis that advances NIE and
commons research. I do this by: (1) Providing a philosophical analysis of crucial
terms integral to commons research. (2) Commons researchers have a
normative perspective they do not explicitly theorize and justify. They also have
“equity” as an explicit criterion for evaluating commons solutions, yet fail to
clarify this criterion. I draw on the bioethics literature on justice to fill this gap.

The second thesis can be broken down in the following contributions: (1) As a
relatively young field of inquiry, commons research stands to benefit from philosophical
reflection on its key concepts and arguments. In the introduction, I conceptually analyze
some of commons research’s key terms; particularly when looking at the concepts of
institution, organization, and resources (see 0.5 A Glossary of Commons Terms). The
detailed discussion of the design principles of successful commons institutions critically
assesses the principles and the relationships between them. Such an analytical treatment
of the design principles has been notably absent from the commons literature (see 2.6
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The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions). In the third chapter, I rely on
Jacob Levy’s work on the pluralist tradition in liberalism to illustrate the importance of
meso-level institutions in safeguarding the diversity needed for health care systems that
are fully responsive to local needs and values (see 3.4 Pluralism and Freedom in Health
Care). Levy’s arguments can provide the basis for a normative argument in favor of health
care commons in particular and commons in general. I evaluate Ostrom’s proposal to
develop polycentric governance regimes (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many
Worlds?).
(2) Commons researchers make normative claims and have a normative
perspective they do not explicitly thematize, and critically evaluate or defend. Bioethics
can aide in the development of undertheorized areas of commons research. In particular,
biomedical ethics can supply the commons with an account of justice. While Ostrom lists
equity as one of the key criteria for the evaluation of institutional performance, she does
not develop the criterion of justice in her work. Given that questions of fairness are linked
to the success of commons institutions, Ostrom must provide more in terms of a
clarification or specification of the criterion of justice than she currently does. Daniels’
theory of justice for health care, based on the seminal work of John Rawls, can provide
Ostrom with an account of justice that is a good fit for her project, thus remedying a key
weakness of commons research (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for the Commons?).
Moreover, the conditions of the A4R approach can be interpreted as four additional
institutional design principles for the development of just (commons) institutions (see
4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles).
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While I present Thesis 1 and Thesis 2 as separate, they are complementary. The
underlying idea, and overarching aim, is to show that commons research and biomedical
ethics can both benefit from an intellectual cross-fertilization. As such, the project is
pervaded by an additional general aim: I want to extend an invitation to apply the
language of NIE to health care in order to “learn to see the commons” in health care.107
Ostrom did not invent the commons, but identified and described organizations that in
some cases have existed for hundreds of years.108 Similarly, commons organizations must
be present throughout health care. I simply take Ostrom’s tools into a new realm with the
aim of identifying and describing these existing health care commons. To give an example,
Atul Gawande discusses how physicians in Grand Junction, Colorado, “agreed among
themselves to a system that paid them a similar fee whether they saw Medicare,
Medicaid, or private-insurance patients, so that there would be little incentive to cherrypick patients.”109 They also agreed, together with the town’s main health plan, an HMO,
to meet regularly to discuss their patients’ charts together in small peer-review
committees.110 The result of this commitment to jointly manage the community’s health
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Sandy Smith-Nonini, “Conceiving The Health Commons. Operationalizing a ‘Right’ to
Health,” in The Global Idea of ‘the Commons’, ed. Donald Nonini (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2007), 115.
108 Indeed, Ostrom is not the first to recognize these distributed governance systems. To
give an example, the anthropologist Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard discusses the dispersed
political system of the Nuer in his famous study of the Nuer people, who lack central
organs of government. (Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes
of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940).)
109 Atul Gawande, “The Cost Conundrum. What a Texas town can teach us about health
care,” The New Yorker, May 25, 2009.
110 The doctors and the HMO also set up regional information network to share office
notes, test results, and hospital data for patients in the area. (Gawande, “The Cost
Conundrum.”)
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care resources were fewer problems, higher quality, and lower costs.111 Even though
these initiatives at a minimum have certain features of the commons, Gawande does not
recognize them as such,112 making the case of Grand Junction a good example of the role
NIE can play in identifying and describing commons in health care.113 Right now, many
commons initiatives likely go unrecognized for what they are, or are overlooked
altogether.114 As Sandy Smith-Nonini notes, this may simply be “a fluke of
nomenclature,”115 which can be resolved by introducing the language of NIE to talk and
think about commons in health care. But this “fluke of nomenclature” has significant
implications. The language of the commons enables us to escape long-standing impasses
in how we approach health care institutions. By extending commons language, we can
discern possibilities of cooperation that can be used to explain why the Grand Junction
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Gawande, “The Cost Conundrum.”
Gawande may come closest to recognizing the commons in the following statement,
“Grand Junction’s medical community was not following anyone else’s recipe. […] The
leading doctors and the hospital system adopted measures to blunt harmful financial
incentives, and they took collective responsibility for improving the sum total of patient
care.” (Gawande, “The Cost Conundrum.”)
113 The following are just a few other examples of commons in health care: (1) Daniels and
Sabin’s description of the Oregon health insurance experiment. (Daniels and Sabin,
Setting Limits Fairly, 9-10.) (2) Marc Rodwin’s discussion of local health planning boards
and employer cooperatives. (Marc Rodwin, “Exit and Voice in American Health Care,”
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 32, no. 4 (1999).) (3) The aforementioned
Obamacare cooperatives. (Reed Abelson, “Tough Going for Health Co-ops,” The New York
Times, September 15, 2015, B1.) (4) The We Can Do Better (www.wecandobetter.org) and
Health Transformation Alliance (www.htahealth.com) initiatives, which may fit better
with the market ideal type, but nonetheless rely on ideas described in NIE and commons
research.
114 The latter is, among others, a worry in case of informal health care commons. Ostrom,
for example, talks about the danger of self-organized community groups going unnoticed.
(Elinor Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” Annual Review of Political
Science 2 (June 1999): 496.)
115 Smith-Nonini, “Conceiving The Health Commons,” 115.
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system has been so successful, and how others can adopt for their context a similar
commons solution. I want to show the potential of NIE and commons research in efforts
to improve the performance of health care institutions. To reiterate Ostrom’s criteria, the
aim is to design the most equitable, efficient, sustainable, and effective institutions for
the management of scarce resources. Biomedical ethicists and health care professionals
are likely more familiar with the so-called “triple aim,” lowering the cost of care while
improving outcomes at both the individual and the population level.116 Health care
organizations play a key role in realizing the triple aim.117 While the project focuses on
the way commons can contribute to the fair and sustainable governance of scarce health
care resources, commons institutions plausibly can improve quality of care and outcomes
as well (see 5.3 Future Research).
0.5. A GLOSSARY OF COMMONS TERMS
NIE and commons research rely on a jargon that must be introduced in order to make
sense of what is to follow, as certain everyday terms are used in a technical sense. The
foremost example, of course, is the notion of institution. Other key terms requiring
explanation are organization, rules, resource user, and resources. The glossary goes
beyond a mere overview of the terms as they are discussed in the commons literature by
critically reflecting on these key concepts. In particular, the discussions of the institutionorganization distinction and of the notion of resources contribute to commons research.
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Donald Berwick, Thomas Nolan, and John Whittington, “The Triple Aim: Care, Health,
and Cost,” Health Affairs 27, no. 3 (May- June 2008): 759.
117 The triple aim plausibly aligns with Ostrom’s criteria (e.g., improving outcomes at the
population level can be related to efficiency and equitability), but a detailed exploration
is beyond the scope of this project.
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0.5.1 INSTITUTION
In the margin of institutional research, there have been several philosophical attempts to
define the notion institution, which can elucidate the concept’s use in commons
research.118 Goodin notes there is a wide diversity in the way institutions are defined
across disciplines.119 According to him, this definitional diversity can be explained by the
tendency of different fields to “[…] opt for a discipline-based, theory-impregnated
internalist-style definition of the term.”120,121 Instead, Goodin, citing Samuel Huntington,
proposes what he calls an “externalist” definition of institutions as “[…] stable, valued,
recurring pattern[s] of behavior.”122 Such an account of institutions explains “what
institutions are and what they do,”123 but refrains from explaining why they do what they
do, which would require a much more narrowly circumscribed and discipline-dependent
definition.124 Leaving behind Goodin’s language of internalist and externalist definitions,
this first attempt at defining institutions is very general, but such a general definition is
precisely what is needed to capture the diverse range of social activities that we would
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This section’s discussion of possible definitions of the notion of institution once again
highlights the difficulty of maintaining a strict distinction between the concepts of
institution and organization (see also 0.5.2 Organization and footnote 23).
119 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 19.
120 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 21.
121 Ostrom provides a similar analysis in the opening pages of her book chapter titled
Doing Institutional Analysis. (Ostrom, E., “Doing Institutional Analysis. Digging Deeper
than Markets and Hierarchies,” in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, ed. Claude
Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2008), 819-822.)
122 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 21.
123 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 21.
124 One might also say that explaining why institutions do what they do would require an
“institution dependent” and/or “discipline dependent” definition.
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want to deem to be institutions.125 Seen the diversity that exists in (commons)
institutions, this is a valuable feature of the definition. Apart from aforementioned
barebones definition, Goodin also provides a richer definition of institutions, stating they
are “[…] organized patterns of socially constructed norms and roles, and socially
prescribed behaviors expected of occupants of those roles, which are created and recreated over time.”126 He adds that institutions provide constraints that are advantageous
to individuals and groups in pursuit of particular projects.127 John Searle settles on a
similar definition of institutions: “What is an institution? An institution is any collectively
accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enables us to create institutional
facts.”128 Anthropologist Mary Douglas, reiterating David Lewis’ definition of convention,
who in turn relies on the work of David Hume,129 provides the following definition of
institution:

Minimally, an institution is only a convention. […] [A] convention arises when all
parties have a common interest in there being a rule to insure coordination, none
has a conflicting interest, and none will deviate lest the desired coordination is
lost.130

Douglas’ definition retains the stable, valued, and recurring patterns of behavior from
Goodin’s initial definition, albeit implicitly, and she adds the need for “a rule to insure
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Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 21-22.
Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 19.
127 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 20.
128 Searle, “What is an Institution?” 21.
129 David Lewis, Convention. A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1969), 3-4.
130 Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 46.
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coordination” of behavior toward a common interest, goal, or outcome. The inclusion of
the term “rule” in the definitions of Searle and Douglas is important, as it is central to
Ostrom’s definition, or rather her definitions, of institutions.
Moving the discussion to Ostrom, one might expect she provides a more detailed,
discipline-specific definition of institutions. After all, she is one of the most prominent
representatives of the school of NIE. However, Ostrom’s emphasis on the complexity of
resource governance issues, and the diversity of institutions to solve those problems,
already hints at her attitude toward defining institutions. Therefore, before looking at
some of Ostrom’s definitions, consider the following: First, more often than not Ostrom
does not define the term institution in her writings. Of course, it could be the case the
reader is simply expected to be familiar with Ostrom’s work and her definition of
institutions, but that seems unlikely. In her Nobel Prize acceptance lecture, for example,
which is intended for a broad audience that is unfamiliar with her work, Ostrom does not
bother defining institutions.131 The more probable answer is that Ostrom believes it is
neither possible nor useful to define the concept precisely,132 which is supported by the
fact she is not committed to a single definition. Commons institutions are not one
narrowly described institutional solution, but rather a theoretically infinite number of
different institutional arrangements that can vary significantly from one another.
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Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States.”
Ostrom is not alone in her (refusal to) struggle to define institutions. As Turner notes,
there “surprisingly” is no consensus on what an institution is in the social sciences.
(Jonathan Turner, “The Formation of Social Capital,” in Social Capital. A Multifaceted
Perspective, eds. Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (Washington: The World Bank,
2000), 97.)
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Moreover, the status quo institutions (state, market, and state-market hybrids) are not
the monolithic institutional arrangements they are sometimes made out to be either, but
can vary considerably from case to case. Any attempt to capture such diversity with a
single definition is going to be unsuccessful. Second, and a direct consequence of the
previous point, the only type of definitions that can fully capture this institutional diversity
are general definitions. Thus, Ostrom would not only approve of the Goodin’s, Searle’s,
and Douglas’s definitions, but she appears to favor such general definitions of institutions
herself. I now look at some of the ways in which Ostrom defines institutions. In Governing
the Commons (1990), Ostrom provides the following, rather detailed definition of
institutions:

“Institutions” can be defined as the sets of working rules that are used to
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are
allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures
must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what
payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions.133

This early definition is unusual in that it almost provides discipline-specific account of
institutions, particular to Ostrom’s work and impregnated with theory.134 She later moves
away from trying to define institutions in this manner and instead opts for much more
general definitions. The only element she retains from this definition, and that is included
in all later definitions, is that institutions are “sets of rules.” Here are some of Ostrom’s
later and much more general definitions of institutions:
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Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 51.

134 As far as I know, Ostrom does not attempt such an encompassing, internalist definition

later in her career.
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Institutions are the rules that people develop to specify the “do’s and don’ts”
related to a particular situation.135 (2002)
Broadly defined, institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all
forms of repetitive and structured interactions including those within families,
neighborhoods, markts, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and
governments at all scales.136 (2005)
[…] I use the term “institution” […] to refer to the rules, norms, and strategies used
by humans in repetitive situations.137 (2005)
[I]nstitutions refers to the rules that humans use when interacting within a wide
variety of repetitive and structured situations at multiple levels of analysis.138
(2012)
We define institutions as formal and informal rules that are understood and used
by a community.139,140 (2007)

To this last definition, Ostrom and Charlotte Hess add the rules are put in place to achieve
a desired outcome, for example ensuring the sustainability of common resources.141 The
concept of “rule,” central to all of these definitions, will be explained in more detail
shortly (see 0.5.3 Rules).
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Dietz, Dolšak, Ostrom, Stern, “The Drama of the Commons,” 21.
Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 3.
137 Ostrom, “Doing Institutional Analysis,” 824.
138 Elinor Ostrom, “Why do we need to protect institutional diversity?” European Political
Science 11 (2012): 130.
139 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 42.
140 In the glossary of Understanding Knowledge as a Commons (2011) institutions are
defined differently, and even more generally, as: “Rules affecting two or more persons
that specify who decides what in relation to whom.” (Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom,
Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 2011), 350.
141 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 42.
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0.5.2 ORGANIZATION
Institution and organization are not treated as synonyms in commons research.142 On the
contrary, Ostrom repeatedly emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between
institution and organization. This begs two questions: What are organizations? And how
do both concepts relate to each other? Much confusion exists around the relationship
between institutions and organizations.143 I conceptualize the matter as one of social
ontology, and while a wholly satisfactory resolution of the issue is beyond the scope of
this project, some clarification is nonetheless in place. While I consistently try to use
institution and organization as discrete concepts, I believe maintaining a strict distinction
between the two is difficult. The concepts likely exist on a continuum. 144
Ostrom repeatedly points out the importance of distinguishing between
institutions and organizations, referencing North in support of maintaining a strict
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While most commons researchers, indebted and loyal to Ostrom, agree the terms are
not synonymous, there is no such consensus within NIE at large.
143 An example is the following quote from Linda Emanuel, “Key terms needed for this
paper are still used, even in highly articulate settings, in an uneven fashion, with
conflicting and overlapping uses remaining common. In this paper, they are used as
follows. The term organizations refers to groups that can be considered as explicitly
organized collections of people who are cooperating toward a common set of ordered
purposes; many organizations are also legally incorporated. […] this paper also refers to
institutions, denoting a collection of organizations embedded in a set of nonformal yet
traditionalized expectations in society. The term institution will not be used to mean
organization, the alternative use that is also well established.” (Emanuel, “Ethics and the
Structures of Healthcare,” 152.) Emanuel clears up none of the confusion surrounding the
terms, however, as for the remainder of her paper she continues to capture both
organizations and institutions (plus “systems”) under the term “structures,” pretty much
equating all three for the sake of argument.
144 Geoffrey Hodgson argues against maintaining a strict distinction in What Are
Institutions? (2006). (Geoffrey Hodgson, “What Are Institutions?” Journal of Economic
Issues 40, no. 1 (March 2006).)
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distinction.145,146 In Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (1990),
North argues institutions are “the rules of the game,” while organizations are “the players
of the game” (see Figure 0.3: Institutions and organizations – North’s view).147 The
players, i.e., organizations, have to abide by the rules,148 i.e., institutions, but they can
also enact institutional change, i.e., the players can change the rules of the game, at least
in some cases.149 Thus, North claims, the analogy captures the bidirectional interaction
between institutions and organizations.150 North has a broad conception of what
constitutes the rules of the game. Like Ostrom (see 0.5.3 Rules), he distinguishes between
formal constraints (e.g., political rules, judicial rules, economic rules, contracts) and
informal constraints (e.g., customs, taboos, standards of conduct).151
How does North’s influential characterization of institutions, organizations, and
the relationship between them sit with the earlier suggestion that the institutions of
market, state, and commons are ideal types? North’s work stands outside the marketstate dichotomy.152 He scarcely even mentions market and state as abstract concepts in
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Ostrom, “Doing Institutional Analysis,” 824-825.
Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 179-180.
147 North, Institutions, 4-5.
148 In practice, players do not passively submit to the rules, however, as they often behave
strategically; meaning they ignore, circumvent, or deliberately misinterpret the rules.
149 An interesting philosophical issue surrounding the distinction between institutions and
organizations is the question whether rules are constitutive or prescriptive. If a rule is the
former, then it seems like it cannot be the latter. Vice versa, if a rule is prescriptive, then
it can seems impossible for it to be constitutive. In the case of commons institutions in
particular, the question becomes then if rules can be both constitutive and prescriptive?
150 North, Institutions, 5.
151 North, Institutions, 36-60.
152 The dichotomy is notably absent from North’s writing, but commentators have
contrasted his work with that of Karl Polayni, whose The Great Transformation (1944) was
influential in establishing the idea of the market as opposed to the state. (Claude Didry
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INSTITUTIONS =
“THE RULES OF THE GAME”
(e.g., political rules, contracts, social norms)

↕
ORGANIZATIONS =
“THE PLAYERS OF THE GAME”
(e.g., insurers, hospitals)

Figure 0.3: Institutions and organizations – North’s view.

his writings, instead he discusses the role of concrete market and state institutions and
organizations on institutional change and economic performance (e.g., his discussion of
the impact of institutional change in 17th century England on economic performance).153
That being said, the ideal types of market, state, and commons can fit within the logic of
North’s analogy by thinking of them as particular constellations of rules that display
certain features that make the particular idealized set of rules either market, state, or
commons (see Table 0.1: Features of market, state, and commons institutions). Market,

and Caroline Vincensini, “Beyond the Market-Institutions Dichotomy: The Institutionalism
of Douglass C. North in Response to Karl Polanyi’s Challenge,” HAL Archives Ouvertes
(2011). https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs00601544/.)
153 North, Institutions, 112-117, 138-140.
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state, and commons as abstract concepts have a similar status then as North’s categories
for making sense of and grouping the different kinds of rules of the game (e.g., political
rules, judicial rules, social norms). They are useful concepts to understand and talk about
the world of institutions, but they are part of a metalanguage rather than corresponding
to actual rules in the world, which are going to be much more concrete.154 That being
said, the concepts are not identical either, for a notion like custom is an umbrella term
for concrete social constraints, while the concept market as an ideal type applies to
shared features of certain institutions. To illustrate, shaking someone’s hand when
meeting them falls under the umbrella term custom, while constraints aimed at
stimulating dispersed competition can be associated with the market ideal.
While the preceding argument fits market, state, and commons institutions into
the logic of the rules-players analogy, it does not explain how the concepts of market,
state, and commons organization work with North’s influential distinction. What does it
mean to be, say, a market organization? This is where the differentiation between
institution and organization becomes fuzzier than North makes it out to be. To maintain
a strict distinction, the answer would have to be that a market organization is a player
that plays according to the rules of the market game. While such an interpretation is
possible, the issue is that the rules are not just external to the organization. North ignores
the fact that organizations themselves can be, and de facto are, conceptualized as sets of
rules. Business analysts, for example, formalize organizational processes into formal sets
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North would probably argue, with Ostrom, that the concepts of market and state are
much too vague to be of much use. You need to provide them with content first for them
to make sense, and whatever content you give them will likely be context specific.
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of rules, usually in the form of flowcharts. These are the rules organizations “play by”
internally, but they also stipulate how the internal rules interface with the external
institutions. In addition, organizations operate in accordance with their own sets of
informal rules, as is illustrated by the work of organizational culture consultants.155 It is
worth noting that this problem exists regardless of any attempts to think of institutions
and organizations in terms of market, state, and commons. In the visualization of North’s
view, I use a dashed line to highlight the fuzziness of the institution-organization
distinction (see Figure 0.3: Institutions and organizations – North’s view).
If we can conceptualize organizations in terms of rules, then it becomes possible
to think of them as concrete instantiations of institutional ideal types (i.e., market, state,
and commons). 156 In other words, institutions are abstract sets of rules, that can function
as ideals (see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy), and organizations are concrete
instances of these institutions. For example, Kaiser Permanente is a market organization,
taking on some features of markets, but also has certain state and commons
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There are other reasons to be skeptical of the ability to maintain a strict distinction
between institutions and organizations. For example, some organizations are so central
to the rule-making process that they can all but be identified with the rules. Obvious
examples are certain branches of the government (e.g., United States Supreme Court)
and supranational organizations (e.g., European Union). In the context of health care,
some examples may be the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), the American Medical
Association (AMA), and Anthem.
156 Hodgson, referencing Searle, produces a similar argument. (Hodgson, “What Are
Institutions?” 2-3.) John Rawls also distinguishes between institutions as “abstract objects
[…] expressed by a system of rules” and the concrete “realization in the thought and
conduct of certain persons at a certain time and place of the actions specified by these
rules” (see 4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the Special Moral Importance of Health Care). (John Rawls,
A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, [1971] 1999), 48.)
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characteristics. In this sense, the instantiation relationship is rather theoretical, but
organizations can also be concrete instances of institutions in a much more
straightforward manner, as organizations often are required to adopt certain
“institutional rules”157 (e.g., health insurers have to abide by rules enacted by Obamacare,
but two insurers may put the requirements into practice differently, albeit functionally
the same).
The above arguments hardly settle the debate surrounding the concepts of
institution, organization, and their relationship.158,159 The point is that maintaining a
distinction between institutions and organizations, like North and Ostrom suggest, is not
as straightforward as the rules-player analogy makes it seem. Given the persistent
ambiguity, I try to reserve the term institution to refer to (1) abstract sets of rules and (2)
the institutional ideal types (i.e., market, state, and commons).160 I consistently try to use
the word organization to refer to (1) the players of the game, which can be conceptualized
in terms of rules themselves, and (2) concrete instantiations of the three institutional
ideal types (e.g., Kaiser Permanente, Medicaid, Palmetto Health Baptist). At times,
however, I inevitably use the concepts interchangeably, as I believe a strict distinction

157

A bit of an odd tautology within the language of commons research, hence the
quotation marks.
158 Hodgson arguably provides the most thorough analysis of the concepts institution,
organization, and their relationship in the NIE literature. For a detailed discussion, see:
Hodgson, “What Are Institutions?”
159 The issues surrounding the conceptualization of institutions as ideal types and
organizations as concrete instantiations thereof can be thought of as another incarnation
of the philosophical problem of universals.
160 While I focus on the institutions of market, state, and commons; the idea of institutions
as abstract ideal types can be applied to other concepts, say, the distinction between
“liberal,” “conservative,” and “social democratic” welfare regimes.
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cannot be maintained and is, in some ways, counterproductive. This sets me apart from
Ostrom and North, who favor the distinction, at least in theory. But other prominent
institutionalists argue for a similar approach, among others, Geoffrey Hodgson.161 The
gain of such an approach is that it becomes possible to think of both institutions and
organizations in terms of rules, making the language and arguments of NIE and commons
research applicable to both abstract institutions and concrete organizations. To give an
example, the problem of health care reform occurs at the abstract institutional level, at
the concrete level of health care systems, but also at the level of concrete organizations,
like hospitals or group practices. The same is true of issues of justice (see 4. A4R in
Practice), which can be identified and resolved at different scales or levels of analysis, to
use the language of commons research.
0.5.3 RULES
Rules and rule making are at the heart of NIE and commons research,162 which can be
conceived as the study of rules. Rules are the building blocks of institutions and
organizations alike.163 The fundamental importance of rules means Ostrom discusses

161 “Institutions are the kinds of structures that matter most in the social realm: they make

up the stuff of social life. The increasing acknowledgement of the role of institutions in
social life involves the recognition that much of human interaction and activity is
structured in terms of overt or implicit rules. Without doing much violence to the relevant
literature, we may define institutions as systems of established and prevalent social rules
that structure social interactions. Language, money, law, systems of weights and
measures, table manners, and firms (and other organizations) are thus all institutions.”
(Hodgson, “What Are Institutions?” 2.)
162 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 57.
163 As such, rules are analogous to atoms and genes. Ostrom writes, “In some ways, rules
have an analogous role to that of genes. Genes combine to build a phenotype. Rules
combine to build the structure of an action situation. The property rights that participants
hold in diverse settings are a result of the underlying set of rules-in-use (Libecap 1989).”
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them in considerable detail throughout her oeuvre.164 As a result, a study of rules in
Ostrom’s work can be a dissertation topic in its own right. I perforce limit myself to a
cursory treatment of rules, highlighting some of the key features necessary to understand
the arguments that are to follow.
In the context of NIE and commons research, rules are to be understood primarily
as regulations, 165 meaning something persons are required, prohibited, or permitted to
do.166,167 Rules can be formal and explicit, but they can also be informal and implicit.168
The latter can be made formal and explicit,169 but this can be difficult to do, even for the
persons using these rules on a daily basis,170 while to outsiders informal and implicit rules
may go unnoticed altogether. I adopt Ostrom’s term “norm” to refer to informal and
implicit rules. While that term is a bit unfortunate given its use and meaning in (moral)

(Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 17.) Ostrom relies on analogies to biology
elsewhere, among others, when thinking about institution in terms of biological
evolution.
164 See, among others: Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 16-22, 135-215.
165 Ostrom references philosopher Max Black’s discussion of rules. Black distinguishes
between four different usages of the term in everyday language: regulations, instructions,
precepts, and principles. (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 16.)
166 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 16, 18.
167 Ostrom defines rules as “shared understandings by participants about enforced
prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or
permitted (Ganz 1971; V. Ostrom 1980; Commons 1968). All rules are the result of implicit
or explicit efforts to achieve order and predictability among humans by creating classes
of persons (positions) who are then required, permitted, or forbidden to take classes of
actions in relation to required, permitted, or forbidden outcomes or face the likelihood
of being monitored and sanctioned in a predictable fashion (V. Ostrom 1991).” (Ostrom,
Understanding Institutional Diversity, 18.)
168 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 16, 18.
169 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 58.
170 Elinor Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” Journal of Bioeconomics
16 (2014): 11; Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 143-144;
Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 430.
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philosophy, the alternatives do not quite capture the breadth of informal and implicit
rules. North’s notion of “social norm,” for example, cannot adequately account for
implicit and informal rules outside of the social realm. Norms include, but are not limited
to the “generally accepted moral fabric of a community.”171,172 In Understanding
Institutional Diversity (2005), Ostrom seems to limit the use of the term norm to such
general moral rules,173 but overall she appears to interpret the concept more
broadly.174,175 Rules can instill and reinforce norms. Similarly, norms can be turned into
rules, but also play a key role in ensuring and facilitating compliance with the rules. As
Derek Wall notes, distinguishing between rules and norms may be difficult in practice.176
Rules and norms do not necessarily have moral content, as they can be purely technical
in nature (e.g., in case of W the norm is to use diagnostic tool X, when using resource Y
the rule is to register it as Z). The boundary between moral and technical rules is not clearcut, as behaviors regulated by technical rules and norms often have moral ramifications,
particularly in the case of the management of scarce health care resources.177
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Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 17.
Another way Ostrom distinguishes between rules and norms is by characterizing the
former as external and the latter as internal. (Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 430431.)
173 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 17.
174 Ostrom’s narrow interpretation of norms in Understanding Institutional Diversity
(2005) appears to result from an effort to track Black’s distinction between four kinds of
rules (see footnote 165), in which norms are to be associated with precepts. (Ostrom,
Understanding Institutional Diversity, 17.)
175 Ostrom has the habit of carefully and precisely defining her terms in theory, but using
them quite loosely in practice. A good example is the distinction between institutions and
organizations.
176 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 57.
177 The ambiguity surrounding the distinction between moral and technical rules seems
universal. To give an example, many of the technical rules that apply to automobiles seem
172
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Following the definitions of institution, rules and norms organize all forms of
structured and repetitive interactions. Rules and norms “operate so as to rule out some
actions and to rule in others”178 with the goal of achieving “better outcomes.”179 For
example, if the goal is the sustainable management of scarce resources, then one of the
tasks of crafting rules is to change the incentives so that free riding behavior is
discouraged.180 A few things must be noted: (1) The rules that matter in structuring
interactions to achieve better outcomes are the so-called “rules-in-use,” these are the
rules individuals effectively use, which may differ from the formal and explicit rules, the
so-called “rules-in-form.”181 (2) When structuring interactions, context is important.
Institutional designers may want to rule out a particular behavior in some situations,
while they aim to rule in the same behavior in others (e.g., rules for queueing in health
care rule out skipping the line most of the time, but allow it in certain situations, say, in
the emergency room).182,183 (3) Rules change over time, among others, in response to
changes in behavior and technology (see 2.6.3 The Challenge of Technological Change).
(4) Rules need not be imposed from the top down, but can also arise from the bottom up,

without moral content, but have moral implications (e.g., pollution, safety). Alternatively,
these rules may seem merely technical, but are in fact inspired by moral considerations.
178 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 18.
179 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 132.
180 William Blomquist, “Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater
Systems in Southern California,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, eds. Elinor
Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006),
294.
181 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 138.
182 The example can be construed in terms of allocating a scarce resource, i.e., time.
183 Ostrom gives the example of ruling out speeds exceeding a certain limit in everyday
traffic, while ruling in high speeds the racetrack. (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional
Diversity, 18.)
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as individuals facing a repetitive situation attempt to craft their own rules in an effort to
improve the outcomes they achieve.184 This is the focus and essence of Ostrom’s work
(see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons). (5) Experiments and field studies show that rules
imposed from the top down by a Leviathan tend to crowd out bottom-up cooperative
behavior and the rules resulting from such behavior.185 To give an example, health care
professionals in a given health care setting may have settled on rules that help them
achieve a balance between outcomes and resource usage, but a new set of rules imposed
from the top down can void their rules-in-use and undermine future collaborative efforts,
as there is little use in crafting rules when they can be overruled at any time. Moreover,
when rules are devised from the bottom-up, users tend to be more familiar with the rules
and thus more likely to comply with them (see 2.4.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements).186
(6) Last but not least, the foregoing discussion may give the impression that all rules and
norms are intentional with respect to a goal, putting in place constraints with the aim of
improving outcomes. However, many rules and norms develop without intent, for
example, as an unintended byproduct of other institutional changes.187 The fact that rules
are unintentional does not mean they are not important. On the contrary, they can be
crucial to an organization’s success, arguably more so in cases of emergent cooperation
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Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 18.
Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 147.
186 Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” in The Commons
in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptation, eds. Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 22.
187 Norms, implicit and informal, are plausibly more often unintentional than rules, which
are more visible, and the focus of much of institutional design.
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(i.e., commons).188 In a famous example, researchers looked at the actions of surgeons
and nurses in the operating room in an attempt to identify deliberate and accidental
activities with the aim of improving procedures. As it turned out, many actions that
neither surgeons nor nurses thought were important were in fact crucial to interactions
in the operating room running smoothly.
Rules can be classified and analyzed in a number of ways. The paramount
taxonomy is arguably the differentiation between “operational rules,” “collective-choice
rules,” and “constitutional-choice rules.”189 The latter are also straightforwardly called
“constitutional rules.” (1) Operational rules directly influence the everyday decisions
made by actors, 190 whether they are persons or organizations, as they regulate actors
“interacting with each other and the relevant physical/material world, making day-to-day
decisions.”191 Among others, operational rules regulate resource usage (i.e., who is
allowed to resources when and how), monitoring efforts (i.e., who monitors the actions
of others and how), information streams (i.e., what information should be captured,
stored and/or communicated),192 and sanctioning mechanisms (i.e., what happens if
actors do not follow the rules). The number of operational rules in health care is vast.193
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That being said, market and state institutions and organizations likely give rise to
unintentional rules and norms of their own, possible examples are the way negotiations
proceed in the souk or bypassing bureaucratic processes in a Soviet-style state
respectively.
189 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 52.
190 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 46.
191 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 50.
192 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 52.
193 Classifications of operational rules capture some of the breadth of operational rules in
use, see: Elinor Ostrom, “A Method of Institutional Analysis,” in Guidance, Control, and
Evaluation in the Public Sector, eds. Franz X. Kaufmann, Majone Giandomenico, and
58

Changes in specific rules may come about accidentally, say, because a rule is forgotten or
a new one is introduced on the spot, but more often than not operational rules are
changed through so-called “collective-choice processes,” in which considerable time and
effort are devoted to consider changes to the rules in order to improve outcomes. 194 (2)
Collective-choice rules are used to determine who is eligible to change the operational
rules and the specific rules to be used when doing so,195 whether the aim is to alter
existing rules or to introduce new ones. In other words, “collective-choice rules affect
who is involved in deciding about future rules and how preferences will be aggregated.”196
In some cases, several collective-choice organizations may compete to change the
operational rules.197 Through their influence on the operational rules, collective-choice
rules affect operational activities and outcomes.198 (3) Constitutional-choice rules
determine “who must, may, or must not participate in making collective choices.”199 The
constitutional rules define and legitimize the rules used in making policy choices,200 i.e.,
collective-choice rules, which in turn define and legitimize the operational rules.201 To
summarize:

Vincent Ostrom (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 468-471; Ostrom, “Do Institutions for
Collective Action Evolve?” 16.
194 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 525.
195 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 46.
196 Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David
Policansky. “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science 284, no.
5412 (April 1999): 281.
197 Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” 15.
198 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 46.
199 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 50.
200 Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” 10.
201 Seye Abimbola, Joel Negin, Stephen Jan, and Alexandra Martiniuk, “Towards PeopleCentred Health Systems: A Multi-Level Framework for Analysing Primary Health Care
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The participants in operational situations are directly affected by the operational
rules structuring what they must, must not, or may do. These rules were crafted
in a collective-choice situation structured by collective-choice rules (which
participants, in what positions, chosen how, given information, and an assessment
of benefits and costs can make operational rules). The collective-choice rules were
themselves crafted in a constitutional situation.202
The rules are “nested,” meaning each set of rules is embedded in another set of rules that
defines how the first set can be changed.203 Higher-level rules, i.e., collective-choice rules
and constitutional-choice rules, are more difficult and more costly to change,204 thus
providing stability and reliability to institutions and actors (see 0.5.4 Resource User).205,206
The locus of the of rules, i.e., the institutional or organizational location where the three
types of rules must be situated, depends on the level of analysis. Operational, collectivechoice, and constitutional-choice rules may neatly correspond to the micro-, meso-, and
macro-level. To give an example, Obamacare instituted a set of operational rules (microlevel), the result of a policy-making process in accordance with collective-choice rules
(meso-level), itself governed by a set of constitutional- rules (macro-level). However, the
micro-, meso-, and macro-level and the corresponding sets of rules can also be situated
within an organization. To illustrate, a health insurer implementing the ACA has to change

Governance in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” Health Policy and Planning 29
(September 2014): ii32.
202 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 214-215.
203 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 51.
204 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 46.
205 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 23.
206 Rule changes increase the uncertainty that individuals face, as rules “provide stability
of expectations” and rule changes undermine that stability. (Ostrom, Governing the
Commons, 53-54.)
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its operational rules to comply with the new law, but makes these changes following its
own collective-choice rules, which are governed by a set of constitutional rules. The
operational, collective-choice, and constitutional rules can also be conflated, especially in
smaller organizations and commons, where the three kinds of rules and the level at which
they operate can be difficult to distinguish. To give an example, in a small group practice
the operational rules are being used by the very same people who can change these rules
through collective-choice processes, which they themselves govern through control over
the constitutional rules. In smaller and more informal settings in particular, individuals
can move between the levels of rulemaking without even realizing it.207
Much more can be said about rules, but the present discussion suffices as an
introduction and in order to understand the project’s main arguments.208
0.5.4 RESOURCE USERS
In commons research, the primary actors are called “resource users,” which is not
surprising given the field’s focus on resource management. Resource users are “decisionmaking entities […] capable of selecting actions from a set of alternatives made available
at nodes in a decision process.”209 They are also named “members” and “participants,”
which are used interchangeably in the literature.210 I use these terms regardless of the
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Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 51.
For an accessible overview, see: Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 420.
209 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 38.
210 Even though the terms are used interchangeably, they strictly speaking are not
synonymous, as the terms participant and member can be used more broadly to refer to
providers of resources and policymakers.
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governance regime. In other words, resource users can (simultaneously) be participants
in markets, states, or commons.
Participants can be persons, but they can also be corporate actors – nations,
private corporations, NGOs, and so on. Depending on the level of analysis, organizations
are often treated as individuals, albeit individuals that are internally made up out of other
actors who stand in relationship to each other.211 Historically, resource users in commons
research have been relatively homogeneous groups, as small natural resource settings
have been the focus of commons research (see 0.5.5 Resources). In recent years, as the
field has expanded, among others, to knowledge commons, the notion participant has
come to refer to a much larger and more heterogeneous groups of actors.212 In health
care, resource users can be patients, health care professionals, hospitals, insurers,
professional organizations, pharmaceutical corporations, and so forth. A key group of
participants in the context of health care is that of potential patients or future patients,
who are not currently using health care resources, but will with high likelihood be
resource users in the future, and thus have a claim to the available resources.213 David
Eddy makes the same conceptual distinction when he differentiates between patients
with a small “p,” which are people who currently have health problems, and Patients with
a capital “P,” which encompasses both people who are currently ill and who are presently
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Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 38.
Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 48.
213 While health care resources are often used for/on patients, making them the endusers of the resources, the decision about resource usage for a large part lies with their
health care provider, who is the decision-making entity capable of selecting the course of
action. The relevant unit of analysis (i.e., patient, health care professional, or both)
depends on the level of analysis.
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well.214 Who the relevant participants are depends on the issue under consideration and
the appropriate level of analysis.
Resource users can also be providers of resources and policymakers. In commons
institutions in particular, participants often fulfill the three roles simultaneously, as the
members of the institution play a key role in the management of such self-governance
regimes. Within the context of the status quo institutions members regularly act as
resource providers, but not as policymakers, except indirectly through voting
mechanisms. To give a concrete example, patients use resources when they are
diagnosed and treated, but they provide resources through paying insurance premiums
and taxes. Here too, the locus of analysis is key, as a participant can be a user of resources
on one level of analysis, but a provider and policymaker on another.
0.5.5 RESOURCES
Commons research focuses on the governance of so-called “common-pool resources,”
which are natural or artificial resources that are sufficiently large to make it costly, but
not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from enjoying their use.215,216 I discuss
common-pool resources, and what sets them apart from other types of resources, in
detail in the next chapter (see 1.6 Argument III: Type of Good). For now, I briefly want to
discuss the difference between natural and artificial resources, as it raises questions
about the applicability of commons research to health care, inviting the charge that I am
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David Eddy, Clinical Decision Making. From Theory to Practice. A Collection of Essays
from The Journal of the American Medical Association (Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett
Publishers, 1996), 78, 84.
215 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 30.
216 I use the neutral “artificial resources” rather than Ostrom’s “man-made resources.”
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quite literally comparing fishing grounds and hospitals, fishers and physicians. Given the
central importance of the issue, I revisit the question of whether or not commons
research applies to artificial resources on several occasions throughout the project with
the aim of resolving this key challenge for commons research (see 1. The Tragedy of the
Health Care Commons, 2. Ostrom’s Black Bag, and 4. A4R in Practice).
While Ostrom explicitly states her research is applicable to both natural and
artificial resources, until recently commons research has focused almost exclusively on
the study of natural resources (e.g., fishing grounds, irrigation systems, groundwater
basins, forests, meadows).217 Even though the focus remains on natural resources, in the
last decade research has expanded, among others, to knowledge commons (e.g., digital
information, intellectual property, academic publishing) and to urban commons (e.g.,
urban zoning, public spaces, urban ecosystems). Still, while artificial, the knowledge and
urban commons are conceptually close to natural resource commons, which is especially
apparent in the case of urban commons, which can be conceived as the city analogues of
natural resources.218 A possible explanation for the focus on knowledge and urban
commons is that commons research has had an easier time appending itself to these
relatively new areas of inquiry, while it has been more difficult to enter more established
fields, the governance of health care resources being one example.
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The claimed similarity between natural resource, knowledge, and urban commons
requires more in terms of argument than I can provide here, but offers a possible avenue
for future research.
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Alternatively, and worrisomely, the reason commons research has found few
applications beyond natural resources is that there is some fundamental difference
between natural resources and artificial resources. The key artificial resources in health
care, and most other areas of economic activity, being physical and financial resources.219
As far as I know, the supposed dissimilarity between natural and artificial resources is not
explored in the literature. At least in part, the question pertains to the “physical
attributes” of the resources and their relationship to institutions, which Ostrom discusses
on several occasions.220 One difference between both types of resources seems to be the
following: In the case of natural resources, the use of the resources is “predetermined”
by the physical attributes of the resource (e.g., water, fish, fodder, wood), which in turn
fixates (part of) the set of rules for managing the resources. However, artificial resources
in general and financial resources in particular are open-ended in their usage, thus they
do not provide any guidance for the design of the institution managing them. Of course,
the question is, does this matter? The open-endedness of artificial resources seems to
make institutional design a more complex task, as there are more ways to use the
available resources, but otherwise it does not seem to make a difference. As I argue in
the next chapter, the key physical attributes of excludability and subtractability apply to
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Within the context of health care, physical and financial resources may fit under the
heading “social commons.” (Donald Nonini, “Introduction. The Global Idea of ‘the
Commons’,” in The Global Idea of ‘the Commons’, ed. Donald Nonini (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2007), 6.)
220 William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang, and Elinor Ostrom, “Regularities
from the Field and Possible Explanations,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources,
eds. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 2006), 308-315; Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge
Commons,” 45-48.
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natural and artificial resources alike (see 1.6 Argument III: Type of Good). When resources
with these attributes are crucial to the livelihood and/or survival of actors, they can lead
to the sort of emergent cooperation that results in commons institutions, also in the
context of health care. I return to the question of whether commons research is
applicable beyond natural resources in the context of Daniels’ theory of justice.
0.6 A WORD TO THE WISE
Throughout her career, Ostrom never ceased to stress the need to treat convoluted

problems in their full complexity, emphasizing there are no panaceas. I believe her advice
applies to commons research in general and the current application of that research to
health care in particular. “Getting the institutions right,”221 which in practice means
changing the rules to achieve better health care outcomes, is not the silver bullet that will
solve all of health care’s problems and save the health care commons from destruction.
Institutional reform, however, seems indispensable in any solution to the health care’s
problems, particularly the management of scarce health care resources.
Bringing together commons research and biomedical ethics is challenging, as it is
difficult to do full justice to both fields and the complex relationships between them in an
initial exploration. So how to proceed? To use an analogy, exploring the relationship
between commons research, philosophy of health care, and bioethics is like charting the
newfound lands between several more (e.g., bioethics) and less (e.g., commons research)
established areas of study. How to chart the new area? Much like the explorers of old,
one walks the landscape while noting its most important features and how to they relate
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Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 14.
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to one another,222 but it is impossible to chart the entire landscape, especially on a first
expedition. “Inevitably in places the argument is speculative; equally inevitably it will
involve both the caricaturing of distinguished thinkers’ arguments and the oversimplification of a complex reality.”223 The result is a wealth of future research
opportunities.

222 French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard discusses the relationship between different

discourses by comparing them to a ship navigating an archipelago, sailing from one island
to the next, and presenting to one island what it finds on the other. (Jean-François
Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Translated by Georges Van Den Abbeele.
Theory and History of Literature 46 (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1988), 130131.)
223 Julian Le Grand, “Knights, Knaves, or Pawns? Human Behaviour and Social Policy,”
Journal of Social Policy 26, no. 2 (1997): 150.
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CHAPTER 1
THE TRAGEDY OF THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS
“Let me here remind you that the essence
of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It
resides in the solemnity of the
remorseless working of things.”1,2
- Alfred North Whitehead -

1.1 INTRODUCTION
Drawing an analogy between a fictional group of herders trying to keep as many cattle as
possible on a common pasture and the use of scarce healthcare resources by health care
actors, like health care professionals and (future) patients, may seem farfetched and even
ill-conceived.3 Nevertheless, I will argue the analogy does not only hold, but suggests a
new approach to the issue of managing scarce health care resources.4

1 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Simon and Schuster,

[1925] 1997), 10.
2 Garrett Hardin cites Whitehead in The Tragedy of the Commons. (Garrett Hardin, “The
Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, no. 3859 (December 1968): 1244.)
3 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244.
4 While I focus on resource usage, and thus on the lowering of health care expenditures,
the challenge of governing scarce resources is inextricably linked to the challenge of
improving health outcomes. If resources are finite, and there is an opportunity cost to any
particular allocation, then the choice to allocate resources in one way rather than another
translates to differences in outcomes. Similarly, inefficiencies in the management of
health care resources affect health outcomes. Improvements in the governance of health
care resources can improve outcomes, both at the population and the individual level.
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Using Hardin’s seminal paper The Tragedy of the Commons (1968) as a starting
point, I present three arguments for treating health care as a commons and health care
resources as common-pool resources: First, I discuss the plausibility of applying Hardin’s
overgrazing scenario to health care, refuting four objections against doing so. Second, I
show game theory provides further support for the analogy. Finally, health care resources
possess the key characteristics of common-pool resources, making health care a
commons. I conclude health care is plausibly heading toward a tragedy of the health care
commons and point toward commons research, pioneered by Ostrom, the first woman
to win the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, as offering a novel set of tools to
avert this tragedy (see 2. Ostrom’s Black Bag).5
The argument presented here is the most detailed discussion of the possibility of
a tragedy of the health care commons available in the literature. As such, the chapter
provides important contributions to both health care research broadly conceived (e.g.,
bioethics, health care economics) and commons research. While the application of the
tragedy of the commons to health care has appealed to researchers ever since the
publication of Hardin’s influential paper, most discussions do not go beyond a loose
analogy between Hardin’s herders and health care. In this chapter, a more systematic
consideration of the tragedy in health care is provided with explicit responses to
objections that may be posed to interpreting health care as a commons. Until now,

5 Ostrom was the only woman to win the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences until

2019, when Esther Duflo received the prize for her research on poverty alleviation.
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commons researchers have done little in terms of expanding their arguments into the
realm of health care. I fill that gap.
1.2 A TRAGEDY OF THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS?
In health care, the challenge of governing scarce resources becomes most apparent in the
continuous increase in health care expenditures across the developed world.6 The United
States, by far the biggest spender, spent over three-and-a-half trillion dollars on health
care in 2018, which amounts to 17.7 percent of the country’s gross domestic product
(GDP). More importantly, and more worryingly, the growth of health spending has been
outrunning the growth of the GDP over the past decades, the period from 2010 to 2013
being a notable exception.7 However, the growth in health care expenditures is projected
to once again outpace the growth in GDP over the next decade at an estimated 0.8
percent per year, causing health care’s share of the GDP to rise to 19.4 percent by 2027.8
While other developed countries’ health care expenditures are lower, almost all of them
are faced with the same discrepancy between the growth of GDP and the rise of health
care costs, the years since the most recent economic crisis again being an exception. 9 As

6

The emphasis on the increase in health care expenditures may seem odd, but
economists are in the habit of placing monetary values on all resources, from hospital
buildings over labor hours performed by health care professionals to even donor organs.
7 “National Health Expenditures 2018 Highlights,” Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.cms.gov/files/document/highlights.pdf.
8 “National health Expenditures Projections 2018-2027,” Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.cms.gov/Research-StatisticsData-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Download
s/ForecastSummary.pdf.
9 “FOCUS on Health Spending. OECD Health Statistics 2015,” Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development, accessed March 10, 2019, http://www.oecd.org/health/
health-systems/Focus-Health-Spending-2015.pdf.
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in the case of the United States, the slowdown in the growth of health care costs is
expected to be short-lived, primarily due to ageing populations in many developed
countries over the next decades.10,11 The growth in health care expenditures as a
percentage of GDP poses a threat to developed countries’ health care sectors in particular
and economies in general.12,13
One cannot have their cake and eat it too is a proverb often heard among
economists. In economics, the figure of speech is usually understood to mean that you
can spend a scarce resource only once. The proverb applies to the use of resources within
the health care system, as resources used to diagnose and treat one patient cannot be

10

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Fiscal Sustainability of
Health Systems. Bridging Health and Finance Perspectives (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015),
29-31.
11 A common misconception among non-economists is that the growth in health care
expenditures over the last decades has been due to a combination of technological
advances and ageing populations. Until now, health care expenditures have risen almost
exclusively due to technological progress and its influence on health care practices, at
least when controlling for time. Over the next decades this is projected to change due to
the ageing of the Baby Boom generation. (Livio Di Matteo, “The Macro Determinants of
Health Expenditure in the United States and Canada: Assessing the Impact of Income, Age
Distribution, and Time,” Health Policy 71, no. 1 (January 2005): 39-40.)
12 Of course, there is no set ceiling on how much a nation can and should spend on health
care. For the United States, economists Robert Hall and Charles Jones have suggested
optimal health spending should be more than thirty percent of GDP by the year 2050,
almost double the current level. (Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones, “The Value of Life
and the Rise in Health Spending,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 1 (February
2007): 68.)
13
There are important differences between the member states of the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). I think it is worth pointing out that the
most notable drop in health care expenditures has occurred in the countries that were
most severely hit by the economic crisis: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Hence, the socalled “PIGS” are responsible for much of the decrease in health care costs, even though
other OECD member states have seen the increase in expenditures fall below the growth
of GDP as well, largely in the wake of the crisis. (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development, “FOCUS on Health Spending. OECD Health Statistics 2015.”)
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used for another. More generally, money spent in one place, say to build a hospital or
hire a new physician, cannot be spent elsewhere. Hence, the competition for scarce
resources in health care intensifies as economic growth is unable to meet the growing
health care needs. A few concrete implications of this evolution are increased health
insurance premiums, the erosion of coverage, and strain on the fiscal solvency of public
insurance programs.14 In addition, money spent on health care cannot be spent on other
goods and services and “every dollar spent represents other human wants that go
unfulfilled.”15 The continuing increase in health care expenditures risks crowding out
other forms of private spending (e.g., iPhones, automobiles) and public spending (e.g.,
education, infrastructure) straining private and public finances alike. In the very long run,
the continuous growth of health care expenditures in excess of the growth in GDP poses
an existential threat to health care sectors and economies across the developed world, as
current growth rates are unsustainable.16,17 A collapse of the health care sector in

14 Peter S. Hussey et al., “A Systematic Review of Health Care Efficiency Measures,” Health

Services Research 44, no. 3 (2009): 784.
15 Loren Lomasky, “Medical Progress and National Health Care,” in Medicine and Moral
Philosophy, eds. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982), 117.
16 I do not use “very long run” in the technical sense here, meaning that all inputs are
variable, including government rules and social customs. However, it is worthwhile to
keep the economic usage of the term in mind, as I will suggest a redesign of health care
institutions to “save” health care from collapsing, such a redesign falls under the very long
run.
17 Of course, the assumption is that no action is taken in the meanwhile to remedy health
care’s expenditure crisis. The demise of the health care sector in the United States, and
other developed countries, due to rising costs has been predicted before, but so far has
not materialized. The situation is reminiscent of the Malthusian catastrophe and the
Simon-Ehrlich wager. In both cases disastrous consequences were predicted, but neither
prediction proved to be correct. As in these two cases, there seems to be a negativity bias
at work in the debate surrounding the continuous increase in health care spending and
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particular and the economy in general as a consequence of rising health care expenditures
may seem unlikely, but the main drivers of expenditure growth, technological progress
and ageing populations, are here to stay.18 Some economists, like Tyler Cowen, suggest
developed economies have picked all the low-hanging fruit and people need to get used
to the GDP growing at rates around 2 percent, at least for now.19 Seeing the two enduring
trends of increasing health care expenditures and slow economic growth, the collapse of
health care sectors and developed economies does not only seem plausible, but may be
inevitable, and thus tragic in the sense that Whitehead uses the term in the quotation at
the beginning of this paper.20 Such a collapse need not be catastrophic, in the sense that

its effects on the health care sector. This merely to point out health care across the
developed world has thus far proven to be remarkably resilient to economic pressures,
the likely reason is that gradually small, and not-so-small, measures have been taken to
keep them from collapsing.
18 Technological advances can also lower costs, specifically in the case of a particular
technology that makes a procedure cheaper and leads to better outcomes. Moreover,
new technologies can often find other applications over time. Looking at technological
progress in general, however, it seems that technology’s primary impact on expenditures
is increasing them. Much is expected from health information technology (HIT) as a
technology that can lower the cost of health care as a whole, for example through the use
of electronic health records, especially in the United States, but the use of HIT requires a
large initial investment and considerable operating costs, while savings are uncertain and
realized in the future. (Gerard F. Anderson, Bianca K. Frogner, Roger A. Johns, and Uwe E.
Reinhardt, “Health Care Spending and Use of Information Technology in OECD Countries,”
Health Affairs 25, no. 3 (May-June 2006).) In addition, there is the risk that HIT becomes
an end in itself rather than a means to an end, namely reducing costs and improving
outcomes.
19 Tyler Cowen, The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All the Low-Hanging Fruit of
Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better (New York: Dutton, 2011).
20 In developed nations, a collapse of the health care sector is only imaginable if the
economy as a whole founders, as the bankruptcy of one is the only thing that would
plausibly lead to the demise of the other and vice versa. Similarly, when discussing health
care reform Victor Fuchs and Ezekiel Emanuel conclude: “Over the long term, reform is
likely to come in response to a major war, depression, or large-scale civil unrest.” (Victor
R. Fuchs and Emanuel J. Ezekiel, “Health Care Reform: Why? What? When? What it Might
73

whole health care systems and economies suddenly come crashing down, but more likely
is a slow and creeping process, a drawn-out sequence of resource governance issues (e.g.,
drug shortages, inability to pay for new technologies) and quick fixes (e.g., increased
premiums, minor institutional changes).21 The tragedy remains, however, as the overuse
of resources remorselessly threatens the long-term economic viability of health care
systems and economies across the developed world,22 thus necessitating a transition to
new institutional arrangements to manage health care resources. To make the scenario
of an inevitable collapse of health care due to the overuse of resources more tangible and
plausible, I turn to Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons (1968).23
1.3 THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
The collapse of a resource due to overexploitation is the focus of Hardin’s paper, albeit in
the context of overpopulation. I discuss his main example, the overgrazing and
destruction of a common pasture by the cattle of rational herders, at some length
because I will use it to argue for the plausibility of a tragedy of the health care commons.

Take to Effect Comprehensive Change,” Health Affairs 24, no. 6 (November-December
2005): 1412.)
21 See also footnote 17.
22 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1.
23 Hardin’s tragedy of the commons has been hugely influential, but also received its share
of criticism. For the purpose of the current argument, it is worth highlighting the risk of
using Hardin’s straightforward scenario as a realistic model for complex and dynamic
resource governance issues, which is analogous to using contentless models of market
and state as solutions to such issues (see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy). (Elinor
Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, “Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons,” in
Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, eds. Elinor Ostrom
and Charlotte Hess (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2011), 12.) Hardin’s tragedy can
nonetheless illustrate the logic at work in the use of shared resources, making it a useful
simplification.
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Imagine a pasture that is open to all. One can expect each herder to try to keep as
many cattle as possible on the commons. After all, as a rational being, each herder wants
to maximize his own gain. “Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, ‘What
is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?’”24 According to Hardin the
utility has a negative and a positive component:

1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since
the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal,
the positive utility is nearly +1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by
one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all
herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is
only a fraction of -1.25

The rational herdsman has to conclude the only sensible course of action is to keep adding
animals to his herd. However, all the herdsmen sharing the commons reach the same
conclusion and herein lies the tragedy. Each herder is compelled to increase his herd
without limit, extracting evermore resources from a limited commons. With a sense for
drama, Hardin concludes, “Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons.”26 The herders in Hardin’s story are trapped in a tragedy of the commons that
they themselves cannot overcome.27 Thus, according to Hardin there are only two options
to avoid the tragedy, either privatize the commons or have a state-like entity regulate

24

Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244.
Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244.
26 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244.
27 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005), 64.
25
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access to the pasture, providing a nice illustration of the market-state dichotomy at work
(see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy).28,29
Hardin is quick to point out some may consider his scenario a platitude, much in
the same way some might find the scenario of rising health care expenditures and the
collapse of health care outlined above unlikely, but rebuts by arguing natural selection
favors psychological denial. “The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to
deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is part, suffers.” 30 Hardin’s
concern is certainly not new. In Governing the Commons (1990) Ostrom cites Aristotle:31
“For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it.
Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when
he is himself concerned as an individual.”32 She adds that Thomas Hobbes’s description
of man in a state of nature can be seen as a tragedy of the commons as well.33 Moreover,
the standard analysis in modern resource economics is that whenever a number of
resource users have access to a common-pool resource, they will withdraw a larger

28

Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1245.
In his paper, Hardin discusses several ways in which the second option can be
implemented, but all of them require the presence of a Leviathan to regulate the right to
use the commons.
30 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244.
31 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 2. (Ostrom’s quotation of Aristotle is slightly shorter
than the one I use here: “what is common to the greatest number has the least care
bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at the all of the common
interest.”)
32 Aristotle, Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2000)
57.
33 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 2.
29
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number of units from the resource pool than the “optimal economic level of
withdrawal.”34,35
Another way to describe the tragedy of the commons is by characterizing it as a
so-called “commons dilemma,” which is a specific type of social dilemma, terminology
Hardin does not use in his article. A social dilemma is a situation in which everyone is
tempted to take one action but everyone will be better off if all, or at least most, take
another course of action.36 Put more precisely, each individual receives a higher payoff
for a socially defecting choice, in this case adding more cattle to the pasture, than for a
socially cooperative choice, in this case refraining from adding more animals, but
everyone is better off if all individuals cooperate than if all defect.37 Individuals profit from
selfishness, unless everyone chooses to be selfish. A commons dilemma can be
characterized as a situation in which individuals have a strong incentive to use more and
more resource units when acting independently, leading to overuse and eventually
destruction of the common resource, unless they find a way to coordinate their actions.38
Now the question is the following: Does Hardin’s tragedy of the commons apply
to the use of resources in health care? Put differently, does health care find itself in a

34

Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 3.
Ostrom’s use of the term “optimal” is a bit puzzling, because she does not explain its
meaning. Does she refer to Pareto-optimality, meaning that it is impossible to make any
one individual better off without making at least one individual worse off? She refers to
a “Pareto-optimal outcome” two pages further. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 5.) Or
does she mean the highest possible level of withdrawal without jeopardizing the
resource?
36 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 79.
37 Robyn Dawes, “Social Dilemmas,” Annual Review of Psychology 31 (1980): 169.
38 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 80.
35
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commons dilemma? I believe the answer to these two questions is affirmative and I
present three arguments to back up my view.
1.4 ARGUMENT I: ANALOGY
Several scholars have suggested there exists an analogy between Hardin’s tragedy of the
commons and the use of resources in health care. The first to do so was Howard Hiatt, a
physician and professor at Harvard Medical School, in an article titled Protecting the
Medical Commons: Who is Responsible? (1975). Published less than a decade after The
Tragedy of the Commons, Hiatt’s article received, and still receives, considerable
attention, having been cited over three hundred times according to Google Scholar. In
most cases, however, Hiatt’s paper is referenced only incidentally when discussing the
problem of rising health care expenditures, without further exploring the analogy. 39 Two
notable exceptions are an article titled Managing Medical Resources: Return to the
Commons? (2007) by Christine Cassel and Troyen Brennan and an essay titled Protecting
the Medical Commons – Ensuring Adequate Care (2012) by Dale Block. In both, the
analogy is explained in somewhat greater detail, primarily by summarizing Hardin’s
original discussion of the tragedy, but without discussing its merits.40 So what would the
tragedy of the commons look like when applied to health care?

39

As far as I have been able to establish, no one then makes the further connection
between Hiatt’s analogy and Ostrom’s work on the commons.
40 Leonard Fleck falls somewhere in between these two categories. While Fleck does not
simply mention the risk of a tragedy of the health care commons in passing, he does not
flesh out the analogy in detail either. That being said, Fleck nicely captures the essence of
the tragedy when he writes, “[T]hen this is precisely what the “tragedy of the commons”
is about. We all have “a right” to use the commons because we have helped to create it.
We all understand that the commons can be destroyed if we overuse it, but we have failed
to articulate clear rules or understandings regarding what counts as appropriate or
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Imagine any pool of health care resources that is open to a group of users. The
resource pool can vary in size from the shared resources in a group practice over the
financial resources of a hospital to the assets of a health insurance company. One can
expect each user, whether they are a health care professional or a patient, to try to
appropriate as much of the resource as possible.41 After all, as rational beings, each user
seeks to maximize her own gain, asking herself: “What is the utility to me of extracting an
additional resource unit from the pool?”42 In making this decision, the resource user
makes a tradeoff between the positive utility of appropriating one additional resource
unit and the much smaller negative utility of putting additional strain on the available
health care resources. The rational health care professional or patient has to conclude the
only sensible course of action is to extract an additional resource unit. Since all the users
of the scarce health care resources reach the same conclusion, however, more and more
resources are extracted leading to a tragedy of the health care commons.43 Thus,

excessive use of the commons. The consequence is that the commons is overused and
the cost of the commons is persistently pushed upward, despite the fact that virtually no
one wants to bear those increased costs.” (Leonard Fleck, Just Caring: Health Care
Rationing and Democratic Deliberation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 157.)
41 Users need not be persons, but can also be impersonal actors, for example a hospital
department, that behave in a self-interested, rational manner.
42 The user’s gain in a health care context is varied. Of course, improving one’s health is a
central gain for both the patient and the attending health care provider, but especially for
the latter there may be other gains at stake, for example financial returns or increased
influence.
43 As Charles Han notes, the process is reinforced by resource users’ perception of the
availability of health care resources. When resource users come to believe there is a risk
the resource system may collapse, a so-called “It won’t be me”-effect comes into play,
meaning that resource users may want to grab as much of the available resources as
possible before the system collapses. (Charles Han, “Overgrazing Behavior and
Rationality: A Dynamic Perspective,” paper presented at the 26th International
Conference of the System Dynamics Society, Athens, Greece, July 2008,
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following Hardin’s recipe to avert the tragedy, scarce health care resources must either
be privatized or access to them must be restricted from the top down. After all, the
resource users themselves cannot overcome the tragedy, at least according to Hardin.
The analogy has a certain commonsensical appeal to it, not in the least because it
takes minimal effort to adapt Hardin’s example in order to apply it to health care, but
does it hold? I briefly consider four objections against the analogy: First, Hardin illustrates
the tragedy of the commons by using a pasture, which is a natural resource, as his key
example. Moreover, commons research has thus far focused largely, almost exclusively in
fact, on the management of natural resources. This might lead one to object that the
tragedy of the commons does not apply to health care resources, which are artificial
resources, primarily financial resources. Even though the difference between natural and
artificial resources is important, principally because the possible uses of financial
resources in particular are more open-ended, which complicates their management (see
0.5.5 Resources), the logic of Hardin’s tragedy seems to apply to both types of resources:
Hardin briefly mentions the example of public parking spaces,44 Ostrom provides several
examples of commons research applied to artificial resources,45 and Derek Wall discusses
several artificial resource commons, among others, health commons.46,47

https://proceedings.systemdynamics.org/2008/proceed/papers/HAN 105.pdf.) The logic
is similar to that of a bank run.
44 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1245.
45 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 3.
46 Derek Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom. Commons, Contestation and
Craft (New York: Routledge, 2014), 137-153.
47 Wall mentions the Ostrom workshop was given a research grant to investigate health
care as a commons in 2009. (Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 149.)
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Second, and closely related to the previous objection, artificial resources in
general and health care resources in particular can be replenished more easily than
natural resources, because one does not depend on capricious and slow natural processes
to restore the resource. Put differently, while natural resource commons (e.g., fishing
grounds, irrigation systems) are depleted over time, the available health care resources
can be replaced as they are used, and even increased. While this may be true, the
characteristic of being more easily replenishable does not solve the tragedy, but merely
allows for the proverbial can to be kicked down the road by gradually replenishing the
resources to avoid collapse. As the economic figures indicate, the “day of reckoning” must
come, to use Hardin’s words.48 The continuous growth of health care expenditures over
the growth of the GDP requires societies across the developed world to pour more and
more financial resources into health care in order to replenish the resources being
extracted, which is unsustainable in the long run (see 1.2 A Tragedy of the Health Care
Commons?).
Third, while the resource in Hardin’s example, a pasture, is clearly defined, health
care resources are not. As physician James Gaulte puts it in an insightful blog post, health
care resources are amorphous, defying enumeration and always changing.49 The
amorphous character of health care resources makes it more complicated to apply

Apart from a paper by Michael McGinnis, which has not been published and is not meant
for citation, the outcomes of the grant are unclear.
48 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244.
49 James Gaulte, “Is the Term “Medical Commons” a Useful Analogy to US Health Care or
a Lame Figure of Speech?” accessed February 8, 2016, http://mdredux.blogspot.com/
2012/11/is-term-medical-commons-useful-analogy.html.
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commons research to health care, but does not change the logic of the tragedy. The fact
resources are difficult to divvy up or to define does not mean they are not subject to
overuse by rational resource users, even though it likely makes it more difficult to devise
successful policies to protect the resources from overexploitation and collapse.
Moreover, there is a straightforward solution to the problem of dealing with nondescript
health care resources, namely dividing them into so-called virtual pools of common
resources, for example a group practice, a hospital, or a region.50 Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs) are a particularly promising virtual commons.51 Ostrom suggests a
similar approach when she states the need to identify the “appropriate level of analysis
relevant to addressing a particular puzzle,”52 which allows solutions to the
overexploitation of resources to be developed and implemented at the local level, after
which they can possibly be scaled up, rather than attempting to tackle the large and illunderstood problem of the overexploitation of amorphous health care resources in a
uniform matter. The pooling of resources need not be virtual only, as health care
organizations increasingly make use of global budgets. Indeed, the pooling of resources
is a common practice throughout health care, as I argue later (see 1.6 Type of Good).
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Notice that I have tentatively suggested this course of action in the example of the
tragedy of the health care commons by saying: “The resource pool can vary in size from
the shared resources in a group practice over the financial resources in a hospital to the
assets of a health insurance company.”
51 Christine K. Cassel and Troyen E. Brennan, “Managing Medical Resources: Return to the
Commons?” Journal of the American Medical Association 297, no. 22 (July 2007): 25192520.
52 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 11-13.
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Finally, the original tragedy relies heavily on the pasture being “open to all,” and
seemingly owned by no one. One may object that arguably this is not the case with health
care resources. To formulate the objection differently, health care resources are already
owned by someone, rather than no one.53 There are two lines of argument to meet this
challenge. One is to point out the difference between the resources on the one hand and
the form of ownership on the other. “Different forms of ownership can be applied to
common pool resources. For example, a lake can be owned by a community, an individual,
a state or may be unowned.”54 So health care resources can be owned by a hospital or an
insurer, but still be common-pool resources. Another, closely related line of argument is
to highlight the difference between usage rights and ownership rights. For example, an
insured patient might not own the insurer’s financial resources, even though she
contributed to them by paying her premiums, but by virtue of being insured she has a
claim to use the insurer’s resources.55 To give another example, an administrator might
not own a hospital’s resources, but as an employee of the hospital she is entitled to use
the available resources. In both examples the rational user, not the owner, of the resource
is tempted to extract additional resource units from the pool of resources to maximize
her own gain, thus contributing to the tragedy.56 The user of the resources can be seen
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Gaulte, “Is the Term “Medical Commons” a Useful Analogy.”
Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 80.
55 Needless to say the term “moral hazard” is sometimes used, usually for illustrative
purposes, in the commons literature. (See, for example: Ostrom, Understanding
Institutional Diversity, 51.)
56 In the commons literature, the difference between ownership rights and usage rights
is often highlighted in the context of marine fisheries. Many fishing zones, and thus the
fishery resources in them, are owned by states, but the resources are still common
property as far as usage is concerned. (See, for example: Colin Clark, “Restricted Access
54
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as a member of the insurance company and the hospital respectively, a feature I will
discuss in greater detail when explaining common-pool resources as a distinct type of
resource (see 1.6 Argument III: Type of Good).57 Regardless the level of analysis, the usual
recipes to prevent that the aggregate self-interested behavior of members leads to the
overexploitation of the available resources are market and state rules, or combinations
thereof. To anticipate the conclusion of the chapter, and one of the central
recommendations of the project as a whole, Ostrom’s research suggests that resource
users working together in emergent cooperative organizations is a valuable
complementary solution to the overexploitation of resources.
Before continuing, a few remarks are in place about the benefits that stem from
the resources. So far, the discussion of the analogy has centered on the features of the
resources, among others, when considering objections against applying the analogy to
health care. I now shift focus to the health and economic benefits generated by the use
of health care resources. Looking at the benefits generated by the resources suggests two
further disanalogies: First, while the benefits flowing from natural resource commons stay

to Common-Property Fishery Resources: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” in Dynamic
Optimization and Mathematical Economics, ed. Pan-Tai Liu (New York: Plenum Press,
1980), 117.)
57 The fact that the patient and the administrator are members of the insurer and the
hospital respectively is important, because commons research puts a strong emphasis on
the difficulty of excluding outsiders from extracting resource units (see 1.6 Argument III:
Type of Good). I would like to point out, however, that due to the special importance that
is attributed to health and health care, non-members are in some circumstances allowed
to make use of available health care resources as well. For example, an uninsured patient
requiring urgent medical attention will still receive care, and thus make use of the
available resources. In other words, the special importance of health care gives rise to
moral considerations that make it more difficult to exclude outsiders, thus making the
issue of a tragedy of the health care commons even more pressing.
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the same over time (e.g., the benefit of bringing in another haul of fish); the benefits
generated by the health care commons have increased spectacularly over the years (e.g.,
improvements of health outcomes). In other words, the marginal utility of extracting
additional units from a natural resource commons is constant, while the marginal utility
of extracting additional units from the health care commons has increased over time.
While this increase in aggregate marginal utility has benefited patients, it does not count
as an objection against the application of the tragedy to health care. On the contrary, the
fact that the marginal utility of extracting additional units has increased over time makes
it that resource users have an additional incentive to extract more resources from the
pool. Health care’s successes have induced in health care actors the assumption that the
extraction of an additional resource unit will in all cases lead to (much) better outcomes.
Of course, the assumed increase in aggregate marginal utility often does not materialize
when applied to particular interventions, because not all treatments are (equally)
beneficial. Still, patients and physicians all too often extract additional resource units even
when there is only a small chance at a slightly better outcome. The result is twofold: (1)
While the marginal utility of extracting additional units has increased over time for health
care as a whole, this is not true when looking at individual resource usage decisions, many
of which result in little or no additional benefit. Thus, these decisions only put additional
strain on the available resources, but do not lead to improved outcomes. (2) The
continuous increase in benefits at the aggregate level has only been possible because
more and more resources have been poured into health care, as is illustrated by the
steady increase in health care expenditures (see 1.2 A Tragedy of the Health Care
85

Commons?). If the pool of resources would be kept constant, then the impact of these
individual resource usage decisions becomes more palpable, since it then becomes clear
that using a resource unit for one purpose means that it cannot be used for another (e.g.,
treating one patient comes at the cost of treating another). As such, the growth of the
resource pool (e.g., increased premiums and taxes) does not only stave off the tragedy,
but also obscures the necessity of making such tradeoffs. Second, the use of natural
resource commons does not directly benefit other members of the commons, while the
use of the health care commons can benefit other members of the commons (e.g., a
patient visiting a provider benefits that provider). In many natural resource commons,
however, the extraction of resources has a similar effect as in the case of health care
resources. To give an example, monitors auditing a commons (e.g., irrigation system)
quite directly benefit from the use of resources, even in cases where they themselves are
not resource users (see 2.6.4 Monitoring). The presence and magnitude of such ripple
effects likely is a feature of the size and complexity of the resource system rather than of
the type of resources managed by the commons (e.g., fish, fodder, knowledge, money).
A further objection may be that in the case of natural resources these multiplier effects
do not contribute to the resource. For example, a guard being paid to monitor an
irrigation system does not increase the amount of water in that system. On the contrary,
the use of health care resources can feed back into the pool of resources. For example, a
health insurance payment to a physician can feed back into the pool of resources, say,
through a contribution to the hospital the physician works at. However, these resources
flow through different (virtual) pools of resources, but they do not increase the overall
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amount of resources available in the system. In the example, the money has gone from
the insurer to the physician and then on to the hospital, but no resources have been
created along the way. The fact that several actors have benefited from the resources
along the way, which is a feature of both natural and artificial commons, does not mean
the available resources have increased.
1.5 ARGUMENT II: GAME THEORY58
Commons researchers in general and Ostrom in particular oftentimes rely on game theory
to better understand the tragedy of the commons.59 The well-known prisoner’s dilemma
game is used most often to elucidate the tragedy.60,61 The classic prisoner’s dilemma is
modeled as a non-cooperative game in which the players possess complete information,
meaning the players are not allowed or able to communicate with each other and know
the full structure of the game and the payoffs attached to the different outcomes.62 In
Governing the Commons (1990), Ostrom applies the prisoner’s dilemma to Hardin’s
herders in a straightforward game she calls the “Hardin herder game.”63

58

Interestingly, Hugo Tristram Engelhardt suggests that it may be possible to develop a
“content-full secular ethics as a basis for bioethics and health care policy” on the basis of
game theory. (H. Tristram Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, [1986] 1996), 55.) He describes the following tradeoff that is applicable
to the three arguments presented here: “In more general terms, the more individuals
value personal freedom and autonomy over other goods, the more they will regard as
unacceptable the costs to freedom and liberty that come from coordination that does not
increase the amount of freedom or liberty. On the other hand, as the value of nonliberty
interests (e.g., prosperity) increases, the more constraints on freedom and liberty will be
acceptable if the result is greater prosperity.” (Ibid.)
59 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, xvii.
60 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 3-5.
61 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 63.
62 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 4.
63 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 4.
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Suppose there are two herders who have to make a decision about the number of
animals to graze on a shared meadow. Assume there is an upper limit to the number of
animals that can graze on the pasture and be well fed, namely L. If the herdsmen opt for
a cooperative strategy, each will let L/2 animals graze on the pasture. If they choose to
defect, however, each will let as many animals graze as he thinks he can sell at a profit. In
her example, Ostrom somewhat arbitrarily sets the outcomes for the different
combinations of strategies as follows:64 If both herdsmen cooperate, limiting their grazing
to L/2, they obtain 10 units of profit. If they both defect, then they will obtain 0 profit. If
one of the herders defects and the other does not, then the defector obtains 15 units of
profit, while the so-called “sucker”65 is left behind with a negative return of -1.66 In a noncooperative setting under conditions of full information, the dominant strategy, meaning
the strategy that the player is always better off choosing, is to defect, regardless of the
other player’s choice.67 Thus, both herders defect rather than cooperate, the game’s Nash
equilibrium.

64

The choice of outcomes is not arbitrary because in a traditional prisoner’s dilemma the
temptation to cheat (T) must be larger than the reward (R) for cooperation, which has to
be bigger than the punishment (P) for noncooperation, which in turn has to be larger than
the sucker’s payoff (S). (T > R > P > S)
65 In the literature, the term “sucker” is the generally accepted designation for the player
who chooses to cooperate in game where the other players defects, thus being left
empty-handed. The choice of words is intriguing, because it implies a negative moral
judgment of the cooperative player, who is the one making the right (i.e., moral) choice.
More interesting still, there is no analogous term for the defector, say egoist, even though
he is more deserving of a negative moral judgment. Nevertheless, I use the term sucker
moving forward because of its status as a technical term.
66 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 4.
67 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 4-5.
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Just like the tragedy of the commons, the Hardin herder game may seem a bit
forced, but as with the tragedy the emphasis is on the logic at work in the game. Since the
dominant strategy for each player is to defect, two rational individuals will never choose
to cooperate, even if doing so would lead to a better outcome for both players. Ostrom
concludes the prisoner’s dilemma fascinates scholars because, “The paradox that
individually rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes seems to challenge
a fundamental faith that rational human beings can achieve rational results.”68 As long as
the structure of the game is not changed and the players only pursue their own immediate
outcomes as the only value to take into account, rational individuals will not achieve
outcomes that leave everyone better off.69 Fortunately, small changes in the structure of
the prisoner’s dilemma game, for example, allowing the players to communicate with
each other, can lead to big differences in outcomes.70
Similar to the Hardin herder game, the prisoner’s dilemma game can be applied
to health care. The game can relatively straightforwardly be turned into a “physician’s
dilemma” or a “hospital’s dilemma,” to give just two examples.71 Suppose there are two
general practitioners with a comparable patient base of 100 patients each. The physicians
have to make a decision about the amount of resources to use to treat their patients. 72 I
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Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 5.
Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 37.
70 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 69.
71 Other imaginable games are the “administrator’s dilemma” and the “patient’s
dilemma,” in which the dominant strategy with regards to resource usage of two players,
administrators and patients respectively, is to defect rather than to cooperate.
72 The example makes abstraction of the relationship between resource usage and quality
of care (see also footnote 4). The assumption is that overuse is the necessary result of
noncooperation, but overuse can lead to iatrogenic harm, thus limiting the amount of
69
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assume they share a fixed yearly budget (i.e., global budget), with a size of R, which means
there is an upper limit to the number of patients that can be treated with the available
resources. If the two physicians decide on a cooperative strategy, each will use R/2 of the
available resources to care for their patients. But if they defect, each will use as much of
the resources as she thinks she can use to treat her patients. I set the outcomes for the
different combinations of strategies as follows: If both physicians cooperate, limiting their
resource use to R/2, they are both able to treat 90 patients. If both of them defect,
attempting to use as many resources as possible to treat their own patients, then they
will only be able to care for 70 patients each.73 If one of the physicians defects while the
other does not, then the defector is able to treat all 100 of her patients, while the sucker
is left with enough resources to care for 60 of her patients. The basic assumptions of the
game being the same as the prisoner’s dilemma (i.e., non-cooperation and full
information), the dominant strategy for both physicians is to defect regardless of the
other physician’s decision. Therefore, both physicians defect rather than cooperate,
leaving 40 patients untreated.74 A possible objection against the physician’s dilemma

resources a physician can expend on the treatment of any patient. That being said, there
often are diminishing returns when using health care resources to treat patients. The real
challenge would be for both physicians to treat all patients for whom they are responsible
with the best possible outcomes for each patient and their respective medical condition.
73 The outcome if both physicians defect might seem odd, or even unreasonable, but keep
in mind the physician’s dilemma is primarily intended to highlight the irrational outcomes
of individuals pursuing rational strategies. That being said, a possible explanation for the
outcome could be that in case of defection by both physicians, the practitioners run out
of resources before the end of the year, leaving them with only the most basic resources,
the physician’s black bag, to treat patients for the remainder of the year.
74 The temptation (T) to cheat, having the ability to treat 100 patients, must be larger than
the reward (R) for cooperation, having enough resources to care for 90 patients, which
must be larger than the penalty (P) for mutual defection, only having the resources to
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game is the contrived use of a fixed yearly budget. Even though fixed global physician
budgets are increasingly being used, they for good reasons do not put a hard limit on the
physician’s available resources, as is the case in the physician’s dilemma, but instead use
financial incentives to reward and punish physicians that stay under and go over their
global budgets respectively.75 When included in the physician’s dilemma, the use of
financial incentives alters the payoffs of the game, possibly making it more attractive for
physicians to cooperate rather than to defect.76 Notice, however, that many other forms
of paying for physician services, like fee-for-service, in which there is no fixed budget,
remove all incentives for the physician to cooperate, as she can extract as many resources
as she likes in the knowledge the resources will be replenished anyway, driving up
resource usage and thus health care expenditures over time.77 Rather than discussing the

treat 70 patients, which must be larger than the sucker’s payoff (S), being left with enough
resources to treat 60 patients. (T > R > P >S)
75 Global physician budgets can be treated as common-pool resources. I talk more about
this in the next section. (John Hurley and Robert Card, “Global Physician Budgets as
Common-Property Resources: Some Implications for Physicians and Medical
Associations,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 154, no. 8 (1996).)
76 The use of incentives does not necessarily make it more attractive for the physicians to
cooperate, because the incentive would have to be such that the reward (R) to cooperate
becomes larger than the temptation to cheat (T). Therefore, altering the structure of the
game, for example by allowing communication, might be a less costly way to stimulate
cooperation.
77 In laboratory experiments, resource extraction often follows a pulsing pattern, meaning
individuals use resources until there is a strong reduction in yield, at which point they
extract fewer resources. A pattern that is repeated over time. (Ostrom, Understanding
Institutional Diversity, 83.) Applied to the physician’s dilemma, if the game would be
repeated, the disastrous result of the strategy to defect in the first year might lead the
physicians to extract resources at a lower rate in the following year. Since such feedback
in the form of less resource availability due to overexploitation is absent in real-life health
care settings, there is no signal for physicians to decrease their use of resources. On the
contrary, resource use keeps increasing over time, which may eventually lead to a
catastrophic collapse of the pool of available resources.
91

hospital’s dilemma game in detail, which would be analogous to the Hardin herder game
and the physician’s dilemma game, I want to look at two concrete examples to make the
logic of the “physician’s dilemma” and the “hospital’s dilemma” more plausible.
The physician’s dilemma game may seem farfetched, but the idea of physician
synchrony, briefly discussed by David Eddy in his book Clinical Decision Making (1996),
closely resembles the logic of the physician’s dilemma. The idea of synchrony between
physicians, which Eddy believes at least some physicians adhere to, is that if each
physician focuses on the good for her patients, this will optimize health outcomes for
everyone.78 In other words, each physician makes decisions to optimize the good for a
particular patient and combined all these decisions by individual physicians for their
patients, through some sort of invisible hand, lead to the greatest good for all. Two
physicians, both adherents of the idea of synchrony, would decide to defect rather than
to cooperate, after all they believe this will lead to the best health outcomes for their
patients as well as for the patients of other physicians, thus driving up resource usage and
health care expenditures. The hospital’s dilemma can be illustrated with the example of
positron emission tomography (PET) scanners in Belgian hospitals. Ideally, hospitals
cooperate when it comes to the use of PET scanners, which are expensive to purchase
and operate, particularly in a small country like Belgium. According to an estimate by the
Health Care Knowledge Centre (KCE), the Belgian equivalent of NICE, the country only
needs 10 such scanners, because hospitals can collaborate regionally, with a minimum
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David Eddy, Clinical Decision Making. From Theory to Practice. A Collection of Essays
from The Journal of the American Medical Association (Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett
Publishers, 1996), 224.
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impact on patients (e.g., wait times, driving distance). In 2013, however, there were no
less than 30 PET scanners, spread across 22 different hospitals.79 The decision of hospitals
to get one, or sometimes more, scanners can be seen as a defect strategy, whereas the
decision to share scanners can be seen as a cooperative strategy. The example of the PET
scanners can easily be expanded to fit the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma game. In
both examples, individually rational strategies lead to a collectively irrational outcome.
The physician’s dilemma and the hospital’s dilemma are, of course,
oversimplifications. Ostrom admits that the mathematical tools of game theory are
powerful and enlightening, but can only be used to elucidate the structure of relatively
simple situations.80 Even in the case of highly structured but much more complex games,
game theory quickly becomes unwieldy, which is not promising for its application to the
messy realities of health care. I nonetheless believe applying game theory to health care
can be valuable for the following reasons: First, despite the complexities of health care,
game theory can be used to elucidate key interactions between health care actors, which
can be represented as games.81 Similar to the virtual commons discussed in the previous
section, it might be worthwhile to focus on specific interactions in health care through
the lens of game theory. Second, game theory can be useful to suggest policies to improve
cooperation in the management of resources in health care, much like Ostrom uses game
theory to develop policies for the successful management of natural common-pool
resources. To give a very straightforward example, according to game theory, cooperation
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81 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 34.
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becomes a possibility when games are set up to last an indefinite number of rounds.82
Since health care systems are set up to last indefinitely, here too cooperation is a
possibility, at least in theory, but can be stimulated by building long-term relationships
between health care actors. Game theory also shows cooperation is much more difficult
to achieve in large group than in small groups, which suggests the best way to increase
cooperation in health care is to first develop small-scale initiatives and then attempt to
expand them, using the small-scale initiatives as incubators for cooperation. Lastly, and
closely related to the previous point, showing the logic of the Hardin herder game applies
to many situations in health care furthers my claim of a tragedy of commons. The
physician’s dilemma and hospital’s dilemma games show that health care actors need to
find ways to deal with self-interest broadly conceived, which includes fiduciary obligations
physicians have to their patients.83 If left unchecked self-interest has the potential to
destroy the health care commons. The pursuit of self-interest, as in the standard Nashequilibrium assumed in game theory, may lead to a reduction in individual gains in the
long run.84
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Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 54.
Many health care actors are narrowly self-interested, for example, a hospital investing
in a PET scanner because of the financial benefits, prestige, and fear of losing patients to
competitors. However, many health care actors behave as defectors because of their
genuine and longstanding focus on the interests of others, for example, a physician who
deliberately miscodes a treatment to make sure it is covered by the patient’s health
insurance. The latter can be thought of as mediated self-interest, because the physician
acts in the self-interest of the patient. The motivations of the actor do not matter when
it comes to the tragedy of the commons, as laudable and despicable motivations alike can
lead to overuse and destruction of the available resources.
84 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 169.
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1.6 ARGUMENT III: TYPE OF GOOD
A final argument in support of the claim that health care is heading toward a tragedy of
the commons is to point out health care resources are common-pool resources, because
they possess the characteristics of such goods. Traditionally, economists divide goods into
two different types, private and public, where it is worth noting that this division is
consistent “[…] with the dichotomy of the institutional world into private property
exchanges in a market setting and government-owned property organized by a public
hierarchy.”85 In 1965, James Buchanan, like Ostrom a laureate of the Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economic Science, added a third type of good. He called this third type “club
goods” or “toll goods.”86 Ostrom, together with her husband Vincent Ostrom,
distinguished a fourth type of good, which they named “common-pool resources” (CPRs).
The four different types of goods are differentiated from one another on the basis of two
characteristics, subtractability and excludability. Subtractability refers to the extent to
which use by one individual subtracts from the availability of the resources for
consumption by others.87 In other words, the consumption of resource units by one
individual to more or lesser extent removes those units from what is available to others.88
The following straightforward examples illustrate the concept: enjoying a park does not
subtract (much) from its ability to be enjoyed by others, meaning the subtractability of a
park is low, but eating a hamburger implies someone else cannot enjoy it, so the
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Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex
Economic Systems,” The American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June [2009] 2010): 410.
86 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 78.
87 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 23.
88 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 79.
95

subtractability of a hamburger is high. Rather than being an all-or-nothing variable,
subtractability ranges in magnitude.89 Excludability, which Ostrom sometimes calls
“exclusion,” refers to the ease with which one can exclude or limit individuals from using
a resource once it is provided.90,91 Two examples can clarify the concept: it is easy to
exclude potential beneficiaries from using a car, while it is difficult to exclude possible
users from a forest. Like subtractability, excludability can range in magnitude. The
characteristics of subtractability and excludability can be used to make a distinction
between the four different types of goods (see Table 1.1: The four types of goods).
CPRs share the attribute of high subtractability of use with private goods and the
characteristic of difficult excludability of use with public goods.92 Thus, CPRs are natural
or artificial resources from which it is difficult to exclude or limit users once the resources
are provided and the use of which removes the consumed resource units from the
available resources, making them no longer available to other individuals.93,94
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Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 79.
Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 6.
91 At times, and somewhat confusingly, Ostrom describes excludability in terms of the
difficulty, rather than the ease, with which one can exclude individuals from using the
resource. Two prominent examples are her discussion of the features of common-pool
resources in Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005) and in her Nobel Prize Lecture
(2009). (See: Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 23, 79; Ostrom, “Beyond
Markets and States,” 412-413.) Ostrom does not provide a rationale for her choice to
define excludability in terms of the difficulty to exclude potential beneficiaries in these
writings, but the change fits with small variations in her depiction of the classification of
goods throughout her work (see Table 1.1: The four types of goods). I define excludability
in terms of the ease of excluding resource users because it is the more intuitive
conceptualization and appears to be the common usage of the term.
92 Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 412.
93 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 79-80.
94 Ostrom’s definition of CPRs differs slightly from one work to another, but always relies
on the characteristics of excludability and subtractability. Here is another definition: “We
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Table 1.1: The four types of goods.

Subtractability of Use

Excludability
of Use

Difficult

Easy

Low

High

Public

Common-Pool

Goods

Resources

Toll

Private

Goods

Goods

(Source: Ostrom, E., Governing the Commons (1990), p. 7.)

The pasture in Hardin’s fictional example is a CPR because it possesses the characteristics
of high subtractability and difficult excludability. The resources consumed by the animals
of one herdsman can no longer be consumed by those of another and denying herders
access to the pasture is difficult. According to Ostrom and her colleagues, the
characteristics of subtractability and excludability can create commons dilemmas “[…] in
which people following their own short-term interests produce outcomes that are not in
anyone’s long-term interest.”95 Therefore, individuals sharing CPRs potentially face a
tragedy of the commons. The possibility of a commons dilemma and an ensuing tragedy
of the commons makes sense in light of the characteristics. After all, when the users know

use the term common-pool resources (CRPs) to refer to resource systems regardless of
property rights involved. CPRs include natural and human constructed resources in which
(i) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and institutional means is especially costly,
and (ii) exploitation by one user reduces resource availability for others.” (Elinor Ostrom,
Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Policansky,
“Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges,” Science 284, no. 5412 (April
1999): 278.) This particular definition is useful because it highlights the aforementioned
difference between the CPRs and the property rights.
95 Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, and Policansky, “Revisiting the Commons,” 278-279.
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resources consumed by one individual are no longer available to others, they will likely
try to appropriate as much of the available resources as they can for fear they will not be
available later.96 When it is difficult to exclude users from appropriating the resources,
they are more likely to extract resources without concern for the negative effects and/or
without themselves contributing to the pool of resources, so-called “free-riding.”97
As with the two previous arguments, the question is whether this line of reasoning
applies to health care. The key characteristics of high subtractability and difficult
excludability do seem to apply to many resources in health care, which makes them CPRs.
Of course, there is the aforementioned issue of health care resources being amorphous,
so it is not difficult to find examples of health care resources that are not CPRs, like a
physician’s personal stethoscope, which is a private good. Nonetheless, many resources
in health care do appear to be CPRs, particularly when resources are monetized.
The first characteristic, the high subtractability of health care resources, is the
easiest to ascertain, keeping in mind it is impossible for one to have their cake and eat it
too. Resources used by one actor in health care in many cases are no longer available to
others, from a cancer drug used by a patient over the money used to pay a health care
professional to the new intensive care unit built by a hospital, to give only a few examples.
Even resources that at first sight may not appear highly subtractable, upon closer scrutiny
often do possess this characteristic, consider the following example: Once purchased or
leased, a PET scanner might not seem to be a highly subtractable resource, but
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nonetheless is characterized by this feature. The scanner can only run a certain number
of scans within a given period of time, say a year, and each scan costs a certain amount
of money. This means that every time a patient “consumes” a scan, which can easily be
monetized, the resources used to perform that scan are no longer available to someone
else. Of course, each scanner has the capacity and budget to perform a large number of
scans each year, but the characteristic of subtractability nonetheless applies.
Applying the second characteristic, excludability, to health care resources is a bit
more difficult. In the case of most natural resource commons, the difficulty of excluding
potential beneficiaries is obvious, but it seems easy enough to exclude actors from using
health care resources, for example, through premiums and fees. The application of the
second characteristic is complicated by the fact that excludability can apply to the
difficulty of excluding or limiting resource usage by members, non-members, or both. In
a health care context, the problem of exclusion applies to both members and nonmembers. The difficulty of excluding or limiting members from using resources once they
are provided is the most important issue in health care. The following two examples make
this clear: First, once a physician is on a hospital’s staff that physician, as a member of the
hospital, can make use of its resources. Rules need to be in place to keep the physician
from extracting resources, like using hospital money to redecorate her private doctor’s
office, or to limit her ability to appropriate the hospital’s resources, say the number of
certain test she is allowed to order per patient. Second, an insured patient is a member
of his insurance plan and as such he has a claim to resources, after all he contributed to
the pool of insurance resources. Here too, rules need to be in place to exclude the patient
99

from extracting resources, say if he wants a cosmetic procedure, or to limit his use of the
resources, like the maximum number of some test he is allowed to use.98 Putting in place
rules to exclude or limit resource usage can be relatively straightforward, meaning
exclusion is easy, but in many cases is difficult, among others due to the emphasis on
physician autonomy and the special moral importance of health care (see 4.3.2.2.1
Explaining the Special Moral Importance of Health Care). The latter is also the reason why
it is difficult to exclude or limit resource use by non-members. The exclusion of nonmembers is easy in the previous examples, since a physician who does not work for a
hospital can readily be kept from using its resources and an uninsured patient cannot
make use of the insurer’s pool of resources, but in some cases it is more difficult to
exclude or limit resource usage by non-members, like in the case of an uninsured patient
who shows up to the emergency room requiring urgent medical care. Medical staff
withholding cooperation or denying access to medical equipment is easy in theory, but
raises serious ethical concerns in practice, making it difficult to exclude patients from
using health care resources. While the latter is not the most pressing case of excludability
in health care, it is provides a clear illustration of the challenge posed by the difficulty of
excluding resources users. In order to avert the tragedy of the health care commons, the
issue of excludability needs to be solved when it comes to excluding or limiting resource
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usage by both members and non-members. Indeed, excludability may be the key
challenge in managing health care resources, given the unwillingness among providers
and the public to exclude patients from the available resources.99
The problem of excludability is sketched poignantly by Eddy in Clinical Decision
Making (1996). While many in society are concerned about paying for health care,
everyone wants to shift the responsibility when it comes to bearing the costs of health
care.100 A classic example of a social dilemma (see 1.3 The Tragedy of the Commons). The
issue is aggravated by the widespread belief that doctors should spare no cost when it
comes to treating their patients. Indeed, many people find it unethical to consider cost in
the provision of health care.101 As a result, excluding patients and physicians from using
scarce health care resources is particularly challenging. However, costs are real and
people care about them, there is no way to simply make the problem disappear, even
though costs are all too often hidden or disguised.102 However, obscuring the problem of
costs can make it even more difficult to exclude resource users from extracting resources.
I explore Eddy’s argument a bit further, because it sheds additional light on the tragedy
of the health care commons. Eddy discusses that many health care resources are in effect
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as many of the available resources now out of fear they will
not be available later likely plays a much smaller role in health care, if it plays a role at all,
at least as long as a catastrophic tragedy does not seem imminent. On the contrary,
resource users likely believe the system will exist in perpetuity, or at least behave as if it
will. This creates a new risk, however, as resource users believe their small acts do not
affect the immortal behemoth, but the aggregate of all these small actions deplete the
system’s resources over time.
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pooled because such pooling of resources allows to spread the financial cost of medical
care over many resource users. He provides the following examples: private health
insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), and
charities.103 “Individuals pay funds into the pool according to a variety of formulas […] and
draw funds from the pool when the need arises.”104 Thus, Eddy confirms that many health
care resources are indeed CPRs. However, he also recognizes that the pooling of resources
brings with it the risk of conflict between resource users, which he describes as a conflict
between individual and society.105 This conflict arises whenever an individual receives a
disproportionate share of resources (e.g., services), but does not replenish them (i.e., pay
for them).106 As a result, someone else must either forego the resources that were used,
or take responsibility for replenishing them.107 Eddy writes, “many activities in medicine
that make great sense from the point of view of an individual patient may not make sense
when the perspective is widened to encompass other activities for other people – what
we call society.”108 This conflict between individual and society nicely captures the tension
at the heart of the tragedy of the health care commons.
To return to the characteristics of subtractability and excludability, I briefly want
to discuss the idea of global budgets, for example the aforementioned global physician
budgets.109 Implemented on a larger scale, the use of global budgets has been suggested
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as a way to control costs in health care systems in general and in the United States health
care system in particular.110,111 The characteristic of high subtractability applies to such
budgets, as resources extracted from the global budget by one actor are no longer
available for use by another actor. For example, if a regional health care system uses a
global budget and one hospital uses funds from this budget to purchase a PET-scanner,
then those funds are no longer available for use by another hospital. The characteristic of
difficult excludability applies as well, as it is hard to exclude actors from using the
budgeted resources. As mentioned before, it is necessary to distinguish between
members and non-members, where the former have the right to use the budgeted
resources, while the latter do not. For example, an insurer making use of a global budget
must distinguish between insured (members) and uninsured (non-members) patients. A
mechanism then needs to be put in place to regulate resource usage by members. Such a
system is nontrivial, since self-interested and rational members want to extract as many
resources as possible from the budget. Moreover, as members they likely feel more
entitled to the available resources. In addition, the special nature of health care
sometimes makes it difficult to distinguish between members and non-members, as there
often will be a strong impetus to use resources from the global health care budget for
non-members, say to treat uninsured patients. The straightforward applicability of
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subtractability and excludability to global health care budgets makes these budgets one
of the most clear-cut examples of CPRs in the context of health care.
1.7 AVERTING THE TRAGEDY OF THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS
The three preceding arguments help to explain the creeping tragedy of the health care
commons that is already taking place, and indicate a more catastrophic collapse of health
care systems is not science fiction. So how can the tragedy of the health care commons
be averted?
A multitude of solutions have been tried to ward off the tragedy, among others,
the aforementioned moves to global budgets and ACOs. Indeed, governance regimes that
are or resemble commons have been tried as well, like the initiative in Grand Junction
(see 0.4 The Double Aim of the Project).112 Nevertheless, most attention has been given
to solutions that rely on the institutional models of market and state. As mentioned
above, Hardin believes these to be the only solutions, but even before him it was generally
assumed that property should either be state owned or be privately owned, because if it
was not then the assumption was the resource would be abused and degraded.113 Even
today, Hardin’s conviction that states and markets, or a combination thereof, are the sole
solutions to avert the tragedy is shared by many. In Governing the Commons (1990),
Ostrom confirms current policy prescriptions for averting the tragedy of the commons
tend to fall within the state-market dichotomy, either “Leviathan as the ‘only’ way” or
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“privatization as the ‘only’ way.”114 She emphasizes, however, that organizations are
seldom exclusively public, “the state,” or private, “the market,” but most often are rich
mixtures of “public-like” and “private-like” institutions, defying classification in a strict
dichotomy (see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy).115 The issue is that too much
high-level theorizing continues to build on the dichotomy, the challenge then becomes to
move past the bifurcation and open up a conceptual space to think of institutions in more
complex ways that, among others, do justice to the possibility of emergent cooperation
at the middle-level as an alternative to the status quo institutions.
The heavy emphasis on state and market as the only possible solutions to policy
issues in general and the management of CPRs in particular appears to be a remarkable
case of path dependence. A good example is the influence of the aforementioned
distinction between private and public goods, generally accepted by economists until
1965, which neatly aligns with the dichotomy and steers solutions to resource governance
issues in the direction of the institutions of market and state. 116 The sheer amount of
attention these solutions have received historically in academia and policymaking has
reinforced the status of market and state as the institutional models to solve resource
governance issues, but has simultaneously blinded many academics and policymakers
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alike to the possibility of alternative solutions to avert the tragedy of the commons.117
The continuing influence of the abstract models of market and state on policymaking
became clear in the political discussions surrounding the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which
were pervaded by vague and ideological notions of market and state that were far
removed from the complex institutional realities of the mixed American health care
system. As if a set of complex and context-dependent resource governance issues can
only have one of two vaguely defined institutional solutions.118 Because the models of
market and state have an intellectual quasi-monopoly within academic research and
policymaking, they tend to crowd out models that emphasize the possibility of emergent
cooperation between resource users,119 both at the level of abstract institutional models
and at the level concrete organizational solutions (see 0.5.2 Organizations).120
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As the discussion of rising health care costs has highlighted (see 1.2 A Tragedy of
the Health Care Commons?), the current solutions to the governance of scarce health care
resources are unable to manage resource use successfully, and thus to avert the tragedy
of the health care commons. The ramifications of technological progress are one of the
main reasons for overharvesting and possibly even depletion, as the introduction of new
technologies in a system where it is difficult to exclude users from the available resources,
which have alternative and mutually exclusive uses, puts evermore pressure on the pool
of resources. The move from the physician with her black bag to modern health care
technologies has in(tro)duced commons dilemmas that market and state institutions
cannot solve because they are “out of sync” with the capabilities of new technologies,121
meaning the institutions have not adapted to developments in the resource system and
in the environment at large, for the increased rate of technological change is not unique
to health care (see 2.7.3 The Challenge of Technological Change). The challenge posed by
technological progress will soon be aggravated by ageing populations; a problem health
care’s existing institutions likely will not be able to cope with either. The key reason
market- and state-based solutions have been unable to get a grip on escalating costs and
dwindling resources seems to be their inability to find a solution to the problem of

themselves have come to shape over time, making it difficult for alternatives to be
successful. To draw an analogy with biological evolution, bar a mass extinction of
humankind, the rise of artificial intelligence, or an alien invasion it is difficult to imagine
another species taking the place of humans as the dominant species on earth. The rise
and fall of the Obamacare cooperatives fits within such an evolutionary argument (see
footnote 104).
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excludability, i.e., deciding which resource users to exclude from what resources.122
Adding commons institutions to the institutional mix may result in organizations that are
better able to tackle the challenge posed by excludability, because the commons opens
up a middle-space where resource users can meet each other to decide collaboratively
and locally on issues of excludability (see also 1.8 The Commons Solution to Health Care’s
Tragedy).123
Of course, the foregoing analysis does not imply that developed countries must
get rid of market and state institutions as models to design health care organizations
altogether, not in the least because academics and policymakers have built up
considerable experience with these models and their application. There is, however, a
need to add other models to the repertoire when developing concrete resource
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design principles of successful commons institutions (see 2.6 The Design Principles of
Successful Commons Institutions), but the relationship between the design principles and
the characteristic of excludability is seldom emphasized. It is worth highlighting that the
emphasis on rules to resolve the challenges posed by excludability plausibly stems from
commons research’s historic focus on natural resources, for which resource users are
dependent on nature to replenish the available resource. In the case of artificial
resources, however, the resources can more easily be replenished, say, through
contributions from resource users. Thus, rethinking the design principles to apply to
commons governing artificial CPRs may result in additional principles that are more
geared toward solving the problems posed by subtractability.
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governance solution, this to break open the “[…] path dependency of existing patterns of
practice when their accompanying ways of thinking have not yielded results,”124 as has
been the case in health care. Such a move “beyond markets and states”125 comes with
the realization that some institutions work in some settings and not in others.126 States
and markets, or a combination therefore, are often presented as abstract models that can
be applied to and will work in all contexts, but they are not always successful. I conclude
this section with the words of Ostrom:

Continuing to presume that complex policy problems are simple problems that
can be solved through the adoption of simple designs that are given general
names, such as private property, government ownership, or community
organization, is a dangerous academic approach. Dichotomizing the institutional
world into “the market” as contrasted to “the state” is so grossly inadequate and
barren that it is surprising how the dichotomy survives as a basic way of organizing
academic studies and policy advice. Oversimplification of our design options is
dangerous since it hides more of the working parts needed to design effective,
sustainable institutions than it reveals.127

1.8 THE COMMONS SOLUTION TO HEALTH CARE’S TRAGEDY
Hardin, pointing resolutely in the direction of state and market as solutions to the tragedy
of the commons, discredited cooperation between individuals as a possible solution to
the tragedy offhand. After all, he sees the tragedy of the commons as inevitable without
outside interference.128 This assumption, that change must come from the outside and
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be imposed upon rational and self-interested resource users (see 0.2 Market and State:
A False Dichotomy), characterizes both the state and market solution.129,130 Ostrom,
however, is interested in “[…] the question of how to enhance the capabilities of those
involved to change the constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other than
remorseless tragedies.”131 Therefore, she argues in favor of commons institutions, in
which resource users develop a multitude of context-dependent solutions to managing
CPRs through emergent cooperation. Ostrom does not claim commons institutions are
the best, let alone the only, solution to the problem of successfully managing CPRs and
averting commons tragedies. State, market, and commons institutions are not mutually
exclusive competing models, but can be combined into complex and context-dependent
solutions to concrete resource governance issues (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many
Worlds?).132 In practice, many organizations already integrate features of all three
models, but the persistent influence of the dichotomy makes it difficult to recognize or
emphasize the role emergent cooperation can play in managing scarce resources. Instead
of operating under the assumption that optimal rules, whether state- or market-based,
can be easily developed and imposed at a low cost by external authorities, she believes
“[…] that “getting the institutions right” is a difficult, time-consuming, conflict-invoking
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process. [A] process that requires reliable information about time and place variables as
well as a broad repertoire of culturally acceptable rules.”133 She adds that institutional
solutions often do not work in practice as they do in abstract models, unless those models
are well-specified and empirically valid. Moreover, the participants in the field must
understand how to make these new rules work.134
The enduring preference for market- and state-based solutions is informed by
“wrong” assumptions in making policy recommendations:135 First, resource appropriators
themselves are deemed incapable of designing rules to sustain resources overtime,
whether they are patients, administrators, or hospitals.136 After all, resource users are
modeled as homo economicus, behaving in a rational and self-interested manner, traits
that cause the tragedy to begin with.137 Research has shown, however, that actors’
motivations are mixed. Thus, the imperfect model of a homo sociologicus (or homo
reciprocans) is more accurate than the model of a perfect homo economicus (see 0.3 A
Third Way: The Commons).138,139 As with the abstract ideal models of state and market,
the perfect model of the homo economicus in fact holds back the progress of successfully
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managing CPRIs, much in the same way that the progress of astronomy was held back due
to the modeling in perfect forms.140 In the realm of social dilemmas, little empirical
support exists for an assumption that all individuals value only the material outcomes that
flow only to them, which points in the direction of a more realistic, but unfortunately also
more complex, model of human behavior.141 Second, designing solutions to improve
outcomes is assumed to be a relatively simple task best done by objective analysts or
experts.142 However, this approach overlooks the complexities of different contexts and
the importance of local knowledge possessed by resource users, which I discuss in more
detail in the next chapter (see 2.2 The Ostrom Approach).143
Research has shown that many groups of resource users do in fact succeed in
effectively managing and sustaining CPRs if they have suitable conditions, like appropriate
rules, good conflict-resolutions mechanisms, and well-defined group boundaries (see 2.6
The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions).144 While most of these
successes have taken place in the context of the management of natural resources, health
care actors as well have successfully adopted commons strategies (e.g., Grand Junction,
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Kaiser Permanente), even if they were not aware their solutions fit within a new and rich
field of inquiry. The users of health care resources, from patients over physicians to
hospitals, can learn from these successes and rely on them to develop their own
commons institutions to manage scarce health care resources and to avoid the tragedy
of the health care commons. This shows the importance of applying the tragedy of the
commons to health care. Not only does the approach supply an entirely new language
and body of research that can be applied to existing initiatives in the governance of health
care resources, but commons research also paves the way for a multitude of new
institutional solutions for the management of scarce health care resources, and for
keeping the tragedy of the health care commons from taking place.
1.9 CONCLUSION
Hebert Simon, yet another Laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences,
repeatedly pointed out the complexity of designing humanly engineered systems, from
computer over road networks to institutional arrangements. He especially stressed that
no complex system can be fully planned to achieve optimal performance. 145 Applied to
highly complex health care systems, Simon would oppose attempts to apply the “twosizes-fit-all” approaches of state and market to manage scarce health care resources.
Academics and policymakers alike must resist the temptation of being drawn into the socalled “abstract model trap,” sometimes called the “ideological model trap.”146 Based on
the figures and arguments presented in this chapter, the tragedy of the health care
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commons appears inevitable, whether in the form of a slow crumbling or a catastrophic
collapse. The prevailing and dominant institutional arrangements of market and state
appear unsuccessful in their efforts to delay the growth in health care expenditures, and
thus to avert the tragedy of the health care commons.
The goal of this first chapter was to show that health care is susceptible to a
tragedy of the commons, health care resources can be seen as CPRs, and commons
institutions are a possible “third-way” to manage health care resources. In what follows,
I develop a framework for talking about, identifying, and developing health care commons
institutions. The commons should not be seen as a manifesto, ideology, or buzzword; but
rather a flexible template for talking about the rich ways in which the users of health care
resources can manage these scarce resources.147 There already exist commons initiatives
to manage health care resources, like regional health collaboratives, while other existing
institutional arrangements can be analyzed and further developed using Ostrom’s tools,
like ACOs. Eventually, the goal is sustainable health care reform, which does not only
mean that health care resources are managed in a sustainable manner, thus averting the
tragedy, but also that health care institutions should continuously be reformed through
time (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons).148 One approach to achieving such sustainable
reform, an approach that can supplement the existing state and market solutions, is to
divvy up the health care commons into smaller, virtual health care commons that can be
managed by health care commons organizations. Important to keep in mind is that there
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is no such thing as the commons approach, but rather an infinite number of approaches
developed by resource users and tailored to specific commons, small and large. Ostrom
does not offer a panacea, and anyone who does is probably a fraud. On the contrary, she
argues against thinking in terms of abstractly modeled solutions that can be implemented
in all contexts. According to Ostrom, the answer to resource management problems is “it
depends.”
Like the state and market solutions to managing scarce health care resources,
commons institutions have their shortcomings: First, they are not immune to the
challenge of increasing rates of change, for example technological progress, making it
difficult to develop sustainable institutions. Commons institutions do not magically solve
the issues of new technologies and ageing populations, but will have to find a way to deal
with these challenges as well. Second, even though the evidence is mixed, developing
commons organizations appears to be more difficult when the resources users are a
heterogeneous rather than a homogenous group.149 As populations across the developed
world become more diverse, resource users will likely find it more difficult to self-organize
into commons organizations. Third, commons organizations tend to work best on a small
scale.150 However, this should not be a defeating shortcoming of the commons models,
as organizations can be developed on a small scale and then scaled up. Finally, developing
commons organizations requires for conditional cooperators to be able to find each other
through either institutional or spatial connections, because otherwise cooperation
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cannot start, or collapses.151 And there is, of course, the possibility that most health care
professionals and (future) patients behave, and will continue to behave, as rational
egoists.152 Therefore, the success of the commons model requires a shift in behavior from
health care actors, from rational self-interest to collaboration.
Institutions cannot only ameliorate bad outcomes, but unfortunately they can also
exacerbate them, as may very well be the case in health care. However, institutions are
the key tool for fallible humans to enable themselves to overcome social dilemmas and
averting commons tragedies.153 As far as coming up with new institutional solutions to
the existing problem of managing scarce health care resources goes, this first chapter
tried to point out the following: “The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping
from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of have been, into every
corner of our minds.”154 This quote from John Maynard Keynes describes the spirit of the
remainder of the project.
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CHAPTER 2
OSTROM’S BLACK BAG
“Our public men have, besides politics, their
private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary
citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of
industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for,
unlike any other nation, we regard the citizen who
takes no part in these duties not as unambitious
but as useless, and we are able to judge proposals
even if we cannot originate them; instead of
looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the
way of action, we think it an indispensable
preliminary to any wise action at all.”1
- Thucydides II.40 -

2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, I presented a series of classic arguments to show health care is
succumbing to a creeping tragedy of the commons, and is plausibly at risk of falling victim
to a more catastrophic collapse. The chapter concluded by briefly touching upon Ostrom’s
cooperative solution to the management of scarce health care resources. Now, I further
explore commons institutions as an alternative approach to successfully managing scarce
health care resources. After looking at some of the features that set apart Ostrom’s
research (see 2.2 The Ostrom Approach), I consider the issue of defining

1

Jon Elster, “Introduction,” in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998,), 1.
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commons institutions (see 2.3 Commons Institutions). To illustrate, I briefly discuss a
typical commons example from the literature (see 2.4 A Common Scenario). The focal
point of the chapter is an in depth discussion of the two main tools for cooperatively
managing CPRs: the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (see 2.5 The
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework) and the eight design principles of
successful commons institutions (see 2.6 The Design Principles of Successful Commons
Institutions). I conclude by discussing the main challenges to the robust governance of
scarce health care resources by means of commons institutions (see 2.7 Challenges Face
by the Health Care Commons). In tandem with the previous chapter (see 1. The Tragedy
of the Health Care Commons), the aim is to provide a thorough introduction to some of
the key discussions in commons research for those unfamiliar with the commons
literature.
The IAD framework, design principles, and challenges are referenced and applied
throughout the following chapters (see 3. A Polycentric Experiment and 4. A4R in
Practice). Therefore, cross-references to the relevant sections in the chapters that follow
are provided between parentheses. I strive to be comprehensive in these references, but
inevitably I will be unable to highlight and discuss all the relationships between this
chapter and the arguments presented in the next chapters. Whether for reasons of
conciseness or simply because I have overlooked, or maybe not yet realized, the relevance
of commons research for a particular debate. Thus, understanding the tools in Ostrom’s
black bag will not only help the reader to better understand the chapters to come, but
will also allow them to discover new relationships and develop applications of their own.
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The chapter provides a number of contributions to both the commons literature
and the philosophy of health care. The three most important developments are the
following: First, I relate the main tools of commons research (i.e., the IAD framework and
the design principles) to health care, making them available for reflection and use in a
new arena. Second, I critically reflect on some of the central concepts of commons
research. Given that commons research is a young and relatively minor strand in
economics, hitherto the field has not been subject to much philosophical reflection.
Finally, I provide what is arguably the most detailed and critical discussion of the design
principles of successful commons institutions currently available (see 2.6 The Design
Principles of Successful Commons Institutions). The chapter contains several minor
contributions, among others, critical discussions of the framework-theory-model
distinction (see 2.2.1 Escaping the Panacea Trap), the use of local knowledge in health
care (see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge), and the curious matter of
defining commons institutions (see 2.3 Commons Institutions).
2.2 THE OSTROM APPROACH
Ostrom draws on a broad range of disciplines and theories (see 3.2.2 Plural Institutions).
At the same time, she firmly grounds her work in practice, and has a strong desire to do
justice to the intricacies of studying real-world commons institutions, and the
complications of overcoming existing tragedies of the commons. The result is a
methodological approach that in and of itself can be the subject of a research project. The
current section aims to highlight some of the main features of what I call “the Ostrom
approach.”
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2.2.1 ESCAPING THE PANACEA TRAP: THEORIES, MODELS, AND FRAMEWORKS
Ostrom does not suggest one-size-fits-all institutional arrangements to solve resource
allocation problems. In fact, she is strongly opposed against the uniform application of
abstract institutional models to solve such problems,2 which she calls the “panacea trap,”3
because she believes model solutions are unable to do justice to the complexities of
resource management issues, which differ on a case-by-case basis.4 “The search for one
best rule for solving all CPR problems is doomed for failure.”5 Lucy Gilson highlights the
uniform application of abstract models is commonplace in health care, and agrees with
Ostrom’s insistence on doing justice to complexity when she remarks the following:

[…] many recent health reforms are apparently underpinned by an understanding
of the health system that “… seems oddly ‘transparent’: a set of rules and formal
organisations that can be rewritten, reorganised, and redirected, given the
political will” (Mackintosh, 2000, p. 176). Future analysis and policy development
must recognize that health systems are complex socio-political institutions and
not merely delivery points for biomedical interventions.6

2

The temptation to uniformly apply models is sometimes called the “abstract model
trap.” (Eric Schokkaert, professor of health economics at the University of Leuven, used
this term in his keynote address at the 2015 Ethics of Economic Institutions conference at
Utrecht University.)
3 Mark Pennington, “Elinor Ostrom and the robust political economy of common-pool
resources,” Journal of Institutional Economics 9, no. 4 (December 2013): 460.
4 As Wall puts it, the danger of using models “is that a messy reality is made to conform
to restrictive assumptions, especially in economics.” (Derek Wall, The Sustainable
Economics of Elinor Ostrom. Commons, Contestation and Craft (New York: Routledge,
2014), 54.)
5 Shui Yan Tang, “Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems,” in Rules, Games, &
Common-Pool Resources, eds. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2006), 237.
6 Lucy Gilson, “Trust and the Development of Health Care as a Social Institution,” Social
Science and Medicine 56, no. 7 (April 2003): 1463. (Even though Gilson cites Ostrom’s
work several times, she does not explicitly reference Ostrom in this instance.)
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An example of the misguided idea that abstract models can be copied and applied
elsewhere is the recent bout of interest in health care reform in The Netherlands. Several
newspaper articles and academic papers have suggested the Dutch model could be the
solution to “fixing” health care in the United States. As Kieke Okma notes, it might indeed
be possible to learn lessons from The Netherlands, but “[…] it all depends on what it is we
think we see, how we interpret that experience, how we frame lessons from that
experience and how we think those lessons apply in different circumstances.”7 Okma’s “it
all depends,” a clause Ostrom likes to use as well,8 can be read as a call to do justice to
complexities.9 There also is a moral reason against the use of abstract models to allocate
scarce health care resources. Norman Daniels and James Sabin point out there is no
consensus on principles of distributive justice in health care.10 Since there is no set of rules
or an algorithm that can provide specific answers about what limitations are fair, they
argue in favor of “[…] fair deliberative procedures that yield a range of acceptable

7

Kieke Okma, “Learning and Mislearning across Borders: What Can We (Not) Learn from
the 2006 Health Care Reform in the Netherlands? Commentary on Rosenau and Lako,”
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 33, no. 6 (December 2008): 1058.
8 To give an example, in the introduction to her discussion of the design principles in
Understanding Institutional Diversity, Ostrom writes: “As social scientists, we have to use
one of our favorite slogans once again – it depends!” (Elinor Ostrom, Understanding
Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 258.)
9 In a 1993 report on health sector reform, the World Health Organization warns against
the uniform application of abstract models: “The complexity of the reform process is
formidable. There is a need to go beyond prescriptive blue print approaches, to develop
more flexible ways which allow learning from experience and adaptation.” (WHO National
Health Systems and Policies Unit, Health Sector Reform (Geneva: World Health
Organization, 1993), 3.)
10 Norman Daniels and James Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
[2002] 2008), 2.
121

answers.”11 As I will discuss in chapter four, commons institutions can serve as the vehicle
for such deliberative procedures (see 4. A4R in Practice). To adopt Ostrom’s terminology,
one can argue commons institutions are better able to deal with the moral complexities
of allocating scarce health care resources. Athena McClean makes a similar point when
she argues that models often tend to mechanically direct action, thus eliminating the
need for conscious human actors. As a consequence, human praxis is reduced to a
mechanical process, disengaging resource users politically.12,13
Mclean’s remark raises an important issue, since models do not necessarily direct
action in a mechanical way.14 While the application of models can indeed be rigid, models
can also be flexible, requiring significant input from conscious human actors when
applied. This is not just a qualitative difference between models, as one and the same
model can be used in a rigid or a flexible manner. The matter relates to a noteworthy
distinction in Ostrom’s work. She repeatedly differentiates between theories, models,
and frameworks.15 As Ostrom notes, the terms are used almost interchangeably by social

11

Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 11.
Athena McLean, “Empowerment and the Psychiatric Consumer/Ex-Patient Movement
in the United States: Contradictions, Crisis and Change,” Social Science and Medicine 40,
no. 8 (April 1995): 1058.
13 Athena McLean discusses models in the context of consumer models, but I believe the
risk she identifies also applies to institutional models.
14 McLean’s suggestion that models direct human action in a mechanical way is likely the
result of her focus on consumer models. But again, the risk she identifies is present in any
context where models are used.
15 Ostrom discusses the distinction between the concepts in most detail in Rules, Games,
and Common-Pool Resources (2006). (Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker,
Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006),
23-25.) She revisits the discussion in Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005). (Elinor
Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005), 27-29.)
12
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scientists, leading “to considerable confusion as to what they mean.”16 Therefore, she
uses the three concepts in a very specific manner, namely as “a nested set of theoretical
concepts – which range from the most general to the most detailed assumptions made
by the analyst.”17 Analyses conducted at each of these levels provide different degrees of
specificity with regards to a particular problem,18 but all three levels are “important in the
long-term development of empirically grounded theory.”19 I now summarize Ostrom’s
discussion of the concepts, before briefly criticizing her distinction. (1) At the framework
level, theorists identify the elements and the relationships between these elements that
one needs to consider for institutional analysis.20 As such, “frameworks help to organize
diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry.”21 Frameworks provide a metalanguage that is
necessary to discuss and compare theories.22 The framework at the center of Ostrom’s
research is the IAD framework (see 2.5 The Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework for a detailed discussion). (2) At the conceptual level of a theory, analysts
specify which components of a framework are relevant for certain kinds of questions and
make broad working assumptions about these elements.23 As such,

[T]heories focus on parts of a framework and make specific assumptions that are
necessary for an analyst to diagnose a phenomenon, explain its processes, and
predict outcomes. To conduct empirical research, a scholar needs to select one or

16

Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 27.
Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 27.
18 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity 27-28.
19 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 23.
20 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28.
21 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 25.
22 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28.
23 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28.
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more theories to use in generating predictions about expected patterns of
relationships. Several theories are usually compatible with any framework.24

The IAD framework is compatible with, among others, game theory, microeconomic
theory, and social choice theory.25 Theories provide a metatheoretical language to
formulate, postulate, predict, evaluate, and change various models of that theory (e.g.,
the game-theoretical models used by game theorists).26 (3) Formal models make precise
assumptions about a limited set of parameters and variables to derive predictions about
the likely outcomes of a particular set of parameters.27 Ostrom writes,

Logic, mathematics, game theory models, experimentation and simulation, and
other means are used to explore the consequences of these assumptions
systematically on a limited set of outcomes. Multiple models are compatible with
most theories.28

Particular models can help analysts produce specific predictions about plausible
outcomes of highly simplified structures. Models are useful in policy analysis when they
are tailored to the problem at hand, but they are used inappropriately when applied to
the issues that do not closely fit the assumptions of the model.29 The question is whether
Ostrom is able to maintain her neat distinction? I think the contrast between model and
framework in particular seems to be difficult to maintain. Ostrom’s characterization of
frameworks makes them sound like flexible, high-level models. After all, and staying

24

Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28.
Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28.
26 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 24.
27 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 23.
28 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28.
29 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 29.
25
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within the logic of Ostrom’s distinction, frameworks too can be used to predict outcomes,
except they include a larger number of parameters and variables. Vice versa, models
simply seem to be more detailed frameworks. Since they also identify elements and the
relationships between them with the aim to organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry.
Ultimately, the difference seems to boil down to a difference in the level of detail, which
impacts the number of variables involved and the precision of the analysis. Broadening
the discussion beyond Ostrom’s framework-theory-model distinction opens up a whole
other can of worms, given the (philosophical) theorizing that has happened on the
(relationship between the) concepts of model and theory in particular. To further
Ostrom’s conceptual analysis, a confrontation with this literature is needed, but such an
endeavor lies outside of the scope of the present project on resource allocation in health
care. However, I have identified an issue in Ostrom’s work that can benefit from further
philosophical reflection.
I briefly want to return to Ostrom’s notion of framework, given how central it is to
her work. Ostrom’s frameworks in general, and the IAD framework in particular, are fluid
and dynamic, making them well suited to develop context-dependent institutional
solutions.30 Frameworks, as conceived by Ostrom, do not only provide a checklist of the
independent variables that explain individual and group behavior, but they also offer a
causal schema with great flexibility in determining what factors should be included.31

30

Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge
Commons,” in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice, ed.
Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 42.
31 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 42.
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Thus, frameworks allow “[…] for detailed analysis of specific resources and situations,
while being general enough to apply to multiple types of inquiries.”32 This high level of
generality is the framework approach’s greatest strength, allowing resource users to
develop custom solutions to manage health care resources and avert the tragedy of the
commons, but also its most important weakness, since frameworks offer little in terms of
concrete recommendations. Robert Goodin’s characterization of the aim of institutional
design provides a helpful clarification of Ostrom’s framework approach:

[W]ithin the realm of our intentional interventions what we should be aiming at is
not the design of institutions directly. Rather, we should be aiming at designing
schemes for designing institutions – schemes which will pay due regard to the
multiplicity of designers and to the inevitably cross-cutting nature of their
intentional interventions in the design process.33

Even though Goodin’s plea can also apply to the use of models, it nicely captures the high
level of generality and the broad applicability of Ostrom’s frameworks, which are in effect
“schemes for designing institutions.”34
2.2.2 RESOURCE USERS RELYING ON LOCAL KNOWLEDGE
Closely related to Ostrom’s opposition against the use of abstract models is her skepticism
of the expert culture, which operates on the assumption that it is possible to successfully

32

Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 42.
Robert Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” in The Theory of Institutional Design,
ed. Robert Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 28.
34 Even though Goodin uses the terms “model,” “theory,” and “framework” in Institutions
and Their Design (1996), he does not make an explicit distinction between the three
concepts. However, based on the chapter, it seems likely Goodin would be supportive of
Ostrom’s use of frameworks.
33
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implement changes from the outside.35 She does not dismiss expert knowledge
altogether, she is convinced such knowledge can be useful, but she strongly emphasizes
the role of resource users, who possess a unique body of local knowledge and
experience,36,37 to successfully manage CPRs.38 Rules developed by commons institutions
can be tailored to the specific characteristics of the CPR, while rules designed by outside
experts often fail to do justice to the characteristics of a specific CPR, making such rules
less effective, or even counterproductive, compared to locally designed rules (see also 4.3
Parallel Experiments).39 Moreover, resource users are the ones who are directly affected
by the resource allocation decisions.40 Therefore, the tools Ostrom proposes take the

35

She talks about “the hubris of experts relying on simple models of the best engineering
plans and idealized sets of rules.” (Elinor Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action
Evolve?” Journal of Bioeconomics 16 (2014): 26.)
36 For example, resource users often “know others living in the area well and know what
norms of behavior are considered appropriate by this community.” (Elinor Ostrom,
“Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (June
1999): 526.)
37 Montesquieu and Mill already recognized the importance of “local knowledge.” (Jacob
Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University 2015), 153, 158,
226.)
38 See also: Friedrich Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” The American Economic
Review 35, no. 4 (September 1945): 521-524.
39 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 304.
40 To give a concrete example, Kaiser Permanente Colorado initially relied on external
consultants (i.e., experts) to steer a major reorganization of their operations, but their
decisions did not sit well with frontline physicians affected by the proposed changes, even
though the overhaul enjoyed broad support with the organization’s leadership. As a
result, the reorganization did not have the desired effect. “Over time, many of us came
to believe that the core issue was the exclusion of doctors from the decision-making
process.” (Jack Cochran and Charles Kenney, The Doctor Crisis: How Physicians Can, and
Must, Lead the Way to Better Health Care (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014), 50.) Only after
an “all-hands meeting” that attracted and involved over two hundred physicians, policy
changes became more successful in addressing the organization’s problems. (Ibid., p. 51.)
The example illustrates the importance of involving the users most affected by the
decision-making process as well as the value of local knowledge.
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form of frameworks that provide suggestions for resource users to then develop their
own institutional arrangements, the ones most suitable to their specific situation and
resource allocation problem.41,42
Ostrom’s framework approach is at odds with much of current practice in health
care. Experts, relying on abstract models, play a key role in advising health care
organizations along the state-market continuum, from private insurers over non-profit
hospital groups to governments, on the management of health care resources.43 Christine
Hogg goes so far as to talk about a reverence for experts and expert knowledge in health
care.44,45 During the 1990s, for example, non-executive directors in the National Health
Service (NHS) were appointed not so much “for their knowledge of the local area or their

41

Unlike the IAD framework, which has the term “framework” in its name, the eight
design principles are not usually labeled a “framework” in the commons literature. I
nonetheless believe the term to be applicable to the design principles as they too are fluid
and dynamic, suited to develop context-dependent institutional solutions. Moreover, the
design principles rely on many of the same variables as the IAD framework and assume
an underlying causal scheme leading to robust commons institutions.
42 Andrew Cassels stresses the need for framework approaches in an annex to the
aforementioned World Health Organization report on health sector reform. (Andrew
Cassels, Perspectives on Health Sector Reform (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1993),
6.)
43 The epitome of expert knowledge on the allocation of health care resources are
supranational organizations, like the World Health Organization, and consultancies, like
The Advisory Board Company and McKinsey & Company.
44 Christine Hogg, Patients, Power & Politics. From Patients to Citizens (London: Sage
Publications, 1999), 137.
45 The reverence for experts in health care management and the knowledge they possess
is probably not surprising in a field in which experts and expert knowledge are so central.
Physicians, with their specialized body of medical knowledge, can plausibly be seen as the
archetype of the expert after which other professions are modeled, from health care
professionals to management consultants.
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links with the community, but for their professional and managerial expertise.”46,47 In fact,
most attempts to control health care costs over the past decades have relied heavily on
an ever larger army of experts,48 ready to apply their knowledge to the issue of managing
limited resources.49 Highlighting the role of experts is important because, despite their
best efforts, the figures discussed in the previous chapter (see 1.2 A Tragedy of the Health
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Hogg, Patients, Power & Politics, 86.
The preference for non-executive directors with professional and managerial expertise
appears to be a direct consequence of Alain Enthoven’s recommendations in the highly
influential report Reflections on the Management of the National Health Service (1985):
“Regional and District Medical Officers are drawn from community medicine. They are
not trained for management and their background is not the best for persons expected
to give leadership to consultants. Medical leadership might be strengthened by giving
post-graduate management training to selected consultants and by finding ways to make
careers in top-level management attractive to them.” (Alain Enthoven, Reflections on the
Management of the National Health Service (London: The Nuffield Provincial Hospitals
Trust, 1985), 2-3.) Two important remarks: First, Enthoven’s recommendations, and the
subsequent reorganization of the NHS, are an excellent example of Ostrom’s skepticism
of abstract models and expert knowledge. Keep in mind that Ostrom does not dismiss the
importance of models and experts outright, but she would likely object that Enthoven’s
recommendations do not do justice to the complexities of health care and the important
role of resource users. Second, Enthoven’s report provides additional support for the
assumption that many health care institutions can be situated along the state-market
continuum. After all, Enthoven advocates to redesign the NHS along the continuum, from
a state institution to a hybrid institution through the introduction of so-called “internal
markets.” (Rudolf Klein, “Self-inventing Institutions: Institutional Design and the U.K.
Welfare State,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert Goodin (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 241-249.) The health care system in the United States
underwent a similar transition toward “more market.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits
Fairly, 8.) The move to more market has not stopped the rise in health care expenditures,
both in the United Kingdom and the United States.
48 Hogg, Patients, Power & Politics, 165.
49 To illustrate just how recent of a phenomenon the expert culture is, consider the
following: The Advisory Board Company, which nowadays focuses exclusively on
consultancy services for health care and higher education, was founded in 1979 with the
aim to provide research for the financial services industry and only launched its health
care focused strategic research division in 1986. The Boston Consultancy Group (1963)
and McKinsey & Company (1926), arguably the two most influential management
consultancies, also only started focusing heavily on health care relatively recently.
47
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Care Commons?) seem to indicate the experts have thus far been unable to subdue the
rise in health care expenditures. The apparent failure of experts to durably manage health
care resources does not only seem to support Ostrom’s skepticism of the expert culture,
at least in health care, but also seems to suggest a need for alternative solutions to the
durable management of resources, for example commons institutions. Of course,
reconsidering the role of the expert in the management of health care resources will not
be an easy task, as the expert’s position and influence has ossified over time. Moreover,
the interests of the experts are significant, both in terms of power and finances, which
are closely intertwined.50 I once again want to stress, however, that the commons
paradigm is not meant to replace the existing institutional arrangements and the expert
culture, but rather to supplement them, which should make commons institutions more
palatable.51 The knowledge and experience of resource users, harnessed through
commons institutions, can be integrated in the existing institutional arrangements (see 3.

50

A cynic, or maybe a realist, would argue self-interested experts are likely to oppose the
inclusion of commons institutions in health care. After all, these institutions threaten the
experts’ power and income. In fact, the tragedy of the commons, as described by Hardin,
and the prisoner’s dilemma, both discussed in the previous chapter, can be applied to the
experts’ predicament. After all, self-interested experts are inclined to defect rather than
to cooperate when it comes to implementing commons institutions in health care. The
situation is not helped by an apparent conflict of interest inherent to the position of the
expert in managing health care resources between the experts’ expected role in reducing
health care expenditures on the one hand and their interest in the revenue from future
efforts to reduce health care spending on the other hand. This conflict of interest is
somewhat reminiscent of the conflict of interest that is inherent to the role of the
physician in fee-for-service settings, where the physician is both the provider and the
purchaser of resources. (Haavi Morreim, Balancing Act: The New Medical Ethics of
Medicine’s New Economics (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1995), 22.)
51 Of course, more radical proponents of the commons may disagree, and instead argue
that the commons should replace the status quo institutions.
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The Polycentric Experiment), keeping in mind many commons initiatives already exist in
health care, for example in Grand Junction, whether they are recognized as such or not
(see 0.4 The Double Aim of the Project). An important first step to integrating new
commons institutions in health care, and to identifying and developing existing ones, is to
have a closer look at these institutions.
2.3 COMMONS INSTITUTIONS
I still have not answered a rather crucial, and seemingly obvious, question: what exactly
are commons institutions? While I highlighted some key features of commons institutions
in the introduction (see 0.2 State and Market: A False Dichotomy), and discussed the
concept “institution” in detail (see 0.5.1 Institutions), I still have not provided a definition
of the notion “commons institution” proper. This must seem like a gross oversight in a
work that centers upon these institutions, but the lack of a definition reflects a quirk of
the commons literature in general and of Ostrom’s work in particular: definitions of the
concept “commons institution” are somewhat of a rarity! In fact, as far as I have been
able to establish, Ostrom herself provides just one clear-cut definition of the concept.52
Odd enough in itself, this becomes even stranger knowing she regularly and precisely
defines her key terms. A good example are Ostrom’s plural definitions of the notion
“institution” (see 0.5.1 Institutions), but she also provides definitions of a host of other
concepts (e.g., rules, design principle). So why is a definition of commons institutions
notably absent from her oeuvre?
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Elinor Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions: Toward a Revised Theory,”
in Handbook of Agricultural Economics. Volume 2. Part A, eds. Bruce Gardner and Gordon
Rausser (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2002), 1317.
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The answer likely lies in Ostrom’s belief there are no one-size-fits all solutions to
commons dilemmas (see 2.2.1 Escaping the Panacea Trap: Theories, Models, and
Frameworks) and her emphasis on the role of resource users in managing CPRs (see 2.2.2
Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge). Thus, commons institutions are not a single
narrowly described institutional arrangement, but rather a theoretically infinite number
of different institutional arrangements that can vary significantly from one another. 53
After all, the “contents” of a particular commons institution, meaning the set of rules that
makes up the institution, are provided by a group of resource users trying to solve a
specific resource allocation issue in a specific context. Ostrom plausibly does not find it
fruitful to try to provide a precise definition of commons institutions precisely because
they are so varied.
The one defining feature shared by all institutions for collective action is that their
members play a central role in governing the institution. Hence, the use of the terms “selforganized” or “self-governed” resource governance systems. Unsurprisingly, this
characteristic sits at the center of the available definitions of commons institutions.
Ostrom defines a “self-governed common-pool resource” as follows:

A self-governed common-pool resource is one where actors, who are major
appropriators of the resource, are involved over time in making and adapting rules
within collective-choice arenas regarding the inclusion or exclusion of
participants, appropriation strategies, obligations of participants, monitoring and
sanctioning, and conflict resolution.54
53

The wide variety of commons institutions, coupled with a poor understanding of them,
makes that they often are not recognized as such. (Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the
Commons,” 520.) Hence, one of the aims of my research is to make health care commons
visible through understanding them better (see 0.4 The Double Aim of the Project).
54 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1317.
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The same emphasis on the role of resource users is found with Massimo De Angelis and
David Harvie’s definition of commons institutions: “In general terms, the commons are
social systems in which resources are shared by a community of users/producers, who
also define the modes of use and production, distribution and circulation of these
resources through democratic and horizontal forms of governance.”55 And again with
Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval: In short, commons are institutions that allow for the
joint management of resources through rules at different levels put in place by the
appropriators themselves.56,57
To avoid confusion, it is worth making explicit two differentiations that I made in
passing in the previous chapter (see 1.4 Argument I: Analogy). First, a distinction must be
made between commons institutions, which are resource management regimes, and the
resources that are being managed by these regimes, the CPRs (see 1.6 Argument III: Type
of Good). In practice, the term “commons” is used to refer to both institutions and
resources. Second, commons institutions as a resource management regime must be
distinguished from commons as a property ownership system. CPRs can be in common
ownership, but they do not need to be commonly owned in order to be managed by a
commons institution. For example, health care resources can be in private or state
ownership, but nonetheless be managed by commons institutions (see 1.4 Argument I:
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Massimo De Angelis and David Harvie, “The Commons,” in The Routledge Companion
to Alternative Organization, eds. Martin Parker et al. (Abington: Routledge, 2014), 280.
56 Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, Commun. Essai sur la Révolution au XXIe Siècle (Paris:
Éditions la Découverte, 2014), 149.
57 “En un mot, les communs sont des institutions qui permettent une gestion commune
selon des règles de plusieurs niveaux mises en place par les «appropriateurs» euxmêmes.”
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Analogy).58,59 To make matters more confusing, both the management and ownership
regime are labelled commons. Commons research focuses on commons institutions as
resource management regimes rather than as property ownership systems.
Even though strictly speaking not (part of) a definition, one further
characterization of commons institutions is useful in light of the following chapters.
Ostrom typifies commons as “complex adaptive systems,”60 which she defines as
consisting of “a large number of active elements whose rich patterns of interactions
produce emergent properties that are not easy to predict by analyzing the separate parts
of a system.”61 John Holland, on whose work Ostrom relies, further describes complex
adaptive systems as “composed of interacting agents described in terms of rules. These
agents adapt by changing their rules as experience accumulates.”62 A key property of such
systems is their diversity, which is one of the main arguments for using commons
institutions to manage health care resources, even though some level of centralization
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Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 80.
As such, the commons concept cuts across the market-state dichotomy viewed as two
opposing modes of ownership. That being said, both market and state can be
conceptualized in a way that does not imply private and public ownership respectively,
but thinks of them as management regimes. To give an example, a resource can strictly
speaking not be owned by the state, but nonetheless be managed by it. The market seems
to be more closely tied to private ownership, but also can be thought of as a management
regime. To give an example, a resource can be owned by the state, but be governed by
market rules. The distinction between ownership and management regime once again
highlights the shortcomings of thinking of market and state as a dichotomy and the
difficulty of defining such rich, diffuse institutions (see 0.2 Market and State: A False
Dichotomy).
60 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 520.
61 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 520-521.
62 John Holland, Hidden Order. How Adaptation Builds Complexity (New York: Helix Books,
1995), 10.
59
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and coordination might be needed to fully reap the benefits of the diversity offered by
the commons (see 4.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).63
2.4 A COMMON SCENARIO
The above discussion of commons institutions is rather abstract, and can benefit from a
concrete example, especially for readers who are less familiar with Ostrom’s work. There
are many classic examples of commons, among others, the communal tenure of high
mountain meadows and forests in Switzerland and Japan,64 the governance of
groundwater basis in the Los Angeles Metropolitan area,65 and the management of
coastal fisheries around the world.66 I choose to discuss the case of huerta irrigation
institutions in Spain, primarily because Ostrom makes reference to them in her discussion
of the design principles (see 2.6 The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions),
which are the focus of much of the remainder of this chapter. I cite the respective design
principles in this discussion of the huertas.67 Moreover, the huertas are a good example
of robust institutions that continue to operate to date in a Western country.
Huertas are common fertile areas surrounding or near towns that are served by
irrigation works bringing water to farmers’ fields in the semiarid region of the present-

63

Conceptualizing institutions as complex adaptive systems fits with taking an
evolutionary approach to think about institutions (see footnote 120 in the previous
chapter).
64 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 61-69.
65 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 103-142.
66 Edella Schlager, “Fishers’ Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource
Dilemmas,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, eds. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner,
and James Walker (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).
67 The zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines are another famous example.
(Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 82-88.)
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day Valencian Community (i.e., Valencia, Murcia, Orihuela, and Alicante).68,69 Ostrom uses
the term huerta specifically in reference to the common irrigation systems serving these
areas. The Spanish huertas have existed for almost 600 years, since they were formally
instituted on May 29, 1435 at the monastery of St. Francis in Valencia, but they have likely
existed for much longer, close to 1,000 years according to some estimates.70 The limited
quantities of rainfall in combination with extreme variations in precipitation make that
“conflict over water has always been just beneath the surface of everyday life”71 in these
areas, at times resulting in fights between individual irrigators, between irrigators and
officials, and between groups of irrigators living downstream and their upstream
neighbors.72 The rules of the huertas, among others, specify who has rights to water from
the irrigation system (see 2.6.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries), how the water is to be shared
in good years as well as bad, how to share maintenance responsibilities, what officials to
elect and how to fine rule breakers (see 2.6.4 Monitoring and 2.6.5 Graduated
Sanctions).73 The precise rules differ from one huerta to the next. I now discuss the
example of the huertas in more detail with reference to the design principles (see 2.6 The
Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions).
In Valencia, Murcia, and Orihuela, the right to water inheres in the land itself. Land
that was watered before the time of the Reconquista is designated as irrigated land
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Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 69-71.
can be found elsewhere in Spain and Portugal, but also in their former colonies
in the Americas. They are sometimes called acequias.
70 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 69.
71 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 69.
72 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 69.
73 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 69.
69 Huertas
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(regadiu) and the remaining lands are dry lands (seca). Some areas are entitled to water
only in times of abundance (extremales).74 “The basic allocation principle […] is that each
piece of regadiu land is entitled to a quantity of canal water proportionate to its size.”75
Around Alicante, water rights have historically been tied to land ownership, but after the
reconquest the right to withdraw water for a fixed amount of time was separated from
land ownership, and a market for these rights was created independent from the market
for land (see 2.6.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries).76,77
In Valencia, irrigators from seven of the major canals organize into “autonomous
irrigation communities.”78 Every two to three years, each community elects their own
leader (sindico) and several other officials for their canal. “The syndic must own and farm
land served by the canal.”79 The syndic, together with his executive committee composed
of delegates from all of the canal’s main service areas (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice
Arrangements), is the executive officer of the irrigation unit. The syndic’s responsibilities
include the following: (1) The basic enforcement of regulations for his own unit. (2) The
power to make allocation decisions in the case of day-to-day disputes. (3) The authority
to levy fines (see 2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions). (4) The responsibility to determine the order
and timing of deliveries during times of severe water shortages. (5) The duty to sit on two
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Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 71, 76.
Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 71.
76 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 78.
77 Alicante is able to take a different approach to assigning the water because the farmers
took the initiative to build a dam. The Tibi Dam (1594) does not only double the amount
of usable irrigation water, but also allows substantial amounts of water to be stored long
enough to be traded. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 78, 92.)
78 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 71.
79 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 72.
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different weekly tribunals with syndics from the other six irrigation communities.80 The
so-called “Tribunal de los Aguas,” which has met for centuries, is the main water court for
resolving disputes between irrigators (see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms). The
court operates without lawyers, but many onlookers follow the proceedings.81 The
members of the court, excluding the syndic whose canal is involved in the dispute, make
an immediate decision based on the facts of the case and in light of the rules of the
particular canal. After court, the syndics may convene a second tribunal to discuss
intercanal problems and operational procedures relating to season low waters. As such,
it serves as a coordinating committee encompassing all seven canals (see 2.6.3 CollectiveChoice Arrangements and 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises). The court mechanism is so
longstanding and well developed because the potential for conflict over a very scarce
resource like water is high.82 The huertas in Murcia and Orihuela are organized in a similar
fashion to the Valencian huerta, including irrigation communities and water courts. The
organization of the Alicante huerta differs from the others. Most importantly, there is
only one irrigation community for the entire huerta.83 Famers form a general assembly
and elect a dozen sindicos to serve on an executive commission, which stays on for a
period of four years. National authorities exercise considerably more control over
irrigation matters in Alicante than in the other huertas, not in the least due to the
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Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 72.
The court meets the publicity condition advocated by Daniels and Sabin for the just
allocation of health care resources (see 4.4.4.1 The Publicity Condition).
82 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 101.
83 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 80.
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presence of a dam.84 Overall, all the huertas discussed here have been able to enjoy a
large degree of autonomy to devise and change their own institutions because their selfgovernance was well-established by the time the centralized monarchy in Madrid came
to dominate Spain and its colonies (see 2.6.7 Recognition of Rights to Organize).85 The
irrigation systems are “organized on the basis of three or four nested levels,” which in
turn are “nested in local, regional, and national governmental jurisdictions” 86 (see 2.6.8
Nested Enterprises).
In Valencia, the basic rules for water allocation are based on decisions made by
the officials of the irrigation community concerning environmental conditions (see also
0.5.3 Rules): (1) abundance, (2), seasonal low water, and (3) extraordinary drought.87 The
most frequent condition is that of seasonal low water:

When the low-water condition is in effect, water is distributed to specific farmers
through a complex, rule-driven hydraulic system. Each distributory canal is
positioned in a rotation scheme in relation to the other distributory canals. Each
farm on a distributory canal receives water in a set rotation order, starting from
the head of the canal and culminating in the tail end of the canal. 88

The allocation system is known as turno and its basic elements are that the order in which
irrigators receive water is fixed, and when it is a farmer’s turn they can decide themselves
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Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 81.
The huertas in eastern Spain were more successful in maintaining their autonomy
because of the historic presence and influence of the kingdom of Aragon, roughly
compromising Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 81.)
86 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 102.
87 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 72.
88 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 73.
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how much water to take as long as it is not wasted. On the one hand, this means no
irrigator knows exactly when their turn will come. On the other hand, each irrigator knows
that they can take as much water as they need when their turn eventually comes. 89 In
Murcia and Orihuela, farmers use an alternative system called tanda, which means each
irrigator is assigned a fixed time period during which they may withdraw water. As a
result, “each farmer knows exactly when and for how long he [they] may obtain water,
but [they do] not know exactly how much water may be available at the time.” 90 As
mentioned above, members of the Alicante huerta use a complex system of trading water
rights.91 The rules for allocating water vary substantially between the huertas, as the sets
of rules are specific to the particular problems in governing each of these broadly similar,
but distinctly different irrigation systems (see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local
Knowledge). As a result, all the huertas generate positive benefits for the farmers that
participate in them, meaning congruity exists between the benefits members receive and
the costs they incur from collective action (see 2.6.2 Congruence between Appropriation
and Provision Rules and Local Conditions).92 The temptation to break the rules is
considerable, given the environment of water scarcity and the risks associated with not
having enough water. Thus, the level of monitoring that is used in the huertas is high.93
Much of the monitoring happens in the fields, as it is easy for farmers to monitor what
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91 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 78-80.
92 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 81.
93 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 73.
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others are doing,94 but there exists a complex system of “reciprocal monitoring
relationships”95 between irrigators, executive committees, syndics, and water courts to
ensure the rules are followed (see 2.6.4 Monitoring). Historically, the fines imposed when
somebody does break the rules are low, but the rule-breaker is held publicly accountable
for the infraction.96 The person reporting the infraction gets to keep part of the fine (see
2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions).97
The huertas in eastern Spain are remarkable examples of robust commons
institutions that have successfully managed scarce resources for nearly a millennium.
While the design principles of the huertas, and other successful commons, do not readily
translate to health care, these institutions can nonetheless be an inspiration for the
governance of scarce health care resources.
2.5 THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK
The first tool in Ostrom’s black bag is the IAD framework. The framework was first
discussed by Larry Kiser and Ostrom in The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical

94

“Irrigation systems […] usually place the two actors most concerned with cheating in
direct contact with one another. The irrigator who nears the end of rotation turn would
like to extend the time of his turn (and thus the amount of water obtained). The next
irrigator in the rotation system waits nearby for him to finish, and would even like to start
early. The presence of the first irrigator deters the second from an early start, the
presence of the second irrigator deters the first from a late ending. Neither has to invest
additional resources in monitoring activities. Monitoring is a by-product of their own
strong motivations to use their water rotation turns to the fullest extent.” (Ostrom,
Governing the Commons, 95.) On the contrary, in health care many actors who are in
direct contact do not have any incentive to monitor one another’s resource usage.
95 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 74.
96 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 74-75.
97 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 96.
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Analysis of Institutional Approaches (1982), even though discussions among commons
researchers leading to the development of the framework must have started at least a
decade earlier. The term “IAD framework” itself is used for the first time in Ostrom’s A
Framework for Institutional Analysis (1991). Since its inception,98 the framework has
gradually been refined by Ostrom and her colleagues, resulting in an elaborate theoretical
apparatus that sits at the center of commons research and ties together almost all aspects
of said research. This makes the IAD framework difficult to understand to outsiders and
somewhat unwieldy. The more detailed discussions of the framework run more than
twenty to thirty pages in length,99 while the most comprehensive discussion takes up
entire books.100 I present a brief overview of the IAD framework, discuss the relevance of
the framework to the following chapters, and briefly consider the use of the framework
in health care.
The IAD framework has a theoretical and a practical purpose. Within commons
research, the framework operates as “a general organizing tool”101 that helps with the
development of a long-term research program on commons institutions, but also with

98 It is worth mentioning Ostrom traces the roots of the IAD framework to “classic political

economy,” particularly the work of Hobbes, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Hamilton,
Madison, and Tocqueville. (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool
Resources, 25.)
99 The discussions of the IAD framework in Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
(1994) and in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons (2011) are two good examples.
(Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 23-50; Ostrom
and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 41-81.)
100 “The “map” that I will elucidate in this volume is a conceptual framework called […]
the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework.” (Ostrom, Understanding
Institutional Diversity, 8.)
101 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 25.
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analyzing “other problems where individuals find themselves in repetitive situations
affected by a combination of factors derived from a physical world, a cultural world, and
a set of rules.”102 In practice, the IAD framework helps “individuals to understand
institutional puzzles”103 and manipulate them. Ostrom and Charlotte Hess describe the
framework’s practical aim as follows:

The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is a diagnostic tool
that can be used to investigate any broad subject where humans repeatedly
interact within rules and norms that guide their choice of strategies and behaviors.
Most importantly, it can lead one out of the path dependency of existing patterns
of practice when their accompanying ways of thinking have not yielded
solutions.104

Apart from the framework’s dual purpose, it is important to note its applicability beyond
natural resource commons, as the framework can be applied to any institutional
arrangement (e.g., markets, states, mixed institutions) and in any context (e.g., health
care).105 Figure 2.1 depicts a simplified version of the IAD framework. The framework
centers upon an “action situation,”106 also called “action arena,”107 even though the two
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Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 25.
Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 54.
104 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 41.
105 “The IAD framework is intended to contain the most general set of variables that an
institutional analyst may want to use to examine a diversity of institutional settings
including human interactions within markets, private firms, families, community
organizations, legislatures, and government agencies.” (Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets
and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems,” The American
Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June [2009] 2010): 414.)
106 Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 414.
107 Blake Ratner, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Candace May, and Eric Haglund, “Resource Conflict,
Collective Action, and Resilience: An Analytical Framework,” International Journal of the
Commons 7, no. 1 (2013): 187.
103
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strictly speaking are not synonymous. The action arena is influenced by external
variables:108 the attributes of the biophysical world (e.g., location, available
technology),109 the characteristics of the community (e.g., size, heterogeneity, culture),110
and the rules used by members to order their relationships (see 0.5.3 Rules).111 Within
the action arena “patterns of interaction” are established, which lead to certain
“outcomes.”112 These outcomes can be evaluated and inform institutional change (i.e.,
changes to the rules-in-use).113 Some of the attributes of the physical world and the
community can also be modified after evaluation, while others are fixed. 114 Ostrom
describes the IAD framework as a “multilayer conceptual map,”115 meaning each variable
of the schema can be “unpacked – and then further unpacked and unpacked,”116 which
explains why the most detailed discussions of the IAD are so lengthy.117 To give an
example, “actors” can be unpacked in actors’ “individual preferences,” “information
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Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 414.
Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 46.
110 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 26-27.
111 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 15.
112 Ratner, Meinzen-Dick, May, and Haglund, “Resource Conflict, Collective Action, and
Resilience,” 187.
113 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 54.
114 For the purpose of analyzing an institution, the analyst assumes all the exogenous
variables are fixed. (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 14.) The variables can
be altered for the purpose of institutional development.
115 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 14.
116 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 14.
117 The gradual refinement of the external variables and the action arena through
continuous iterations is reminiscent of the notion of reflective equilibrium from the work
of John Rawls, which formed the basis for Daniels’s work on justice in health care (see 4.
A4R in Practice). The IAD framework has the potential to be used as a way to
operationalize the notion of reflective equilibrium in the design of just institutions.
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processing capabilities,” “selection criteria” and “individual resources.” In turn, actors’
preferences are explained in terms of utility theory and other preference theories.118

EXTERNAL
VARIABLES

ACTION ARENA

Biophysical
Characteristics
Action Situation

Attributes of the
Community

Interactions
Actors

Rules-in-Use

Evaluative
Criteria

Outcomes

Figure 2.1: The IAD framework. (Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the
Knowledge Commons,” 44.)

Depending on the issue, the institutional analyst or designer may have to delve several
layers deep into the framework to identify the problem and to find a solution. The layering
of the framework is a first introduction to the concept of “nestedness,”119 which recurs
through Ostrom’s work (see 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises and 3. The Polycentric Experiment).
The idea of nesting pertains to the IAD framework in a second way, as the framework can
be applied at different scales or levels of analysis: local, regional, and global.120
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Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 33-35.

119 In her Nobel Prize Lecture, Ostrom describes the framework as “a nested set of building

blocks.” (Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 413.)
120 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 44.
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Alternatively, the levels of analysis can be characterized more generally as the micro-,
meso-, and macro-level.121 As Ostrom puts it, “What is a whole system at one level is a
part of a system at another level.”122 Many complex issues are situated at several levels
of analysis simultaneously. Thus, part of the challenge for the institutional analyst or
designer is to identify “the appropriate level of analysis relevant to addressing a particular
puzzle.”123 To complicate matters further, the two types of nestedness interact with each
other. The variables of the framework that apply at one level of analysis may not apply at
another. Similarly, the theoretical contents of the variables changes with scale (e.g.
depending on whether the actor is an individual, hospital, or health care system will
impact the actor’s preferences, information processing capabilities, selection criteria, and
resources).124 As no analyst or designer masters the theoretical contents of all variables
at all levels of analysis, institutional analysis and design is a multi- and interdisciplinary
endeavor.
Discussing the relevance of the IAD framework for the following chapters is
difficult, because as long as one keeps unpacking the framework and/or changing the
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More concrete instantiations are “equally valid,” for example “department-schooluniversity.” (Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,”
44.) Applied to the context of health care, the following is a possible example:
patient/practitioner-hospital-health care system.
122 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 11.
123 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 12.
124 To give another example, the criteria for evaluating outcomes will vary depending on
the level of analysis. Applied to the allocation of health care resources, a satisfactory
outcome at the micro-level may be evaluated negatively at the meso- and macro-level
(and vice versa), say a physician that was able to “game the system” to get treatment or
diagnosis for his patient (see 2.4.4 Monitoring and 2.5.3 The Challenge of Technological
Change).
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scale, most if not all the discussions in the subsequent chapters fit in the framework.
Moreover, debates are never limited to a single variable, but sit at the intersection of
different variables. To give an example, health care reform consists in a change of the
rules-in-use. High-level actors meet each other in action arenas to discuss, propose,
decide on, and enact rule changes (outcomes), thus changing the rules-in-use. The
interactions between the actors pursuing reform and the decisions they can take are
themselves subject to the rules-in-use (e.g., rules stipulating whether reform requires a
majority, qualified majority, or unanimity) and limited by the biophysical world (e.g., level
of economic growth).
The IAD framework can be a useful tool to approach institutional challenges in
health care in general. As Andrew Cassels remarks, “Institutional issues tend to be ignored
because they are regarded as messy and difficult. There is a need for usable frameworks
for thinking about and describing institutional change.”125 The IAD framework is precisely
such a tool. Indeed, several attempts have been made to apply Ostrom’s framework to
health care. To give an example, the World Health Organization (WHO) built a framework
for use in health care relying on NIE, among others, incorporating elements from the IAD
framework.126,127 In another example, Seye Abimbola and colleagues draw on Ostrom’s
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Cassels, Perspectives on Health Sector Reform, 6.
Inke Mathauer and Guy Carrin, The Role of Institutional Design and Organizational
Practice for Health Financing performance and Universal Coverage (Geneva: World health
Organization, 2010).
127 Inke Mathauer and Guy Carrin draw on a number of sources apart from Ostrom, thus
a more detailed discussion is outside the scope of the current project.
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work in their development of a “multi-level governance framework” for analyzing the
management of primary health care in low- and middle-income countries.128,129
2.6 THE DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSFUL COMMONS INSTITUTIONS
In comparison to the clunky and abstract IAD framework, the second tool in Ostrom’s
black bag appears refreshingly straightforward: a series of eight concrete
recommendations, so-called “design principles,” for the development of successful (i.e.,
efficient, effective equitable, and robust) commons institutions. In Governing the
Commons (1990), the first work in which Ostrom advances the design principles, she
defines “design principle” as “an essential element or condition that helps to account for
the success of [enduring, self-governing] institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining
the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to the rules in use.”130
One of the few other characterization of the concept I found in the literature is the
following: “generic advice about properties that should be designed into institutions to
increase their chances of long-term success.”131 Other definitions of the notion design
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Seye Abimbola, Joel Negin, Stephen Jan, and Alexandra Martiniuk, “Towards PeopleCentred Health Systems: A Multi-Level Framework for Analysing Primary Health Care
Governance in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” Health Policy and Planning 29
(September 2014): ii29-ii39.
129 Health care systems in low- and middle-income countries are particularly promising
when it comes to the potential application of Ostrom’s work to health care, because
governments and markets often are unable to organize a consistent and qualitative
supply of complex and resource-intensive health care services. Commons institutions may
be able to fill the institutional vacuum and overcome some of the challenges typical to
providing health care in a developing world context. Given the particular challenges of
organizing health care in low- and middle-income countries, I do not discuss this
application of Ostrom’s work in the current project (see 5.3 Future Research).
130 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 90.
131 Paul Stern, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Elinor Ostrom, and Susan Stonich, “Knowledge
and Questions after 15 Years of Research,” in The Drama of the Commons. Committee on
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principle, let alone a detailed conceptual analysis, are noticeably absent from the
literature. In contrast to the IAD framework, little theorizing regarding the concept has
happened. More often than not, the idea is simply assumed, and commons researchers
focus on the principles themselves and their application instead.
This pragmatic approach taken by many researchers may explain some of the
confusion that exists regarding the design principles. They are not in the first place
principles for the development of successful commons institutions, even though they can
be used as such. When Ostrom conceived the design principles, she did not formulate
them as a series of recommendations for developing new or existing institutions, but
rather as a list of characteristics, Ostrom uses the term “conditions,” displayed by robust
commons institutions (see also 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles). Robust, long-surviving
institutions are characterized by most of the design principles, while fragile institutions
are marked by some principles, and failed institutions are distinguished by very few of
them.132 Moreover, she based the design principles on an initial sample of fourteen case
studies,133 even though later studies have provided additional support for the design
principles.134 In Governing the Commons (1990), Ostrom is explicit about both the origins

the Human Dimensions of Global Change, eds. Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak,
Paul Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke Weber (Washington: National Academy Press, 2002),
459.
132 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1330.
133 Arun Agrawal, “Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability,” in The Drama of
the Commons. Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, eds. Elinor
Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Paul Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke Weber
(Washington: National Academy Press, 2002), 49.
134 A much cited review of over ninety studies summarizes “the principles are well
supported empirically.” However, the authors measure support for the design principles
by calculating the ratio of supportive to unsupportive studies, an approach that can easily
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and use of the design principles. She is careful to point out the list of principles is
speculative.135 Despite these caveats, the design principles have sparked considerable
research interest,136 looking at the principles as a way to develop new and existing
commons institutions. This has caused some researchers, for example Nives Dolšak and
notably Ostrom herself, to describe the design principles as “a set of general principles
that increase the performance of an institutional design.”137 Beyond theory, international
agencies like the United Nations, World Bank, and many NGOs have adopted the design
principles as a tool to “craft” commons institutions.138 None of this precludes the design
principles from being used to develop robust commons institutions, on the contrary, but
knowledge of their genesis might temper the hope for easy success when using the
principles as an institutional design tool. Ostrom, of course, is keenly aware of all of this.
Reminiscing about the inception of the design principles, she writes:

be criticized. The review finds that each principles has “at least twice as many supportive
as unsupportive cases” and refers “to principles with ratios > 10 as very strongly
supported, ratios of 5-10 as strongly supported, and ratios of 2-5 as moderately well
supported,” which already betrays a favorable bias toward the design principles. In
addition, three of the design principles have a ratio of supportive to unsupportive studies
right at or just above two. (Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold, Sergio Villamayor Tomás, “A
Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural Resource Management,”
Ecology and Society 15, no. 4 (2010). http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/
art38/.)
135 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 89-91.
136 Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern, “The Drama of the
Commons,” in The Drama of the Commons. Committee on the Human Dimensions of
Global Change, ed. Elinor Ostrom et al. (Washington: National Academy Press, 2002), 16.
137 Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” in The Commons
in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptation, eds. Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 22.
138 Fred Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory and the Reality of
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At times, I think that I should have called them something else because people
confused that term with the idea that we are trying to design something from the
beginning. However, I was really undertaking a study of robustness of systems that
already existed.139

This passage may be the closest Ostrom has come to rejecting the use of the principles to
design commons institutions. On the contrary, she has embraced the “misuse” of her
brainchild, as is evidenced by the above definition and apparent throughout her later
work.140 She does, however, repeatedly warn the design principles are not to be used as
blueprints:141,142 “There is a danger […] that project planners searching for the “right”
design will try to build a one-size-fits-all project supposedly based on the design
principles.”143 A warning that chimes with her emphasis on context, local knowledge, and
frameworks. That being said, Ostrom has also argued the design principles are universal
and predictive in that they can distinguish successful from unsuccessful commons
institutions, regardless of contextual differences.144 Thus, there is hope for applying the
design principles to health care commons institutions, but their application should be
carefully adapted to the general context of health care (e.g., considerations of justice,
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special importance of health care to the individual and society)145 and to the particular
health care circumstances (e.g., a group practice in the Belgium would require a different
institutional solution from a group practice in Canada).
The present overview is one of the most comprehensive discussions of the design
principles in the literature, and an important contribution to commons research, as the
available discussions of the principles are often brief and do not critically asses the design
principles.146 I highlight the relevance of the principles to the discussions in the following
chapters and briefly mention possible health care applications. The current theoretical
and practical interest in the design principles makes a more detailed study of them in the
context of health care a promising avenue for future research.
2.6.1 CLEARLY DEFINED BOUNDARIES
The first design principle, “clearly defined boundaries,”147 is easy to understand, but
difficult to implement, especially in a health care context where its implementation is
complicated by, among others: size of the CPR, the special importance of health care,
information issues (e.g., asymmetries, uncertainty), and moral hazard. The principle is

145 Leonard Fleck, Just Caring: Health Care Rationing and Democratic Deliberation (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2009), 103.
146 I use Ostrom’s original list of eight as the basis for the survey of the design principles.
(Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 88-102.) The design principles have later been
amended, subdividing three of the design principles (i.e., clearly defined boundaries,
congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, and
monitoring) into subcomponents, this to respond to criticisms and resolve some
ambiguities. (Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”) Ostrom later
endorsed this new framing of the design principles. (Ostrom, “The Future of the
Commons,” 78.)
147 The design principle is directly related to the characteristics of CPRs, i.e., excludability
and subtractability (see 1.6 Argument III: Type of Good).
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subdivided into two components:148 First, the members who have rights to withdraw
resources from the commons must be clearly defined, thus expressing the need for “rules
that clearly define who has rights to use a resource”149 (see 2.5.3 The Challenge of
Technological Change for some concrete examples of boundary rules).150 This first
component of the principle addresses the issue of free-riding behavior by limiting access
to the CPR.151,152 The principle asks: who is authorized to use the available resources?153
This question is recognizable to researchers and practitioners familiar with the issue of
allocating scarce health care resources as it permeates health care at all levels of analysis.
To give just a handful of examples: Do all (potential) patients have a claim to the health
care commons, even those who are uninsured? Do patients have the authority to consult
specialists, or must they be referred by a primary care provider? Are patients free to seek
out multiple opinions? (A question that stirred emotions when the Dutch reformed their
health care system.) What authority do physicians have over the use of resources, say,
expensive diagnostic or therapeutic technologies? Rehashing the PET scanner example
from the first chapter, how much leeway do hospitals have to appropriate expensive new
imaging technologies? Who has the authority to make technology appraisal decisions in
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Ostrom already distinguishes between these two subcomponents in Governing the
Commons (1990). (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 91.) Michael Cox and his colleagues
make the distinction more explicit. (Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design
Principles.”)
149 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1330.
150 For a detailed discussion of boundary rules, see: Ostrom, Understanding Institutional
Diversity, 194-196, 223-226. For more summary discussion, see: Ostrom, Gardner, and
Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 302.
151 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 260-261.
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a given health care system? (For a more detailed discussion regarding the challenges
posed by new health care technology, see section 2.6.3 The Challenge of Technological
Change.) The principle is sometimes given an alternate, or maybe complementary,
reading that fits the “spirit” of the commons paradigm: enabling members “to know who
is in and who is out of a defined set of relationships and, thus, with whom to
cooperate.”154 Framing the principle in terms of relationships between participants and
cooperation is less clear, but meets a common criticism that the principle is too rigid, not
allowing for fuzzier social relationships and ad hoc arrangements between members.155
Emphasizing cooperation may translate into more flexible, yet sufficiently well-defined,
boundaries through ongoing processes of deliberation at different levels of analysis.156
Second, the boundaries of the CPR themselves must be well defined,157 meaning
participants need to have a clear understanding of the resource system and its boundaries
which, in the commons literature with its focus on natural resources, usually refers to
geographic or physical boundaries (e.g., forestland, fishing ground). In other words, this
second component of the principle aims to clarify what is meant by a particular resource
system.158 The principle is more difficult to apply to health care for a reason highlighted
in the previous chapter: the amorphous character of health care resources (see 1.3
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156 I also discuss the issue of membership in the following chapter (see 3.4.3 The Dangers
of the Middle-Level).
157 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”
158 Elinor Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have
We Learned?” in Property Rights and Land Policies, ed. Gregory Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong
(Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009), 32.
154

Argument I: Analogy). The solutions proposed in chapter one also pertain here: relying on
virtual commons, adjusting the level of analysis, and the de facto use of global budgets in
health care allow the boundaries of the health care commons to be defined. So at least in
theory, it is possible to apply the second component of the design principle to health care.
In practice, however, the principle will be difficult to use beyond small-scale health
commons (e.g., group practice, small hospital), as the features of many health care
systems (e.g., size, complexity, uncertainty, limited knowledge of members) make it much
more challenging to design boundary rules clearly demarcating the health care
commons.159 A key challenge in health care is to increase resource users’ (e.g., patients,
providers, hospitals) awareness of the boundaries of the resource system, meaning they
must understand “their” pool of resources and its constraints. Breaking down health care
systems into small, well-defined virtual commons may be a good way to communicate
the boundaries of the CPR to users and to raise awareness about its limitations, which in
turn can be the impetus for health care reform.
Both components of the first design principle go hand-in-hand. Even if you are
able to clearly define who has the right to use a resource, the CPR can still be mismanaged
if you do not have a clear understanding of it. In other words, the resources can be used
only by those participants who have the right to do so, and in the way prescribed by the
boundary rules, but because the boundaries of the resources are not well defined or
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Paul Stern has argued the first design principle as a whole cannot be applied in any
meaningful way to truly global commons, like oceans or the climate. (Paul Stern, “Design
Principles for Global Commons: Natural Resources and Emerging Technologies,”
International Journal of the Commons 5, no. 2 (2011): 219.)
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understood, a tragedy of the commons may still take place. Analogously, the CPR can be
marked off precisely, but if it is unclear who is authorized to make use of the available
resources, the resource system might nonetheless collapse.
2.6.2 CONGRUENCE BETWEEN APPROPRIATION AND PROVISION RULES AND LOCAL
CONDITIONS
The second design principle, with the rather lengthy name “congruence between
appropriation and provision rules and local conditions,” is broken down into two
components as well: First, the principle expresses the need for congruence between the
set of rules and local conditions,160 a recommendation that articulates Ostrom’s emphasis
on local context and knowledge, and her wariness of one-size-fits-all institutions designed
by model-wielding experts. Ostrom’s initial discussion of the design principle in Governing
the Commons (1990) is limited to this first interpretation.161 Applying the design principle
to health care is straightforward, as the principle calls for health care institutions that are
attuned to relevant variations in local conditions, for example: differences in population
(e.g., socioeconomic, age), therapeutic preferences of physicians and patients (e.g.,
vaginal delivery, Caesarean section), or economic circumstances (e.g., economic growth).
Even though the second design principle, like several of the others, can also be applied to
the status quo institutions, they are unlikely to fully do justice to differences in local
conditions, thus strengthening the case for versatile health care commons institutions.
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Second, the design principle asks for correspondence between appropriation and
provision rules, a difficult way of saying there needs to be congruity between the benefits
members receive and the costs they incur from collective action.162 If some participants
enjoy most of the benefits but pay few of the costs, then other members become
unwilling to follow the rules over time,163 as the inequity frustrates participants causing
more and more of them to consider the rules unfair.164,165 The relevance of this second
component of the design principle to health care quickly becomes apparent when applied
to a health care system that is perceived as inequitable. When some participants (e.g.,
patients, practitioners) believe the rules are rigged in favor of certain members (e.g.,
insurers, immigrants) this leads to an unwillingness to play by the rules and induces selfinterested behavior (e.g., moral hazard, overconsumption). Perception is everything. The
disproportion between benefits and costs among participants need not be real.166 As long
as the belief exists that certain members enjoy disproportionate benefits vis-à-vis the
costs they bear, say Medicaid abusers, the damage is done. If even a small number of
members believes there is no congruity between benefits and costs, causing them to stop
following the rules and pursue their self-interest, this in turn affirms the belief of others
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165 The congruity between benefits and costs can be interpreted in a number of
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the rules are not fair, leading to a potentially disastrous domino effect. On the contrary,
if the institution ensures the distribution of benefits and the distribution of costs are
broadly consistent, then participants display a greater willingness to follow the rules and
maintain the resource system.167 As Ostrom puts it, “fairness is a crucial attribute to the
rules of robust systems.”168 Institutions that ensure a fair distribution between benefits
and costs can build trust. Moreover, if the rules meet shared concepts of fairness, then
more individuals are willing to abide by them.169 In the case of health care, so central to
many societies, one might even argue that fair health care institutions can shape people’s
perception of fairness.
The second component of the design principle is particularly relevant for the
following chapters. First, individuals’ willingness to follow the rules touches upon issues
of legitimacy,170 which are central to Daniels and Sabin’s work on setting limits fairly.
Commons research can shed new light on the so-called “legitimacy problem” (see 4.4.1
Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R)), which is applicable to social institutions.171 Of
course, questions of fairness stemming from the congruity of benefits and costs more
generally relate to their work on just health care (see 4.4.4.2 Relevance Condition).
Second, the (perceived) tradeoff between benefits and costs among members plays a role
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in health care reform, as inequities can both spur reform efforts or be a hindrance to
them.172
2.6.3 COLLECTIVE-CHOICE ARRANGEMENTS
The third design principle, “collective-choice arrangements,” is closely related to the
second principle, as “resource regimes that use this [third] principle are both better able
to tailor rules to local circumstances and to devise rules that are considered fair by
participants.”173 But what does the principle entail? Ostrom defines the principle as
follows: “Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying
the operational rules.”174 Unlike the first two principles, this design principle has not later
been refined.175,176 More importantly, this rule operates at the collective-choice level
(meso-level) rather than at the operational level (micro-level), stipulating a particular way
operational rules should come into existence, namely through deliberation among
members of the commons.177 So while most other design principles function at the
operational level (i.e., clearly-defined boundaries, congruence, monitoring, sanctioning,

172 The congruity between the benefits members receive

and the costs they incur can also
be a way to conceptualize equitability as a criterion of institutional performance.
173 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 263.
174 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 93.
175 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”
176 A noticeable exception is Stern. When considering the applicability of the design
principles to global commons, he suggests rephrasing the third design principle as follows:
“Ensure meaningful participation of the range of interested and affected parties in
developing rules.” (Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 221.)
177 Of course, the question is how one should interpret that “most individuals affected by
the rules” should participate in their modification? The answer is “it depends,” among
others, on the boundaries of the commons (see 2.6.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries) and on
the level of analysis.
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and conflict-resolution mechanisms),178 this principle stipulates the manner in which
those other rules are filled in. The fact this principle operates at the collective-choice level
rather than the operational level sets it apart from the other design principles. In a way,
collective-choice arrangements captures the essence of the commons paradigm: relying
on deliberation among users to manage shared, scarce resources. One can attribute a
certain primacy to this third design principle, for without it most of the other design
principles must remain without content.179 The presence of collective-choice
arrangements seems to be a precondition for the other design principles that operate at
the operational level. Remarkably, the central importance of the third design principle
has not been recognized in the commons literature, where the principle is consistently
discussed in relation to the second design principle,180 much along the lines of the opening
sentence of this section. The principle is treated simply as unum inter pares rather than
as primum inter pares.
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The last two design principles, minimum recognition of rights and nested enterprises,
are exceptions in that they do not as obviously operate at the operational level or at the
collective-choice level as the other principles do, but pertain to a commons institution’s
relationship to other, often larger institutional arrangements.
179 Nothing prevents other institutional arrangements from using the other design
principles. To give just one example, a state can recognize the importance of clearly
defining the boundaries of a shared resource and implement the design principle without
relying on input from the individuals affected by the operational rules, thus filling in the
design principle without relying on deliberation. The third design principle stands out,
however, in that it cannot be adopted by the status quo institutions without at the same
time embracing the key idea of deliberation among resource users, thus adopting the
commons paradigm itself.
180 See: Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 93; Ostrom, “Collective Action and the
Evolution of Social Norms,” 150; Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,”
1332; Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions,” 34; Cox, Arnold,
and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”
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Nonetheless, discussions of the third design principle highlight several features
that are of interest to its application in health care: First, experiments and field studies
have shown that participants are more willing to abide by the rules if they participated in
their design.181 Conversely, rule compliance is lower when the rules are implemented
form the top down.182 Second, collective-choice arrangements allow for information
about benefits, costs, and local conditions as perceived by the members of the commons
to be taken into account when drafting rules.183 Thus, commons institutions likely are able
to process information more efficiently than state institutions, and possibly even more
effectively than market institutions, because commons’ deliberative processes allow for
more meaningful information to be processed.184,185 Third, the fact members are at the
center of these collective-choice arrangements does not mean they must be the ones to
initiate them. In other words, collective-choice arrangements do not have to come about
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commons institutions designed with processes for deliberation in place, but members of
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Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).) Of course, much like the models of
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(Diego Gambetta, “‘Claro!’: An Essay on Discursive Machismo,” in Deliberative
Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22.)
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from the bottom up (see 3. The Polycentric Experiment). To give an example, a national
health care system that wants to devise new operational rules for hospitals can set up
collective-choice arrangements from the top down for hospitals to engage in deliberation.
Fourth, collective-choice arrangements build trust through the development of social
networks and reciprocal relationships between resource users.186 Rules devised by
governments or far-away headquarters do not have the same positive impact. Finally, the
main criticism of this design principle is especially relevant to health care, as many
scholars worry that collective-choice arrangements may exist in form, but in practice they
are coopted or undermined by powerful, self-interested actors (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of
the Middle-Level for a detailed discussion of so-called “elite capture”).187
The most promising application of the third design principle, in combination with
the other principles, is to offer new insights on operationalizing a series of longstanding
proposals in the bioethics literature for deliberative resource management and policy
development. Emanuel, for example, has proposed the development of community
health programs based on principles of deliberative democracy.188 Fleck is another
prominent advocate of relying on deliberation to allocate scarce resources (“rational
democratic deliberation”),189 even though his account is heavily indebted to Daniels (and
Sabin).190 Eddy would ideally rely on the market to make resource allocation decisions,
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but because the health care marketplace is flawed,191 he believes decisions about the
management of scarce health care resources should be based on the preferences of
patients (“rationing by patient choice”), bottom-up rather than top-down.192 Of course,
aggregating patient preferences does not necessarily imply deliberation.193 Moreover,
states and/or markets can be the institutions responsible for aggregating patient
preferences. Still, Eddy does not rule out a deliberative approach altogether, and he
promotes deliberative approaches at Kaiser Permanente.194 In fact, Fleck names Eddy and
Daniels in the same breath when discussing rational democratic deliberation.195,196 That
brings us to Daniels and Sabin’s approach to the deliberative management of scarce
health care resources, probably the most well-known and influential account. Their
proposal, named “Accountability for Reasonableness,” is the subject of chapter four (see
4. A4R in Practice).

191 David Eddy, “Rationing by Patient Choice,” Journal of the American Medical Association

265, no. 1 (January 1991): 105.
192 Eddy, “Rationing by Patient Choice,” 106-107.
193 David Eddy, “Principles for Making Difficult Decisions in Difficult Times,” Journal of the
American Medical Association 271, no. 22 (June 1994): 1797.
194 “[A]ll the approaches that resolved the conflict [between individual and society] are
based on the same principle – let people decide what they are willing to pay for, respect
those decisions, and adhere to those decisions.” (David Eddy, “The Individual vs Society:
Resolving the Conflict,” Journal of the American Medical Association 265, no. 18 (May
1991): 2401.) Eddy does not specify how the principle should be put into practice.
195 Fleck, Just Caring, 152.
196 To be fair, Fleck writes both Eddy and Daniels have identified the same “[…] essential
moral insight that makes rational democratic deliberation fair and feasible.” (Fleck, Just
Caring, 152.) In other words, Eddy has identified the same rationale for democratic
deliberation, but that does not mean they endorse the same solution, but Fleck seems to
believe Eddy would be open to relying on deliberation (rather than simple aggregation)
to decide on the allocation of scarce health care resources.
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2.6.4 MONITORING
Ostrom defines “monitoring,” the fourth design principle, as follows: “Monitors, who
actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are accountable to the
appropriators or are the appropriators.”197 More recently, commons researchers have
divided the fourth design principle into two subcomponents:198 First, monitors are
present and actively audit CPR conditions and the behavior of resource users. 199 On this
first reading, the principle simply “stipulates the presence of monitors.”200 In the absence
of monitoring, rules become meaningless.201 The rules need following and rule breakers
must be discovered in order to keep the commons from deteriorating.202 Moreover, by
ensuring adherence to the rules the presence of monitoring strengthens trust.203
Second, the principle qualifies the attributes of the monitors required by the first
subcomponent: monitors are accountable to or are themselves resource users.204 This
sets the design principle apart from other monitoring schemes, which often rely on
external authorities. Reliance on external authorities for monitoring can be harmful in at
least two ways. On the one hand, strong external monitoring does enforce cooperation,
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but without the development of any internal norms.205 On the other hand, and even
worse, low levels of external monitoring not only discourage the formation of social
norms, but also make it attractive for some members to abuse the commons, as the risk
of being caught is low.206 In response, Ostrom argues members can develop their own
rules to support cooperation, which are more easily internalized vis-à-vis externally
imposed rules. Commons research suggests the following monitoring arrangements for
self-governed resource regimes: In some small-scale commons, “monitoring is a
byproduct of particular ways of managing the commons,”207 allowing for fully
decentralized monitoring and low monitoring costs.208 Such an approach is virtually
impossible in case of a global commons, because of the size and complexity of the
commons. This does not only make monitoring technically difficult and costly, but the
large number of users and high stakes lead to conflicts of interest between the major
participants, who are best placed to monitor resource usage but have an incentive to
underreport, and the bulk of the members to whom the monitors should be accountable
(e.g., physicians reporting abuses by other physicians).209 This objection also plagues the
next monitoring arrangement: reliance on official monitors selected by the members of
the commons. By appointing monitors, participants do not have to rely solely on the
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commons’ design and on the norms of the other members.210 Resource users can either
rotate into the role of monitor or the position can take a more permanent form.211 In the
former case, monitors sometimes are often not remunerated beyond the benefits that
flow from maintaining the commons. (Of course, for this to happen monitors must benefit
directly and sufficiently from improved resource conditions!212) In the latter case,
monitors are usually paid from funds collected from the members.213 Still, the membermonitor may be mired in conflict of interest or simply unable to perform the difficult task
of monitoring. However, the monitor need not necessarily be a member of the commons,
which offers a possible way around the objection. Rather than elect monitors amongst
themselves, members can instead appoint independent, third-party monitoring of the
CPR.214 In the instance of a large and rich commons (e.g., health care), the members can
sufficiently fund the independent monitor (or monitors) to perform its difficult task and
assure its autonomy. Nevertheless, major participants have a strong incentive to
influence the monitor, which raises the question: quis custodiet ipsos custodes?215 A
question that is equally pertinent when the monitor is a member of the commons. To
resolve this second-order dilemma,216 Ostrom suggests closing the loop between

210

Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 265.
Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions,” 34-35.
212 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”
213 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 265.
214 Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 221.
215 Freely translated, “Who will monitor the monitors themselves?” (Literally translated,
“Who will guard the guards themselves?”)
216 Arun Agrawal, “Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule
Systems and Resource Use,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, eds. Elinor
Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006),
275.
211

166

monitors and users,217 in effect turning users into the auditors of the monitors. In theory,
users are motivated to perform this role because they have an active interest in the
survival of the commons,218 while professional monitors receive financial incentives. To
illustrate Ostrom’s idea, consider the following example: patients/physicians are
monitored by administrators who in turn are audited by an independent watchdog that
is accountable to all patients/physicians. This builds some redundancy into the monitoring
system, as failure to detect one infraction does not trigger a cascading process of rules
infractions.219 Polycentric governance regimes can more easily accommodate redundant
monitoring systems that rely on feedback loops (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many
Worlds?).
Ostrom’s ideas about monitoring relate to health care in a number of interesting
ways: First, her approach depart from many existing monitoring practices in health care,
which rely heavily on top-down monitoring. Second, historically commons-like monitoring
has played an important role in health care, for example the role professional
organizations have played, and continue to play, in monitoring and sanctioning their
members. However, these arrangements have important drawbacks, among others, the
danger of creating homogenous silos of actors responsible for monitoring each other and
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the related risk of a lack of transparency.220 A good example of such a lack of transparency
are the controversies surrounding information about hospital performance being made
available to the public in the United States, Belgium, and elsewhere. Ostrom’s analysis
can inform discussions about how to institute more transparency. Finally, health care
seems to be characterized by either very strong external monitoring, leading to health
care actors not developing internal norms, or what are de facto low levels of internal
monitoring, also leading actors not to develop norms and making it attractive for some
actors to deceive and defect.221 Ostrom’s work provides concrete guidelines for
developing more intricate, hybrid monitoring systems that can overcome the
shortcomings of the current monitoring systems.
2.6.5 GRADUATED SANCTIONS222
The name of the fifth design principle conveys its main recommendation: progressive
sanctions work best to maintain compliance with the rules. There will always be instances
in which members break the rules; even members who are basically committed to
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Archives of Internal Medicine 151, no. 3 (March 1991).
222 The first five design principles fit together to form a “coherent theoretical explanation
of why they may work together:” when the users of a CPR design their own rules (see
2.4.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements) that are enforced by the users or accountable to
them (see 2.4.4 Monitoring) relying on graduated sanctions (see 2.4.5 Graduated
Sanctions) “that clearly define who has rights to withdraw from a well-defined resource”
(see 2.4.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries) and effectively assign costs in proportion to
benefits (see 2.4.2 Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local
Conditions) then collective action problems tend to be resolved. (Ostrom, “Design
Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions,” 35.) The sixth design principle (see 2.4.6
Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms) bolsters the operation of these five design principles.
(Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 152.)
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following the rules may succumb to the temptation to break them.223 The real threat to
rule compliance, and to the commons, comes from users who repeatedly break the
rules.224 Not only does their frequent rule breaking put a strain on the CPR, but it can
instill the belief in other resource users that the rules are not followed, in turn making
them less likely to comply with the rules. Commons research suggests a small, even
negligible penalty is the most effective way to deal with occasional rule breakers, while
more severe penalties should be reserved for repeat violators. The suggestion may seem
common sense, but goes against the standard recommendation in the economics
literature: harsh sanctions work best because the expected value of breaking the rules is
negative, even when the probability of being caught is relatively low.225
There are several reasons imposing a small sanction on the odd rule breaker is
most effective: First, a small penalty “may be sufficient to remind the infractor of the
importance of compliance.”226 Of course, the first-time rule breaker might have acted
strategically, knowingly and willingly breaking the rule out of self-interest, but users are
likely to break the rules in error,227 especially in large and complex commons with many
rules (e.g., health care). A small penalty reminds the rule breaker, as well as the other
participants, of the rules. Second, minor sanctions convey information in another way,
they let the infractor and the other users know that monitoring is ongoing and penalties
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are being handed out, avoiding a potentially catastrophic cascade of noncompliance.228
Third, a small initial sanction avoids the risk of crowding out endogenous cooperative
behavior,229 for example a conditional willingness to follow the rules. If the sanction is
disproportionate to the infraction,230 the rule breaker is likely to find the sanction unfair,
because needlessly punitive, leaving them disenchanted with the institution.231 As a
result, such members may be more inclined to act self-interestedly rather than
cooperatively. Finally, field studies and experiments show that even small verbal
sanctions directed against unknown defectors can be enough to change the behavior of
rule breakers (i.e., simply pointing out that “someone” is breaking the rules).232 In some
field settings, outsiders might even find it difficult to recognize minor sanctions used to
punish first-time offenders as penalties because they center on peer disapproval,233 which
can result in an unwillingness to extend trust to the rule breaker in future dealings,
representing a significant cost to the offender despite the penalty itself being relatively
minor.234 As such, small sanctions provide information in yet another way: they let users
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know who follows the rules and who breaks them, who behaves cooperatively and who
acts self-interestedly.235
Stricter penalties are reserved for repeat offenders, who pose the main threat to
the commons. Members who repeatedly break the rules should eventually face a penalty
that makes rule-breaking an unattractive option.236 While the initial sanctions have little
to no impact on the expected benefit to cost ratio of breaking the rules, penalties for
repeat offenders do alter the anticipated return of an infraction. If ever higher sanctions
do not have the desired effect, offenders are sometimes forced to leave the commons
altogether.237
Regardless of the severity of the penalties, commons research suggests sanctions
work best in combination with arenas for communication (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice
Arrangements).238 Based on experiments, the result of sanctioning without
communication is often that sanctioning costs (i.e., fines) offset the gains in efficiency
brought about by the penalties, so the net result is usually not improved by the
sanctions.239 Sanctioning in combination with communication, however, tends to lead to
significantly better outcomes, especially when the members are allowed to develop their
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own sanctions.240,241 This leads Ostrom to conclude: “[S]ubjects who use the opportunity
to communicate to agree to a joint strategy and choose their own sanctioning mechanism
achieve close to optimal results based entirely on the promises they make, their own
efforts to monitor, and their own investments in sanctioning.”242

As monitoring and sanctioning are often discussed in tandem, several considerations
apply to both design principles: First, monitoring and sanctioning must be carried out
consistently in order for them to be effective. Monitors must be proactive in their efforts
and willing to impose sanctions whenever they find rule violations.243 Of course, this does
not mean each and every infraction needs to be detected, but members have to believe
monitoring and sanctioning are ongoing to assure their continued compliance with the
rules. Thus, monitoring and sanctioning activities must be public. At least to the extent
they are transparent, even if the offenders themselves must sometimes remain
anonymous (e.g., privacy concerns). As such, monitoring and sanctioning are subject to
Daniels and Sabin’s publicity condition (see 4.4.4.1 Publicity Condition). In turn, commons
research provides an additional argument to support the use of the publicity condition in
the context of allocating health care resources. Second, according to economic orthodoxy
resource users should not engage in monitoring and sanctioning, because these are costly
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activities no homo economicus in the right mind would take up, lest he be the “sucker”244
whose hard work other self-interested maximizers take advantage of. In other words, selforganized systems themselves should not exist, hence the need for top-down monitoring
by a Leviathan. Commons research challenges this “[…] Hobbesian conclusion that
constitution of order is only possible by creating sovereigns who then must govern by
being above subjects, by monitoring them, and by imposing sanctions on all who would
otherwise not comply.”245 Bottom-up monitoring and sanctioning are not only possible,
but commons research shows self-organized systems may be able to perform these tasks
better than hierarchies can. That being said, hierarchies can help to stimulate selfgovernance at lower-levels (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).
2.6.6 CONFLICT-RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
Conflicts are inevitable when access to scarce resource is concerned, let alone health care
resources. While rules are assumed to be clear and unambiguous in theoretical work,246
this is not the case in practice.247 Rules are open to interpretation, even when resource
users have jointly drafted them, and the rules have to be understood to be effective.248
Moreover, disagreements about the interpretation of the rules are only one potential
source of conflicts, which can have a host of other causes, say, changing circumstances

244 In the literature, the term “sucker”

is the generally accepted designation for the player
who chooses to cooperate in game where the other players defects, thus being left
empty-handed (see footnote 65 in the previous chapter).
245 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 193-194.
246 Moreover, the assumption is the rules “are enforced by external, all-knowing officials.”
(Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 100.)
247 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1332.
248 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 267.
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(e.g., technological change) or new insights into the CPR (e.g., rate of resource usage is
higher than initially thought). Thus arises the need for the sixth design principle: “conflictresolution mechanisms,” which bolsters the operation of the aforementioned design
principles.249 The design principle stipulates the importance of “rapid access to low-cost
local arenas in which to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials.”250
As with the other design principles, Ostrom does little in terms of specifying what these
conflict-resolution mechanisms should look like, that is up to the members of a particular
commons to decide upon collectively, but she stresses arenas to resolve conflicts need to
be present.251 Commons institutions with conflict resolution mechanisms are more likely
to survive vis-à-vis commons where such mechanisms are difficult to access, or not
available altogether.252
Still, the design principle itself and Ostrom’s writings offer some guidance as to
what these conflict-resolution mechanisms should look like: First, the mechanisms should
be “rapid,” arguably both when it comes to gaining access to them and resolving the
conflict. As conflicts linger, they undermine trust, cooperation, and compliance with the
rules. Second, the conflict-resolution mechanisms must be “low-cost.”253 When it is too
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costly to resolve a conflict, resource users will not bother making use of the available
mechanisms, again posing a threat to continued cooperation and compliance. This is only
in part an issue of access. The cost to enter into the conflict-resolution process can
deliberately be kept low, but if members (know they) subsequently get bogged down in
a long and costly procedure, they can nonetheless be dissuaded from making use of the
mechanism. Third, the conflict-resolution mechanism needs to be “local,” which can be
interpreted as being situated at the appropriate level of analysis. To illustrate, a conflict
between physicians in a group practice should ideally be resolved in that practice, while
a conflict between regional hospitals must be resolved by that region’s health
authority.254 Similarly, a patient seeking to access resources but being denied should be
able to challenge the decision and resolve the conflict locally, without escalation to a faroff, anonymous decision maker. On a complementary reading of the requirement, the
tendency to resolve conflicts at a higher level of authority should be resisted in favor of a
local resolution of the conflict (see 2.4.7 Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize).255 By
doing so, members are involved in the conflict-resolution process rather than feeling the
issue is decided over their heads. Member involvement in conflict-resolution mechanisms

254 Ostrom gives several examples of conflict resolution mechanisms: (1) The water

courts
in the Spanish huertas (see 2.4 A Common Scenario). (2) In Nepal, conflicts between users
of common forests are resolved through a tiered system. Smaller internal conflicts are
resolved by the local forest users’ committee, while more complicated internal issues are
handled by “forest user group” (FUG) assemblies, sometimes with help from local forestry
officials. As semiautonomous entities, FUGs can go to court for more serious conflicts, but
that has not happened so far. (Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights
Institutions,” 42.)
255 The view that issues should be dealt with at the most immediate (i.e., local) level that
is consistent with their resolution is also known as the principle of subsidiarity (see 2.7.1
The Challenge of Size and 3.6 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).
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can stimulate cooperation, increase compliance with the rules, build trust, and provide
members with valuable insights into the nature of the resource constraints. At the same
time, however, members need to have the option to escalate disagreements to higherlevel arenas for conflict resolution in order to avoid the conflict-resolution mechanism is
hijacked by a few powerful local members (see 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises and 3.5
Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).256 The result is a tiered conflict-resolution
mechanism.257 Fourth, and closely related to the previous requirement, the solution to
the conflict should be “generally known in the community.”258 Much like the publicity of
monitoring and sanctioning, publicity of the conflict resolution process assures members
that the institution works, again stimulating cooperation, rule compliance, and trust.
Moreover, by being public, the conflict-resolution mechanism provides the users with
information about the interpretation of the rules, resolving the ambiguity that (often) lies
at the basis of the conflict in the first place (see also 4.4.4.1 Publicity Condition). Finally,
the conflict-resolution mechanisms should be “orderly,”259 meaning the mechanisms
themselves need to operate following certain rules determined by collective-choice
arrangements (see 3.4.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements). This does not mean, however
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that the conflict-resolution process must be highly formalized. On the contrary, an agreed
judicial body can mediate conflicts even if the process they use is highly informal. 260
The commons literature does not explicitly acknowledge the role that conflictresolution mechanisms can play in bringing about institutional change. First, resolving
ambiguities surrounding the rules can itself constitute a form of institutional change, as
interpreting a rule in a certain way can imply a change from the way that rule was applied
up until that point. To give a mundane example, even though a health system has certain
vague rules about printing documents (e.g., employees should not waste paper), a
majority of its employees may nonetheless always print their documents one-sided. If
somebody complains about this practice, then the rule may be clarified to mean that
employees should print double-sided whenever possible.261 While changes resulting from
the interpretation of existing rules will often be minor, they nonetheless imply an
institutional (micro) change. Second, conflict-resolution mechanisms are the locus to
identify rules that must be changed to ensure the sustainability of the institution. While
many conflicts will be one-offs, or simply the result of everyday rule infractions during the
regular use of the resources, some conflicts may be the indication of a development which
requires a change in the rules to cope with the evolution (e.g., shift in behavior of resource
users, gradual depletion of the available resources, environmental changes). To give a
concrete example, the introduction of costly health care technologies leads to new
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conflicts about resource usage that require changes to the rules (see 2.7.3 The Challenge
of Technological Change). Conflict-resolution mechanisms can identify developments that
require rule changes and escalate them to the collective-choice level (see 0.5.3 Rules).
Finally, and related to the previous point, conflict-resolution mechanisms are often
closely aligned with, or sometimes can even be identified with, the collective-choice
mechanisms responsible for changing the rules. To give a concrete example, the water
court in the Valencian huerta can make certain operational decisions that directly impact
the rules-in-use (see 2.4 A Common Scenario). As such, mechanisms responsible for
resolving conflicts often play a key role in changing the rules.262 In conclusion, I believe
the role conflict-resolution mechanisms can play in institutional change is an
indispensable and valuable addition to the design principle in order to ensure institutional
robustness.
2.6.7 RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS TO ORGANIZE263
Until now, the design principles have primarily been recommendations concerning the
“inner workings” of commons institutions. However, principles seven and eight (see 2.4.8

262 Of

course, this raises questions about the relationship between conflict-resolution and
collective-choice mechanisms. While I argue there are advantages to maintaining
communication channels between them, there likely are good reasons not to integrate
these mechanisms, as this can lead to conflicts of interest and undesirable power
concentrations.
263 The seventh design principle is usually named “minimal recognition of rights to
organize,” which seems to imply there is some minimal threshold of the recognition of
the right to organize that must be met in order for commons to be successful. Ostrom
does not stipulate, however, what that minimal recognition of the right to organize would
be. Moreover, the way the design principle is unpacked in the literature simply argues
that the right of resource users to devise their own rules is not challenged by external
authorities. I therefore choose to call the design principle “recognition of rights to
organize.”
178

Nested Enterprises) pertain to commons institutions’ relationship to other, often larger
institutional arrangements. Both principles are related to autonomy (see also 3.4
Pluralism and Freedom in Health Care).264 According to the seventh design principle,
dubbed “minimal recognition of rights to organize,” external authorities do not challenge
the rights of members to devise their own institutions.265 In other words, larger
institutions should enable resource users in social dilemma situations to have sufficient
autonomy so they can draft and change the rules that affect their particular situation.266
On the contrary, if external authorities presume only they have the authority to draft,
monitor, and sanction rules; then it becomes very difficult for resource users to sustain
their commons institution in the long run.267 Even though in the commons literature
external authorities are usually associated with the state, they can also appear in the guise
of powerful market institutions.
Acknowledging the rights of resource users to organize is important for several
reasons: First, local users, relying on local knowledge, are able to design rules that are
better suited to local conditions (see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge),268
while externally imposed rules might be ill-adapted to local circumstances, something Cox
and his colleagues catalogue as a government failure.269 Second, the rules of commons
that enjoy (a certain level of) autonomy are less likely to be challenged by upstream
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entities (e.g., courts, administrative, and legislative institutions).270 When higher-level
institutions do not recognize a commons institution’s right to organize, disgruntled
members can appeal to these institutions when they disagree with the rules. As a result,
the drafting or changing of rules requires unanimity in order to avoid a challenge,271
imposing high transaction costs on the commons and preventing members from
searching for better-matched, lower-cost rules.272 Nonetheless, some commons
institutions that use unanimity as the rules to change rules have been able to operate for
a relatively long time.273 Third, stressing the right of institutions to organize is necessary
because once the process of drafting and altering rules has been taken over by higherlevel institutions, it is difficult to then turn it back over to resource users,274 itself a form
of elite capture (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-Level). Arguably, the monopolization
of the rule-making process by upstream institutions has already taken place in health
care, making it difficult to grant rights to users to draft their own rules, thus posing an
important challenge to the development of commons solutions in health care.275 Finally,
emphasizing the autonomy of commons institutions can help resist the push to privatize
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commons or to bring them under state control (see 4.4 Pluralism and Freedom in Health
Care).276,277
The design principle calls for the right to organize to be “recognized,” by no means
does it demand for absolute autonomy. On the contrary, commons institutions do not
operate in a vacuum but are embedded in other, often higher-level, institutional
arrangements. Commons must relate to and rely on these other institutions in order to
avoid several pitfalls that stem from self-organization at the local level: First, lower-level
institutions have both “incentives and opportunities to externalize the costs of the
resource degradation they cause,”278 effectively passing the degradation of the CPR on to
others. Solving this issue likely requires local autonomy to be restricted in some ways
while allowed in others or “to devise institutional forms that give local users incentives to
self-govern in the wider interest.”279 Second, local resource users may not possess the
necessary knowledge, or other resources, to sustain the commons without outside
help.280 Local knowledge is important, but may fall short. Hence, commons often need to
rely on specialized knowledge or reliable information from upstream organizations.281
These considerations connect the principle to the final design principle (see 2.4.8 Nested
Enterprises) and to the idea of polycentricity (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many
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Worlds?). Finally, the design principle can also apply internally to larger organizations that
are not themselves commons. The current formulation of the principle likely is the
consequence of the features of the natural resource commons that much of commons
research is based on.
In natural resource settings, commons often are overlooked and allowed to
operate simply because they are “invisible” to authorities.282 It is difficult to imagine
commons can fly under the radar in health care, however, given the costs and interests
at stake, making it necessary to explicitly grant autonomy from the top down in order for
health care commons to develop and for institutional experiments to take place (see 3.
The Polycentric Experiment). To give an example, in Singapore authorities gave more
authority to public hospitals during the restructuring of the health care system during the
1980s, allowing them to reorganize internally.283 It is worth noting that modern
technology (e.g., HIS, big data) allows for considerably more control to be exerted from
the top down. On the one hand, this poses a threat to autonomy, as upstream actors may
be tempted to use technology to micromanage downstream entities. On the other hand,
technological developments present an opportunity, as authorities can allow
downstream entities considerable freedom to organize themselves, while relying on
technology to monitor their actions from a distance and interfere only when necessary.
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2.6.8 NESTED ENTERPRISES
The final design principle, “nested enterprises,” applies to large and complex CPRs.284
Thus, the principle is particularly relevant to health care. In Governing the Commons
(1990), Ostrom provides the following lengthy definition of the design principle:
“Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance
activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.”285 In later publications,
she summarizes the principle as follows, “the presence of governance activities organized
in multiple layers of nested enterprises.”286 This shorter definition is the one that stuck.
The design principle is based on Ostrom’s observation that among robust commons,
smaller scale organizations tend to be nested in ever-larger organizations.287
The need for nested enterprises arises because Ostrom believes purely
decentralized systems are just as likely to fail as completely centralized ones.288 Relying
on a variety of nested institutions is indispensable for the successful management of large
and complex CPRs (see 3. The Polycentric Experiment). There are several reasons for this:
First, commons are not insular. Resources are shared between interlocking and
interdependent commons institutions.289 In a health care system that uses a global
budget, for example, two seemingly discrete hospitals in fact draw on the same CPR. This
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is the case regardless of the particular institutional form of the hospitals. Nesting allows
larger institutions (e.g., regional health authority) “to govern the interdependencies
among smaller units.”290 Second, and closely related to the preceding reason, the design
principle is motivated by the first design principle (see 2.4.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries).
The boundaries of the commons must be defined in relation to other institutions that
make use of the same CPR. Nesting is a way to achieve this “match” between
boundaries.291 Third, institutional monocropping is dangerous because overreliance on a
single institutional arrangement can have catastrophic consequences for the CPRs if that
arrangement fails (see 3. The Polycentric Experiment). This applies both to institutional
form (e.g., state, market, commons) and to institutional size (e.g., small-scale, largescale). Nesting allows for the mixing and matching of institutions of different types and
sizes to avert this threat and design more robust institutions. In practice, small-scale
commons can function as “base institutions,” relying on face-to-face communication to
solve “many of the day-to-day problems in smaller groups,”292 at the same time gaining
experience with collective-choice arrangements (see 4. A4R in Practice). Building on this
experience, larger institutions can then coordinate the activities of these commons, while
also providing resources to tackle bigger issues (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many
Worlds?). Finally, Ostrom notes that “[e]stablishing rules at one level, without rules at the
other levels, will produce an incomplete system that may not endure over the long
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run.”293 As often, she does not explain the idea of “completeness” in detail, but instead
uses an example to illustrate its meaning.294 Applied to health care, the example looks
something like this: the problems facing administrators at a local hospital are different
from, but related to the issues experienced by the regional health authority, which in turn
are distinct from, but again related to, the challenges faced by the national health care
system. Establishing rules at one level, without accompanying rules at the other levels,
leads to an incomplete system of rules that likely will not prove to be robust. Nesting can
be used to produce a complete and integrated set of rules to manage CPRs.
An important clarification of the design principle is that nesting may occur both
vertically, between institutions at different levels (e.g., hospital and regional health
authority), and horizontally, between institutions situated at the same level (e.g., two
hospitals). The former is closest to the classic idea of nesting, where a governance system
at a lower level of analysis falls under a governance system at a higher level of analysis.
In other words, governance levels are layered one on top of the other. At least initially,
Ostrom seems to be primarily interested in vertical relationships.295 However, governance
levels can also be layered next to one another, in a way that there is considerable
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interaction between the horizontal entities and rules must be in place to govern the
relationship between them. Cox and his colleagues talk about connections between
resource governance communities that must be situated at the same level. 296 While
horizontal nesting departs from the traditional interpretation of the concept of nesting,
it does meet the definition of the eighth design principle. Moreover, horizontal nesting
can make sense within polycentric governance systems. While many interactions
between lower-level organizations in a polycentric governance system will run via a
higher-level entity, resource systems at the same level may nonetheless have important
interactions between themselves that are not mediated by a higher-level institution. The
rationale behind the principle of nesting discussed in the previous paragraph applies to
horizontal as well as vertical linkages.
I think an important criticism of the argument for nested enterprises is that it
disregards the difficulty of integrating heterogeneous institutions (see 2.7.2 The
Challenge of Heterogeneity),297 both horizontally and vertically. Trying to coordinate
between a series of small-scale commons, each different from the next (e.g., members,
collective-choice arrangements, culture, conflict-resolution mechanisms), and/or having
them work together under the auspices of a larger institution with an altogether different
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Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”
To give a concrete example, single-payer systems that already operate under a global
budget and rely on political decision-making processes may have an easier time
integrating commons institutions into the existing set of rules than health care systems
that are characterized by mixed institutions, like that of the United States. I base the
example on Daniels and Sabin’s suggestion that single-payer systems operating under a
global budget will have an easier time adopting their A4R approach than mixed systems.
(Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 19-20.)
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makeup (e.g., state, market) is a daunting task. As such, the challenge posed by
institutional heterogeneity is not only an issue for the principle of nesting, but poses a
serious threat to the idea of polycentricity (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many
Worlds?).
Nevertheless, many of the ideas discussed here will be relevant to the discussion
of polycentricity in the following chapter (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many
Worlds?), as polycentricity can be conceived as a complex form of nesting combining both
vertical and horizontal integration.298

The design principles as a whole raise several important questions and criticisms: First,
there is the question of external validity. I have already highlighted the issue of applying
research that is largely based on natural resources to artificial resources in general and
health care resources in particular (see 0.5.5 Resources). The problem of external validity
becomes even more salient when considering the design principles, with their promise of
offering concrete recommendations for the development of robust commons institutions,
despite having been conceived as a series of conditions observed in robust commons
institutions (see 2.6 The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions). This in and
of itself already seems to temper any strong claims to external validity! The issue of
external validity breaks down into two questions: (1) “Can the design principles be applied
to complex, large-scale commons, sometimes called ‘global commons?’” (2) “Are the
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Ostrom often discuses nesting and polycentricity in tandem. (See, for example:
Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 270.)
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principles applicable to artificial resources in general and health care resources in
particular?” (1) Unsurprisingly, several authors are skeptical about applying the design
principles to cases other than the small-scale commons that were used to develop
them,299 while Stern believes the principles can be applied to global commons given some
adaptations and additions (see also 2.7.1 The Challenge of Size).300 The current project is
an attempt to apply commons research in general and the design principles in particular
to a large and complex commons, i.e., the governance of health care resources. (2) The
commons literature offers even less in terms of an answer to the second question.
Commons research’s focus on natural resources makes the question of whether or not
the design principles can be applied to artificial resources often is not even considered. A
notable exception are the knowledge commons. Ostrom speculates the design principles
may apply to the knowledge commons,301 or maybe over time it will be possible to come
up with a set of principles specifically for the knowledge commons,302 but she designates
both as questions for future research.303 In the secondary literature, Wall briefly argues
for the application of Ostrom’s ideas to the coproduction of physical goods, the
governance of financial resources, and the management of health care resources;304 but
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Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”
Stern, who is critical of the design principles, believes all design principles apply to
global commons bar the first one (i.e., clearly defined boundaries). (Stern, “Design
Principles for Global Commons,” 220.)
301 Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, “Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge
Commons,” in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, eds.
Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2011), 7.
302 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 68.
303 Knowledge commons tend to be large-scale commons, so implicitly Ostrom seems to
endorse the applicability of the design principles to global commons, at least tentatively.
304 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 143-150.
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he does not discuss the possible applicability of the design principles to these other
arenas. A possible rebuttal of the criticism that the design principles may not apply to
artificial resources is that their rationale is independent of the kind of resource, instead
focusing on institutional design features. Regardless, to determine whether the design
principles apply to health care commons, small and large, real-world health care
commons institutions must be analyzed in order to determine if they are characterized
by the current set of design principles or maybe they display conditions specific to health
care commons. In the meanwhile, and based on the limited success with applying the
design principles in the context within which they were developed (i.e., natural
resources),305 any use of the design principles as tools to develop health care commons
should be undertaken with extreme caution. Each attempt at applying the principles is
effectively a policy experiment with uncertain outcomes and possibly grave consequences
(see 3.3.3 The Ethics of Parallel Institutional Experiments). Of course, this caveat also
applies to using the design principles to operationalize Daniels and Sabin’s A4R approach
(see 4. A4R in Practice).
Second, several scholars have pointed out the design principles are incomplete,
suggesting additional criteria for the sustainable management of CPRs.306 Given Ostrom’s
insistence on the importance of context and complexity, she would certainly agree with
this criticism.307 To give a concrete example, some scholars have argued for the inclusion
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Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory.”
Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”
307 At the same time, the critique that the design principles are incomplete is a bit odd in
light of the IAD framework, which takes a much broader approach to the analysis and
development of institutions.
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of a design principle that further regulates the relation to “external socioeconomic
factors,”308 particularly the presence of markets. Several authors find the presence of
markets has a negative impact on cooperation and destabilizes commons
arrangements,309 which points toward a design principle specifically regulating the
relationship between commons and markets.
Finally, Ostrom’s principles raise a much more philosophical question. The design
principles characterize well-designed commons institution. Considering the general issue
of institutional design, Goodin asks to what extent such “good design” implies “good” in
a moral sense? In other words, in what sense do the design principles track morality?310
Goodin distinguishes between “internal” and “external” criteria of good design. He
characterizes the former as an institution’s fit with its environment,311 but at the same
time he suggests another interpretation of the notion “fit:” to what extent does the
institution do what it is designed to do. He describes the latter as judging an institution in
light of larger external evaluative criteria (i.e., moral criteria).312,313 To give an example,
the Tuskegee syphilis experiments may have been well designed (i.e., good) by the
internal criterion, in the sense that the experiment was methodologically sound and
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Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”
310 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 37.
311 “A well-designed object is one that fits its environment well.” (Goodin, “Institutions
and Their Design,” 37.)
312 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 37-38.
313 A bit confusingly, Goodin describes the external criterion of good design in terms of
“fit” as well, but “fit with external standards of moral worth.” (Goodin, “Institutions and
Their Design,” 37.)
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yielded significant scientific results,314 but were far from good when held up to judgment
against the external criterion of morality.315 Goodin summarizes his position as follows:

The appeal is, ultimately, to some larger moral code. There is a sense in which an
institution might be said to be well designed if it is internally consistent and
externally harmonious with its larger social environment. But that is still an
essentially internalist definition of optimal design which must eventually give way
to larger external critiques, rooted in normative principles that are at the end of
the day themselves independently defensible.316

What does this mean for Ostrom’s design principles? I think an initial consideration may
be the following: as a whole the design principles for successful commons institutions are
good by both criteria because ultimately they allow for the sustainable governance of
CPRs, which is morally good in itself. Of course, it is just a moral good, and not the morally
good as a whole. Still, in the case of health care resources and the resources discussed in
the commons literature (e.g., water, fish, knowledge, and climate), the sustainability of
the resources is a good thing. In the case of other resources, however, it may be better if
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The example is imperfect for two reasons: (1) One may argue the Tuskegee
experiments were not “harmonious with their external social environment” and thus their
design was poor by the internal criterion from the get-go. (Goodin, “Institutions and Their
Design,” 39.) (2) In the aftermath of the experiment, rules were developed to regulate
studies involving human participants (i.e., National Research Act, Belmont Report). In
other words, the external criterion of morality has been internalized, as it is now part of
the internal requirements for good design. From that point forward, studies like the
Tuskegee experiments meet neither internal or external criteria of good design.
315 Still more dramatic are instances of institutions “set in the context of an evil social
order which morally we ought to destroy.” (Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 38.)
For example, well-designed medical experiments on Untermenschen (internal criterion)
in Nazi Germany may be positively morally evaluated in the context of Nazism (external
criterion), but deserve nothing but moral criticism from an external point of view (external
criterion). The example is particularly interesting because it operates at different levels of
analysis (Ostrom).
316 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 39.
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the tragedy of the commons takes place (e.g., drugs). Not all commons are good commons
when judged against “some larger moral code,” it all depends on the CPR and its uses.317
Thus, as a whole the design principles are not categorically good, which means the
principles have to be evaluated individually, a daunting task as the principles have to be
judged against an ethical touchstone. Luckily, Goodin provides an illustrative shortlist of
desirable design principles that he believes have “deeper moral resonance.”318
Referencing the work of Robert K. Merton, he describes them as “principles that trade on
“theories of the middle range” in both empirical and normative realms.” 319 Without
explaining each of Goodin’s principles (and the rationale behind them) in detail,320 there
is considerable overlap between his shortlist and Ostrom’s design principles: First, the
principle of “revisability,” accounting for human fallibility and societal change,321
resembles Ostrom’s call for conflict-resolution mechanisms, which can serve as engines
for revising rules (see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms).322 Second, Goodin identifies
“robustness” as a desirable principle, the capability of adapting to new situations rather
than being destroyed by them.323 Even though none of Ostrom’s individual design
principles calls for robustness, the eight principles together are meant to ensure the
robustness of commons institutions. Third, Goodin suggests the need for a “publicity
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A discussion that leads to the intersection of economic value theory and moral value
theory: not all economic goods are moral goods.
318 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 39.
319 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 39.
320 For a detailed discussion, see: Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 39-43.
321 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 40.
322 The revisability principle also matches the feedback loop from the IAD framework.
323 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 40-41.
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principle,” meaning institutions and their actions must be publicly defensible.324 Publicity
is an integral part of several of Ostrom’s design principles (e.g. clearly defined boundaries,
collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict-resolution
mechanisms). Fourth, the principle of “variability” is needed to ensure learning-by-doing
in order to perfect institutional arrangements.325 Ostrom’s design principles, particularly
the last two (2.6.7 Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize and 2.6.8 Nested
Enterprises), explicitly aim for such variability (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many
Worlds?). Finally, even though Goodin does not include deliberative processes on his
tentative list of desirable design principles, he would likely agree democratic deliberation
is a principle that has “deeper moral resonance” (see 4. A4R in Practice).
2.7 CHALLENGES FACED BY THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS
In addition to the design principles, Ostrom identifies a number of challenges facing
commons institutions. These challenges complicate the use of commons institutions in
health care and may even preclude the use of the commons paradigm in health care
altogether. Ostrom distinguishes between what she calls “theoretical puzzles,” namely
the problems of size and heterogeneity, and threats. The rationale behind this distinction
is not entirely clear.326,327 I discuss both theoretical puzzles and threats under the
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Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 41-42.
Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 42.
326 Ostrom sometimes groups the theoretical puzzles and the threats together. (Ostrom,
“Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 148.)
327 Moreover, the (number of) threats Ostrom identifies differs, even though there is a
large overlap. For example, she identifies eight threats in Collective Action and the
Evolution of Social Norms (2000): (1) efforts by governments to impose a single set of
rules, (2) rapid changes in technology, (3) failure to transmit operational principles from
one generation to the next, (4) turning to external sources for help too often, (5) aid that
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umbrella of challenges. Rather than discuss all of the challenges identified by Ostrom, I
focus on the ones that are particularly relevant to the use of commons institutions in
health care: size, heterogeneity, and technological change. Even then, I perforce limit
myself to a summary discussion of these challenges, as a more detailed discussion lies
outside the scope of this dissertation, but offers an avenue for future research, both
theoretical and empirical.
2.7.1 THE CHALLENGE OF SIZE328
Almost all of the successful commons institutions described in commons research are
small, which potentially is a big problem for the implementation of these institutions in
health care. The laboratory experiments that commons research draws on have been
conducted on appropriation situations ranging from two to a couple of dozen
participants, while most field studies examine commons institutions with a maximum of
no more than a couple of hundred resource users. The limited number of resource users,
particularly in field studies of successful commons institutions, is no coincidence. After
all, commons researchers agree large-scale commons institutions, sometimes called

does not take account of local knowledge and institutions, (6) growth of opportunistic
behavior (e.g. corruption), (7) lack of large-scale institutional arrangements providing fair
and low-cost resolution mechanisms for conflicts, and (8) rapid shifts in population.
(Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 153.) However, she only
lists five of them in Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005): (1) rapid exogenous
changes (e.g., technology, heterogeneity), (2) transmission failures, (3) relying on
blueprint thinking, 4) corruption and rent-seeking, and (5) lack of large-scale supportive
institutions. Some of the threats from the former list are seemingly and plausibly
collapsed into one another in the latter list. (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional
Diversity, 271-279.)
328 “Size” primarily refers to the number of resource users involved in the appropriation
situation, but the number of appropriators tends to correlate with the physical size of the
CPR.
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“global commons,”329 are much less likely to be successful than small ones.330 Some of
the reasons for the failure of global commons are the following: First, since monitoring
and sanctioning becomes more difficult and costly as the commons increases in size, it
becomes more likely resource users will get away with free-riding behavior. Thus, users
are more inclined to behave strategically rather than cooperatively in large commons.
Second, laboratory experiments have shown that face-to-face communication is crucial
in establishing trust between resource users, which in turn provides the basis for
successful cooperation.331,332 However, opportunities for face-to-face communication are
limited or altogether impossible in large-scale commons. Third, as commons increase in
size, it becomes more difficult for resource users to process all the relevant information
due to the limits of human rationality, this in turn complicates communication with other
resource users and impedes decision-making.333 While this issue is a challenge for all
institutional arrangements, it is especially problematic for commons, which often are
small-scale and lack the resources to process large and complex information. Fourth, as
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“Global commons” usually refers to worldwide commons, say the climate or oceans,
but the term can be used for any large-scale commons.
330 A separate but related issue is whether the design principles are applicable to largescale commons. (Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”) A detailed
discussion of this extension of the problem of external validity of the design principles is
beyond the scope of this dissertation, but Stern discusses the application of the design
principles to global commons. (Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 219-222.)
331 Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 140-141.
332 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 145-170.
333 Ostrom notes that in small-scale commons, and under the assumption of full
rationality, resource users are expected to converge to the same strategy through
learning. As the number of participants increases and the appropriation situation
becomes more complex, such convergence is unlikely to take place. (Ostrom,
Understanding Institutional Diversity, 106.)
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commons grow larger, the private gain of resource users ceases to be connected to the
degradation of the resource in a readily visible manner. In other words, the effects of
degradation are distant, which makes it more difficult for appropriators to notice the
connection between their behavior and the degradation of the resource.334 The increased
distance between resource users’ actions and the degradation of the resource does not
only obscure the fact of subtractability, but also makes it much more difficult to exclude
users from extracting resources, or even to convince them that it is necessary to put limits
to resource usage. This issue and the previous one are particularly important in the
context of health care. Finally, increased size tends to lead to more heterogeneity, which
in turn hinders collective action,335 as I will discuss in the next section (see 2.7.2 The
Challenge of Heterogeneity).336
As a result, commons researchers talk about the “scaling-up problem,”337 the
difficulty of successfully implementing self-governed solutions to large-scale commons
dilemmas.338 This problem is particularly worrisome when considering the application of
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Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 216-217.
The following passage highlights the relationship between size and heterogeneity:
“The costs of sustaining large and diverse resources are much higher than when governing
small and relatively homogenous resources.” (Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for
Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 44.)
336 Mancur Olson, in his seminal work The Logic of Collective Action (1971), provides a
more general discussion of the relationship between group size and group behavior that
complements Ostrom’s ideas. (Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, [1965] 1971), 53-65.)
337 Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David
Policansky, “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges,” Science 284, no.
5412 (April 1999): 281.
338 There is, however, some evidence to the contrary. Based on research from an
altogether different context (i.e., marketing), Wall suggests size may to some extent be
beneficial, in that a critical mass of members is necessary for individuals to adopt a certain
335
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commons research to health care, since even a small hospital easily has hundreds of
members, while a health care system counts tens of thousands or even millions of
users.339 Thus, the practical use of commons institutions in health care seems to be
limited to small commons, like group practices or local health services. An answer that is
hardly satisfactory, because even if small-scale commons institutions can robustly
manage medical resources, the global health care commons remains jeopardized, which
in turn threatens the continued existence of the local commons. After all, a minimum of
participants is needed to achieve the collective benefit,340 meaning enough resource
users must participate in the collective effort to durably manage health care resources
for the effort to be successful, otherwise the attempts of those users working toward the
durable management of the resources will be in vain.341 Applied to the aforementioned
scenario of a local health care commons: Why would the physicians in one group practice
or the administrators in a local health center cooperate amongst each other to conserve
health care resources in a health care system that is otherwise characterized by self-

behavior (i.e., cooperation). Moreover, a growing number of members might create the
momentum necessary to sustain a commons institution in the end, because only then can
it be a viable alternative to other institutional arrangements. (Wall, The Sustainable
Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 142-143.)
339 Depending, of course, on the level of analysis and who are identified as the primary
resource users.
340 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 188.
341 This seems to be a special case of a general principle identified by Robert Axelrod in
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984): A minimum number of cooperators is needed for
cooperation to take off, because otherwise their willingness to cooperate will be
exploited by self-interested agents. Luckily, even if there are only a few cooperators, their
efforts can be successful as long as they are able to identify one another and work
together. Once cooperation takes off, it can crowd out strategic behavior, at least in
theory.
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interested behavior? If the global health care commons are destroyed due to overuse,
the local health care commons will more than likely collapse as well.
The classic solution for solving the problem of size in commons research is to turn
to the final design principle: the nesting of commons institutions. In theory, successful
cooperation in small-scale commons institutions can be built on to expand the
collaborative effort to ever-larger self-governed systems nested inside one another.
Ostrom suggests this nesting should happen according to the principle of subsidiarity,
meaning tasks should be decentralized to the lowest level of governance with the capacity
to perform the tasks in a satisfactory manner (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many
Worlds?).342 Unfortunately, there is very limited empirical evidence that nesting works in
practice, especially in large-scale commons,343 but a lack of evidence does not imply
commons institutions should be dismissed altogether as a possible solution to managing
global commons like health care systems.
Several other solutions have been proposed to mitigate the problem of size: First,
Stern proposes a series of additional design principles that are particularly relevant for
large-scale commons: “investing in science to understand the resource and its
interactions with users and those affected by its use,” “integrate scientific analysis with
broadly based deliberation” (see 4. A4R in Practice), “plan for institutional adaptation and
change,” and “engage in a variety of institutional forms” (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best
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Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions,” 43.
Moreover, Ostrom speculates it might be better to start from smaller units and then
building upward rather than creating smaller units within larger units. (Pennington,
“Elinor Ostrom and the Robust Political Economy,” 461.) The former approach would pose
an additional complication for the use of commons institutions in health care.
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of Many Worlds?).344 Apart from the first design principle, which seems to be more
applicable to complex natural resources, the principles suggested by Stern may indeed be
helpful to manage large-scale health care commons. Second, health care information
systems (HIS)345 might allow for the successful management of large-scale health care
commons, as they enable resource users to process large amounts of information and can
help them monitor resource usage more effectively and at a lower cost,346 overcoming
two of the most important issues resource users face when managing global commons.
Moreover, HIS can help resource users to communicate with each other more easily.
There is, however, an important caveat. Experiments have shown that face-to-face
communication is crucial to establish trust and spur cooperation. In experimental
settings, resource users do not achieve the same results when they communicate through
electronic means.347 The newest developments in communication technology, for
example fast and easy video conferences using smartphones and tablets, might be able
to obtain results similar to face-to-face communication,348 but additional research is
needed to ascertain this indeed is the case.349 Even then, however, communication would
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Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 223-224.
The same acronym seems to refer to both “health care information systems” and
“hospital information systems.” The terms “health information technology” (HIT) and
“health information management” (HIM) are also used.
346 Dolšak and Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” 27.
347 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 149.
348 Then again, when the complexity of the commons increases, and it increases with size,
then the success of face-to-face communication is reduced regardless. (Ostrom, Gardner,
and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 168.) New technologies are
unlikely to be able to overcome this reduction as they are still limited by the nature of
face-to-face communication.
349 A possible counterexample are the global digital commons, such as the open-source
movement, which a large number of members, many of whom never have face-to-fact
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quickly become unwieldy as the number of resource users increases, which seems to limit
the use of this technology to certain settings. Third, Ostrom suggests that the relationship
between the size and the performance of commons institutions may be curvilinear rather
than inverse,350 meaning increases in size may only have a negative impact on the
performance of the institution up to a certain point, a hypothesis that is confirmed by at
least one systematic study.351 Finally, and maybe most importantly, the problem of size is
not only an issue for commons institutions, but for other institutional arrangements as
well. In fact, the status quo institutions of market and state may be failing to sustainably
manage health care resources precisely because of the complexities inherent to managing
large-scale resources. Over half a century ago, Leopold Kohr suggested in The Breakdown
of Nations (1957) that society’s problems are not so much caused by the particular
institutional arrangements, but by the size of its institutions.352 In order to solve these
problems they need to be broken down to “the human scale,” a scale at which people
could play a part in the systems that govern their lives. Taking Kohr’s analysis seriously
would require health care systems to be broken up into smaller units, avoiding the
problem of size altogether. A suggestion Ostrom would no doubt be sympathetic to.
Alternatively, and more realistically, Kohr’s work simply suggests that to tackle health
care’s major challenges (e.g., resource governance, health care reform) these issues must

contact, successfully rely on technology to collaborate. (Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework
for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 49.)
350 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1333-1334.
351 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 251-252.
352 Leopold Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1957).
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be broken down into smaller and more manageable problems that can be solved within
the existing organizational structures.
2.7.2 THE CHALLENGE OF HETEROGENEITY
The “puzzle” of heterogeneity poses a challenge to the management of health care
resources at the individual/group level, the organizational/institutional level. The
individual/group level is the focus of most discussions of heterogeneity in the commons
literature, while the organizational/institutional level has received little attention from
commons researchers, but both kinds of heterogeneity pose serious difficulties to the
communal management of health care resources. I will discuss them in turn.
In the commons literature, the problem of heterogeneity arises because (groups
of) members differ from each other along a range of dimensions, including their norms,353
cultural background, and interests.354,355 When (groups of) members hold different sets
of beliefs, the cooperative management of the resource becomes more difficult.356 The
problem of heterogeneity is particularly pressing in health care and familiar to authors
discussing the allocation of scarce health care resources. Daniels and Sabin, for example,
write:
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Hence, Ostrom sometimes talks about “heterogeneity of norms.” (Ostrom,
Understanding Institutional Diversity, 123-125.)
354 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1334.
355 Ostrom talks about the “cultural diversity challenge.” (Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard,
and Policansky, “Revisiting the Commons,” 281.)
356 As Ostrom writes in Governing the Commons (1999): “None of these [enduring, selfgoverning CPR institutions] involves participants who vary greatly I regard to ownership
of assets, skills, knowledge, ethnicity, race, or other variables that could strongly divided
a group of individuals.”(Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 89.) She also notes successful
commons institutions are characterized by “extensive norms […] that narrowly define
“proper” behavior.” (Ibid., 88.)
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Even people who want to cooperate in steering a society’s health system will hold
diverse moral and religious views. Their individual value systems will lead them to
disagree morally about what constitutes a fair allocation of resources to meet
competing health care needs.357

The issue of collaborating on the allocation of health care resources sketched by Daniels
and Sabin is precisely the general problem of heterogeneity from the commons literature.
Heterogeneity arises from immigration, which brings new (groups of) participants with
different belief systems,358 but also from the diversity inherent to liberal, individualistic
societies. Within such societies, concurrence on the management of scarce health care
resources is difficult to come by.
In contrast, consider the following two examples in which the members are more
homogeneous: First, in societies where most people share the same value system it is
more straightforward to agree on the management of health care resources. To give a
concrete example, in some religious traditions there is a belief that biological life should
be preserved at all cost, a so-called “vitalist stance.”359 In a society where mostly everyone
adheres to this conviction, it is much easier to come to an agreement about the allocation
of resources in case of, say, end-of-life care or abortion.360 Second, within heterogeneous
societies, certain particular groups that are internally more homogeneous may readily
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Limits through Policy Developments,” The American Journal of Bioethics 16, no. 1 (2016):
39.
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is easier when resource users share the same values.
358

202

reach agreement, because they share one or more characteristics, with accompanying
beliefs, which bind them together. To give two concrete examples, both the woman’s
health and disability rights movements, which relied heavily on what are in effect
institutions for collective action (e.g. Boston Women’s Health Collective),361 were able to
influence health care policy, and thus the allocation of resources, because they were
united by their gender and long-term health concerns respectively.362 The example shows
homogeneity can play a powerful role in stimulating cooperation and agreement on
health care policy, but it also reveals a dark side of homogeneity, as homogeneous groups
can successfully “hijack” health care policy (see 3.4.2 The Dangers of the Middle-Level).
How to solve the issue of individual/group heterogeneity? As with the problem of
size, nesting commons institutions may help to overcome heterogeneity. However, the
nested institutions would have to be designed with the challenges posed by diversity in
mind, otherwise the lower-level institutions risk becoming competing homogeneous silos,
making cooperation at the higher-levels more difficult. Alternatively, defenders of the
commons paradigm argue the problem can be overcome by taking more time to draft
better rules,363 but this seems hardly a satisfactory answer, as heterogeneity impedes the
process of drafting rules to begin with, yet another second-order dilemma. Hence, the
process to draft rules itself must be designed in such a way that it can help to overcome
heterogeneity. In theory, carefully designed deliberative procedures can aid resource

361 Marc Rodwin, “Exit and Voice in American Health Care,” University of Michigan Journal

of Law Reform 32, no. 4 (1999), 1047.
362 Rodwin, “Exit and Voice in American Health Care,” 1051-1052.
363 Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory,” 643.
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users work “through” their heterogeneity, serving as the basis for cooperation and over
time a shared understanding of the issues at hand (see also 4. A4R in Practice). Over time,
repeated experiences with deliberative processes might lead to the creation of a shared
or collective identity among the participants in the deliberative procedure,364 so the
members think of themselves first and foremost as deliberators rather than as Catholics,
physicians, paraplegics, or Americans.365 In practice, however, the emergence of an
overriding collective identity as deliberative members of the commons is a tall order.366
As Fred Saunders notes, it is more likely the members’ other identities will emerge and
disrupt the deliberative process.367 That being said, some evidence exists that
communication can help to overcome heterogeneity, at least in small-scale
experiments.368
The problem of heterogeneity also arises at the organizational/institutional level.
Daniels, whose work served as the inspiration for this second kind of heterogeneity,
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Fred Saunders uses both the term “shared identity” and “collective identity.”
(Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory,” 647.)
365 In Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005), Ostrom describes a similar process,
suggesting individuals can “develop a shared mental model” through repeated
interactions, particularly face-to-face communication. (Ostrom, Understanding
Institutional Diversity, 107.)
366 Moreover, resource users can converge on identities that are altogether not desirable.
A good example is the shift from “caring” to “curing” discussed by Daniel Callahan. Under
the influence of biomedical advances, many people now share “the belief that the longstanding, seemingly inherent finitude of the body […] can be overcome.” (R. Larry
Reynolds, “The Delivery of Medical Care and Institutional Change,” Journal of Economic
Issues 23, no. 1 (March 1989): 223-224.) It is worth pointing out his is an easy belief to
converge on, as it is in the self-interest of virtually all members of the health care
commons, from (potential) patients over providers to insurers.
367 Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory,” 647.
368 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 87-91.
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describes health care systems as involving “a diverse set of institutions which have a
major impact on the level and distribution of our welfare.”369 Both integrating
heterogeneous organizations (e.g., hospitals, health systems) and abstract institutions
(e.g., combine market, state, and commons into a polycentric governance system) are
nontrivial. As far as I know, the problem receives no attention in the commons literature.
On the one hand, this is not all that surprising seen commons research’s virtually exclusive
focus on commons institutions. On the other hand, the issue of institutional diversity also
plagues commons institutions themselves, since they are not narrowly defined and can
vary significantly from one another. Thus, relying on the final design principle (see 2.6.8
Nested Enterprises) to manage a global commons, like health care, could be complicated
if the commons organizations involved are diverse.370 To give just one example, the
deliberative procedures of one health care commons can differ significantly from those
of another, making it difficult to wed their deliberative processes. The issue is
compounded when commons organizations are integrated with market and state
organizations. Even without this additional complication, however, the issue of
institutional heterogeneity seems to be of interest to commons researchers.
As with individual/group heterogeneity, the question arises how to address the
issue of organizational/institutional heterogeneity? The reflex to get rid of
organizational/institutional heterogeneity altogether must be resisted. As discussed in
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Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), ix.
Of course, the nesting of enterprises could result in more minimal procedures as one
moves to higher levels within the nested system, but these higher-level rules would
plausibly be more complex themselves when the lower-level enterprises are more
heterogeneous.
370
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the introduction (see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy), there is a drive toward
organizational/institutional mono- and dual-cropping, relying on (a combination of)
market and state. A movement that is also apparent in health care, just think about the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the United States, which introduced health insurance
marketplaces (market) while at the same time expanding Medicaid (state), or the
privatization of health care in The Netherlands, which pushed the Dutch health care
system

toward

an

increased

reliance

on

market

forces.

Having

diverse

organizations/institutions is not just a problem but also a strength, as heterogeneous
organizations/institutions can serve as incubators for new ideas and are more resilient in
the face of systemic shocks (see 3.5 Polycentrism: The Best of Many Worlds?). Thus,
institutional heterogeneity is a challenge that must be managed rather than a problem
that needs to be gotten rid of. Of course, this leaves the question: how to manage
institutional diversity? Even though the problem is not explicitly discussed in the
commons literature,371 commons research offers a suggestion as to how to tackle the
issue. Organizations/institutions can be integrated into complex governance systems in
which the actions of lower-level entities are coordinated by higher-level rules, i.e.,
polycentric governance systems (see 3.5 Polycentrism: The Best of Many Worlds?).
Ostrom would point toward the importance of developing higher-level deliberative
procedures to manage organizational/institutional diversity at lower levels of analysis.
However, as with the issue of individual/group heterogeneity, this is not an entirely
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Ostrom’s Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005) does not offer many answers,
despite what the title may suggest.
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satisfactory answer. On the contrary, successfully scaling up deliberative processes from
the intra- to the inter-organizational/institutional level is a nontrivial task.
2.7.3 THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Of all the challenges identified by Ostrom, academics and practitioners acquainted with
the issue of allocating scarce health care resources are likely to be most familiar with the
threat posed by technological change.372 As discussed in the previous chapter (see 1.2 A
Tragedy of the Health Care Commons?), new medical technologies are the primary cause
of the rise in health care expenditures, and thus of the ever increasing strain on health
care resources. The commons literature pays ample attention to the issue of technological
externalities as well, as commons are often threatened by the introduction of new
technologies. The classic example are fisheries, where the introduction of new fishing
methods and technologies can disturb existing resource usage patterns and lead to a
tragedy of the commons.373,374 Of course, changes in technology may also decrease
pressure on the commons by providing more efficient ways of using them. I will discuss
the threats and opportunities posed by technological development in turn. I would like to
point out that the following arguments for most part make abstraction of issues of quality
(i.e., improving health outcomes).375
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Ostrom sometimes discusses the threat of technological change under the header
“rapid exogenous changes.” (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 272.) Even
though in the case of health care, but also in the example of fisheries, many technological
developments seem to be endogenous to the institution. Then again, Ostrom’s use of the
word “exogenous” is not entirely clear, because it raises the question: exogenous to
what?
373 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 12, 252-253.
374 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 273.
375 See footnote 4 in the previous chapter.
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Up until the middle of the twentieth century, “health care was largely delivered in
homes by family members.”376 The available technology was limited. Physicians, for
example, had little to offer apart from their “conscientious care and attention.”377 As one
author reminisces in 1978, when medicine’s technological revolution was already well
underway, “[on a house call] there is only you, your black bag, and the patient – whose
trust springs from past generations of physicians who brought comfort to the home even
when they had little else to offer.”378 The use of the same, necessarily restricted
technology across the board meant that health care expenditures were low and
predictable.379 To use the language of the commons, the use of limited and homogeneous
technology throughout health care makes the pace at which members extract resources
slow, steady, and thus easy to foretell.380 But technological innovations cause the rate at
which resources are extracted to intensify, sometimes unpredictably so, increasing
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Morreim, Balancing Act, 8.
Morreim, Balancing Act, 8.
378 Robert Taylor, “Home Care,” in Family Medicine. Principles and Practice, eds. Paul
Paulman and Robert Taylor (New York: Springer, 1978), 114.
379 As Morreim notes, in 1929 health care represented only 3.5% of the Gross National
Product (GNP) of the United States and by 1950, over twenty years later, that figure had
risen to just 4.4%. (Morreim, Balancing Act, 8.)
380 Of course, describing the relationship between technology and resource usage as onedirectional is an over-simplification made for the sake of discussing the threat of
technological change. In reality, economic growth and the accompanying increase in
health care’s key resource, money, spurred medicine’s technological revolution.
Moreover, and more relevant to the commons, the relationship between technological
change and the pooling of health care resources is complex. The increased reliance on
expensive health care technology necessitated the creation of large, common-pools of
resources in order to pay for these expensive technologies. In turn, over time pooling
became an answer to rising health care expenditures driven by technological advances
(e.g., the use of global budgets, HMOs, ACOs). Disentangling these relationships is an
promising avenue for future research.
377
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pressure on the available health care resources and thus expenditures for all members,
even those that do not directly make use, or even want to make use, of the new
technology. A good example is the overuse of PET scanners in Belgian hospitals discussed
in the first chapter (see 1.5 Argument II: Game Theory), the proliferation of the expensive
scanners leads to increased costs and pressures on the health care system’s global
budget.381
The standard solution to the challenge of technological change found in the
commons literature is the use of “technology rules,” limiting the types of technology that
can be used and/or the frequency with which these technologies may be used. As such,
technology rules are a specific type of a boundary rule, in line with Ostrom’s first design
principle (see 2.4.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries).382 Technology rules can reduce the load
on the available resources and help sustain the long-term use of the commons.383 As with
other rules, careful monitoring and graduated sanctions need to be in place for the rule
to be successful, as self-interested members have an interest in circumventing the rules.
Technology rules are commonplace in health care, abound with clinical practice
guidelines (e.g., the National Guideline Clearinghouse developed by the Agency for Health
Care Research and Quality in the United States), which often contain a technology
component, and technology appraisal decisions (e.g., NICE technology appraisals in the
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Of course, the scanners also improve diagnostic certainty, thus improving health
outcomes and possibly saving money. (Charles Phelps, Eight Questions You Should Ask
About Our Health Care System (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2010), 50.) Remember,
the issue in Belgium is there are too many PET scanners.
382 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 258-259.
383 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 511.
209

United Kingdom), which are clear-cut examples of technology rules.384 Systems are in into
place to monitor the use of technology (e.g., reimbursement based on diagnosis-related
groups)385 and sanction the illegitimate use of technology (e.g., budgetary sanctions). Of
course, the problem of self-interested members trying to circumvent the rules is also
present in health care, resulting in attempts to “game the system” at all levels of
analysis.386 Belgian hospitals without a PET scanner, for example, may fear to be at a
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis their peers with the imaging technology. To give
another example, patients and physicians who believe a technology may be beneficial to
treat a particular condition, even though the guideline recommends the technology not
be used, may be tempted to game the system. The most striking are cases of patients who
are terminally ill and want to make use of costly unproven technologies in a final attempt
to save their lives. Often such cases are highly publicized, as patients and their physicians
attempt to capture the discourse (see 4. A4R in Practice). In short, the large amount of
resources (i.e., money) revolving in health care and the special importance of health care,
both at the individual and the societal level, provide resource users with considerable
incentives to strategically pursue their own interests and bypass technology rules.

384 Daniels and

Sabin’s example of coverage decisions regarding growth hormone therapy
for children are another illustration of technology rules (see 5.4.3.4.1 Publicity Condition).
385 Morreim, “Gaming the System,” 444.
386 Morreim’s comprehensive discussion of gaming, particularly her discussion of
“resource rules,” is strikingly similar to discussions of technology rules in the commons
literature. (Morreim, “Gaming the System,” 443-444.)
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Of course, technological advances can also have a positive impact on the
commons.387 First, technology can directly lead to the more durable use of resources.
Dolšak and Ostrom point out advanced industrial economies may be able to decrease
pressures on the commons by coming up with more efficient ways of using the available
resources because of technological development.388 A good example from the health care
arena is laparoscopic surgery, which does not only lead to better outcomes, but can also
lead to lower costs, as keyhole surgery is less invasive (e.g., patient does not have to stay
in the hospital as long, reduced risk of infection), say in the case of anti-reflux surgery.389
As already noted, however, most technologies will cost more money rather than less.
Second, technological developments can help to solve commons dilemmas, by enabling
members to identify and monitor the available resources more effectively and at lower
costs,390 but this is “not a substitute for decision-making.”391 Take the example of HIS in
general and electronic patient records in particular, which are technologies that can be
used to more closely monitor the use of health care resources. These technologies are
regularly presented as a silver bullet to more efficiently manage resources and lower
costs,392 not in the least by outside experts, often representatives of “the market” (e.g.,
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First and foremost, new health care technologies can lead to improvements in
outcomes, but the present discussion focuses on the issue of resource governance.
388 Dolšak and Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” 27.
389 Francisco Schlottmann, Paula Strassle, and Marco G. Patti, “Comparative Analysis of
Perioperative Outcomes and Cost between Laparoscopic and Open Antireflux Surgery,”
Journal of the American College of Surgeons 224, no. 3 (March 2016)
390 Dolšak and Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” 27.
391 Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, and Policansky, “Revisiting the Commons,” 279.
392 See, for example, William Haseltine’s discussion of the Singapore health care system
and its reliance on electronic patient records to control costs. (Haseltine, Affordable
Excellence, 75-76.) For another example, see Jack Cochran’s discussion of the
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consultants). In and of themselves, these technologies cannot decide on the allocation of
scarce health care resources, which requires some sort of decision-making process. On
the contrary, focusing exclusively on HIS and presenting them as a panacea for health
care’s cost crisis can hide or obscure the need for hard choices.393 Finally, technological
advances may indirectly play a role in averting the tragedy of the commons by facilitating
deliberation between members of the commons, leading to the more efficient use of
resources. To give a concrete example, Singapore’s experiments with Telemedicine, allow
for micro-level deliberations between patients, nurses, general practitioners, and
specialists.394 In theory, such initiatives could be scaled-up relying on the design principle
of nesting. As I have already highlighted the drawbacks of technology-based
communication when discussing possible solutions to the challenge of size (see 2.7.1 The
Challenge of Size), I will not discuss them again here.
Like other global commons, the health care commons grapple with accelerating
rates of technological change. Imaging technologies and HIS are still relatively recent
additions to health care’s black bag, but continue to develop at a rapid pace. In
comparison, biotechnology is in its infancy, and so far health care applications are limited,
but “biotech” holds great promise (e.g., personalized and regenerative medicine), albeit
at a hefty price tag. The breakneck speed of technological change causes learning by doing

“Information Age model of care.” (Cochran and Kenney, The Doctor Crisis, 31.) A former
professor at Harvard University, Haseltine is the founder of ACCESS Health International,
a non-profit health care consultancy, while Cochran is a physician-executive with Kaiser
Permanente.
393 Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 115, 136.
394 Haseltine, Affordable Excellence, 75-76.
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to become increasingly difficult, “as past lessons are less and less applicable to current
problems.”395 As such, technological change might lead to a feeling of resignation: ever
more and evermore expensive technology will lead to a tragedy of the health care
commons, as resource users fruitlessly apply solutions that have not worked in the past
to the technological revolution of the present. Even if some technological advances (i.e.,
HIS) can lead to better monitoring, coordination, and deliberation; health care’s
technological rat race does not revolve around these institutional goals.396 The focus is on
curative technologies that “will cost more money, often much more.”397 As such, and
herein lies a glimmer of hope, technology may over time be the impetus for institutional
change. Enduring technological progress combined with the inability of the current
institutions to deal with the demands these new technologies place on the health care
commons may result in a shock due to resource overuse. Strong institutions often emerge
in the wake of such shocks and subsequently persist over time.398 A “technological shock”
can thus bring about new institutional solutions to the challenge posed by technological
change.
The challenges of size, heterogeneity, and technological change are not standalone issues. They are relevant to the discussions on institutional experiments (see 3. The
Polycentric Experiment) and deliberative processes (4. A4R in Practice) in the subsequent
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Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, and Policansky, “Revisiting the Commons,” 281-282.

396 HIS holds the risk of becoming a goal in and of itself, much in the same way bureaucracy

existed for the sake of bureaucracy in the USSR.
397 Phelps, Eight Questions You Should Ask, 59.
398 Giangiacomo Bravo, “Agents’ Beliefs and the Evolution of Institutions for CommonPool Resource Management,” Rationality and Society 23, no. 1 (2010): 119, 145.
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chapters. As with the IAD framework and the design principles, to do full justice to the
complex relationships between the challenges and these debates is difficult, but
throughout the following chapters, I will reference the challenges wherever possible.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLYCENTRIC EXPERIMENT
“In an advancing society […] any restriction on liberty
reduces the number of things tried and so reduces
the rate of progress.”1
- Henry Bayard Phillips “It’s always the patient who has to take the
chance when an experiment is necessary. And
we can find out nothing without
experiment.”2
- George Bernard Shaw -

3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters, I summarized, discussed, and criticized key ideas from commons
research. I consistently related and applied these concepts to health care, highlighting the
potential value of the commons paradigm to the governance of scarce health care
resources. The current chapter takes a different approach in that it presents one
overarching argument in favor of the use of commons institutions in health care relying
on a fundamental idea: pluralism. Starting from the indetermination of commons
institutions, I argue that the introduction of the commons paradigm in health care has the

1 Henry Bayard Phillips, “On the Nature of Progress,” American Scientist 33, no. 4 (October

1945): 255.
2 George Bernard Shaw, The Doctor’s Dilemma (London: Penguin Books, [1911] 1954), 98.
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following advantages: First, pluralist commons institutions allow for running diverse
parallel experiments to solve health care’s challenges. Second, Jacob Levy’s work on
pluralism and freedoms suggests diverse institutions can function as a safeguard against
overbearing power concentrations within health care. I conclude by discussing how these
advantages can be integrated with the strengths of the institutions of market and state
by taking a polycentric approach to health care systems.
The chapter provides contributions to both commons research and health care
ethics. First, the discussion of parallel experiments is the most comprehensive available
in the commons literature. Moreover, the commons approach to parallel experiments has
not been applied to health care.3 Second, Levy’s work on pluralism and freedom provides
an entirely new perspective on Ostrom’s work, which is sometimes criticized for being
apolitical, while at the same time deepening existing discussions in the commons
literature and suggesting another role for the commons in health care, namely as
bulwarks against overbearing power concentrations. Finally, the concluding discussion of
polycentricity is distinct because of its breadth and critical assessment of the concept.
3.2 PLURALISM OUT OF INDETERMINATION
Probably the most puzzling, and arguably the most frustrating, aspect of commons
institutions has been their elusiveness, for they are theoretically infinite in number and
the sets of rules they adopt can differ greatly. As discussed in chapter two, the only

3

Discussions of parallel experiments in the commons literature are virtually all limited to
brief, theoretical musings over the possibility and the advantages of running parallel
institutional experiments with self-organized governance regimes. Thus, the application
of the idea of parallel experimentation is somewhat of a novelty in the field regardless of
the area of application (i.e., health care).
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feature shared by all institutions for collective action is that their members play a central
role in governing the institution (see 2.3 Commons Institutions). However, the
indeterminism of the commons is also their strength, as it allows for the emergence of a
wide diversity of rules to solve resource governance issues. This will the argument of the
current section: commons institutions are characterized by indetermination out of which
pluralism arises.
3.2.1 INDETERMINATE INSTITUTIONS
The indeterminateness of commons institutions can easily be construed as problematic.
Human beings dislike indetermination because it is akin to uncertainty. Self-governed
institutions put the onus of governance on resource users to draft their own rules, which
is difficult enough when someone already is a member of an existing commons
institutions, and almost inconceivable in the case of new commons. Policymakers,
entrenched in health care’s status quo institutions,4 do not care for open-endedness
because it makes for poor policy proposals, ostensibly akin to: “You, health care users,
must self-organize in order to govern your scarce resources!” In addition, the one feature
shared by all commons institutions, the emphasis on the responsibility of the members,
diminishes the power of traditional decision-makers, distributing decision-making among
a large number of actors instead.

4 In this case, the term “status quo institutions” does not primarily refer to the institutions

of market and state, but to existing health care organizations regardless of their precise
institutional makeup. Of course, most health care institutions are a mix of market and
state institutions, which are also the abstract models that exert a strong influence on
policymakers.
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The problem of (in)determination is easy to exaggerate, however, as health care’s
status quo institutions are seldom precisely defined either, but function as unquestioned
(or even unnoticed) background assumptions.5 This definitional deficit is not experienced
as an insurmountable problem in the implementation of institutions in health care and
elsewhere. As Ostrom argues, “both the centralizers and the privatizers frequently
advocate

oversimplified

institutions

–

paradoxically,

almost

“institution-free”

institutions,” leaving the precise rules, what Ostrom calls the “institutional details,” up in
the air.6 The institutions operate as tacit assumptions both in the literature and in
practice.7
Furthermore, the open-ended definition of commons institutions does not mean
concrete commons arrangements are underdefined. On the contrary, Ostrom stresses the
set of rules used in a given commons institution should be defined as precisely as
possible,8 ruling out ambiguities and possible freeriding. From a philosophical
perspective, one may argue the commons paradigm implies a shift in focus from the
universal to the particular. This move is interesting because it makes explicit a process
that willy-nilly also takes place in case of the status quo institutions, namely the

5

Health care institutions have developed over a long period of time through a
combination of conscious decisions, many now forgotten or settled into documents (e.g.,
laws, policies, guidelines), and organic evolutions. Institutions only cease to be invisible
background assumptions if policymakers learn to see them (see 0.4 The Double Aim of the
Project).
6 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 22.
7 Institutionsvergessenheit is not confined to the realm of economics (see 0.1.1 A Brief
History of Institutional Economics).
8 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 22-23.
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development of concrete policy measures (e.g., for the governance of health care
resources) enacted through sets of rules broadly construed.9 Commons institutions draw
these policy decisions out into the open, engaging the members of the institution in the
decision-making process (see also 4. A4R in Practice).
As such, relying on commons does not sideline policymakers, but requires a
redefinition of their role. Rather than making decisions themselves, policymakers must
facilitate decision-making. The empowerment of downstream actors to design their own
institutions inevitably implies that upstream actors lose (some) immediate power over
the rule-making process, which is part of the reason commons are difficult to implement
in the presence of longstanding institutions, as is the case in health care. The downward
distribution of the decision-making process necessitates that traditional decision-makers
act as facilitators, enabling downstream actors to design their own rules. What that
facilitator role looks like in practice depends on both the current institution and the
commons-like institution that follows it, but likely is as context dependent as commons
institutions themselves (e.g., an existing organization in which downstream actors already
enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy requires a different approach than an
organization in which they do not).10 In addition, traditional policymakers can take on
second-order institutional responsibilities, among others, contributing to the resolution
of conflicts (see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms) and the design of constitutional

9

At the limit, any process, decision, or resolution can be construed as a rule (see also
0.5.3 Rules).
10 The suggestion is not that older institutional arrangements should be replaced by
commons, but that commons institutions are integrated in the existing set of rules (see
3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).
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rules (see 0.5.3 Rules). Regardless, from the perspective of the status quo institutions,
such a recasting of their role may be a difficult pill to swallow for actors that currently
hold considerable sway over the rule-making process.
3.2.2 PLURAL INSTITUTIONS
Out of the indetermination of commons institutions arises institutional diversity. The
result of relying on small-scale, bottom-up decision making is that rules are locally
specified as solutions to particular problems. Indeed, groups of resource users facing
similar, or even identical, resource governance issues can design radically different
institutions to approach the same challenge. Not only can the rules themselves be specific
to particular commons, but also the process through which the solution was reached. The
multiplicity of commons institutions is evidenced by the rule diversity observed in field
studies and by the theoretical number of possible rules.11 The commons paradigm implies
institutional pluralism at the meso-level. Interestingly, the term pluralism is largely absent
from the commons literature, despite being a central theme of commons research. As far
as I have been able to establish, Ostrom herself does not use the term at all. 12 A possible
explanation for the absence of the concept from her oeuvre can be found in Paul Dragos

11

Ostrom gives the example of allowing five rules changes to each of the seven
components of an action situation (see 2.5 The Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework) resulting in 75,525 (57) combinations. “This is a gross simplification, however,
since the important rules used in field settings include more than five rules –at least 25 in
the case of boundary rules, and over 100 variants in the case of authority rules.” (Elinor
Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” Annual Review of Political Science 2
(June 1999): 519.) In theory, the number of different combinations of rules is infinite.
12 The term “pluralism” does not appear in any of the (40+) papers and books by Ostrom
I consulted. A search on Google Scholar for “Ostrom pluralism” did not produce any
writings by her hand either.
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Aligicia’s Institutional Diversity and Political Economy: The Ostroms and Beyond (2014).
According to Aligicia, “the themes of institutional diversity, pluralism, and
heterogeneity”13 in the work of the Ostroms have two major sources:14 First, Ostrom’s
pluralism is foundational. Ostrom regards pluralism as a “social fact.” As a result of this
“inexorable and irreducible feature of the world,”15 institutions are and need to be
pluralist as well.16 Aligicia summarizes:

In other words, when it comes to organizing human coordination and
interdependence in diverse circumstances, with diverse preferences,
endowments, and beliefs, institutional pluralism is a fact, a challenge, and a prima
facie normative answer.17,18

He then situates the Ostroms within social philosophy, placing them among radical
pluralists, genre Isaiah Berlin, rather than moderate pluralist, like John Rawls and Jürgen
Habermas.19 Aligicia characterizes moderate pluralists as acknowledging the challenge of
pluralism, but still trying to find “a common grounding principle, a counterweight to
heterogeneity.”20 Radicals, on the contrary, do not believe in universal theoretical or

13

Paul Dragos Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy: The Ostroms and
Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1.
14 The Ostroms are Elinor and her husband Vincent (see also 1.5 Argument III: Type of
Good).
15 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 1.
16 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 1.
17 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 1.
18 A bit oddly, Aligicia concludes the paragraph by writing: “All in all, Ostromian
institutionalism seems to have a strong pluralist bend.” (Aligicia, Institutional Diversity
and Political Economy, 1.)
19 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 2-3.
20 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 2.
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institutional strategies to reduce pluralism to some sort of homogeneity.21 To them,
“diversity, divergence, and disagreement are unavoidable characteristics of our social
condition.”22 Pluralism is a fact and has a foundational role to play.

Consequently, we should be prepared to think in contextual and situational terms,
about a variety of solutions to the variety of problems, identified by a variety of
people in a variety of circumstances, sometimes involving profound trade-offs and
irreconcilable tensions and sacrifices.23

Second, Aligicia points toward the evolution of the research program of the Ostroms as
an origin of their pluralism. He questions to what extent the Ostroms were fully aware of
the “profound pluralism embedded in their approach”24 from the start. Instead, he
suggests their pluralism grew over time as their research agenda progressed.25 An
important consequence of this second source is that Ostrom is not a doctrinaire pluralist.
Rather, her pluralism is the result of “an ongoing dialogue between theory and empirical
reality.”26 Regardless the precise origins of Ostromian pluralism, likely an interplay of both

21

I do not wholly agree with Aligicia’s argument. At least at the level of the individual
commons institutions, Ostrom seems to believe pluralism can be overcome through rulemaking and collective-choice arrangements. A view that is also evidenced by her
discussions of heterogeneity as a theoretical puzzle that can be solved (see 2.7.2 The
Challenge of Heterogeneity).
22 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 2.
23 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 2.
24 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 3.
25 I argue that the two sources of Ostrom’s pluralism as identified by Aligicia appear at
odds with one another. For if her pluralism is foundational, then it seems like her research
program must have been pluralist from the outset. Vice versa, if her pluralism only arose
over time, then it appears it cannot have been foundational. Aligicia neither
acknowledges nor resolves this apparent tension, even though resolutions are possible
(e.g., the Ostroms were committed to pluralism from the outset, but did not fully
recognize their commitment until much later in their intellectual development).
26 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 3.
222

sources, Aligicia’s discussion may explain the absence of the term pluralism from
Ostrom’s oeuvre. If Ostrom’s pluralism is foundational, it can be presumed to underlie
her entire work, without her perceiving the need to make it explicit. Or rather, without
her feeling the urge to spell it out, as ideas of pluralism and diversity permeate her work.
If her pluralism is the result of the evolution of her research, then it may only have
become clear in retrospect. Indeed, most sources explicitly relating Ostrom’s work to
pluralism are recent, for example Aligicia’s book.27
Ostrom’s institutional pluralism is the focus of this chapter, but she is also labeled
a value pluralist, epistemological pluralist, and methodological pluralist.28 Aligicia typifies
her work as “all-the-way-down pluralism.”29 These different types of pluralism appear to
be undergirded by a foundational belief in pluralism, as discussed in the previous
paragraph, but are also related to one another, albeit without her ever making these
relationships explicit. For example, Ostrom’s institutional pluralism is supported by her
value pluralism, which in turn is the result of plural meso-level institutions. Wall does
some work unpacking these relationships, in particular the link between Ostrom’s
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Wall’s The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom (2014) is another example. (Derek
Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom. Commons, Contestation and Craft (New
York: Routledge, 2014), 30, 38, 49, 179.)
28 Aligicia adds “sociological pluralism” to this list. (Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and
Political Economy, 3.) Wall includes Ostrom’s “causal” and “ontological” pluralism. (Wall,
The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 53.) I do not attempt to justify this multitude
of characterizations of Ostrom’s pluralism, for the remainder of the chapter builds solely
on her institutional pluralism.
29 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 3.
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epistemological and methodological pluralism,30 but much remains to be done to further
map Ostrom’s pluralism, a promising avenue for future research.
Pluralism is often conceived as a good in itself and thus something that ought to
be pursued.31 Even though Ostrom regards pluralism as a matter of fact, her institutional
pluralism too has an undeniable normative component,32 “there is in it an implicit
embrace of pluralism and diversity, a predilection toward negotiation and commonly
agreed solutions.”33,34 Even though I support Ostrom’s position,35 the pluralist argument
presented in the remainder of the chapter is altogether more pragmatic and does not
require an endorsement of pluralism as a normative good in itself: institutional pluralism
is a way to stimulate parallel experiments in health care (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments),
and to ensure the freedom of health care (see 3.4 Pluralism and Freedom in Health Care).
3.3 PARALLEL EXPERIMENTS
Friedrich Hayek, the famous economist and political philosopher,36 argues that free
societies are successful because they allow their members to find solutions to problems
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Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 53.
Ted Honderich ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Second Edition (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 727.
32 Saying Ostrom’s pluralism is normative offers support to the claim that her pluralism is
foundational.
33 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 22.
34 Of course, it is possible to “embrace” pluralism and diversity, while being indifferent
about whether they should be promoted.
35 Given that pluralism permeates Ostrom’s work, following her in (most of) her
arguments as I do inevitably implies endorsing her strand of pluralism with its normative
implications.
36 Hayek was also an accomplished philosopher of science. One of the first classes he
taught at the University of Chicago was a seminar on the philosophy of science attended,
among others, by Enrico Fermi. (Bruce Caldwell, Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual
Biography of F.A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 298-299.)
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through trial-and-error.37 “Liberty is essential in order to leave room for the
unforeseeable and unpredictable; we want it because we have learned to expect from it
the opportunity of realizing many of ours aims.”38 North summarizes Hayek’s argument
as follows: “The society that permits the maximum generation of trials will be most likely
to solve problems through time.”39 The use of commons institutions in health care allows
for precisely this: the running of parallel institutional experiments to identify the best
practices to manage health care resources, while providing a diverse range of institutional
arenas to test and evaluate solutions to other contested health care issues, like different
approaches to health care reform.40 Daniels and Sabin, among others,41 recognize the
need to identify best practices to manage health care resources. They “believe societies
should experiment with a family of best practices,”42 and argue it would be wise for
society “to experiment with several promising strategies in order to learn more over time
about how well they work and how morally acceptable they seem in light of actual
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Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
[1960] 2011), 73-90.
38 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 81.
39 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 81.
40 In a WHO report on health sector reform, Cassels argues health care reform is “not a
sequential process” and there is a need to analyze “the outcome to different approaches
to institutional change.” (Andrew Cassels, Perspectives on Health Sector Reform (Geneva:
World Health Organization, 1993), 6-7.)
41 Cochran, a physician-executive at Kaiser Permanente, argues: “We have a responsibility
to identify the very best practices for quality, efficiency, and cost control; package them
so they are easily spread; and share them with organizations throughout the country.”
(Jack Cochran and Charles Kenney, The Doctor Crisis: How Physicians Can, and Must, Lead
the Way to Better Health Care (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014), 19.)
42 Norman Daniels and James Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
[2002] 2008), 79.
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practice.”43 Parallel trials are especially important in health care, among others, because
of disagreements about the moral acceptability of certain approaches and the high
degree of uncertainty involved in health care practice.44 I return to Daniels and Sabin’s
particular approach, and discuss some of its shortcomings, in the next section (see 3.3.1
State and Market Experiments).
Much like Hayek and North, Ostrom is convinced that “allowing parallel selforganized governance regimes to engage in extensive trial-and-error learning”45 is the
best approach to finding close-to-optimal solutions in highly complex systems.46 Her
emphasis on experimentation stems from her conviction “that “getting the institutions
right” is a difficult, time-consuming, and conflict-invoking process.”47 In Coping with
Tragedies of the Commons (1999) and again in Understanding Institutional Diversity
(2005), she argues designing rules that approach optimality or improve institutional
performance is not a straightforward analytical task that can be undertaken by experts
(see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge). Instead, the policy design process
should be understood as tinkering with rules in an attempt to find combinations that work
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 68.
There are additional reasons running parallel trials is especially important in health
care. For example, if health care indeed is of special moral importance, then the collapse
of health care systems and the resources they manage is particularly troublesome. Relying
on parallel institutional experiments rather than a single system decreases the risk of
catastrophic collapse.
45 Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David
Policansky. “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science 284, no.
5412 (April 1999): 280-281.
46 “In any design process that involves substantial probability of error, having redundant
teams of designers has been shown to be advantageous.” (Ostrom, “Coping with
Tragedies of the Commons,” 520.)
47 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 14.
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together better than others.48 Thus, policy changes must be thought of as experiments
based on informed expectations about possible outcomes, and the impact of these
outcomes on participants. Whenever a rule is changed, a policy experiment is
conducted.49,50 ln other words, all efforts to solve resource management problems must
be viewed as experiments based on partial analyses of specific problems.51 Ostrom’s
institutional experiments sound much more abstract than the trials proposed by Hayek
or the best practices of Daniels and Sabin, but in practice these rule changes refer to
concrete practices, like implementing a guideline or using a particular piece of technology
(see also 2.7.3 The Challenge of Technological Change).
Of course, running policy experiments is not a feature exclusive to commons
institutions. Parallel experiments can take place within the status quo institutions as well.
However, both state-run experiments and market-run experiments have important
drawbacks vis-à-vis policy experiments relying on commons institutions. In turn,
“commons experiments” have their own disadvantages, suggesting the best approach to
conducting successful policy experiments is to ensure they take place within a diverse set
of institutions (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). Once again, Ostrom
does not think commons institutions are an institutional magic bullet meant to replace
the status quo institutions, but can be a valuable and underappreciated addition to the
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Elinor Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” Journal of Bioeconomics
16 (2014): 4.
49 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 519-520.
50 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005), 243.
51 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 220.
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institutional repertoire when trying to resolve resource governance issues. Before
discussing the advantages and disadvantages of conducting policy experiments using
commons institutions (see 3.3.2 Commons Experiments), I discuss some shortcomings and
advantages of state- and market-run experiments.
3.3.1 STATE AND MARKET EXPERIMENTS
Within states, policymakers tend to experiment simultaneously with all of the resources
within their jurisdiction. Of course, central governments can undertake pilot programs to
experiment with various options, but they usually intend to find the set of rules that works
best for an entire jurisdiction.52 Once a successful approach is identified, the risk exists
other experiments are shut down and the rules identified in the successful experiment
are adopted universally. The urge to do so must be resisted for at least two reasons: First,
the solution identified in one experiment might not work across the board. Ostrom
believes the rules should be context-specific and based on local knowledge (see 2.2.2
Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge). Second, a set of rules that seems to work
initially might not be successful in the future. Path dependence, a familiar issue in the
evolution of technology, equally applies to institutions.53 As North explains, a productive
path can turn into an unproductive one over time but because of path dependence, the
initially chosen set of rules is nonetheless preserved and even reinforced.54 Thus, the
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The classic example of path dependence is the QWERTY keyboard layout. The layout is
not the most efficient (e.g., the layout overemphasizes the left hand), but other layouts
were prone to cause the arms of mechanical typewriters to clash and jam. As a result,
QWERTY became the standard. The dominance of VHS (Video Home System) over
Betamax is another common example of path dependence.
54 North, Institutions, 8, 92-104.
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universal adoption of a single experiment may prove disastrous, yet inescapable in the
long run (e.g., the widespread use of fee-for-service promotes resource use due to the
incentives it creates, but for the same reason the rule has proven difficult to change once
it is entrenched in health care systems). One can speculate certain features of the
American health care system (e.g., systemic errors in the financing and organization of
health care55) are the result of such path dependence gone awry. The concept of path
dependence highlights another issue, as a path that is viable in the long term in one
context, may not be in another context. Apart from their misguided emphasis on finding
a single successful approach, state-run experiments are usually slow,56 in part a
consequence of the limited number of experiments being run. Finally, experimentation is
counter to hierarchical institutions themselves, as the liberty Hayek identified as being
the key to generating the maximum number of trials is at odds with the centralized,
command-and-control structures of state institutions.
The shortcomings of state-run experiments do not preclude them from playing a
role in trial-and-error learning. First, states have the ability to coordinate experiments in
a way that markets and commons cannot (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many
Worlds?). Second, even if states experiment with all or most of the resources within their
jurisdiction, parallel experiments can still take place. However, one is required to take an

55 Victor R. Fuchs and Emanuel J. Ezekiel, “Health Care

Reform: Why? What? When? What
it Might Take to Effect Comprehensive Change,” Health Affairs 24, no. 6 (NovemberDecember 2005): 1400.
56 Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” 14.
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international perspective, looking at policy experiments across borders.57 This is precisely
the approach taken by Daniels and Sabin in Setting Limits Fairly, especially in the chapters:
An International Learning Curve,58 Learning to Share Medical Resources,59 and Revisiting
the International Learning Curve.60 The authors use the term “social learning process”61
to describe the implementation of their ideas on the fair management of health care
resources in different countries. They write:

It is necessary to examine efforts to implement fair rationing procedures across
national boundaries. The many factors that would discourage such efforts, such
as the conviction that political and health system differences between countries
vitiate efforts at transferring experiences, must be set aside. Too much is at stake
not to engage in a serious effort at examining best practices across variations in
systems design.62

Daniels and Sabin analysis of “fair rationing procedures across national boundaries” is
akin to a series of parallel experiments. Such an international approach, comparing state
experiments, can be valuable to identify best practices, but there are several caveats to
consider: First, even if a large number of countries experiment with different policies for
governing health care resources, the total number of experiments remains relatively
limited. Second, countries might copy and then build on each other’s rule sets early on.
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As Hogg writes, “International cooperation provides opportunities for users to learn
from the experiences of other countries.” (Christine Hogg, Patients, Power & Politics.
From Patients to Citizens (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 156.) In the United States,
parallel experiments could be organized at the state-level.
58 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 149-168.
59 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 169-174.
60 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 175-191.
61 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 175.
62 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 167.
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Not only does this aggravate rather than mediate the risks of path dependence, but it also
limits the number of independent experiments and thus the probability of identifying best
practices. A good example is the influential Norwegian report (1987) on setting limits,
which served as a model for reports in Sweden (1994), Finland (1995), and Denmark
(1996).63 Such modeling is not wrong. After all, it reflects the basic idea of parallel
experiments: to identify, disseminate, and build on best practices. However, copying early
on reduces the number of unique policy experiments. 64 As a result, better rules (and
outcomes) “may exist in a subspace that was cut off early in the process of crafting
rules.”65 Finally, if Ostrom’s is right about the importance of local context and knowledge
(see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge), then Daniels and Sabin likely
underplay the impact “political and health system differences between countries” have
on the possibility to transfer experiences.66 Sets of rules are likely more easily transferable
within more homogeneous local contexts (e.g., countries, regions, and states) than
between countries, with some exceptions (e.g., the Scandinavian countries). Of course,
none of these arguments renders parallel experiments at the international level in general
and Daniels and Sabin’s discussion in particular futile. They simply highlight concerns
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Ostrom warns against simply imitating the rules that operate in more successful
systems as local circumstances differ, the rules being copied are misunderstood, or there
may be existing rules in the imitating system that are incompatible. In addition, imitation
holds the risk of “biased transmission” because “some rules are particularly easy to
understand, remember, and seem to work well.” (Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective
Action Evolve?” 21-22.)
65 Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool
Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 325.
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about running parallel experiments at an international scale. Once policy experimenters
are aware of these concerns, they can incorporate them into the social learning process
promoted by Daniels and Sabin. Even though their discussion focuses heavily on learning
processes between countries, Daniels and Sabin mention several parallel experiments at
smaller scales. For example, they describe the decentralized Canadian health care system
as “an excellent laboratory,”67 but also speak highly of the regional organization of Kaiser
Permanente and the Veterans Health Administration in the United States as facilitating
the search for best practices.68 These examples are much closer to the idea of parallel
experimenting proposed by Ostrom and discussed in the next section.
While state experiments are often plagued by an excess of coordination, marketrun experiments are at risk of suffering from a lack of coordination. Markets allow for a
large number of parallel experiments to be run, but the lack of oversight makes it more
difficult to identify successful experiments, among others, because the solution that
“wins” in the marketplace is not necessarily the best.69 Moreover, the outcomes of the
experiments risk becoming proprietary, making it difficult (i.e., costly) or altogether
impossible to copy them.70 These characteristics make it more difficult to recognize and
implement best practices. Lastly, even though the market is likely to give rise to numerous
experiments, the fact all these experiments take place within organizations that all share
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the same basic design plausibly decreases the variety of the trials being run. For example,
market institutions all have certain obligations to their shareholders and share similar
management structures, some of which are legal requirements. As a result, the decisions
made by market organizations are likely to converge. To give a concrete example,
consider the impact of exclusively relying on the market to develop new drugs, which is
another resource allocation issue (i.e., the decision to allocate resources to the
development of certain drugs but not to the development of others).71 Drug
manufacturers have neglected and in many cases altogether stopped the development of
antibiotics, primarily because they have a poor return on investment compared to drugs
that treat chronic illness.72 Thus, some promising experiments will not be run or even
conceived in the marketplace simply due to the lack of institutional diversity.
Of course, this brief overview does not do justice to state and market experiments,
not in the least because I have focused almost exclusively on their shortcomings. Rather
than wanting to criticize these approaches, the reason for highlighting their weaknesses
is to draw attention to the advantages of commons institutions in running institutional
experiments.
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This resource allocation decision can be described in terms of rules, namely drug
manufacturers adopting a rule not to develop antibiotics.
72 Antibiotics are taken for a short time and cure the target disease, while drugs that treat
chronic illness (e.g., high blood pressure) are taken daily for the rest of the patient’s life.
(WHO, “Race Against Time to Develop New Antibiotics,” Bulletin of the World Health
Organization 89, no. 2 (2011): 88.) Moreover, the high cost of developing new antibiotics
is unattractive in light of increasing resistance of bacteria.
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3.3.2 COMMONS EXPERIMENTS
Relying on commons institutions to experiment with different institutional arrangements
and to explore different solutions to health care problems has several advantages: First,
the use of commons institutions can break down complex and unwieldy institutional
challenges, like the management of health care resources, into smaller and more
manageable issues. Evidence suggests that individuals in relatively simple systems are
likely to develop rules that are more nearly optimal than individuals in more complex
systems.73 After all, small-scale commons institutions allow resource users to rely on local
knowledge, include trustworthy participants, and make use of disaggregated
knowledge.74 This often appears to lead to better rules than can be provided by any
general system of rules.75 Faced with complex problems, individuals grouped in smallscale, cooperative, and overlapping organizational arrangements “have a better chance
at testing, modifying, and improving rules.”76
Second, commons institutions tend to have lower monitoring and enforcement
costs than state institutions. Since local participants have to bear the costs of monitoring
and enforcement, they are likely to devise rules that make infractions highly obvious.
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Moreover, locally created rules are more easily seen as legitimate, leading to higher
conformance rates among participants in commons institutions.77 The lower monitoring
and enforcement costs, combined with high conformance, increase the likelihood of
success of local experiments.
Third, as discussed in the previous section, introducing commons institutions into
the health care system is akin to running parallel experiments, building redundancy into
the system, and thus greatly reducing the probability of systemic failure. Relying on
parallel, redundant design teams each trying to find the best combination of rules also
reduces the risk of local breakdowns, as the designers are attuned to the local context.
Unlike policies imposed on entire regions from the top down without taking into account
the differences, thus increasing the chances of a mismatch between the rules and the
local circumstances, resulting in a local tragedy.78
Commons institutions for most part share these first three advantages with
market-run experiments. However, commons experiments have several features that set
them apart from market institutions: First, using commons institutions in health care can
combine “the advantages of market competition while yet maintaining the principle of
assigning merit goods like health care on nonmarket criteria, and avoiding the possibility
that the production of such goods may be corrupted by the profit motive.”79 David Miller
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calls such “a market approach which deliberately seeks to eliminate the profit motive: a
market of co-operatives.”80 Within such a market of co-operatives it is presumably easier
to identify, share, and adopt successful experiments (see also 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best
of Many Worlds?).81
Second, the chapter began with highlighting the elusiveness of commons
institutions, which are theoretically infinite in number and produce a huge diversity of
rules. In field studies of irrigation systems, for example, farmer-owned systems generate
a far greater diversity of rule configurations than government-owned systems.82
Arguably, and depending on the definition of market institutions (see 0.2 Market and
State: A False Dichotomy), commons are more diverse than market institutions as well,
since the latter all arise within the market ideology with its reliance on the profit motive.83
Ostrom does not provide any empirical data to back up this conjecture, but the example
of drug manufacturers neglecting the development of new antibiotics is a possible
illustration. The takeaway is relying on inherently diverse commons institutions in
addition to the more uniform status quo institutions will generate a much larger number
of trials and is thus considerably more likely to solve health care’s problems.
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Finally, and closely related to the previous point, running a large diversity of
experiments is important because it can help plan for institutional adaptation and change,
so-called iterative risk management. As internal and external variables change, like new
medical technologies and ageing populations, health care institutions need to be able to
adapt to these changes.84 In the context of institutional change, North talks about the
importance of institutions that are “adaptively efficient.”85 Running a large and diverse
number of institutional experiments increases the odds of finding solutions to problems
in a changing world. However, North points out the process is not merely a probabilistic
one. Institutions that are (not) adaptively efficient can also arise systematically, because
a particular set of rules is easy to understand or seems to work well,86 but also because
of ideologies that give people a preference for similar solutions.87 So even though markets
can give rise to a large number of experiments, they may all resemble one another, and
thus not be adaptively efficient. Introducing commons institutions into health care can
mitigate this risk. Moreover, commons institutions might be better suited to adapt to
changes than market institutions. Because the latter may be terminated when they do
not meet some performance measure (e.g., not profitable, unable to attract capital),
some promising experiments might be abandoned early on, even though they would
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prove to be adaptively efficient further down the road. As Ostrom points out, “the best
outcome may exist in a subspace that was cut off early in the process of crafting rules.”88
Running a large number of diverse experiments and allowing members to learn from each
experiment before launching another one greatly increases the chances complex systems,
like health care, will be able to adapt to changes.89
Of course, commons institutions also have their limitations when conducting
parallel experiments: A first important disadvantage of relying on commons experiments
is that some members will not organize themselves. A particular worry in the context of
health care, as members often have neither the time nor knowledge to set up cooperative
experiments. Some of the main reasons are a lack of leadership and a fear of seeing their
experiments overturned by outside authorities,90 hence the importance of a minimal
recognition of the right to organize (see 2.6.7 Recognition of Rights to Organize).91 If
central governments recognize the importance of running parallel experiments, they can
mediate the issue by incentivizing self-organization (see also 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best
of Many Worlds?).
Second, incentives need not necessarily be financial,92 as the hurdle to organize
and conduct successful policy experiments will often be a lack of specialized knowledge.
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Local groups may possess extensive local knowledge and be specialists in their respective
fields of health care, but that does not mean they have the necessary expertise to set up,
conduct, and communicate the results of experiments. Central governments can provide
local groups with project managers or train health care professionals, like physicians and
administrators, in order to conduct successful experiments (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The
Best of Many Worlds?). Such an approach could fit within a more general move to
incorporate more economics into medical education,93 which could emphasize the value
of NIE to health care in general and the importance of parallel policy experiments in
particular.
Third, experiments must be followed up to prevent stagnation from occurring.
Once a local group has found a set of rules that works relatively well for them, they might
be tempted to cling to this solution “and stop innovating long before they have developed
rules likely to lead to better outcomes.”94 Incentives and knowledge provided by a
centralized government can help to ensure experiments continue moving forward, which
can be part of the reenvisioned role of policymakers as facilitators of rule-making
processes (see 3.2.1 Indeterminate Institutions). Setting up experiments according to the
aforementioned principle of a market of co-operatives can also help to prevent
stagnation.

Behavior,” Annual Review of Sociology 41 (August 2015): 48.) Relying on the power of
reputation and the prospect of forming new, enduring relationship may be more effective
to promote cooperation and prosocial behavior. (Ibid., 49, 53.)
93 Samuel Sessions and Allan Detsky, “Incorporating Economic Reality into Medical
Education,” Journal of the American Medical Association 304, no. 11 (September 2010):
1229-1230.
94 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 527.
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Finally, the issue of size, one of the theoretical puzzles haunting the commons (see
2.7.1 The Challenge of Size), also plagues commons experiments. Some experiments
simply are beyond small-scale institutions, which lack the resources to conduct them.
Closely related, commons institutions may be well suited to conduct a large variety of
policy experiments, but to identify and scale-up those experiments some larger-scale
jurisdiction likely is necessary, whether a centralized government or a higher-level
commons institution,95 as is suggested by the design principle of nesting (see 2.6.8 Nested
Enterprises). Still, the cooperative ethos of the commons may facilitate the scaling up of
experiments. After all, the more prevalent commons institutions are in society, the more
trust is built up through the collaborative interactions within and between these
institutions, presumably making the scaling up of experiments easier. The question
remains whether experiments can or should be scaled up altogether, given variations in
local circumstances solutions identified in one experiment might not work across the
board, but instead must be adapted to operate within other meso-level institutions.
Even though the foregoing discussion focused on the advantages and
disadvantages of relying on commons institutions to conduct policy experiments, the
status quo institutions of market and state were never far away, not only as points of
comparison, but also as necessary complements to the commons. The importance of
broader institutional diversity when conducting parallel experiments points in the
direction of polycentric institutions that combine the advantages and mitigate the
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Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 527.
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weaknesses of any single institutional arrangement (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of
Many Worlds?).
3.4 PLURALISM AND FREEDOM IN HEALTH CARE
We saw that Hayek believes freedom is essential to find solutions to society’s problems
through the process of trial-and-error. As discussed in the previous section, indeterminate
and plural institutions allow for the parallel experiments that can help realize this goal. In
turn, as I argue in this section, pluralistic institutions operating at the meso-level can
secure the freedom of society and the autonomy of its members by providing a
counterbalance against concentrations of power in one or a few institutions. In other
words, freedom permits societies to run parallel institutional experimentation, while
parallel institutional experiments safeguard the freedom of society.
What is true for society in general applies to health care in particular. Parallel
institutional experiments can be used to identify best practices in health care, but diverse
institutions can also serve as “institutional bulwarks” 96 against overbearing states or
powerful market institutions. Domineering status quo institutions can seize control over
the allocation of health care resources,97 thwarting ideals of jointly managing resources

96

As Levy points out, “bulwark” falls short as a metaphor because it refers to a physical
structure that passively protects, like a wall, while institutional bulwarks have a capacity
to act politically. (Jacob Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford
University 2015), 254.)
97 The tendency to seize control over health care resources is directly related to
discussions about the nature and ownership of health care resources (see 1.6 Argument
III: Type of Good). Health care resources are often pooled, the result of contributions by
members (e.g., potential patients paying insurance premiums, physicians paying dues to
hospitals), but once pooled ownership and control over the resource often de facto ends
up with the institutions managing the resource pool, an encroachment that can be
conceived as an enclosure (see also 3.4.1 Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom).
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through deliberative democracy (see 4. A4R in Practice), but they can also hijack other
aspects of health care, like the process of health care reform.
3.4.1 RATIONALISM, PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM
Levy’s Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (2015) provides a comprehensive discussion
of the pluralist tradition in liberalism in contrast with the better known, and more
influential, rationalist tradition. “[S]ince rationalist liberalism is most easily and most
often mistaken for the whole of liberal political philosophy, the history and the arguments
in favor of pluralism are generally underdeveloped and unfamiliar in contemporary
theory,”98 hence Levy focuses on the pluralist tradition.99 Levy’s approach is primarily
historical, providing a chronological overview of pluralism from ancient constitutionalism
to John Stuart Mill, a notable critic of pluralist liberalism.100 He does draw some normative
conclusions in the last two chapters of the book, but these unfortunately are not the
work’s strongest.101 While Levy proves himself to be an excellent historian, he falls short
in the application of his rich historic material.102
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Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 28.
According to Levy there is a “tendency in the twentieth century to treat rationalist
liberalism as the sum total of the liberal tradition.” (Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and
Freedom, 235.) As Charles Frankel puts it in The Case for Modern Man (1955): “There has
been a tendency, on one side of liberalism, to neglect the importance for the freedom
and power of individuals of secondary associations in between the individual and the
State, and to overlook the possibility of any kind of collective action for the achievement
of broad social purposes that is not State action.” (Charles Frankel, The Case for Modern
Man (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, [1955] 1972), 205.)
100 The bulk of Levy’s book is devoted to a detailed historic discussion of the pluralist
tradition. (Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 85-249.)
101 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 251-282.
102 The normative conclusions he draws in chapter ten (The Constitution of Group Life)
echo the sources he draws upon rather than transcends them, while the application of his
99
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The importance of Levy’s work for the health care commons lies in its focus on socalled “intermediate groups,”103 which stand between the individual and the state as
“sites where free people live their diverse lives.”104 The label “intermediate group”
pertains to a wide diversity of organizations and institutions, classic examples being
guilds, churches, and universities. The term is also applicable to commons institutions, for
example the huertas discussed in the previous chapter (see 2.4 A Common Scenario).
Given the project’s focus on the commons, I treat the terms “intermediate group” and
“commons (institution)” as interchangeable, but it is worth keeping in mind that Levy’s
concept applies to a broader range of organizations (see also 3.4.2 Securing the Freedom
of Health Care).105
Levy characterizes pluralist liberalism as “skeptical of the central state and friendly
toward local, customary, voluntary, or intermediate bodies, communities, and
associations.”106 In contrast, rationalist liberalism focuses on the freedom of the
individual and the role of the state in guaranteeing that freedom in face of “local
tyrannies.”107 While the rationalist tradition is plausibly skeptical of commons institutions,

normative conclusions to universities in chapter eleven (Associations are Not States) adds
little to his overall argument.
103 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 2.
104 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 2.
105 Indeed, certain market organizations may be construed as intermediate groups. To
give an example, Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) can plausibly be conceived as
intermediate groups (see also footnote 199). The fact both commons and market
organizations can be construed as intermediate groups once again highlights the fluidity
of both concepts, and the difficulty of clear demarcation (see 0.2 Market and State: A
False Dichotomy).
106 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 2.
107 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 2.
243

the pluralist tradition is sympathetic to the idea of institutions for collective action.
Indeed, Levy references Ostrom’s work on the commons when discussing the sources of
social order.108 His summary of the pluralist view of the origins of social order would feel
right at home in the commons literature, and is a first testimony to the relevance of Levy’s
work for the commons:

The rival set of answers to the question of where social order comes from involves
the emergence and evolution of norms that govern group life in any particular
setting. The emphasis is typically on the development of rules suited to a particular
group's social needs, on the stable benefits of cooperation and reciprocity under
conditions of long-term coexistence, and on local knowledge of everything from
the natural environment to the character of one's neighbors.109

To further tie in Levy’s work with that of Ostrom, several remarks and reflections are in
place: First, within the pluralist tradition, and thus also in Levy’s book, the focus is on
safeguarding the liberty of intermediate groups and their members vis-à-vis states. This
exclusive focus on states is understandable seen liberalism’s development in concert with
the rise and subsequent dominance of the nation state,110 but since the beginning of the
twentieth century different market organizations at different times have rivaled the
nation state’s power (e.g., railroad companies, banks, and now internet giants like Google,
Amazon, and Facebook).111 Even though many market organizations can be situated at
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Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 37.
Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 37.
110 (Rationalist) liberalism itself is in part responsible for the rise of the nation state.
Moreover, intermediate organizations were, and still are, associated with the Middle Ages
(e.g., guilds, cities) immediately making them suspect in the eyes of many Early Modern
political philosophers.
111 Levy’s history of the pluralism ends before these developments take place. Moreover,
Levy has reasons to exclude economic institutions from his study. (Levy, Rationalism,
109
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the middle-level, a select few are quasi states.112 Within market-based health care
systems, such market powerhouses exist as well113 (e.g., Anthem Inc., Hospital
Corporation of America, and Community Health Systems in the United States). 114 Apart
from an ability to control the health care marketplace, these organizations also wield
power by influencing states through lobbying efforts.115 Second, the authoritative and
dominant rationalist tradition of liberalism emphasizes the individual (micro-level) and
the state (macro-level), while ignoring and even dismissing intermediate groups (mesolevel). This arguably goes a long way in explaining why the middle-level has been
overlooked, for example in economics with its classic division into microeconomics and
macroeconomics. The subject of the former are the decisions of individuals and firms,
while states typically are the subject of latter.116 In other words, the state-market

Pluralism, and Freedom, 12-16.) However, both the institutions he considers as economic
institutions and his reasoning for excluding them are unclear: (1) Levy explicitly excludes
labor unions and commercial corporations, but seems to leave room for commons
institutions as he cites Ostrom’s work. (Ibid., 37.) He also repeatedly discusses guilds,
which are economic organizations. (2) Levy appears to exclude economic institutions on
the basis that their locus of control is external rather than internal, but then goes on to
discuss at least some ways in which non-economic institutions project power externally.
112 Even though their power falls short in comparison to that of states in some ways (e.g.,
monopoly of violence), in other ways their influence surpasses that of states (e.g., not
territorially bound, available resources).
113 Linda Emanuel talks about the American health care system at the turn of the century
as an “era of mushrooming power for health care organizations.” (Linda Emanuel, “Ethics
and the Structures of Healthcare,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9, no. 2 (April
2000): 153.)
114 Anthem Inc. is the country’s largest for-profit managed care company, while Hospital
Corporation of America and Community Health Systems are two of the largest hospital
systems in America.
115 Interestingly, they lobby through intermediate organizations more narrowly defined
(see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-Level).
116 G. Chris Rodrigo, “Micro and Macro: The Economic Divide,” Finance and Development,
June 1, 2018, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/bigsmall.htm.
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dichotomy itself can plausibly (and in part) be traced back to the dominance of rationalist
liberalism (see 0.2 State and Market: A False Dichotomy), but a more detailed discussion
of its influence lies outside the scope of this chapter.117,118 Third, and closely related to
the previous point, the rationalist tradition’s emphasis on the individual and the state
likely shaped the distinction between private goods (micro-level) and public goods
(macro-level), while club goods and common-pool resources, both situated at the mesolevel, were not recognized until relatively recently (see 2.5 Argument III: Type of Good).
Fourth, each of the traditions provides part of the puzzle to ensure a free society based
“on different sociological and psychological generalizations,”119 for example the model of
the homo economicus in contrast with the homo sociologicus (see 0.2 Market and State:
A False Dichotomy). As Levy repeatedly points out, each strand of liberalism has its merits
and faults (e.g., both intermediate groups and states can protect individual freedom or
pose a threat to it). Levy’s focus on the pluralist tradition must be understood as the
revaluation of an unappreciated strand of liberalism rather than as a dismissal of the
rationalist tradition.120 Lastly, Levy believes the tension between the two traditions is
irresolvable.121 On the one hand, this may imply it will be difficult to carve out a space for
pluralist liberalism given the existing dominance of rationalist liberalism, even though

117

Economic liberalism and ordoliberalism, which emphasizes the role of the state in
regulating the market, align with rationalist liberalism.
118 The division in microeconomics and macroeconomics does not arise until the
twentieth century but, of course, that does not rule out the influence of rationalist
liberalism. (Rodrigo, “Micro and Macro: The Economic Divide.”)
119 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 253.
120 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 3, 253.
121 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 3, 253.
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Levy’s and Ostrom’s work are a testament to a tentative revaluation of pluralism. On the
other hand, it suggests the potential value of a polycentric approach to protect freedom
(see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds), as a mix of micro-, meso-, and macrolevel institutions can potentially ensure a balance of power without any particular level
becoming overbearing. The importance of safeguarding freedom in health care and the
role of intermediate groups in doing so will be discussed in more detail in the next section
(see 3.4.2 Securing the Freedom of Health Care).
Before continuing, it is worth to touch upon two philosophers who figure
prominently in Levy’s book as well as in the work of Ostrom.122 Levy notes there is a
“recurring tendency to treat Hobbes as a or even the founder of liberalism,”123 adding
that pluralists have no place in any liberalism of which Hobbes is the source. 124 Contrary
to pluralists, whose views on the origins of social order have been summarized above,
Hobbes believes social order must be “coercively imposed from above”125 by an
orderer,126 Hobbes’s famous Leviathan. Collective action problems can only be
successfully resolved through coercion.127 This is Hardin’s preferred solution to the
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A third figure to add to this list is Hayek, who influenced Ostrom deeply, but is
dismissed by Levy because he conflates “the rationalist tradition within liberalism as more
or less equivalent to an attraction to economic planning, and the pluralist tradition largely
equivalent to the market liberalism that values the spontaneous economic order of
commercial society.” (Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 14.) According to Levy,
such conflations between the two liberal traditions on the one hand and normative
theories of political economy on the other should be avoided because it interferes with a
clear understanding of either. (Ibid.)
123 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 235.
124 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 235.
125 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 36.
126 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 36.
127 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 37.
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tragedy of the commons (see 1.3 The Tragedy of the Commons) and thus the impetus to
Ostrom’s research.128 Insofar as Hobbes is the father of rationalist liberalism, he is one of
the main intellectual opponents of Levy and Ostrom as representatives of pluralism. The
second philosopher is Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the most influential thinkers in the
pluralist tradition and arguably Ostrom’s single most important intellectual inspiration.129
Levy writes, “Tocqueville consistently sees the world of intermediate local groups as a
check on or alternative to centralized state power.”130 Even though Ostrom presents
commons institutions as an alternative to states (and markets), she does not emphasize
their role as checks on power concentrations. Indeed, this section has highlighted several
parallels between Levy’s work on pluralism and Ostrom’s research on the commons, but
the concepts of “freedom” and “liberty” as sources of political power so central to
pluralist liberalism are notably absent from her work. Throughout, she treats autonomy
as if it is merely passive, something that is given rather than demanded, and not a basis
to actively engage with other autonomous units.131 Both her discussion of parallel
experiments (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments) and the seventh design principle (see 2.6.7
Recognition of Rights to Organize) are good examples of her treatment of freedom and
liberty. In other words, the argument that intermediate groups, like commons
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Ostrom mentions Hobbes on the second page of Governing the Commons (1990) and
the section titled “Leviathan as the “only” way” discusses the Hobbesian solution to the
tragedy of the commons. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 8-12.) (See also 1.6 Averting
the Tragedy of the Health Care Commons.)
129 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 24-26.
130 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 213.
131 The absence of the notion of autonomy can also be explained by the fact Ostrom
undertheorizes the role of power.
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institutions, function as a bulwark against powerful state and market institutions is not
Ostrom’s, but is nonetheless inspired by her work and complements the role she envisions
for commons institutions.
3.4.2 SECURING THE FREEDOM OF HEALTH CARE
Plural institutions can protect the freedom of health care, both the independence of
health care institutions and the autonomy of individuals participating in health care,132 by
providing a counterbalance against overbearing concentrations of power, whether in the
hands of the state or in those of powerful market organizations. This section begins by
discussing how plural institutions can protect individual autonomy, then shows why and
how pluralism can protect the freedom of health care institutions themselves, and ends
by arguing commons institutions are better suited than market organizations to fulfill the
role of bulwark against overbearing state and market institutions.
Individual autonomy is considered an important value in contemporary
biomedical ethics, arguably the most important value.133 To give two prominent

132

Freedom and autonomy are not necessarily the same, even though the concepts can
certainly be defined as being equivalent. Usually, freedom is considered the ability to act
without internal or external constraints, while autonomy concerns the independence and
authenticity of the desires that move ones actions in the first place. (John Christman,
“Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2020 Edition), accessed June 1, 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomymoral/.) For the sake of the present argument, I use the concept of autonomy when
talking about individuals, because of its usage in the bioethics literature, while I use both
concepts interchangeably when talking about institutions, as Levy does in Rationalism,
Pluralism, and Freedom (2015). Treating the concepts separately would result in a more
intricate argument but the basic claim, and the arguments supporting it, would remain
the same: plural institutions operating at the meso-level secure freedom and autonomy.
133 The importance of autonomy is also stressed in the influential The Belmont Report,
which discusses the importance of autonomy in the context of human subjects research.
The report defines autonomy as follows: “An autonomous person is an individual capable
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examples: (1) In Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s influential Principles of
Biomedical Ethics (1984), the principle of autonomy is one of four principles undergirding
moral reasoning in bioethics, but according to some critics enjoys a primacy vis-à-vis the
other three principles.134 (2) Onora O’Neill, influenced by Kantian ethics, highlights the
centrality of autonomy in biomedical ethics in Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics
(2002).135,136 Autonomy is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. In the Western

of deliberation about personal goals and of acting under the direction of such
deliberation. To respect autonomy is to give weight to autonomous persons' considered
opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their actions unless they are
clearly detrimental to others. To show lack of respect for an autonomous agent is to
repudiate that person's considered judgments, to deny an individual the freedom to act
on those considered judgments, or to withhold information necessary to make a
considered judgment, when there are no compelling reasons to do so.” (The National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
“The Belmont Report. Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Research,” accessed November 20, 2019, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/
regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/read-the-belmont-report/index.)
134 Beauchamp and Childress discuss how their approach has often been criticized for
placing too much emphasis on respect for autonomy, but they themselves emphatically
deny the principle of autonomy has moral priority over the other principles. (Tom L.
Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Seventh Edition
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1977] 2013), 101, 141.)
135 “[N]o themes have become more central in large parts of bioethics, and especially in
medical ethics, than the importance of respecting individual rights and individual
autonomy. These are now the dominant ethical ideas in many discussions of topics
ranging from genetic testing to geriatric medicine, from psychiatry to in vitro fertilization,
from beginning to end of life problems, from medical innovation to medical futility, from
heroic medicine to hospices.” (Onora O’Neill, O., Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. The
Gifford Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2.) O’Neill also points
toward Beauchamp and Childress as being responsible for the prominence of autonomy
in bioethics. (Ibid., 34.)
136 O’Neill’s treatment of autonomy in relationship to trust is interesting, because it sits
at the intersection of the current discussion, and the role trust plays in ensuring the
success of institutions for collective action. Her argument that gains in autonomy may
lead to decreases in trust can be framed in terms of institutions (e.g., sets of rules that
enhance autonomy lead to more self-interested behavior and thus to a decrease in trust).
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philosophical tradition, autonomy has become a basic moral and political value with the
turn to the individual in modernity.137 According to Mill, to give an example that fits within
the prior discussion of rationalist liberalism, autonomy is “one of the elements of wellbeing.”138 Unsurprisingly, as bioethics stems from this philosophical tradition, autonomy
is sometimes considered of intrinsic value in biomedical ethics, for example in the work
of Beauchamp and Childress,139 even though some contest this status of autonomy as an
intrinsic good.140 Individual autonomy is of instrumental value because it furthers such
goods as patient well-being and the ability of physicians to act in the best interest of their
patients,141 to give just two examples.142 In response to the rationalistic and individualistic

A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but offers a promising
avenue for future research.
137 Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.”
138 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, [1859] 2015), 55-72.
139 “Personal autonomy is, at minimum, self-rule that is free from both controlling
interference by others and from limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that
prevent meaningful choice. The autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a
self-chosen plan, analogous to the way an independent government manages its
territories and sets its policies.” (Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical
Ethics, 101.)
140 Jukka Varelius claims many bioethicists ostensibly present autonomy as being of
intrinsic value without argument altogether or without good arguments. (Jukka Varelius,
“The Value of Autonomy in Medical Ethics,” Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy 9, no.
3 (2006): 377-388.) The lack of argument may (in part) be explained by the emphasis on
individual autonomy as an intrinsic good in the Western philosophical tradition.
141 The instrumental value of autonomy in bioethics is uncontested. James Stacey Taylor,
for example, believes “the value of autonomy in bioethics is primarily instrumental.”
(James Stacey Taylor, Practical Autonomy and Bioethics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), xv.)
Christopher Tollefsen has also argued autonomy has instrumental rather than intrinsic
value. (Chris Tollefsen, “Sic et Non: Some Disputed Questions in Reproductive Ethics,” in
Handbook of Bioethics: Taking Stock of the Field from a Philosophical Perspective, ed.
George Khushf (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004).)
142 More generally, autonomy is of instrumental value because it allows individuals to act
in a way that allows them to pursue their desires and goals.
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account of autonomy that still dominates medical ethics,143 some bioethicists have
proposed relational accounts of autonomy. Both the concept of autonomy and its value
can be discussed at length, but the takeaway point for the purpose of the present
discussion is one all bioethicists agree on: autonomy matters in health care, even if it the
principle’s precise role and value are contested.
While the emphasis on autonomy in general and individual autonomy in particular
must primarily be situated within the dominant rationalist tradition of liberalism from
which it originated, I argue that plural institutions operating at the meso-level play a key
role in securing that (individual) autonomy. As I discussed in the previous section (see
3.4.1 Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom), rationalist liberals tend to emphasize the role
of the state in ensuring the autonomy of the individual, while pluralist liberals stress the
role of middle-level institutions as bulwarks against oppressive power concentrations and
as loci where autonomy is realized. The concerns of rationalists and pluralists translate to
health care. I briefly discuss three examples that illustrate the dynamic between powerful
hierarchies and meso-level institutions in the context of autonomy. In each case, I
highlight the concerns of both rationalists and pluralists, but beyond that the examples
lack detail. (1) A terminally ill patient has been admitted to a Catholic hospital and due to
his condition cannot be moved. The atheist patient has requested euthanasia, but his
physician and the hospital refuse to grant his request, because it conflicts with their moral
convictions. Under the assumption that euthanasia is legal, rationalist liberals would

143

O’Neill talks about the “triumph of autonomy.” (O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in
Bioethics, 34-37.) A reference to the title of a book chapter by Paul Root Wolpe titled The
Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A Sociological View (1998). (Ibid., 2.)
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argue the state should step in to protect the patient’s right to choose euthanasia.
However, the pluralist may argue in favor of the autonomy of the physician and the
hospital, stating they should have the freedom to act according to their convictions. From
this perspective, state intervention is a form of oppression that should be resisted.144 (2)
The state regulates the health care market, among others, to protect individuals against
potentially predatory behaviors of health care organizations (e.g., Obamacare forbids
health insurance companies to refuse coverage or charge patients more just because of
the presence of a preexisting condition),145 thus ensuring patient autonomy. Middle-level
organizations may argue such state intervention in fact limits patient choice, and thus
threatens (potential) patients’ autonomy, by determining too narrowly how health care
organizations ought to behave in the marketplace. The case is tricky, because in practice
rationalist liberals often argue against state intervention in favor of personal autonomy,
but that goes to show that the allegiances of rationalists and pluralists are messy. (3) A
Muslim woman in need of emergency care demands to be treated by a female physician.

144

I loosely base the example on several cases that made headlines in Belgium following
the legalization of euthanasia in 2002. Zorgnet Vlaanderen, the representative of
(primarily) Catholic hospitals in the north of Belgium, has repeatedly stated that their
members follow the law on euthanasia.
145 While the case of health insurers refusing to cover patients with preexisting conditions
appears to be a clear-cut example, there are arguments to defend the practice, especially
in situations where having health insurance is not compulsory. In such a scenario,
disallowing insurers to deny coverage to patients with preexisting conditions can lead to
a moral hazard, where potential patients remain uninsured, and thus do not contribute
to the pool of health care resources, until they become seriously injured or ill. To frame
the problem in the language of the commons, making it illegal for insurers to refuse
coverage to patients with preexisting conditions makes it difficult for insurers to exclude
beneficiaries and to clearly define the boundaries of the CPR (see 2.6.1 Clearly Defined
Boundaries).
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The hospital wants her to see a male physician on the grounds that no female doctors are
available.146 Based on the woman’s experience, local Muslim groups argue for the hospital
to change its procedures to make sure a female physician is present, or at least on call.
The example illustrates the role middle-level organizations can play in both limiting and
enabling individual autonomy in a context that pluralists are particularly concerned about
(i.e., safeguarding religious freedom and personal autonomy with regards to religious
convictions). I discuss the dangers posed by local tyrannies in detail in the next section
(see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-Level). These examples highlight the doubleness in
the role of both the state and middle-level organizations. On the one hand, the state and
meso-level organizations can protect individual autonomy.147 On the other hand, both
types of institutions can encroach upon personal autonomy in ways that are experienced
as authoritarian. Within the context of middle-level organizations, rationalist liberals tend
to be suspicious of local tyrannies, and focus on the role the state can play in ensuring
personal autonomy. At the same time, however, rationalist are wary of overbearing state
influence, but they tend to mitigate this by emphasizing the central importance of
individual autonomy rather than pointing toward middle-level institutions. Pluralists
stress the role of the meso-level in safeguarding autonomy, but risk local oppression. Levy
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Aasim I. Padela and Pablo Rodriguez del Pozo, “Muslim Patients and Cross-Gender
Interactions in Medicine: An Islamic Bioethical Perspective,” Journal of Medical Ethics 37,
no. 1 (January 2011).
147 In theory, powerful market institutions can also fulfill the role of the state when it
comes to protecting individual autonomy, but it is difficult to construe their motivations
for allocating resources to the protection of autonomy in terms other than self-interest.
To give a concrete example, health insurance companies often present themselves as
champions of patient autonomy, arguing in favor of patient choice, but their reason for
doing so likely is not a strong commitment to ensuring personal autonomy.
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summarizes the doubleness of the middle-level as follows: “The virtues of group life
include groups' ability to protect their members and to counterbalance against intrusive
state power; but that ability depends on normative and institutional features of group life
that increase the risks of internal unfreedom.”148 Both macro- and meso-level institutions
have a role to play in protecting individual autonomy. Like Levy, I focus on meso-level
organizations because their significance has been underappreciated given the dominance
of the rationalist tradition. And, of course, because of the project’s focus on commons
institutions which must be situated at the middle-level. For societies in general and health
care institutions in particular to ensure the most possible personal autonomy, there
plausibly needs to be a mix of macro- and micro-level institutions (see 3.5 Polycentricity:
The Best of Many Worlds?). However, as the prior examples show, within such a context
the different institutional levels likely exist in tension with each other concerning
particular matters of personal autonomy. Indeed, different meso-level organizations may
play opposing roles, both protecting and limiting autonomy. While this will inevitably lead
to conflicts, this institutional dynamic is not something that ought to be resolved, but
rather a prerequisite for preserving autonomy.
The pluralists’ concerns about the threat (quasi) states pose to individual
autonomy are arguably more pressing in developed societies and their health care
systems than those of the rationalist: First, there is the de facto dominance of rationalist
liberalism and the comparative weakness of pluralist liberalism described by Levy. These
are not mere theoretical considerations, but have practical implications. For example,
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Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 9.
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rationalists’ emphasis on the state and the individual combined with their suspicion of
the meso level has plausibly resulted in the inflation of top-down power concentrations
and the underdevelopment, and subsequent erosion,149 of the middle-level.150 The
breakdown of the meso level leaves Western societies largely divided into micro-level
human monads and macro-level institutional Leviathans, where the latter pose a threat
to the autonomy of the former. Second, Levy confirms as much when he discusses the
threat that “taking centralization to excess”151 poses to autonomy.152 States and market
organizations have a tendency to turn into centralized, bureaucratic behemoths whose
power curbs individual autonomy.153 According to Kohr, abuses of power at the cost of
the individual are the inevitable corollary of such institutional oversize (see 2.7.1 The
Challenge of Size).154 Finally, given the state of the institutional landscape and the existing
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Putnam provides extensive empirical evidence for the disappearance of intermediate
organizations from the meso level in Bowling Alone (2000), leaving market organizations
as the prevalent institutions occupying the middle-level.
150 Path dependence plays a role here, as these institutional developments are likely
reinforced over time and difficult to change (see 3.3.1 State and Market Experiments for
a more detailed discussion of institutional path dependence).
151 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 200.
152 Levy’s detailed discussion of “Tendencies toward State Excess” for most part is equally
applicable to large and powerful market organizations. (Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and
Freedom, 61-70.) Among others, he highlights the “organizational imperative to gather
information,” which leads the state to increase the “legibility of society” (i.e.,
surveillance), and the centralizing temperament of the “man of system” that is opposed
to “custom or to local reasons that do not mirror the balance of reasons considered
appropriate by the state.” (Ibid., 64, 68.)
153 Unsurprisingly, the fear of taking centralization to excess figure prominently in popular
culture, from the superstates in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (Oceania) and
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (World State) to the megacorporations in Paul
Verhoeven’s RoboCop (Omni Consumer Products) and Frank Herbert’s Dune (CHOAM). In
the case of Nineteen Eighty-Four and Brave New World, loss of autonomy at the hands of
powerful, centralized bureaucracies is a key theme.
154 Leopold Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1957).
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power distributions, there is another reason to believe individual autonomy being curbed
by overbearing centers is a greater concern than individual autonomy being curtailed by
middle-level institutions. In “one-on-one battles”155 against (quasi) states, the individual
is always going to be at a disadvantage and more often than not will lose out. Without a
developed and active meso level, there is no source of institutional resistance against
powerful hierarchies.156 “Many-on-one battles,”157,158 where individuals organize
themselves in intermediate groups, and these middle-level organizations can in turn
coordinate and mobilize against power concentrations, offer better odds at success. 159
Meso-level organizations do not only play a role in protecting the autonomy of
individuals, but also safeguard the freedom of organization, which is a precondition for
the middle-level to do its part in the protection of individual autonomy.160 In other words,

155

Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993), 22.
156 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 58.
157 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 22.
158 As Putnam puts it in Bowling Alone (2000), “when people associate [in intermediate
groups] their individual and otherwise quiet voices multiply and are amplified.” (Robert
Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2000), 338.)
159 The argument is inspired by Putnam’s discussion of intergovernmental relationships in
Italy, where regional governments individually had a hard time prevailing against the
central government in policy decisions, while regional governments acting as a group
were much more successful in achieving victories. (Putnam, Making Democracy Work,
22.)
160 The previous paragraphs focus on the role middle-level organizations play in enhancing
individual autonomy, promoting autonomy at the micro-level, i.e., “downward.” The
current discussion focuses on the role meso-level organizations play in enhancing
institutional freedom, promoting autonomy at the meso- and macro-level, i.e., “lateral”
and “upward” respectively. To use an imperfect analogy, a faculty member can enhance
the autonomy of her students (micro-level, downward), but she can also promote the
freedom of her colleagues (meso-level, lateral) or of the administration (macro-level,
upward).
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meso-level organizations can ensure institutional freedom, and thus promote the
freedom of health care systems (e.g., the freedom to start a new group practice or health
care cooperative) and societies (e.g., the liberty for groups of individuals to draft their
own rules).161 This role of the meso level as the guardian of institutional freedom is
seldom discussed,162 particularly in biomedical ethics. First things first, however, why
does institutional freedom matter? Like individual autonomy, institutional freedom may
be of intrinsic value, as it is a prerequisite for flourishing institutions.163 Alternatively,
organizational freedom may be construed as a direct expression of value pluralism,
because free institutions are diverse institutions.164 Unsatisfactory as these reasons for
attributing intrinsic value to institutional freedom may be, in practice the freedom of
organizations is often presented as an intrinsic good.165 If the reasons for attributing
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Given the central role of health care in society, a free society and a free health care
system likely go hand in hand.
162 Levy too pays relatively little attention to the role intermediate groups can play in
protecting institutional autonomy, possibly because much of his argument is historical,
and since the pluralist tradition developed in relation with the rationalist tradition, it
primarily positions itself vis-à-vis the macro- and micro-level. Hence, when pluralist
liberals (and Levy) are concerned about protecting institutional freedom, they primarily
worry about defending meso-level institutions against the power of the state (macrolevel) or an internal putsch by individuals (micro-level) (see 3.4.3 Dangers of the MiddleLevel).
163 The term “prerequisite” points toward instrumental rather than intrinsic value. Then
again, the same can be said about the intrinsic value of individual autonomy. After all,
stating that autonomy is “one of the elements of well-being,” to use Mill’s example, just
seems to be the rationalist liberal’s way of saying it is a necessary prerequisite for human
flourishing, which reeks of instrumental value.
164 Here too, freedom seems like a necessary condition for institutional diversity,
suggesting instrumental rather than intrinsic value.
165 The modern ideas about the intrinsic value of individual autonomy have seemingly
spread to institutions. One plausible reason for this “contamination” is economic:
assuming institutional freedom is an intrinsic good provides a justification for ever
increasing organizational freedom, particularly of market organizations. The claim to
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intrinsic value to institutional freedom are dubitable, there are good arguments in
support of the view that free institutions are instrumentally valuable: First, institutional
freedom is important to safeguard individual autonomy. Without free institutions,
personal autonomy comes under threat of overbearing power centers,166 as I argued at
length in the previous paragraphs. Second, institutional freedom allows for running
parallel institutional experiments, which play a key role in identifying best practices and
protecting complex systems against catastrophic failure (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments).
Third, institutional freedom allows for the expression of diverse values and the protection
of those values. A typical example is the freedom to organize health care in line with
certain religious beliefs (e.g., the freedom of Catholic hospitals in Belgium to refuse
euthanasia).167 Finally, institutional freedom is of instrumental value because it is a
precondition for institutions to fulfill their role of protectors of freedom, whether

intrinsic value is a powerful argument in discussions about corporate personhood, for
example in the context of the high-profile Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission
case, to provide just one illustration. (Remember the slogan “Corporations are people!”
which, among others, featured prominently on Stephen Colbert’s The Colbert Report. The
catchphrase implies corporations and people enjoy the same rights and freedoms.)
166 Even though I present institutional freedom as a necessary condition for individual
autonomy, there may be cases where the latter is present without the former, say in a
society governed by an Enlightened despot who seeks to maximize individual autonomy
but sees institutional freedom as a political threat. Of course, this places at least one
important limitation on individual autonomy (i.e., a restriction of the freedom of
organization).
167 The example illustrates both a meso-level organization asserting itself against the
legislative state (macro-level) and placing limitations on individual autonomy (microlevel). At least, if the individual in the example does not subscribe to the same religious
ideas, because the hospital’s refusal can also be construed as enhancing the religious
individual’s autonomy in a society that “promotes” euthanasia (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of
the Middle-Level).
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individual autonomy or institutional freedom. In other words, organizations need
freedom in order to protect it.
Meso-level institutions protect institutional liberty by providing a “germ of
resistance” against overbearing power centers, to use the words of Benjamin Constant.168
They play a crucial role in maintaining a balance of power in society by checking the power
of the state and powerful market organizations. According to ancient constitutionalists,
middle-level institutions need not have an interest in protecting the freedom of
individuals or society at large, as long as they pursue the protection of their own freedom
this automatically tempers any “absolutist pretensions.”169 Of course, this requires
middle-level institutions to have some capacity to act politically,170 which in turn
necessitates political institutions for them to exercise their political power (see 3.5
Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). Arguably, however, even without such rules in
place the meso level can provide a counterbalance against powerful centers. Meso-level
institutions can fulfill their role as protectors of freedom in a variety of ways: First, they
can function as “schools for democracy,” teaching civic and social skills to their members,
turning them into citizens able to engage in public issues, also outside of the sphere of
their own institution.171 Second, and closely related to the previous point, middle level
organizations can serve as forums where participants hone their democratic skills and
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Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 254.
Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 120.
170 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 254.
171 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 338.
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build trust,172 allowing them to fight “many-on-one battles” against centers of power.173
As such, the meso level guards the freedom of individuals, organizations, and society
alike.
For the purpose of the present discussion, i.e., vindicating the role of the meso
level in protecting individual and institutional autonomy, middle-level organizations have
so far been treated in aggregate, this in order to highlight the dynamic between the
different levels of analysis. However, the middle level is occupied by a diversity of
institutional arrangements: market organizations, commons, and the intermediate
groups that are the subject matter of Levy’s study. The potential of each of these
institutional arrangements as champions of autonomy must now be assessed. Given the
focus of this study on commons and markets, I treat commons as a particular type of
intermediate group (see 3.4.1 Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom), and draw a
comparison between commons and market organizations, arguing the former are
superior as bulwarks against overbearing centers.174 First, there is the issue of motivation:
the motives of market organizations are much more narrowly defined by their
institutional form than those of commons institutions, whose pluralism allows for a much
broader range of motivations. Market organizations all share similar motivations and
related goals: to create shareholder value, to increase market share, to innovate more,
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Putnam, Bowling Alone, 339.
Collective-choice arrangements provide such a forum (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice
Arrangements).
174 As with the market-state dichotomy (see 0.2 Sate and Market: A False Dichotomy),
here too talking in terms of a division between commons and market organizations is an
undue but necessary simplification for the sake of the argument.
173
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and so on (see also 3.3.1 State and Market Experiments). However, safeguarding their
own autonomy, let alone the autonomy of others (e.g., individuals, competitors,
intermediate groups), at best seems to be a secondary motivation to help them reach
their primary goals.175 In comparison, the pluralism of commons institutions allows for
much more diverse motivations and goals: to preserve certain practices, to serve the local
community, to protect the autonomy of their members, and so on. These goals can be
primary rather than secondary. Moreover, the emphasis of the commons paradigm on
horizontal cooperation makes it more likely commons institutions will be motivated to
protect the autonomy of their peers (e.g., because they feel the practices of the other
intermediate groups and their members are worth preserving as well). In other words,
commons can be primarily and authentically motivated to protect the autonomy of
themselves, their members, and other institutions. Even though, in practice, they often
act in their own interest (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-Level). Second, the
emphasis of commons institutions on the participation of their members allows for the
interests of the institutions and its members to align in a way that enforces the autonomy
of both the individual and the institution. Ideally, the goals of the self-governed individual
should line up with the goals of the self-governed intermediate group in meaningful ways
beyond the realm of the mere economic (e.g., a religious physician who chooses to work
in a Catholic hospital). Conflicts can take place, but there are designated arenas to resolve
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There are, of course, examples where safeguarding their own autonomy becomes a
primary motivation, say in the case of a hostile takeover by another market organization
or impending government seizure of their assets. Still, it is unclear what would motivate
market organizations to be staunch defenders of individual and institutional autonomy
tout court.
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these disagreements through dialogue (“voice”) rather than through disengagement
(“exit”),176 thus deepening the relationship between the institution and its members,
resulting in a strong mutual allegiance (“loyalty”).177 Arguably, members and institutions
in such close-knit relationships will have a greater interest in and commitment to
safeguarding their respective and joint autonomy. Of course, this tightly knit relationship
between the institution and its members also opens the door for local tyrannies (see 3.4.3
The Dangers of the Middle-Level). Third, intermediate groups quite literally fill up a void
in social space between individuals and (quasi) states.178 As Charles Frankel noted about
life in centralized, bureaucratic societies in The Case for Modern Man (1955):

The individual can no longer have the sense – except vicariously – that he is taking
an active part in the making of public decisions that affect him. His access to
centers of social power becomes increasingly difficult; he comes to experience
social authority as something remote and abstract; he feels isolated and
depersonalized.179

Commons institutions are better suited than market organizations to bridge this space
that has opened up in contemporary society, because they are inherently political,
internally as well as externally. This also becomes apparent in the relationship individuals
have to commons institutions, which is akin to a responsible citizen rather than a self-
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See also 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanism.
For more on Hirschman’s concepts of “exit,” “voice,” and “loyalty” see footnote 184 in
the previous chapter (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements).
178 I use the term “social space” in the same way as Levy (see 5.4.3 The Dangers of the
Middle-Level).
179 Frankel, The Case for Modern Man, 202.
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interested consumer.180 Finally, commons institutions build so-called “social capital”181
that enables them to mobilize against (quasi) states threatening their autonomy, but also
empowers their members, non-member individuals, and indeed society at large.182
Societies with a large supply of social capital will be able to better resist threats to their
freedom at all levels of analysis. Of course, an excess of social capital can also lead to blind
devotion, which can in turn pose a threat to autonomy (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the
Middle-Level).183 Some have argued there is a middle ground, between too little and too
much social capital, characterized by an informed commitment to the wider society, while
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Of course, individuals can also relate to market organizations as employees, which
does allow them to develop many of the same civic and social skills, with some limitations.
181 While Ostrom already mentions social capital in Governing the Commons (1990), she
becomes increasingly interested in the concept later in her career, coediting a monograph
on the topic titled Foundations of Social Capital (2003). Ostrom recognizes the following
“three basic forms” of social capital: trustworthiness, networks, and institutions. (T.K. Ahn
and Elinor Ostrom, “Social Capital and Collective Action,” in The Handbook of Social
Capital, eds. Dario Castiglione, Jan W. van Deth, and Guglielmo Wolleb (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 73.) For the purpose of the project, I have limited the use of the
concept to this single passage, as the notion of social capital remains controversial.
182 Milton Esman, Social Capital and Empowerment (Washington: World Bank, 2003).
183 The attitude of Americans toward their health care system may be a good example of
social capital gone awry. Social capital can be bonding (within the same group, horizontal),
bridging (between groups, horizontal), or linking (between groups, vertical). Similarly,
one can think of social capital as operating horizontally or vertically, a distinction made
by Putnam. Horizontal social capital creates horizontal allegiances and alignments, while
vertical social capital imposes “hierarchy and order on latent anarchy.” (Putnam, Making
Democracy Work, 130.) Vertical social capital can make one fiercely devoted to one’s
country, as is the case in the United States. In case of war, for example, Americans rally
behind their Commander in Chief. This national allegiance may also express itself in the
belief of many Americans that their country’s health care system is the best in the world,
despite overwhelming proof to the contrary. (Robin Herman, “Most Republicans Think
the U.S. Health Care System is the Best in the World. Democrats Disagree,” accessed
March 1, 2020, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/republicansdemocrats-disagreeus-health-care-system/.)
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preserving independence and liberty, so-called “embedded autonomy.”184 Thus, in theory
there are some reasons to believe commons institutions are better protectors of
autonomy than market organizations, but realizing this theoretical potential in practice is
difficult. For one, there is the dominance of market and state institutions, so even if
commons are better at safeguarding autonomy, the fact they are underrepresented
makes it difficult for them to fulfill this role. Taking an evolutionary perspective of
institutions, one can speculate the status quo institutions and the power relationships
fixated in them have shaped a social environment in which they thrive and which is aimed
at maintaining the balance of power.185 In addition, many intermediate groups fall victims
to the dangers of the middle-level, posing a threat to autonomy themselves rather than
safeguarding it. This is, at least in part, the result of oversize and a lack of diversity (see
2.7.1 The Challenge of Size). When there are too few commons institutions that are too
large, it becomes easier for them to behave self-interestedly and align with the proverbial
powers that be, while it becomes difficult to challenge them. As Levy notes, for group
pluralism to be politically stable, it must be to some degree oppositional, since “bulwarks
depend on their being a sense of independence that makes it possible to say ‘no.’”186
Having more and more diverse institutions induces opposition and stimulates a sense of
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Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock, “Health by Association? Social Capital, Social
Theory, and the Political Economy of Public Health,” International Journal of Epidemiology
33, no. 4 (August 2004): 656.
185 Putting the matter as such imbues the status quo institutions with agency and reeks
of conspiracy theories, but the dominance of market and state has come about and is
maintained quite organically. Of course, particular (quasi) states and the individuals
leading them understand their own power and can wield it. A rare few may even be able
to exert some influence on the otherwise impersonal processes at work.
186 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 254-255.
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independence.187 This, in turn, points to a role for the institutions of market and state, as
they also add to the pluralism needed to build free societies and health care systems (see
3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).
3.4.3 THE DANGERS OF THE MIDDLE-LEVEL
Meso-level institutions have been presented as bulwarks against powerful status quo
institutions and guarantors of the freedom of health care, but that is only half the story.
Levy may favor the “neglected and unfamiliar”188 pluralist liberalism, but he
acknowledges many of the worries rationalist liberals have about pluralism.189 Arguably,
Levy’s most pertinent contributions to the commons literature are his discussions of
rationalist criticisms of intermediate groups, because they relate to several discussions in
commons research. Moreover, they provide important criticisms of the, at times, overly
optimistic arguments of proponents of the commons paradigm.190
First, when discussing the issue of heterogeneity, we saw nesting commons
institutions is a possible solution, but the strategy risks creating self-contained and
homogeneous meso-level institutions (see 2.7.2 The Challenge of Heterogeneity). The
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Of course, too much diversity may lead to irresolvable tensions. An issue that can, in
theory, be resolved by nesting diverse clusters into one another (see 2.6.8 Nested
Enterprises).
188 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 3.
189 Much like Ostrom, Levy is an intellectual fox rather than a hedgehog, to use Isaiah
Berlin’s famous distinction. (Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on
Tolstoy’s View of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1953] 2013).)
190 There are more mundane worries about an increased role for meso-level institutions
than the philosophical concerns that are the focus of this section, say their ability to
perform the administrative tasks performed by macro-level institutions (i.e., states and
large market organizations). In Italy, for example, the regionalization of the national
health care system during the 1970s was “regarded by many as an administrative fiasco.”
(Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 48-49.)
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worry is that nesting creates homogeneous silos, which impede rather than promote
cooperation. Levy recognizes the same risk in the context of intermediate groups:
“Freedom of association in one generation could leave the next with a social world wholly
carved up into mutually exclusive groups, with no space in between.”191,192 As such,
freedom of association may in fact be self-undermining.193 Homogeneous institutional
silos at the middle-level are worrisome for another reason, since their rules may not take
into account the interests of outsiders or prospective new members, which is “especially
acute when it comes to membership rules themselves.”194 Relying on boundary rules (see
2.6.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries), commons institutions can decide “whom to admit and
whom to refuse,”195 a prerogative rationalist liberals take issue with as the refusal of
membership can be pernicious.196 In the case of health care, meso-level institutions could
base membership on religious views, excluding those who do not adhere to a particular
value system. Even more blatant, a successful health care commons may deny
membership to the sick or destitute, because they are perceived as a threat to the
available CPRs. This, of course, is the well-known issue of refusing health insurance
coverage on the basis of preexisting conditions and the closely related problem of adverse
selection (see 3.4.2 Securing the Freedom of Health Care). Levy notes worries about
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Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 47.
Space can refer to physical space, but also to metaphorical social space. (Levy,
Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 47.) Thus, Levy’s space can also mean space to
deliberate and cooperate on commons dilemmas.
193 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 47.
194 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 40.
195 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 40.
196 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 40.
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exclusion often raise questions about diversity, because strict boundary rules will lead to
intermediate groups that lack diversity vis-à-vis the whole of society, enabling members
to live their lives insulated from diversity altogether.197 The defense of the proponents of
associational freedom and pluralism is a familiar one:

[…] diversity can be, and often is best, an intergroup rather than an intragroup
phenomenon. We will have more genuine diversity if there is a range of genuinely
different organizations, communities, and institutions to choose among than if we
insist that each organization must be a representative microcosm of the whole
social order.198

A large number of diverse homogeneous silos is better than a diverse society at large,
because it provides “genuine” diversity, for example when experimenting with different
sets of rules to find the best possible solutions to health care’s problems (see 3.3 Parallel
Experiments). This is not, however, a satisfactory response to the rationalist’s objection.
Instead, striving for a diverse set of institutions that can ensure both intergroup and
intragroup diversity can satisfy pluralist and rationalist liberals alike (see 3.5
Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).
Second, there is another danger of meso-level institutions hidden in the previous
paragraph that is deserving of scrutiny. Levy writes intermediate groups “will not take the
interests of outsiders […] into account.”199 In other words, middle-level institutions are
likely to be self-interested. As Levy puts it, “[W]hile the state ideally puts the right ahead
of the good, intermediate associations are strongly dedicated to their particular
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conceptions of the good.”200 We have already encountered this issue in chapter two (i.e.,
homogeneous groups hijacking health care policy,201 competition rather than cooperation
between internally homogeneous commons institutions),202 and the problem arises also
in the context of health care reform.203 Of course, states are not wholly disinterested
either, often pursuing the self-interests of political actors,204 but state power can put the
right ahead of the good in a reasonably just constitutional state, according to Levy. The
leaders of intermediate groups, however, are by definition committed to not being
disinterested,205 even when they pursue the good of their intermediate group rather than
their own interests. Levy does not offer a solution, beyond stating the problem exists for
both meso-level (i.e., intermediate groups) and macro-level institutions (i.e., states).
Ostrom would likely point to the inevitable, yet unsatisfactory, drafting of better rules or
to polycentricity as possible solutions (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).
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Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 79.

201 “It is a commonplace of political science that small coherent interest groups can secure

legal and political victories disproportionately often, on topics of greater importance to
them than to the majority. The paradigmatic case is that of a narrowly targeted subsidy:
the benefit to the recipients can be great enough to justify their political efforts, while the
costs are so widely diffused that no one has enough incentive to mobilize against them.”
(Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 258.)
202 See 2.7.2 The Challenge of Heterogeneity.
203 For example, self-interested intermediate groups’ lobbying efforts in the case of
health care reform affect non-members, who do not have the incentive or resources to
organize (e.g., patients, citizens).
204 Buchanan, who introduced the concept of club good (see 1.6 Argument III: Type of
Good), is one of the founders of public choice theory, among others, the analysis of selfinterested behavior in politics. (James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of
Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
[1962] 1999).) The final section of the work, titled The Politics of the Good Society is of
particular interest to philosophers. (Ibid., 216-219.)
205 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 79.
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Finally, spread throughout Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (2015) are
arguments that are relevant to the issue of elite capture, which we have come across in
our discussion of the design principles (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements and
2.6.7 Recognition of Rights to Organize). Before having a closer look at Levy’s arguments,
it is worth noting the issue of elite capture is closely related to the problem of selfinterested behavior of intermediate groups discussed in the previous paragraph.206 As the
interests of the group often, albeit not necessarily,207 reflect the self-interest of a small
elite. However, elite capture is not only an intergroup problem, between meso-level
institutions and in their relationship with larger units (e.g., society as a whole, the state,
the health care system), but also intragroup. In fact, one of the main worries rationalist
liberals have about intermediate groups is the tendency “toward intragroup hierarchies
and domination.”208 Mill, for example, in his criticisms of Tocqueville, showed deep
concern “with local power in all its varieties.”209 Even though he was intellectually
committed to balancing centralization and decentralization, he had much more
confidence in the ability of the state to ensure freedom and to check intragroup
tyranny.210 Levy summarizes Mill’s view of intermediate groups as follows:
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Even though Levy discusses both issues, he does not always make the relationship (or
distinction) between them clear, sometimes moving from one issue to the other without
making it explicit. A good example is his discussion of Interested and Invasive Power at
the end of chapter three. (Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 79-83.)
207 Middle-level institutions can internally be just (e.g., functioning collective-choice
arrangements are in place to ensure member participation), but nonetheless be “strongly
dedicated to their particular conceptions of the good,” to use Levy’s words.
208 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 3.
209 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 217.
210 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 217.
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Mill's pervasive concern with the entwined problems of local despotism and local
backwardness offered him reason to prefer distant power strong enough to
overcome them. Local rule, small-group loyalties and membership, and adherence
to custom were necessarily stultifying, at odds with the interests of man as a
progressive being; and forcible inclusion into a great kingdom, nation, or empire
at least might point the way toward intellectual uplift.211

Of course, one may wonder if Mill would have the same faith in the bureaucratic states
of the twentieth and twenty-first century, but that is a different matter altogether.212
Regardless, Mill nicely articulates the issue of elite capture from the commons literature.
Authority, whether at the meso- or the macro-level, generates power. This creates
opportunities for those in power to reach decisions “for their own reasons, in their own
interests.”213 In turn, power allows group leaders to wield authority over the group’s
other members,214 posing a threat to the freedom of the group members.215 The issue of
a self-interested elite arbitrarily wielding power over its subordinates is related to the
age-old problem that those who seek power are particularly ill-suited to be trusted with
it.216,217 Moreover, rules to promote institutional diversity at the meso-level and to
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The rationalist critique of pluralism must be seen in the context of Early Modern
Europe, where religious groups are the example intermediate groups and the specter of
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213 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 50.
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215 As Levy notes, “A group's internal rules and decisions become a kind of law outside the
state's control, at least for their members and often for others.” (Levy, Rationalism,
Pluralism, and Freedom, 35.)
216 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 80.
217 The issue is maybe put most adroitly by Douglas Adams in The Restaurant at the End
of the Universe (1995): “To summarize: it is a well-known fact that those people who must
want to rule people are, ipso facto, those least suited to do it. To summarize the summary:
anyone who is capable of getting themselves made President should on no account be
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protect intermediate groups from state power can worsen the issue of elite capture,218 as
these rules provide opportunities for leaders to establish intragroup hierarchies and
domination. A problem of institutional pluralism that receives little attention in commons
researchers. At the same time, however, rationalist liberals may perceive undue
domination and abuses of power where there are none. After all, group members’
second-order preferences may be derived from and structured around group life.219
Members may not only derive their views about right and wrong conduct from the
intermediate group, but also have second-order preferences to be good group members
(e.g., contribute resources, participate in collective-choice arrangements, serve as
monitors). So whenever pressure is exerted on individuals to comply with rules or
sanctions are imposed a breach of the rules (see 2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions), it is difficult
(and sometimes impossible) to know if that individual wants to be brought into

allowed to do the job.” (Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe (New
York: Del Rey, [1980] 1995), 197.)
218 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 4.
219 Childress makes the same point, albeit a bit more elaborately and eloquently:
“Abdication of first-order autonomy appears to involve heteronomy, that is, rule by
others. However, if a person autonomously chooses to yield first order decisionmaking to
a professional or to a religious institution, that person has exercised what may be called
second-order autonomy. People who are subservient to a professional or to a religious
institution may lack first-order autonomy – self-determination regarding the content of
their first-order decisions and choices – because they have exercised and continue to
exercise second-order autonomy in selecting the professional or institution to which they
choose to be subordinate. Hence, in those cases, respect for their second-order
autonomy is central, even though their first-order choices are heteronomous. This point
is important because of the common supposition that the principle of (respect for)
autonomy is at odds with all forms of heteronomy, authority, tradition, etc.” (James F.
Childress, “The Place of Autonomy in Bioethics,” The Hastings Center Report 20, no. 1
(January-February 1990): 13.)
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compliance or sanctioned.220 In other words, it is difficult to differentiate between “a case
in which the rule is irksome but strongly connected to other group goods and goals that
the person does endorse; or a case in which biased or power-hungry or intrusive elites
and enforcers are, in good faith or bad, constraining the person unnecessarily.”221 Of
course, this is hardly a solution to the problem of elite capture, but merely shows that in
some cases members may willingly submit themselves to intragroup authority that strikes
an outsider as an unjustifiable limitation of freedom. Again, a mix of diverse institutions
may be able to check the intragroup power of elites (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of
Many Worlds?).
3.5 POLYCENTRICITY: THE BEST OF MANY WORLDS?
We discussed how relying on plural commons institutions in health care allows for parallel
institutional experiments to identify best practices and erects bulwarks against
overbearing centers of power. Moreover, commons are an institutional “third way” to
avoid the tragedy of the commons (see 1.8 The Commons Solution to Health Care’s
Tragedy). We encountered the advantages of commons institutions vis-à-vis the status
quo institutions of market and state, but we also underlined some of the challenges (see
2.7 Challenges Faced by the Health Care Commons) and dangers (see 3.4.3 The Dangers
of the Middle-Level) of relying on the commons paradigm in health care. Commons are
not an institutional magic bullet to solve all of health care’s problems. Not only does such
a single-minded approach run counter to the spirit of Ostrom’s work, as she always
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stresses the need for complex solutions to complex problems, but the status quo
institutions of state and market have certain features commons institutions cannot adopt.
Hierarchies offer a degree of coordination, especially at larger scales, that is foreign to
commons. Markets rapidly process information and drive innovation through the
mechanisms of price and competition. Unsurprisingly, some of the most successful
examples of commons management are so-called “mixed regimes,” combining elements
of cooperative governance, public regulation, and individual property.222 Commons,
states, and markets are complementary institutions rather than alternatives. Each of
these institutional arrangements has persuasive arguments in its favor. As Ernst Friedrich
Schumacher puts it in Small is Beautiful (1973): “Maybe what we really need is not eitheror but the-one-and-the-other-at-the-same-time.”223
Ostrom’s version of “the-one-and-the-other-at-the-same-time” is called
polycentricity. The idea is so central to Ostrom’s work that it is sometimes used to
characterize her thought as a whole, “polycentric governance.”224 Simply put,
polycentricity means a “world of many social orders.”225 Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout,
and Robert Warren introduced the notion in 1961 in an effort to better understand how
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a multitude of public and private agencies provides public services in metropolitan
areas.226 They define the concept as follows:227

‘Polycentric’ connotes many centers of decision making that are formally
independent of each other. Whether they actually function independently, or
instead constitute an interdependent system of relations, is an empirical question
in particular cases. To the extent that they take each other into account in
competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and cooperative
undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the
various political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function in a coherent
manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior. To the
extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a ‘system’.228

In other words, polycentricity suggests there is a need for many decision centers:
communal (commons), public (state), and private (market). Each decision center can act
with a high degree of autonomy within their own jurisdiction, but they all operate under
an overarching set of rules. These macro-level rules focus on the maintenance of order
and the resolution of disputes (see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms) rather than on
specifying the particular rules to be used by each subsidiary.229 The concept can also be
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described in terms of nestedness (see 2.5 The Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework and 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises). Polycentricity then means layering various
institutional arrangements on top of one another, resulting in so-called “multitier
governance systems.”230 The following definition from Ostrom combines both features:

By polycentric, I mean a system where citizens are able to organize not just one
but multiple governing authorities at differing scales (see V Ostrom et al 1961; V
Ostrom 1987, 1991, 1997). Each unit may exercise considerable independence to
make and enforce rules within a circumscribed scope of authority for a specified
geographical area. In a polycentric system, some units are general-purpose
governments, whereas others may be highly specialized (McGinnis 1999a,b,c).
Self-organized resource governance systems, in such a system, may be special
districts, private associations, or parts of a local government. These are nested in
several levels of general-purpose governments that also provide civil equity as
well as criminal courts. In a polycentric system, the users of each common-pool
resource would have authority to make at least some of the rules related to the
use of that particular resource.231

Like commons institutions, Ostrom also describes polycentric governance systems as
complex adaptive systems (see 2.3 Commons Institutions). The former then are so-called
“parallel adaptive systems,” while the latter are both horizontally and vertically
integrated adaptive systems.232 As with any other institutional arrangement, there is no
guarantee polycentric governance systems will find those combinations of rules at diverse
levels that are optimal for the environment. On the contrary, one should expect
polycentric governance systems to operate at less than optimal levels, given the difficult
of fine-tuning any complex and multitier system.233
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Polycentricity is particularly relevant for the management of global commons
(e.g., health care). While commons institutions may be able to govern local resources
successfully, the governance of large-scale CPRs transcends them. Therefore, Stern
suggests polycentricity as an additional design principle necessary for governing global
commons (see 2.7.1 The Challenge of Size). He baptizes this design principle, “Engage in
a variety of institutional forms.”234 Stern suggests polycentricity is not included in
Governing the Commons (1990), which served as the basis for later discussions of the
design principles, because of the work’s focus on successful local commons institutions.235
A plausible explanation given that Ostrom places more emphasis on polycentricity later
in her career, maybe because she gets a better grasp of the limitations of the commons
paradigm as commons research progresses and finds applications beyond local, natural
resource commons. If one adopts polycentricity as an additional design principle, the
challenge then becomes finding those combinations of institutional arrangements that
can implement the other principles best,236 as will become clear in the following
discussion of the advantages of polycentricity. Parenthetically, the concept of
polycentricity is not meant to replace commons theory, instead it reinforces the commons
paradigm’s existing assumptions by emphasizing that small, self-governed institutions are
crucial for designing effective and sustainable institutions.237
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The advantages of relying on polycentric governance regimes for managing global
commons are many, as polycentricity combines the strengths of parallel meso-level
institutions with those of macro-level institutions. The following is a nonexhaustive list of
the benefits of polycentric governance systems: First, we saw that states, markets, and
commons have their particular strengths and weaknesses when running parallel trials (see
3.3 Parallel Experiments). Polycentricity enables one to capitalize on the advantages of
each of these institutional arrangements, while mitigating their drawbacks when
experimenting. To give a concrete example, one issue of meso-level institutions is
communicating the results of their experiments, both failed and successful, to one
another. Improving communication between middle-level institutions, which all have
experience with multiple rules related to manage similar resources, would allow them to
make informed decisions about the impact of rule changes.238 This is where macro-level
institutions come in, as they can organize the sharing of information, thus increasing “the
likelihood of improving performance over time.”239 Macro-level institutions can also set
up systems to identify successful experiments. At the same time, the diversity of
polycentric governance regimes results in more diverse experiments, as different
institutional arrangements will likely come up with different rule changes, which might
nonetheless apply to, and be copied by, other institutional forms (e.g., a market
institution might come up with a new way to allocate resources that can be adopted by
commons institutions). Second, mixed regimes can draw on both local knowledge and
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expert knowledge (see 2.2 The Ostrom Approach). To illustrate, when running
experiments institutions can draw upon expert knowledge available at the macro-level,
say guidelines about how to best organize trials, while at the same time relying on local
knowledge at the meso-level, say information about local conditions. To provide another
example, Ostrom recommends blending scientific information (i.e., expert knowledge)
with local knowledge by requiring major universities and research centers to relay their
findings to smaller units within their respective regions.240 Third, polycentricity can
mitigate some of the dangers of the middle-level (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the MiddleLevel). Concerns about local tyrannies and inappropriate discrimination can be alleviated
by relying on macro-level institutions “that are responsible for protecting the rights of all
citizens and for the oversight of appropriate exercises of authority within smaller units of
government.”241 Moreover, macro-level institutions can direct meso-level institutions
toward the common good, lest the latter focus too much on the pursuit of their own
interests. Fourth, in line with Stern’s interpretation of polycentricity as an additional
design principle, polycentric regimes can be used to better implement the other design
principles. To give a few examples: (1) Polycentric governance may result in less costly
and more effective monitoring (see 2.6.4 Monitoring) and sanctioning (see 2.6.5
Graduated Sanctions). As we discussed in chapter two, members are more likely to
comply with rules they themselves helped to devise through collective-choice
arrangements, especially when they are affected by these rules on a day-to-day basis (see
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2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements). Moreover, participants at the meso-level often are
better placed to observe infractions and to impose sanctions.242 However, macro-level
institutions can provide mechanisms to support local monitoring and sanctioning
efforts,243 among others, by backing up monitoring and sanctioning decisions taken at the
middle-level (see 2.6.7 Recognition of Rights to Organize). Higher-level regimes also have
the scale necessary to implement certain monitoring mechanisms that are beyond mesolevel institutions, say because they are too costly or require a level of expertise
unavailable locally (e.g., HIS).244 (2) Polycentric regimes can provide upstream arenas to
resolve persistent intrainstitutional conflicts as well as interinstitutional conflicts (see
2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms). If meso-level institutions are unable to resolve
internal conflicts, these can interfere with the operation of the institution and may
eventually threaten the institution’s existence. Polycentric regimes offer the possibility to
escalate conflicts to higher-level institutions for resolution. Similarly, conflicts between
middle-level institutions can be resolved by upstream entities. Provisions can also be
made to resolve issues between meso- and macro-level institutions, by closing the loop
between different institutional levels (see 2.6.4 Monitoring). In such a scheme, lowerlevel institutions would play a role in resolving conflicts between higher-level institutions
(e.g., arbitration mechanisms in which the arbitral tribunal consists of representatives of
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downstream institutions). The same approach could be used to resolve tensions within
macro-level institutions, when escalation to a higher-level is no longer possible. Finally,
polycentricity introduces an element of redundancy, as multiple levels of institutions can
cope with poor institutional performance at any level (see also 2.6.4 Monitoring). Under
threat of a tragedy of the commons, mixed regimes are better suited than any single
institutional arrangement to avert catastrophic failure, because when small systems fail
there are larger systems to step in and vice versa (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments).245 In a
polycentric regime, one can imagine a large-scale collapse of the commons, where macrolevel institutions and most meso-level institutions fail, but there are several independent
holdouts at the middle-level. The advantages of polycentric governance regimes lead
Ostrom to conclude that a combination of higher levels of government and local systems
is better able to cope with tragedies of the commons.246 Moreover, mixed regimes are
able to develop more effective rules over time than regimes that lack institutional
diversity,247 again decreasing the risk of tragedy.
The supposed advantages of polycentricity are tentative. The concept is still
relatively new, and its implications in commons research are still being worked out.248
Polycentric governance is attractive in theory, but the practical implementation of mixed
regimes raises many questions and concerns. First, there is the issue of institutional
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heterogeneity (see 2.7.2 The Challenge of Heterogeneity).249 Mixing diverse institutions
into interdependent polycentric regimes is a nontrivial process that is likely to lead to
conflict, especially given that some of the features of the three model institutional
arrangements are at odds with one another (e.g., blending collaborative commons with
competitive market organizations and hierarchically organized states). That being said,
conflict can potentially generate information that is useful for all participants involved in
order to solve their collective action problems.250 Second, the balance between the
steering center and the autonomous meso-level institutions is unclear,251 and the precise
degree of integration between the different institutional arrangements is equally fuzzy,
as the institutions per the definition can remain formally independent but at the same
time “function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable patterns of
interacting behavior.”252 The reply that this is a case-by-case, empirical issue is
unsatisfactory. Commons research must resolve some of the ambiguities of the concept
of polycentricity for it to be meaningful and useful.253 Third, and closely related to the
previous concern, some meso-level institutions will plausibly resist polycentric
governance regimes because they fear central direction and domination (see 3.4.2
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Securing the Freedom of Health Care).254 Moreover, becoming part of a larger whole
might not be attractive to downstream organizations, because they worry becoming an
insignificant and meaningless cog in the mixed regime. The standard reply is that such
apprehensions are unfounded because they are based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of polycentricity,255 which stresses the formal independence of the
different units, and the lack of any “one central authority dominating all the others,”256
but given the ambiguities of the concept this is hardly a satisfactory answer. Even if, for
the sake of the argument, we do grant the reply in theory. In practice, the threat of
overbearing centers is likely difficult to defuse. Fourth, and following from the previous
two points, there is the question of how to bring about polycentric governance regimes:
from the top down or rather from the bottom up? The former seems to be counter to the
emphasis of commons research on self-organization, while the latter places too much
responsibility on meso-level institutions to organize into large-scale mixed regimes.257 A
possible solution is to rely on the state to facilitate the process of integration rather than
to take full responsibility, having it play the role of a so-called “facilitator state.”258
However, that role must be defined much more precisely to differentiate it from a
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traditional, more involved, top-down approach. Finally, there is no need for commons
researchers to reinvent the wheel. The concept of polycentricity may be new, but the
arguments behind it have precedents. Levy, for example, reviews the work of Otto von
Gierke and John Dalberg-Acton, better known as Lord Acton, both proponents of
“decentralization, competing institutions, and multiple authorities checking one
another.”259 Their work may be of interest to commons scholars. The extensive literature
on the principle of subsidiarity seems to be more directly applicable to polycentricity,260
but its relevance has been insufficiently recognized and investigated.261 Graham Marshall
is one of the few scholars who has explored the relationship between commons research
and the principle of subsidiarity in any detail.262 Several of these questions and concerns
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are reflected in a final criticism of polycentric governance and in a concrete example of a
mixed regime, discussed in the following paragraphs.
A critique of polycentricity that deserves some closer attention is its supposed
emphasis on decentralization. David Harvey, approaching commons research from a
Marxist perspective, asks:

How can radical decentralization – surely a worthwhile objective – work without
constituting some higher-order hierarchical authority? It is simply naïve to believe
that polycentrism or any other form of decentralization can work without strong
hierarchical constraints and active enforcement.263

According to Harvey, administrative decentralization and local autonomy seem attractive,
but ultimately benefit neoliberalism, as they facilitate the reproduction of class
privileges.264 Harvey provides an interesting example, because it readily translates to
health care and tags on to worries about a society divvied up into homogeneous silos. He
worries that in the context of a metropolis divided into local jurisdictions, each with their
own tax regime, the rich would be able to vote with their feet, paying the entry price of
property and land costs. Thus, the rich have access to superior public education at the
cost of increased higher property prices and taxes, while the poor are stuck “in a poor
jurisdiction with poor public education.”265,266 The issue is reminiscent of the so-called

Natural Resources Management in Australia, eds. Marcus Lane, Cathy Robinson, and
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postcode lottery in the United Kingdom, where citizens receive different care depending
on the postal code they happen to live in.267 Adapted to the context of the commons, the
members of one commons institution may enjoy better health care than the members of
another, using boundary rules the members of the former institution can exclude new or
undesirable entrants (e.g., old, sick, poor) (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-Level).268
Harvey’s concerns are justified, but at the same time his criticism misses its target. After
all, the aim of polycentricity is precisely to incorporate a degree of centralization and
hierarchy to counter the dangers of the middle-level. Moreover, Ostrom explicitly states
she does not advocate radical decentralization.269 In Why Do We Need to Protect
Institutional Diversity (2012), for example, she discusses radical decentralization into
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“self-organized, local bodies”270 as one form of governance, but she is quick to add that
commons research “supports more complex, adaptive designs that do enable the users
to have a substantial voice in the design and monitoring of rules but also involve larger
units in a polycentric system.”271 Interestingly, Harvey’s criticism mirrors several of the
questions surrounding the concept of polycentricity discussed in the previous paragraph,
and his critique may in fact originate from these ambiguities: the balance between
centralization and decentralization is unclear, so is the degree of integration, and its
origins (i.e., top-down and/or bottom-up).
The following example from Daniels and Sabin raises similar questions. In Setting
Limits Fairly (2008), Daniels and Sabin discuss how different programs (i.e., Health
Partners, PacifiCare, Aetna, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon, Group Health Cooperative
of Puget Sound, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, and Northern California Kaiser
Permanente)272 decide whether to cover lung volume reduction surgery (LVRS).273 Before
continuing, notice how the decision-making processes of these organizations can
plausibly be conceived as a series of parallel “experiments.” As Daniels and Sabin point
out:

In the mixed U.S. health care system, the [scientific and clinical findings about a
new technology or treatment] are processed and acted upon by a mixture of
local/regional/ national insurance and managed care programs, public and
private, and not-for-profit and for-profit. All programs have access to the same
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scientific and clinical data, but they operate under a diversity of internal structures
and external market conditions.274,275

As such, the case study highlights a particular strength of the pluralistic American health
care system. Based on, among others,276 “differences in the policy-making process”277
(i.e., differences in the rules-in-use), two organizations decide not to cover LVRS while
five others do.278 To return to the issues surrounding the concept of polycentricity, the
different programs deciding to cover LVRS certainly have the appearance of a mixed
regime. After all, these programs can be construed as meso-level institutions “formally
independent of each other,” but operating under an overarching set of rules.279
Broadening the scope, or changing the level of analysis, Daniels and Sabin describe the
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American health care system as decentralized and pluralistic.280 At the same time,
however, the system has strong central institutions, both at the federal level (e.g., CMS,
NIH, CDC) and at the state level (e.g., DHEC, DHHS).281 In other words, the American health
care system seems to be a multitier, polycentric governance regime. Moreover, the
American health care system de facto possesses the following features of such regimes:
(1) Parallel institutional experimentation (e.g., organizations trying out different
approaches to managing last chance therapies in general and LVRS in particular, which
are then adopted by other organizations). (2) Institutional redundancy (e.g., health
insurers, hospital systems, or Obamacare coops can fail without jeopardizing the health
care system as a whole).282 (3) Individual autonomy (e.g., patients can choose between
insurers, hospitals, and providers) and institutional freedom (e.g., the right to start a new
health care organization, the opportunity for legal recourse against other organizations
and the state). In short, the system achieves some of the key objectives of polycentric
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 101.
The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) is
responsible for a host of health-related programs (e.g., acute/chronic disease
epidemiology, birth defects, health licensing) and the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHSS) manages South Carolina’s Medicaid program.
282 One can wonder about the degree of redundancy of the American health care system.
How resilient would the system be in case one (or more) key actors are knocked out of
this diverse, multitier governance regime (e.g., Anthem Inc., Hospital Corporation of
America, Medicare and Medicaid)? Even in case of the catastrophic failure of
government-run health care programs (i.e., Medicare, Medicaid, and the Health
Exchanges), it is possible that health care would continue to be provided at an organized
and sophisticated level by non-government actors. Of course, the failure of governmentrun health care programs would likely coincide with the failure of (large parts of) the
United States government, which would greatly complicate the provision of any goods or
services. The key point is that highly centralized, single-payer systems (e.g., Belgium,
France) plausibly are less redundant.
281
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governance regimes. Therefore, both in form and in function the American health care
system appears to be a polycentric governance regime.283 Yet it is doubtful whether
Ostrom, or any other commons researcher for that matter, would consider the American
health care system as an example of a polycentric governance regime. Why? Pointing out
the multifold failures of the American health care system is an inadequate. Like commons
institutions, polycentric regimes can be successful or unsuccessful, but their success or
failure is not what determines if they are mixed regimes.284 Moreover, valuable lessons
can be learned from imperfect governance regimes. To return to the question at hand,
why would not Ostrom, or most other advocates of the commons, consider the American
health care system a polycentric governance regime? The plausible answer is that they
ultimately envision multitier, polycentric governance regimes to give more weight to
decentralized, self-governed institutions; which are integrated into more complex,
centralized systems from the bottom up. While Ostrom explicitly rejects radical
decentralization later in her career, the more complex governance regimes she proposes
nonetheless emphasize the importance of users having a substantial voice in the design
and monitoring of their own rules, as becomes clear from the aforementioned definition
of polycentricity.285 Thus, from the perspective of commons research, the key feature that
is missing from the United States health care system for it to be a polycentric governance

283

Reading Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren’s definition of polycentricity with the American
health care system in mind, one cannot help but to conclude it is per definition a
polycentric governance regime.
284 In Governing the Commons (1990), Ostrom also discusses failed and fragile commons
institutions. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 143-181.)
285 Ostrom, “Why do we need to protect institutional diversity?” 140.
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regime is the prevalence of robust self-governed institutions. The fact that selfgovernance regimes are present in certain pockets of the system (e.g., Kaiser
Permanente, Group Health Cooperative) is likely insufficient for them to characterize the
system as a whole as polycentric.286 However, the emphasis on self-governance appears
to be a feature of the historic focus of commons research on small, self-governed
institution rather than an essential feature of tiered, polycentric governance regimes as
defined by (Vincent) Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren.287 Moreover, in light of the challenges
faced by global commons in general and health care commons in particular (see 2.7 The
Challenges Faced by the Health Care Commons), it is questionable whether polycentric
regimes can develop from the bottom up out of small, self-governed institutions in a
context like health care.288 The truth is that polycentricity may willy-nilly require more
centralization, integration, and top-down control than commons researchers are readily
willing to admit given their allegiance to the principle of small-scale self-governance,
which is precisely Harvey’s point when he writes that polycentricity is unimaginable
without a strong center.
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Kaiser Permanente acquired Group Health Cooperative, formerly Group Health
Cooperative of Puget Sound, in 2017.
287 Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, “The Organization of Government in Metropolitan
Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry,” 831-832.
288 Even under the counterfactual assumption that these health care commons are
allowed to develop in an institutional vacuum, meaning there are no other organizations
and institutions already in existence providing health care, it seems implausible that large
and complex polycentric governance regimes would easily arise out of small, selfgoverned institutions. After all, most commons are de facto small, and tackling larger
commons dilemmas (e.g., climate, oceans) has proven to be problematic.
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The foregoing critique of polycentricity leads to the following conclusions: First,
even though Ostrom’s theory of polycentric governance regimes originate from commons
research, the concept of polycentricity seems to exist in tension with the commons
paradigm’s emphasis on self-organized, local governance systems. While the concept is
appropriated by commons research, it can be construed as a standalone institutional
design that is applicable to systems that do not necessarily have a strong commons
component (e.g., the United States health care system). Second, and following from the
previous point, a clear distinction needs to be made between polycentricity as tiered,
diverse, and multicentric governance regimes, and polycentric regimes as displaying all
the prior features plus a significant commons component. While the latter is Ostrom’s
vision of polycentricity, it is certainly possible to envision polycentric governance regimes
that do not emphasize self-governance. Commons research must explicitly acknowledge
the duality of the concept of polycentricity. On the one hand, doing so promotes the
introduction and application of a meaningful concept (i.e., polycentricity) outside of the
realm of commons research. On the other hand, the distinction highlights the possibility
of a more fully realized kind of polycentricity that emphasizes the inclusion of small, selfgoverned institutions; incorporating the advantages of such institutional arrangements
and resulting in more diverse polycentric governance systems. Finally, questions remain
surrounding the concept of polycentricity: What is the balance between the center and
the periphery (centralization vs. decentralization)? How integrated are polycentric
regimes? How does the governance system come about (top-down vs. bottom-up)? And
what is the role of self-governance? While the answer to some of these questions may be
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“it depends,” a more developed and detailed account of polycentricity is needed in order
to successfully identify, define, discuss, and develop multitier, polycentric governance
regimes.

The commons paradigm is not the panacea to cure health care’s many ills. In chapter one,
we saw they are not the only solution to tragedies of the commons. Yes, they provide an
alternative to state and market, but the latter are de facto the preferred solutions, at least
for now. In the second chapter, we discussed three challenges to the communal
management of health care resources (i.e., size, heterogeneity, and technological
change). A nonexhaustive list of issues plaguing global commons in general and health
care commons in particular that commons research does not offer satisfactory solutions
to. Finally, in this chapter, we considered the dangers of meso-level institutions, as they
risk partitioning society into self-interested, homogeneous silos dominated by local elites.
Yet, for all its shortcomings, the commons offer some things the status quo institutions
do not: a promise of self-governance, an increase in trust, a focus on parallel experiments,
and a safeguard against overbearing centers. The advantages discussed so far all stem
from the commons literature. Promising as they may be, they are theoretical and distant.
Their implications for health care are all but clear. I now turn to the accountability for
reasonableness approach, a prominent approach to allocating scarce health care
resources from the health care ethics literature, to show how commons research can
provide valuable new insights to an important and ongoing debate in biomedical ethics.
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CHAPTER 4
A4R IN PRACTICE
“The design given to political institutions such
as health systems governs the notions of
morality and justice prevailing in society.”1
- Lucy Gilson -

4.1 INTRODUCTION
The challenge of the fair allocation of health care resources has permeated the discussion
of commons research in the preceding chapters. Now the time has come to apply
Ostrom’s work to a concrete philosophical account for the just governance of health care
resources. Daniels’ theory of justice for health care and the accompanying accountability
for reasonableness (A4R) approach, which he developed together with Sabin, is arguably
the single most influential account for the just allocation of health care resources in the
bioethics literature. Moreover, the theory of justice and A4R interface with the commons
in ways that enhance our understanding of the work of both Daniels and Ostrom. The
result of bridging their work is a proposal for a hybrid “Daniels-Ostrom approach” to the
just allocation of health care resources.

1

Lucy Gilson, “Trust and the Development of Health Care as a Social Institution,” Social
Science and Medicine 56, no. 7 (April 2003): 1462.
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The chapter proceeds as follows. I first highlight two key features of the approach
to allocating resource allocation presented here, which focuses on (1) fair procedures (see
4.2.1 A Procedural Approach) at the (2) meso-level of health care institutions (see 4.2.2 A
Meso-Level Approach). I then move to the discussion of Daniels (see 4.3 Enter Daniels),
arguing his approach to allocating health care resources can be characterized as
institutionalist (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist), and providing a detailed account of
his theory of justice for health care (see 4.3.2 A Theory of Justice). I interweave the
discussion of Daniels’ theory of justice with reflections on the possibility of applying his
theory of justice to the commons (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for the Commons?). Next,
I discuss Daniels and Sabin’s accountability for reasonableness approach (A4R), beginning
with the suggestion that the approach’s four conditions can be interpreted as institutional
design principles (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles). I then discuss each of the conditions
in turn with a focus on the relationship between the conditions and commons research
(see 4.4.4 The Four Conditions), particularly the design principles for successful commons
institutions. I briefly highlight a few more ways in which commons research can contribute
to a deeper understanding of A4R (see 4.5 The Further Institutionalization of A4R). Finally,
I suggest the need to develop an ethics of health care institutions (see 4.6 Toward an
Ethics of Health Care Institutions).
The encounter between the research of Daniels and Ostrom offers important
contributions to both literatures, primarily by filling gaps in the respective analyses.
Commons research furthers Daniels’ work in two major ways: First, while Daniels
recognizes the need to cooperate when governing health care resources, he does not fully
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appreciate the role the institutional meso-level can play in realizing his approach, instead
reverting to the state (macro-level) for implementation. The commons provides Daniels
with an institutional arrangement that is particularly suitable to put his approach to
resource allocation into practice (see 2.1 A Meso-Level Approach). Second, NIE supplies a
language and tools that can further develop the A4R approach as a conceptual framework
for designing just health care institutions. Moreover, Ostrom’s work exposes weaknesses
of A4R and suggests solutions to them. For example, when it comes to the interpretation
and development of the regulative condition (see 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition).
Daniels’ main contributions to commons research are twofold as well: First, while Ostrom
lists equity as one of the key criteria for the evaluation of institutional performance, she
does not develop the criterion of justice in her work on the commons, even though
concerns about fairness are often at play in the background, among others, when
discussing the need to balance the benefits members receives and the cost they incur
from collective action (see 2.6.2 Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules
and Local Conditions). Given that questions of fairness are linked to the success of
commons institutions, Ostrom must provide more in terms of a clarification or
specification of the criterion of justice than she currently provides. Daniels’ theory of
justice for health care, based on the seminal work of John Rawls, can provide Ostrom with
an account of justice that is a good fit for her project (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for
the Commons?), thus remedying a key weakness of commons research. Second, Daniels’
development of a theory of justice for health care provides an additional argument for
the extension of the commons paradigm beyond natural resources to artificial resources
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in general and health care resources in particular (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the Special
Moral Importance of Health Care and 4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the Special Moral Importance of
Health Care). Ultimately, the encounter between the work of Ostrom and Daniels may be
able to provide a new impetus for the development of a full-fledged ethics of health care
institutions. I provide several novel suggestions for the advancement of research into
such an ethics (see 4.6 Toward an Ethics of Health Care Institutions).
The scope of the chapter grew over time, as the full degree to which the research
of Daniels and Ostrom interface with one another revealed itself through the
development of the arguments presented here. Initially, the idea was that commons
research can be used to develop A4R as an institutional design approach. The relevance
of Daniels’ work to commons research in particular only became clear subsequently. The
relationships between the bodies of research suggests that a continued exploration will
plausibly lead to further insights that can move forward both literatures.
4.2 THE DANIELS-OSTROM APPROACH
I develop a hybrid “Daniels-Ostrom approach” to the fair allocation of health care
resources characterized by two main features, which come from the work of Daniels and
Ostrom respectively: (1) The approach relies on procedural justice (Daniels). (2) The
approach must be situated primarily at the meso-level (Ostrom). I briefly discuss both
features with an emphasis on the latter, since the approach is to be implemented at the
meso-level of health care institutions, but is backed by a higher-level theory of justice,
which requires some more explanation.
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4.2.1 A PROCEDURAL APPROACH
Daniels and Sabin decide on a procedural approach to allocating health care resources
because there is no “consensus on principles for resolving conflicting claims on resources
for meeting health needs,”2 a general problem that also arises in the context of other
needs that must be met.3 In the absence of agreement on distributive principles for health
care, societies must find some other way to arrive at social policies, and procedural justice
provides a path to allocate scarce resources despite disagreement.4 They write,

The basic idea behind this appeal to procedural justice is quite familiar. When we
lack consensus on principles that tell us what is fair, or even when we have general
principles but are burdened by reasonable disagreements about how they apply,
we may nevertheless find a process or procedure that most can accept as fair to
those who are affected by such decisions. The fair process then determines what
counts as a fair outcome.5,6
While Ostrom is for most part tacit when it comes to matters of justice, apart from
including equity in her list of criteria for institutional performance (see 0.3 A Third Way:
The Commons and 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for the Commons), she likely is amenable to
a procedural approach. In her Nobel Prize lecture, Ostrom notes that there is no “single

2

Norman Daniels, Just Health (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 24.
Daniels, Just Health, 24.
4 Norman Daniels and James Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
[2002] 2008), 2-4.
5 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 4.
6 Largent provides a similar characterization of procedural justice, “When, as in health
care, there is no broadly accepted, independent criterion for what constitutes a just
distribution of resources, we often rely on procedure: If a process is just, the outcomes
should be fair. In other words, the procedure itself becomes a criterion for what
constitutes a fair outcome.” (Emily Largent, “Health Care Organizations and the Power of
Procedure,” The American Journal of Bioethics 16, no. 1 (2016): 51.)
3
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normative theory of justice that can unambiguously be applied to all settings”7 discussed
in the commons literature. Unfortunately, she does not explain her remark.8 Even though
Ostrom is right that the concrete distributive principles used by commons differ from one
institution to the next, most successful commons institutions decide upon the rules to
allocate resources through collective-choice arrangements (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice
Arrangements). Moreover, successful commons have rules in place to appeal and revise
the distributive rules (see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms and 4.4.4.3 Revisions and
Appeals Condition). As such, the distributive principles are the result of institutional
procedures, which implies a procedural approach. Of course, the fact that the principles
are the result of procedure does not necessarily mean the procedure is, or has to be, fair.
However, given Ostrom’s concern with justice, both explicit (e.g., equity as a criterion for
evaluating institutional performance) and implicit (e.g., need for conflict-resolution
mechanisms, commitment to pluralism), procedural justice is the apparent path to
designing fair (commons) institutions. She just omits a discussion of what justice means
in the context of the commons, and how to implement equity in commons institutions.
As I argue later in the chapter, the four conditions of A4R can plausibly be interpreted as
additional design principles for the development of just (commons) institutions (see 4.4
A4R in Practice). Due to their focus on deliberation, commons are a particularly suitable
institutional arrangement for implementing procedural approaches to justice. The

7

Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex
Economic Systems,” The American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June [2009] 2010): 435.
8 Ostrom cites Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009) as the source for her claim.
299

endorsement of A4R as design principles for just (commons) institutions automatically
entails the adoption of a procedural approach to justice.
4.2.2 A MESO-LEVEL APPROACH
Historically, bioethics has focused on micro-level moral issues (individual), with questions
of justice coming to the forefront later, and being relegated to the macro-level (policy).9
Daniels works within the contrast between micro- and macro-level bioethics.10 Indeed, in
the opening pages of Just Health Care (1985), Daniels explicitly states that he is “entirely”
concerned with the macro-level of decision-making, which he associates with the design
of health care institutions (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist).11 Inspired by Ostrom’s
work on the commons, I suggest that Daniels’ macro-level approach would benefit from
the introduction of the meso-level of health care institutions, effectively “splitting” his
approach between a macro-level theory of fair resource allocation, and the meso-level
institutional implementation thereof when solving concrete resource governance issues.
I argue that Daniels’ theory of justice must be situated at the macro-level,
providing the rationale for and anchoring the practice of the fair allocation of health care
resources (see 4.3.2 A Theory of Justice). The A4R approach, which specifies four
conditions for the design of just health care institutions (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design

9

Daniels writes that early on medical ethics “has fed on new-life-and-death dramas.”
(Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1.)
10 The fact that Daniels works within the constraints of bioethics’ micro-macro bifurcation,
situating his contribution at the macro-level, exerts a profound influence on his project,
much like the market-state dichotomy does (see 4.5.1 Breaking Open the Dichotomy).
Among others, the bifurcation can explain the Daniels’ challenge of framing his theory of
justice and A4R as an exercise in institutional/organizational design, i.e., meso-level (see
4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist).
11 Daniels, Just Health Care, 1-2.
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Principles), can be situated at both the macro- and meso-level. The concrete
implementation of the conditions in health care organizations must be located at the
meso-level of health care organizations, i.e., instantiated institutions (see 0.5.2
Organization). However, the four conditions of A4R as abstract principles for institutional
design, as discussed by Daniels and Sabin, can be conceived as higher-level (i.e., macrolevel) institutional design principles that are made concrete when they are implemented
at the meso-level by health care organizations.12 As such, A4R is fixed at the macro-level,
grounding the approach by providing an independent set of criteria for fair health care
institutions, but becomes context sensitive when implemented at the meso-level. The
major gain for Daniels and Sabin is the introduction of the meso-level of health care
institutions, which ties their approach in with the NIE literature, furthering their goal of
designing fair health care institutions. Moreover, Ostrom provides an alternate path to
the implementation of cooperative decision-making regarding the allocation of health
care resources, emerging from the bottom up rather than coming from the top down, a
possibility that Daniels and Sabin do not fully appreciate. It is worth to keep in mind that
the design of fair health care institutions likely requires designers to move dynamically
between the meso- and macro-level, going back and forth during the implementation
process.13

12 I discuss the

status of the conditions of A4R vis-à-vis the other design principles in more
detail later (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles). The discussion of the conditions of A4R
as design principles raises several issues that suggest the proposed distinction between
meso- and macro-level may not be as clear-cut as presented here.
13 The process resembles the method of reflective equilibrium as discussed by Rawls in A
Theory of Justice (1971), a coherent set of beliefs arrived at through a process of
deliberative adjustment between general principles and particular judgments. (John
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Once implemented, the meso-level becomes the locus for fair process in the
allocation of health care resources, enabling public deliberation and democratic oversight
when setting health care limits.14 Situated between the micro- and macro-level, the mesolevel is arguably the most suitable level to take resource allocation decisions in health
care for reasons discussed throughout the project. To reiterate a few: (1) The issue of
scarcity becomes more palpable to resource users at the meso-level. (2) At the mesolevel, the deliberative process becomes more manageable, among others, allowing more
resource users to participate in deliberation and ensuring transparency of the process. (3)
Meso-level decision-making processes are likely more efficient and effective than their
macro-level counterparts, among others, because the set of rules is not unnecessarily
inflated and rule compliance is higher. (4) The meso-level keeps allocation issues away
from the bedside without having to resort to macro-level policies.
4.3 ENTER DANIELS
Daniels recognizes the key role of institutions and their design in setting limits on the use
of health care resources. Before I provide a detailed discussion of Daniels’ Rawlsian theory
of justice for health care (see 4.3.2 A Theory of Justice), I argue that his overall project of
setting fair limits rightfully can be characterized as institutionalist (see 4.3.1 Daniels the
Institutionalist).

Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, [1971] 1999), 40-46.)
14 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 4.
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4.3.1 DANIELS THE INSTITUTIONALIST
I am going to go ahead and call Daniels an institutionalist. That may seem like a bold claim,
and certainly a convenient one given my overarching argument, but the project Daniels
embarks on in Just Health Care (1985) is fundamentally institutionalist.15 If I am able to
show that Daniels is indeed an institutionalist, then this does not only further my own
argument, it also allows others to see and develop Daniels’ work in new ways that do
justice to his underlying commitment to institutions, thus providing an important
contribution to the literature.
Daniels is keenly aware of the role institutions play in ensuring a just health care
system.16 The opening sentences of his work read:

This book is about justice in the design of a health-care system. The term ‘health
care’ is used broadly to include personal medical services, preventive medical and
public health measures, including health and safety regulation, and certain social
support services for the chronically ill or disabled. So a health-care system involves
a diverse set of institutions which have a major impact on the level and distribution
of our welfare. A theory of justice articulates the general principles which should
govern this system.17 (Emphasis mine.)

15

Daniels’s institutionalism most likely is inspired by Rawls, who discusses the role of
institutions in ensuring justice throughout A Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls treats
institutions in a more sophisticated manner than Daniels (see footnote 176), who adopts
Rawls’s language of institutions but focuses on extending Rawls’s theory of justice. While
an in-depth assessment of Rawls as an institutionalist is outside of the scope of the
current project, I briefly touch upon Rawls’s institutionalism later on (see 4.3.2.2.2
Justifying the Special Moral Importance of Health Care and 4.7 Conclusion).
16 The statement may be interpreted as mischaracterizing Daniels’s project, as his primary
concern is to develop a theory of justice that can then inform the design of health care
institutions (theory of justice → design of health care institutions). Nonetheless, Daniels
recognizes the key importance of institutions in ensuring a just health care system (health
care institutions → justice).
17 Daniels, Just Health Care, ix.
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Thus, Daniels conceives of a health care system in terms of “a diverse set of institutions,”
which influence welfare through their role in the distribution of “various goods and
services,”18 i.e., the governance of health care resources. Daniels aim is to seek “principles
of justice to govern the design of basic health-care institutions”19 and to solve “problems
in the design of health-care institutions.”20,21 He highlights the importance of institutions
and institutional design to the just allocation of health care resources numerous times
throughout Just Health Care (1985), particularly in the opening pages of the work.22 So
labeling Daniels as an institutionalist is not as farfetched as it may seem.
Of course, to brand Daniels an institutionalist is one thing, but to claim he is a new
institutionalist is a different matter altogether. Obviously, Daniels is not ignorant about
the central role institutions play in health care. In this sense, he does not need to learn to
“see” the institutions. However, he does not “see” them through the lens of NIE (see 0.4
The Double Aim of the Project). As such, Daniels misses the language and theoretical
framework to bring his vison about health care institutions to complete fruition. While he
develops arguably the single most influential account of justice in health care,23 and

18

Daniels, Just Health Care, ix.
Daniels, Just Health Care, 9.
20 Daniels, Just Health Care, 10.
21 A few pages earlier, Daniels writes that health inequalities “are the direct results of
features in the design of our basic health-care institutions.” (Daniels, Just Health Care, 3.)
Principles of justice can “serve as a public and final basis for resolving disagreements
about how basic institutions, such as health-care institutions, should be designed.” (Ibid.,
4.)
22 Daniels, Just Health Care, ix-xi, 1-4, 8-10, 41, 45, 47-48, 95, 99-100, 102.
23 I deliberately do not use the word “successful” to characterize Daniels’s theory of
justice in health care, as it has been the target of a host of criticisms, which I choose to
ignore here for the sake of the argument. Again, even though I am sympathetic to
Daniels’s account of justice, I am not strongly committed to it, but his account is
19
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applies this theory to a variety of cases, his institutional project is not as successful as it
could be. Daniels seems to realize the shortcomings of his argument. While he dwells on
the role of institutions at length early on in Just Health Care, repeatedly emphasizing their
importance in the preface and opening chapter, he does not develop his institutional
arguments further. Daniels spends the first three chapters of the work developing a
Rawlsian theory of justice for health care (see 5.4.2 A Theory of Justice for Health Care),
and the remaining six chapters discuss more or less concrete applications of this theory
to health care, but there is no general discussion of the role of institutions. Daniels, who
squarely situates his project at “the social or macro level of decision-making,”24 lacks a
meso-level theory of institutions to make his macro-level theory of justice more specific
without having to descend all the way to concrete applications (micro-level).25 The
hypothesis that Daniels is somewhat disillusioned with his institutional ambitions is
further backed up by the marked cutback in talk about institutions and institutional design

particularly amenable to show the possible applications of NIE and commons research to
issues of justice in health care, among others, because of Daniels’s foundational concerns
about the role of institutions.
24 Daniels, Just Health Care, 1.
25 A few remarks are in place: (1) Daniels states he is “entirely” concerned with the macrolevel and thus appears to situate the concrete applications in the book’s later chapters at
the macro-level as well. (Daniels, Just Health Care, 1.) (2) Such a characterization makes
sense from Daniels’s perspective, as he works within the “classic” bioethical distinction
between the micro-level (individuals) and the macro-level (policy), which defines much of
biomedical ethics as a field of study. Interestingly, Daniels’s struggle with institutions may
be a direct result of the bioethics’ micro-macro bifurcation. (3) From the perspective of
NIE, however, Daniels’s concrete applications can be situated at the level of organizations,
i.e., instantiated institutions (micro-level). On this view, Daniels does not have a mesolevel theoretical framework to discuss institutions in abstract terms. (4) The terms micro,
meso-, and macro-level are equivocatory, as they mean different things in biomedical
ethics and in NIE. Moreover, by now it should be clear the idea of levels of analysis is used
liberally in commons research.
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in Just Health (2008), the sequel to Just Health Care (1985) that reiterates, updates, and
expands many of the earlier work’s arguments.26 The difference between the books is
particularly noticeable in the opening pages.27
Then there is the issue of Daniels’s use of the term “institution,” which I briefly
touched upon in the introduction (see 0.1.2 NIE, Bioethics, and Philosophy). For most part,
Daniels treats the words institution and organization as synonyms, both referring to
concrete organizations rather than abstract institutions.28 In other words, from the
perspective of NIE, when Daniels talks about institutions, he really means organizations,
and when he discusses institutional design, he really means organizational design. In the
opening pages of Just Health Care (1985), however, Daniels appears to mention
institutions and their design in a way that brings his work much closer to NIE.29 Of course,
the fact he then goes on to use the terms as synonyms seems to prove I am reading

26

To be sure, Daniels uses the word institution a lot in Just Health (2008), over a hundred
times, but almost exclusively as a synonym for organization.
27 If Daniels’s institutionalism is indeed inspired by Rawls (see footnote 15), which seems
plausible, this may offer an additional explanation for the initial focus on and later
departure from institutions. While Daniels adopts the language of institutions early on,
he does not develop the institutional argument in detail, and instead chooses to focus on
the theory of justice, thus the institutional strand loses importance over time.
28 Daniels’s enumeration of some of health care’s “most visible and familiar” institutions
is especially telling, as almost all the institutions he lists are organizations (e.g., hospitals,
clinics, training institutions for medical professionals, R&D institutions, institutions
providing social support and personal care). (Daniels, Just Health Care, 1.) He also includes
“laws and agencies responsible for the control of infectious disease, nutrition and health
education, drug and food protection, consumer product safety, and the regulation of
health hazards in the environment.” (Ibid.) The latter illustrates Daniels does not
distinguish between laws (i.e., sets of rules) and agencies (i.e., organizations), at least not
in the relevant sense.
29 Rawls’s institutionalism, and its influence on Daniels (see footnote 15), may explain why
Daniel’s earlier work discusses institutions in a way that seems closer to NIE, as Rawls
defines institutions in a way that resembles definitions from NIE (see footnote 176).
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Daniels’s supposed new institutionalism into his work. Still, I think early on Daniels is
grappling with the concepts of institution and institutional design on a deeper level, or at
a higher level of abstraction, but he abandons this line of inquiry because he does not
possess the theoretical apparatus to pursue it further.
Then again, to say Daniels gives up on his attempt to think about institutions in
abstract terms strictly speaking is not correct either, as he continues to pursue his goal of
solving problems in the design of health care institutions, culminating in the
accountability for reasonableness (A4R) approach he develops together with Sabin in
Setting Limits Fairly (2002). A4R is in effect an exercise in institutional design, not
organizational design, as the approach’s four conditions are essentially abstract principles
for the design of health care institutions. I discuss the A4R approach as a set of
institutional design principles, and how they fit with commons research, in detail later in
the chapter (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles). Within the scope of the current
discussion of Daniels’ merits as an institutionalist, I think it is remarkable that A4R is not
framed in terms of institutions or institutional design, or even recognized as such. Daniels
sets out to solve institutional design issues, and he succeeds in doing so in developing
A4R, but the full extent of his proposed solution only becomes clear from the perspective
of NIE. Institutionalism leads to a deeper appreciation of the problem Daniels has solved.
He set out to develop conditions for fair health care organizations (i.e., theory of justice,
A4R), but provides design principles for just health care institutions. The fact Daniels’
solution can be “scaled up” to a higher level of analysis or abstraction seems to be a
feature of the continuity between institutions and organizations (see 0.5.2
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Organization).30 Put differently, Daniels “sees” the institutions, but he sees them as
organizations rather than as abstract sets of rules. He believes and knows he has proposed
an “institutional design” (i.e., organizational design) solution, but he does not appreciate
the full implications of his solution, and in a real way he does not know he has in fact
developed an institutional design solution.31 Fortunately, the epistemological intricacies
of the matter need not be of concern here, what matters is that Daniels is motivated by
a concern about just health care institutions and in response develops an institutional
design solution which, when interfaced with NIE, provides a powerful tool to setting fair
limits in health care. By looking at Daniels through the lens of NIE, one can recognize the
worth of Daniels the institutionalist and build on his vision using the tools of NIE. Bridging
both literatures allows for a fuller exploration of “that intermediate space in which we try
to look at real social institutions with some philosophical vision”32 and provides additional
guidance on how to design more just health care institutions.33

30

The fact Daniels’ solution can be scaled up so easily provides additional support for the
continuity between organizations and institutions (see 0.5.2 Organizations), which first
and foremost requires a conceptual switch from the level of concrete organizations to
that of abstract institutions.
31 Daniels’s predicament is of epistemic interest, as he knows he has provided an
institutional solution to designing just health care institutions, he has a justified true belief
(JTB), but his knowledge seems to be the result of a contingent feature, i.e., the continuity
of institutions and organizations, because he does not know he has provided an
institutional design solution. The problem is reminiscent of the well-known Gettier
problem but is not a textbook example, as Daniels’ justification for the belief is not false.
Then again, maybe the problem at hand is not that complicated, but simply a case of (1)
Daniels not understanding the full implications of his work and (2) a semantic issue
deriving from treating institution and organization either as synonyms (Daniels) or as
distinct concepts existing on a continuum (NIE).
32 Daniels, Just Health Care, xi.
33 Daniels, Just Health Care, x.
308

Before continuing, I want to highlight that, while Daniels’ approach plausibly can
be characterized as institutionalist, meaning he recognizes the central importance of
institutions and their design in governing health care resources, this does not necessarily
put him in the camp of Ostrom and the commons. While Daniels is a proponent of a
deliberative approach to allocating health care resources, he situates his intellectual
project at “the social or macro level of decision-making,”34 and the same is true of the
practical implementation thereof. Ultimately, he believes it is up to the state to regulate
the mechanisms for the fair allocation of resources he envisions (see also 4.4.4.4 The
Regulative Condition). Daniels has a good reason for this approach, as he believes and
wants his theory to be universally applicable, but his choice for the macro-level may also
be the result of the lack of a meso-level institutional entity (i.e., commons) to serve as the
vehicle for the A4R approach. As we will see, Daniels advocates deliberation and
cooperation, but he does not fully realize or appreciate how the solution he proposes can
be associated with a distinctive institutional meso-level, instead he reverts back to the
institutional macro-level (i.e., state). Integrating commons research in Daniels’ analysis
implies an important gain, as it allows Daniels to have his cake and eat it too. His theory
of justice for health care and the A4R approach can function as a macro-level theory of
justice and institutional design principles respectively, but their implementation can take
place at the meso-level of health care commons organizations. As a result, his approach
maintains its universality, but at the same time can allow for differences in health care
context. To give an example, it allows for some variation within what counts as relevant

34

Daniels, Just Health Care, 1.
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reasons in making resource allocation decisions, say, in a secular as compared to a
religious context (see 4.4.4.2 The Relevance Condition). Of course, Daniels may disagree
with allowing such leeway in the meso-level implementation of his approach because it
undermines the universality of his project, among others, because it may lead to a slippery
slope with regards to relevant reasons. To sum up, while Daniels can be labeled an
institutionalist, he may or may not be a proponent of the commons. He may want to be,
because it makes his approach sensitive to real-world differences in health care context,
but he may not want to be, as it requires him to give groups of resource users more
autonomy in making resource allocation decisions than he is willing to concede.
4.3.2 A THEORY OF JUSTICE
While Daniels goal is to design more just health care institutions, his first concern is to
develop a theory of justice for health care that can inform institutional design. The A4R
approach is a later development that is justified by, and relies on, Daniels’s theory of
justice. Hence, before I discuss A4R in connection with commons research, I provide a
detailed summary of the theoretical rationale behind the A4R approach drawing on Just
Health Care (1985) and Just Health (2008). Furthermore, summarizing Daniels’s theory of
justice is of potential value to commons research. While Daniels is concerned with health
care institutions, and his theory of justice can be applied to health care commons, as I
argue below, his work can plausibly be applied to certain commons institutions beyond
health care (e.g., knowledge commons, urban commons,35 natural resource commons).

35

Rawls’s theory of justice may straightforwardly apply to certain commons without
having to extend the theory, as Daniels does to apply it to health care. Urban and
knowledge commons, for example, may fall directly under the first principle of justice as
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While I do not present a detailed argument in support of this thesis, which is beyond the
scope of the current project, I briefly discuss the possible relevance of Daniels’s theory of
justice to commons research, and highlight some of the reasons the theory may pertain
to the commons as I breakdown Daniels’s argument (see 4.3.2.2 A Theory of Justice for
Health Care).
4.3.2.1 A THEORY OF JUSTICE FOR THE COMMONS?
The chapter focuses on the role NIE can play in developing and expanding Daniels’s
institutional project. In other words, the chapter’s central question is, “What can
commons research do for Daniels?” However, Daniels’s work may provide a
straightforward path to a theory of justice for the commons. At a minimum, his theory of
justice for health care can inform and facilitate the development thereof. Thus, this
section seeks to provide an initial answer to the question, “What can Daniels bring to
commons research?” A question I return to outside of the scope of a theory of justice
throughout the chapter.
I briefly discussed Ostrom’s criteria for evaluating institutional performance in the
introduction,36 flagging justice as one of them and suggesting the criterion is one of the
most promising interfaces between NIE and philosophy. Since Ostrom does not elucidate
what she means by justice, the concept remains undefined in her work. 37 Nor is the

fairness, which states each person has a claim to equal basic liberties, because they are
important to ensure (political) liberties.
36 As a reminder, Ostrom’s criteria for the evaluation of institutional performance are
justice, sustainability, efficiency, effectiveness, and robustness (see 0.3 A Third Way: The
Commons).
37 Ostrom’s silence on the issue of justice plausibly fits with her avoidance of questions of
power.
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criterion a topic in the commons literature. Ergo, Ostrom presents justice as a criterion to
evaluate institutional performance, but she provides no guidance on how to determine
whether an institution is just. Moreover, as the criterion goes undetermined, it cannot
provide any guidance on the design of just commons institutions. This is where the work
of Daniels comes in, as his extension of Rawls’s theory of justice can plausibly be adopted,
and if necessary adapted, to provide content to Ostrom’s criterion of justice. As such, the
theory can serve as the basis for assessing whether a commons institution is equitable.38
The theory of justice can also provide guidance on the design of just commons
institutions, much as Daniels aims to do in his work (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist).
Furthermore, Daniels’s theory of justice may be able to justify Ostrom’s emphasis on
justice, i.e., provide a rationale for including justice as a criterion to evaluate institutional
performance, particularly in the evaluation of commons institutions (see 4.3.2.2 A Theory
of Justice for Health Care).
Daniels applies his theory of justice for health care to a range of organizations, as
is evidenced by the diversity of examples he uses, covering all institutional types (i.e.,
market, state, and commons) and levels of analysis (e.g., local, regional, national,
transnational). Indeed, one of the strengths of Daniels’s approach is that it operates at a
level of generality that allows it to interface with a variety of institutions. Therefore, even
though Daniels’s procedural account fits particularly well with the commons, as I suggest

38

While Daniels does not make it explicit, he already uses his theory of justice for health
care as a criterion to evaluate organizational performance when he compares and
contrasts concrete examples, which is yet another way in which commons research sheds
new light on Daniels’s project.
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throughout the chapter, it can be applied to all kinds of institutions, including hybrids and
polycentric governance regimes (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).
Ostrom would likely be amenable to Daniels’s approach to justice, as his theory allows for
the institutional pluralism she holds so dearly (see 3.2.2 Plural Institutions).
Of course, more work needs to be done to turn Daniels’s theory of justice for
health care into a theory of justice for the commons. An important question that must be
answered is whether Daniels’s theory can be applied to commons outside the realm of
health care in a straightforward manner. I briefly argue that it can indeed be applied to
other commons later in the chapter (see 4.4.2.2 A Theory of Justice for Health Care).
Alternatively, Rawls’s theory of justice can be adapted in some other way in order to apply
it to the commons, much in the same way Daniels adapts Rawls’s theory to apply it health
care.
4.3.2.2 A THEORY OF JUSTICE FOR HEALTH CARE
Daniels develops his theory of justice for health care in Just Health Care (1985) and
extends the theory in Just Health (2008). As the arguments in both works are largely
analogous, I treat them as one. In the later work, Daniels expands his theory to apply to
health needs generally rather than health care alone,39 albeit broadly conceived,40 but the
gist of his argument remains unchanged.41 In a few places, I interlace the discussion of
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Daniels, Just Health, 29.
Daniels, Just Health Care, ix.
41 In Just Health (2008), Daniels finds additional support for his claim that justice requires
the protection of opportunity by drawing on recent theories that compete with Rawls’s
view of distributive justice. (Daniels, Just Health, 30, 63-77.)
40
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Daniels’s theory of justice with remarks on its possible applicability to the commons (see
4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for the Commons?).
To repeat, Daniels ultimate aim is “a just redesign of health-care institutions,”42
but how does one embark on such an endeavor? A straightforward but inadequate
answer to the question is to appeal to a “notion of individual or human rights,” 43 which
can then serve as the basis for redesigning health care’s institutions. The problem with
such an approach is that “rights are not moral fruits that spring up from bare earth, fully
ripened, without cultivation.”44 The notion is too vague to serve as the basis for decisions
about the governance of scarce health care resources,45 as Daniels argues in some detail
in Just Health Care (1985).46 Any appeal to a right to health or health care must be based
on, and derived from, a general theory of distributive justice or a particular theory of
justice for health care.47 The easiest way to proceed then seems to be to apply a general
theory of justice to health care, but this approach assumes that such theories can simply
be applied to health care.48 Daniels attempts such a strategy early in his career,
straightforwardly extending Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness to health care, but fails.49
The unsuccessful attempt or rather attempts, as he tries four different approaches, lead
him to conclude,
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Daniels, Just Health Care, 4.
Daniels, Just Health, 14.
44 Daniels, Just Health Care, 5.
45 Daniels, Just Health Care, 9.
46 Daniels, Just Health Care, 4-9.
47 Daniels, Just Health, 15.
48 Daniels, Just Health, 15.
49 Daniels, Just Health Care, 10.
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In order to apply such general theories to health care, we need to know what kind
of a social good health care is. We need to know what its functions and effects are
and why we might think these make it differ in moral importance from other
things which improve our quality of life in various ways. An analysis of this problem
cannot be provided by appeal to the theories of justice themselves.50
Therefore, Daniels begins his search for a theory of justice for health care by asking, “Is
health care special?”51 A question he later broadens to, “What is the special moral
importance of health?”52 Before continuing, it is worth noting the relevance of Daniels’s
experience to the development of a theory of justice for the commons, as the question
about the special moral importance of health (care) also applies to commons institutions,
which are much more diverse in the resources they manage and the goals they pursue
than are health care institutions, even when the latter are broadly conceived. A possible
strategy is to argue that most commons discussed in the literature are of special moral
importance to their respective communities, who depend on them for their livelihood
and often for their very survival (e.g., water, fish, fodder, wood).53 The same is true of the
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Daniels, Just Health Care, 10.
Daniels, Just Health Care, 10-11.
52 Daniels, Just Health, 17.
53 The suggestion raises an interesting question, can any commodity, or service for that
matter, become of special moral importance given the circumstances? To give an
example, smartphones are not usually considered to be of special moral importance, on
the contrary, but to refugees they can be crucial tools to stay in touch with family and to
access crucial information, which also explains the opposition to proposals to confiscate
them. (Will Worley, “Syrian Woman Explains Why Refugees Need Smartphones,” The
Independent, May 12, 2016.) Similarly, oil seems to be of special moral importance,
especially for oil producing countries, who depend on the resource for their
socioeconomic development, effectively protecting the range of opportunity open to
their citizens, among others, by funding health care and education. The issue raises a
broad question within the ethics of economics that is outside of the scope of the current
project.
51
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artificial and global commons that have become a topic of interest in the commons
literature over the course of the last decades (e.g., knowledge commons, urban
commons, climate, oceans),54 which are not like other commodities (e.g., smartphones,
cars),55 but resemble health care in that they seem to be of special moral significance. I
do not pursue a detailed answer here, but return to the issue after looking at Daniels’s
explanation of the special moral importance of health care (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the
Special Moral Importance of Health Care). For now, it is important to note that a further
development of this line of argument is not necessary for the health care commons, as
they fall squarely under Daniels’s theory of justice for health care and the question, “What
is the special moral importance of health?”
Before providing a systematic answer, Daniels notes that health care certainly
looks as if it is special, as is illustrated by the observation that people and societies that
tolerate vast inequalities in wealth and power are morally outraged when sick people
cannot get care because they cannot afford it.56 The short answer is that health care is
special because it keeps people functioning normally, which ensures the range of
opportunities open to them. The protection of opportunity is, among others,57 justified
by Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. While disease and disability reduce the range of

54

In all these examples the commons appear to be of special moral importance
Daniels, Just Health Care, 10-11.
56 Daniels, Just Health, 18.
57 Daniels finds additional support for the protection of opportunity in the capabilities
approach (Sen, Martha Nussbaum) and the appeal to “equal opportunity for welfare or
advantage” (Richard Arneson, Gerald Cohen), even though these accounts are critical of
key aspects of Rawls’s work. (Daniels, Just Health, 63-77.) A detailed discussion is beyond
the scope of the current project, but NIE can plausibly adopt and/or benefit (from) these
other approaches to distributive justice.
55
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opportunities open to people compared to when they are healthy or fully functional,
keeping them functioning normally protects their range of opportunities.58,59 Hence, “the
socially controllable factors that promote health […] derive special importance from their
contribution to protecting opportunities.”60 I now discuss the key moves of Daniels’s
argument in detail.61 For the sake of clarity, I break down the argument in two parts,
which roughly correspond to the way Daniels sets up his argument. I first explain the
special moral importance of health (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the Special Moral Importance
of Health Care) and then discuss the justification for health care’s special significance (see
4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the Special Moral Importance of Health Care).
4.3.2.2.1 EXPLAINING THE SPECIAL MORAL IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH CARE
Daniels begins by arguing health care is better thought of in terms of needs rather than
preferences, despite the problems surrounding the former notion and the strengths of
the latter concept, which is used in welfare economics.62,63 A common argument to show
any talk about health care needs can be avoided is the so-called “Argument from Fair

58

Daniels, Just Health, 20-21.

59 Daniels summarizes the argument as follows: (1) “Since meeting health needs promotes

health (or normal functioning), and since health helps to protect opportunity, then
meeting health needs protects opportunity.” (2) “Since Rawls’s justice as fairness requires
protecting opportunity, as do other important approaches to distributive justice, then
several recent accounts of justice give special importance to meeting health needs.”
(Daniels, Just Health, 29.)
60 Daniels, Just Health, 21.
61 I primarily draw on the somewhat shorter, and in places more organized, argument
from Just Health (2008). (Daniels, Just Health, 29-63.)
62 Daniels, Just Health, 31.
63 The prevalent “preference for preferences” seems to be in part the result of the
influence of orthodox economics.
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Shares.”64 The argument can be summarized as follows: (1) suppose each person had a
“fair income share” according to some agreed upon theory of distributive justice, (2)
suppose there is a competitive medical market to buy insurance, then (3) people could
protect themselves against the risk of needing health care resources by purchasing a
reasonable insurance package,65 defined as a package that “meets the health-care needs
or risks it is rational for a prudent person to insure against.”66,67 Thus, demand, in the form
of preferences for different insurance packages, and supply, in the form of health care
goods and services, meet each other in the health care marketplace and are efficiently
matched,68 or so the argument goes. However, the argument does not show that we can
do without health care needs, because even though we know little about “fair income
shares,” it seems plausible such a share is fair only if someone can buy a reasonable
insurance package with it.69 But what is someone’s income share is too small to afford a
reasonable insurance package? Then the share is inadequate, i.e., it is unfair that person
cannot buy a reasonable health insurance package.70 Daniels concludes,

So, to know whether income shares are fair, we must know that they can buy
reasonable coverage. But to know what coverage is reasonable, we need to know
64

Daniels, Just Health Care, 20.
Daniels, Just Health Care, 20.
66 Daniels, Just Health Care, 21.
67 Of course, one can object there is no insurance level that is prudent for everyone. An
objection Daniels counters by arguing the variation of prudence must not be exaggerated,
since the notion of prudence reflects a concern for meeting certain basic needs. Some
individuals may have a fair share of income, but nonetheless be unable to purchase a
reasonable insurance package, i.e., one that meets these needs, which puts them in a
position where they are unable to act prudently. (Daniels, Just Health, 31.)
68 Daniels, Just Health Care, 20-21.
69 Daniels, Just Health, 31.
70 Daniels, Just Health, 31-32.
65

318

what health-care needs it is prudent to insure against. Thus we must talk about
health-care needs after all!71
Since the concept of needs cannot easily be eliminated, and is necessary in order to talk
about the special moral important of health care, the notion must be clarified.72 A key
issue with the concept is that it seems to be both too weak and too strong to be of use,73
i.e., “too many things become needs, and too few.”74,75 However, not all needs are on
par.76 In some moral contexts, like health care, certain needs are given a special moral
weight.77 In order to sort out competing claims for resources in these contexts, one must
rely on various objective criteria to assess needs instead of on subjective assessments.
Daniels frames the issue as a question about the structure of the scale used to assess the
strength of different claims for assistance.78 The scale is truncated or selective rather than
full or complete,79 meaning the scale gives weight to some kinds of needs, which are
reasons for assistance, but not to others, which are irrelevant.80 The scale differs from
one moral context to another (e.g., health care, education, parenting).81 For such a scale
to function, the needs must be “objectively ascribable,”82 meaning they can be ascribed
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Daniels, Just Health Care, 21.
Daniels, Just Health Care, 23.
73 Daniels, Just Health, 32.
74 Daniels, Just Health Care, 23.
75 Daniels calls the concept “opportunistic.” (Daniels, Just Health Care, 23.)
76 Daniels, Just Health Care, 23.
77 Daniels, Just Health, 33.
78 Daniels, Just Health, 33.
79 Daniels, Just Health Care, 24-25.
80 Daniels, Just Health, 33.
81 Daniels, Just Health, 34.
82 Daniels, Just Health Care, 25.
72
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to someone even if that person does not realize their need, and “objectively important,”83
meaning there is widespread agreement on their importance and relevance.84 The needs
that fit the bill are “those required for normal species functioning.” 85,86 Such needs are
objectively ascribable, assuming the notion of normal species functioning can be
adequately specified. But why are they objectively important? In other words, what
explains the broad agreement on the importance of needs that ensure normal species
functioning?87 A tempting, but unsatisfactory answer is that these needs are a condition
for happiness, i.e., people are unable to achieve their chosen goals and be happy without
normal species functioning.88 However, not all of life’s important goals are undermined
by ill health or disability. Moreover, it is possible to adapt one’s goals in accordance with
health issues and thus achieve happiness still.89 While Daniels admits it is plausible that
meeting key needs that contribute to normal functioning indeed has “a definite tendency
to promote happiness,”90 he proposes an alternative account that he believes better
explains the broad agreement on meeting those needs that are essential to normal
species functioning, but does not depend on any empirical claims about the relationship
between happiness and normal functioning.91 The alternative account hinges on the idea
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Daniels, Just Health Care, 25.
Daniels, Just Health, 34.
85 Daniels, Just Health, 34.
86 They are also called “course-of-life needs” (David Baybrooke) because humans have
them throughout their lives or at certain stages of their lives everyone must go through
(e.g., food, shelter, clothing, rest, companionship). (Daniels, Just Health Care, 26.)
87 Daniels, Just Health, 34.
88 Daniels, Just Health, 34-35.
89 Daniels, Just Health Care, 27.
90 Daniels, Just Health, 35.
91 Daniels, Just Health, 35.
84

320

that any impairment of normal species functioning reduces the normal range of
opportunities open to the person in pursuing their “plans of life” or “conceptions of the
good” (Rawls).92
In order to clarify the relationship between the above account of needs and health
needs in particular, the notion “health” needs further specification.93 Daniels starts from
the basic, albeit somewhat misleading notion that “health is the absence of disease,”
which fits with the controversial biomedical conception of health.94 This negative
definition is deceptive, because the concept of disease is too narrow to provide an
adequate contrast to health. Instead Daniels, following Christopher Boorse, characterizes
health as the “absence of pathology,”95 where pathology must be understood as a
departure from normal functioning.96 In other words, health is normal species functioning
and health needs are things needed to maintain said functioning over the course of a
human life. As such, health needs are objectively ascribable, because for most cases it is
possible to rely on biomedical science to characterize pathology and on epidemiology to
clarify normal functioning. Moreover, health needs are objectively important, because
aforementioned sciences ensure considerable agreement on where to draw the line
between normal function and pathology.97 Daniels discusses several objections against
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Daniels, Just Health, 35-36.
Within the development of his theory of justice for health care, Daniels’s account of
health has undergone the greatest evolution from Just Health Care (1985) to Just Health
(2008).
94 Daniels, Just Health, 35.
95 Daniels, Just Health, 37.
96 I return to Boorse’s controversial definition of health in the next section (see 4.3.2.2.2
Justifying the Special Moral Importance of Health Care).
97 Daniels, Just Health, 37, 42.
93
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his approach, but their discussion would not add much to the current argument, so I omit
them.98,99 In general, the distinction between normal functioning and pathology holds,
even allowing and accounting for the criticisms of Daniels’s argument.100 The result is a
list of health needs, which “are those things we need in order to maintain, restore, or
provide functional equivalents (where possible) to normal species functioning (for the
appropriate reference class by gender and age).”101 Health needs are a diverse set: (1)
“adequate nutrition,” (2) “sanitary, safe, unpolluted living and working conditions,” (3)
“exercise, rest, and such important lifestyle features as avoiding substance abuse and
practicing safe sex,” (4) “preventive, curative, rehabilitative, and compensatory personal
medical services (and devices),” (5) “nonmedical personal and social support services,”
and (6) “an appropriate distribution of other social determinants of health.”102,103 The list
includes things that are not commonly thought of as health needs, but Daniels argues it
is designed to broaden thinking about health care beyond personal medical services, by
highlighting the relationship between health and the “many goods, services, and
institutions that bear on health and its distribution.”104,105 As a side note, by broadening
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Daniels, Just Health Care, 29-32.
Daniels, Just Health, 37-42.
100 Daniels, Just Health, 42.
101 Daniels, Just Health, 42.
102 Daniels, Just Health, 42-43.
103 Daniels identifies the first five as health care needs in Just Health Care (1985) and he
adds the sixth category of “socially controllable factors affecting health” in Just Health
(2008) to broaden his account to all health needs. (Daniels, Just Health, 42.)
104 Daniels, Just Health, 43.
105 While Daniels does not here assign any primacy to institutions, they are responsible
for allocating health (care) goods and services. Of course, based on Daniels’s remarks
about institutional design, especially early on in Just Health Care (1985), it is safe to
assume he does attribute special importance to institutions to meet health needs.
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health needs as much as he does, Daniels opens himself up to the criticism that just about
anything can be conceived as a health need, from organic food over a Harvard education
to Peloton exercise bikes.
That leaves the question, “What is so important about normal species
functioning?”106 In other words, why give such moral importance to health needs simply
because they preserve normal species functioning?107 Daniels answers the question by
developing the relationship between normal functioning and opportunity, for now under
the assumption that protecting opportunity matters, as the argument that opportunity
ought to be protected is to follow (see 4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the Special Moral Importance
of Health Care). Daniels defines “normal opportunity range” as the “array of life plans
reasonable persons are likely to develop for themselves”108 within a given society, which
implies the concept is socially relative.109,110 As such, facts about social organization,
among others, the conception of justice designed into a society’s institutions, determine
how the normal opportunity range is distributed among the population.111 Leaving aside
the issue of societal distribution, normal functioning “offers a clear parameter affecting
the share of the normal range open to a given individual.”112 The distribution of health
care and the meeting of other health needs affects precisely this parameter. Thus, the
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Daniels, Just Health, 43.
Daniels, Just Health, 43.
108 Daniels, Just Health, 43.
109 Daniels, Just Health, 43-44.
110 Daniels’s socially relative definition of the normal opportunity range is interesting,
because it seems to allow for pluralism. However, the pluralism applies to the normal
opportunity range and not to the theory of justice and its principles.
111 Daniels, Just Health, 44.
112 Daniels, Just Health, 44.
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special importance attributed to meeting health needs can be explained by the
significance attached to protecting people’s normal range of opportunity against
departures from normal functioning.113 Daniels points out it is illuminating to contrast the
way in which social practice protects opportunity in case of pathology but not in case of
variations in talents and skills.114,115 Any impairment from normal functioning due to
significant pathology (e.g., disease, injury, disability) limits people’s opportunity relative
to the normal range that would have been available to them were they healthy.116 “If
individuals’ fair shares of the normal range are the life plans they may reasonably choose
[…] then disease and disability shrink their shares from what is fair.”117 Of course, some
pathologies have a more severe impact on the opportunity range than others (e.g., flu,
cancer, broken leg, blindness). Moreover, given the normal opportunity range is socially
relative, the same illness may influence opportunity differently in two societies (e.g.,
dyslexia in a highly literate society compared to a generally illiterate society). 118
To summarize Daniels’s argument thus far: (1) Health care and health must cannot
only be thought of in terms of preferences, but must also be thought of in terms of needs.
(2) Health needs are special because they ensure normal species functioning. (3) In turn,
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Daniels, Just Health, 44.
Daniels discusses the difference between protecting the normal opportunity range
against ill health and protecting it against variations in talents and skills in more detail.
(Daniels, Just Health Care, 33-34; Daniels, Just Health, 44-45.)
115 Increasingly, societies do try to correct for differences in talents and skills if those
variations are the consequence of social conditions (e.g., socioeconomic background,
institutionalized racism). However, such interventions are more controversial than
protecting opportunity against ill health.
116 Daniels, Just Health, 44-45.
117 Daniels, Just Health, 45.
118 Daniels, Just Health, 45.
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normal functioning allows people to pursue their life plans by providing them with a
normal range of opportunities. However, merely explaining the special moral importance
ascribed to meeting health needs does not amount to a justification of existing moral
beliefs and practices in health care. Daniels’s search for justification, relying on Rawls’s
theory of justice as fairness, is the topic of the next section (see 4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the
Special Moral Importance of Health Care).
Daniels’s explanation of the special moral importance of health seems to apply to
at least some commons institutions,119 namely those governing resources that meet
needs required for normal species functioning. When these needs are not met, members
of the commons experience a reduction in the range of opportunities open to them in
pursuing their life goals. As I mentioned before, many natural resource commons as well
as artificial commons seem to be of special moral importance, as they satisfy needs that
are prerequisites for normal functioning, i.e., they ensure a normal range of opportunities
is open to their users, whether locally (e.g., forests, irrigation systems,120 urban commons)
or globally (e.g., oceans, climate, knowledge commons).121 Much like Daniels explores the
notion of health in order to elucidate the relationship between health needs and needs
of special moral importance, a full account of the special moral importance of a given
commons would likely require a discussion of the particular CPR and the need that is being
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Again, Rawls’s theory of justice may apply to certain commons without having to
extend the theory in the way Daniels does for health care (see footnote 35).
120 The Spanish huertas (see 2.4 A Common Scenario) are a good example.
121 In the case of many natural resource commons in particular it is easy to see how they
fulfill course-of-life needs (see footnote 86), often centering on resources that (in)directly
provide nutrition to the commoners.
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fulfilled. However, at least some commons can be included in Daniels’s health needs
broadly conceived, since they are necessary to “maintain, restore, or provide […] normal
species functioning.”122 Many natural resource commons fulfill a need for adequate
nutrition (e.g., fisheries, irrigation systems), the first health need identified by Daniels.
Global natural commons, like oceans and the climate, plausibly fit with the need for
“sanitary, safe, unpolluted living and working conditions”123 broadly conceived. The same
need is fulfilled by at least some urban commons, which can also play a role in providing
“nonmedical personal and social support services.”124 Of course, Daniels’s inclusion of “an
appropriate distribution of other social determinants of health”125 opens up possibilities
to include other commons.126 Knowledge, for example, can be conceived as a key social
determinant of health,127 which can be used to explain the special moral importance of
knowledge commons, at least for knowledge pertaining to medicine and health care.128,129
Alternatively, it may be possible to formulate a more general argument for the special
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Daniels, Just Health, 42.
Daniels, Just Health, 42.
124 Daniels, Just Health, 43.
125 Daniels, Just Health, 43.
126 Daniels’s inclusion of “other social determinants of health” in the list of health needs
broadens our thinking about health care, but also seems to broaden the concept of health
needs to the extent that too many things become needs of special moral importance, at
a minimum requiring some sort of scale and/or process to determine the relative
importance of different health needs.
127 (Access to) epidemiological knowledge, for example, correlates with other
socioeconomic determinants of health.
128 The claim is supported by the push for open-access in the publication of medical
research.
129 Daniels sees Rawls’s argument for the importance of public education to ensure fair
equality of opportunity as supporting his move to broaden the principle to health care.
(Daniels, Just Health, 52-53, 60-61.) Public education can be thought of as the open-access
distribution of knowledge.
123
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moral importance of the commons, for example, based on the type of resource (CPR) or
the institutional features. I briefly explore one such suggestion. By now, it should be clear
that developing and maintaining commons institutions takes much time and effort on
behalf of resource users. As Ostrom points out, until recently the prevailing sentiment
was that an “orderer” (Leviathan) is needed to introduce social order (see 0.3 A Third
Way: The Commons), precisely because so much time and energy are needed to develop
and maintain institutions.130 Now the idea is that groups are only able to overcome the
cost of institution building in those cases where the resource is of special (moral)
importance to them, for otherwise they would not have invested the time and effort it
takes to develop a cooperative governance scheme. On such an account, it is no
coincidence that so many examples of the commons seem to be of special moral
importance, because it requires a resource of special significance for resource users to
bootstrap themselves into a commons institution in the first place.
4.3.2.2.2 JUSTIFYING THE SPECIAL MORAL IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH CARE
Until now, Daniels’s argument has focused on “describing and explaining certain features
of our moral practice, not actually justifying that practice.”131 In other words, Daniels has
yet to provide an argument to justify the use of an objective, truncated scale of well-being
rather than a more complete measure of satisfaction.132 In addition, he has to show why
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Of course, Ostrom is not the first to appreciate the possibility of meso-level
institutional arrangements arising at the middle-level. Indeed, some of the proponents of
pluralist liberalism already recognize the possibility of social order arising without the
necessity for a Leviathan (see 3.4 Pluralism and Freedom in Health Care).
131 Daniels, Just Health Care, 36.
132 Daniels, Just Health Care, 36.
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people’s fair shares of the normal opportunity range should be protected. Daniels
provides such an argument by extending Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness so it can
address health care issues.133 Daniels notes such an extension is nontrivial, as Rawls’s
theory makes abstraction of variations among people (e.g., disease, disability), instead
assuming they are idealized social contractors “who are fully functional over a normal
lifespan.”134 Daniels strategy is to relax this simplification, thus increasing both the power
of Rawls’s theory and its plausibility. That being said, Daniels does not argue for the
overall acceptability of Rawls’s theory. Instead, he argues that if Rawls’s general theory
of justice is correct, then it provides one plausible justification for using an objective scale
of well-being that includes health needs and for the obligation to protect opportunity. 135
While Daniels’s extension of Rawls’s theory increases its power and plausibility,
thus making this prominent general theory of justice more practicable, both the original
theory and its extension must nonetheless be situated at the theoretical macro-level (see
4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). Consequently, the philosophical arguments that are to
follow are far removed from the commons, both in theory and in practice. While detailed
and at times abstruse, the arguments are still of interest to commons researchers, as they
provide a possible route to a theory of justice for the commons, among others, grounding
and providing content to justice as a criterion of institutional performance (see 4.3.2.1 A
Theory of Justice for the Commons?). To use Ostrom’s vocabulary of levels of analysis, the
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Daniels, Just Health, 46-47.
Daniels, Just Health, 47.
135 Daniels, Just Health, 47.
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work Daniels does upstream potentially has important implications downstream for the
commons and commons research.136
Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness settles upon two principles of justice: 137 (1)
“Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”138 (2) “Social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the
least advantaged […] and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity."139 The second principle can be conceived as two separate
principles, called the “difference principle” and the “equal opportunity principle”
respectively. Daniels’s adaptation of Rawls’s theory in order to make it applicable to
health care centers upon the second principle. The extension of justice as fairness hinges
on integrating Daniels’s account of health needs, and their relationship to opportunity,
with Rawls’s index of primary social goods. The index of primary social goods is a key
feature of Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. Rawls uses the index to determine “who
is better and who is worse off for purposes of justice.”140 For the integration to be
successful, the concept of opportunity will need to be modified.141

136 Daniels provides a similar apology and justification for taking his readers “[…] deep into

the general theory of justice and beyond our focus on just health care.” (Daniels, Just
Health Care, 36.)
137 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on John Rawls provides a good
introduction to, and overview of, Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. (Leif Wenar, “John
Rawls,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), accessed June 8,
2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls/.)
138 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 266.
139 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 266.
140 Daniels, Just Health, 47.
141 Daniels, Just Health, 47.
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Daniels begins by explaining Rawls’s use of primary social goods, because it
provides the justification for using an objective, truncated scale of well-being. As the
second principle of justice highlights, Rawls is committed to give priority to improving the
lives of those who are worst off. Within his theory, this has two parts: First, the social
contractors choosing principles of justice in the so-called “original position,” behind the
famous “veil of ignorance,” must think about what principles “make their lifetime
prospects acceptable, regardless of their social position.”142 Second, the principles the
contractors pick require them to know who are worst off and how the structure of society
can work in order to make them as well off as possible.143 Both decisions require a basis
for judging inequalities. In A Theory of Justice (1971), and again in later works, Rawls
formulates arguments against using so-called “welfarist accounts of well-being” to judge
inequalities, which figure prominently in utilitarian theory.144 Welfarist accounts are
concerned with experiential states, like the satisfaction of preferences, making them
subjective measures of well-being. Rather than focusing on Rawls’s criticisms of welfarist
accounts, Daniels discusses Rawls’s defense of an objective, nonwelfarist approach.145
Rawls bases his account on “what he takes to be a shared conception of rationality”146
and certain “uncontroversial appeals to psychology and beliefs about human nature.”147
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Daniels, Just Health, 48.
Daniels, Just Health, 48.
144 A well-known argument against welfarist accounts of well-being is the possibility of
“social hijacking” by persons who cultivate expensive tastes, an objection that figures
prominently in Just Health Care (1985). (Daniels, Just Health Care, 35-39.)
145 Daniels, Just Health, 47-48.
146 Daniels, Just Health, 49.
147 Daniels, Just Health, 49.
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The result is an index of primary social goods, which are “things it is rational to want
whatever else one wants.”148 Rawls identifies the following types of primary social goods:
“a set of basic liberties,” “freedom of movement and choice of occupations against a
background of diverse opportunities,” “powers and prerogatives of office,” “income and
wealth,” and “the social bases for self-respect.”149 To simplify matters, Rawls proposes to
use income and wealth as a proxy for the index as a whole.150 The objectivity of the
primary goods and of the index as a whole relies on a relatively uncontroversial account
of rationality that does not depend on controversial preferences and values that shape
persons’ conceptions of the good life.151 In his later work, Rawls strengthens his case for
the index of primary social goods by discussing the role the goods play in rational plans of
life.152 Persons have two basic moral powers: a sense of justice, meaning “they seek terms
of fair cooperation to resolve conflicting claims,”153 and the choice to form and revise
their conception of a good life, meaning they determine their own ends in life.154,155 This
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Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 223.
Daniels, Just Health Care, 43.
150 Daniels, Just Health Care, 43.
151 Daniels, Just Health, 49-50.
152 Daniels, Just Health, 50.
153 Daniels, Just Health, 50.
154 Daniels, Just Health, 50.
155 I find it interesting to assess Rawls’s theoretical claims in light of Ostrom’s empirical
work. (1) While Ostrom emphasizes that humans are not merely rational and selfinterested maximizers, her research heeds against dismissing strategic behavior
altogether. In other words, her work provides support for Rawls’s claim that people seek
fair cooperation to resolve conflicting claims, but simultaneously cautions against being
overly optimistic about people’s inherent sense of justice. (2) Rawls’s emphasis on
people’s power to choose and revise their plans of life conceives of people as free and
equal individuals, which fits with the modern turn to the individual that permeates
(political) philosophy, but also the humanities and social sciences, including economics
(e.g., modeling humans as self-interested, rational maximizers). Commons research
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political conception of persons as free and equal citizens is a shared feature of democratic
culture and provides the basis for construing their needs in terms of an objective index of
primary social goods. Primary goods “are what free and equal persons […] need as
citizens,”156 as they support their capabilities to function as such (i.e., as free and equal
citizens).157,158 To sum up, while Rawls’s justification for using primary social goods
evolves over the years, throughout his work he remains committed to providing an
objective basis to determine who has better and who has worse lifetime prospects. From
the perspective of justice, a welfarist account of well-being is irrelevant.159 It is worth
noting that the stark contrast between a needs-based account and a welfarist account
can be resolved by situating allocation decisions at the institutional meso-level, making
the decisions relative vis-à-vis a particular deliberative community and/or institution. The

emphasizes persons, and their life plans, as embedded in communities, which conceivably
play a role in determining people’s conception of the good life, but also in shaping their
sense of justice. In Rawls’s work, as in other modern and contemporary theories of justice,
there exists a tension between the goal of developing a just society out of rational monads
on the one hand, and the presence of a society of people that is made up out of existing
communities on the other hand. The tension can in part be explained by the dominance
of the rationalist liberal tradition vis-à-vis the pluralist liberal tradition (see 3.4 Pluralism
and the Freedom of Health Care).
156 Daniels cites Rawls’s Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). (John Rawls, Justice as
Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 60.)
157 Daniels, Just Health, 50.
158 Rawls argues that people who hold very different conceptions of the good life
stemming from differences in moral or religious worldviews nonetheless can agree on this
political conception of the good, which can thus serve as the basis for comparing people
for purposes of justice. (Daniels, Just Health, 50-51.) I think Rawls is too optimistic about
the supposed consensus regarding his political conception of the good. He plausibly
underestimates the robustness of certain worldviews and their incommensurability with
modern political philosophy. Rawls happily endorses pluralism, but at the same time fails
to acknowledge and allow for a more radical pluralism, which would undermine his
theory.
159 Daniels, Just Health, 47-48.
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reason Daniels, following Rawls, opts for a needs-based account, and rejects a welfarist
account, is that he wants an independent criterion for determining who is better and
worse off to inform resource allocation decisions.160 This is also the reason Daniels relies
on Boorse’s controversial definition of health as absence as pathology, because it
provides a “scientific”161 and objective basis for his needs-based approach.162 Situating
resource governance decisions at the meso-level, thus making them dependent on a
particular institutional context, can protect Daniels’ account against certain criticisms, for
example, by making Boorse’s definition of health relative to a particular community (e.g.,
reference values for his biostatistical theory of health become context dependent).163 In
fact, situating allocation decisions at the institutional meso-level may provide Daniels
with a path to abandon Boorse’s controversial definition altogether, and instead adopt a
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The choice to reject welfarist accounts is not merely a pragmatic one, particularly for
Rawls. Welfarist accounts are closely tied to utilitarianism, which Rawls sees as his
principal opponent. In the first edition of A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls writes that one
of the work’s main goals is to provide a “workable and systematic moral conception to
oppose” utilitarianism. (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, xvii.)
161 Biologists have rejected Boorse’s view because of the enormous genetic variation
within species and population. Moreover, physiological functions change with the
environment, meaning reference values are context-dependent (e.g., blood cell counts
vary with altitude, metabolic rates change with temperature). (Wim J. van der Steen and
P.J. Thung, Faces of Medicine: A Philosophical Study (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1988), 90.) Lennart Nordenfelt points out that on Boorse’s account infections
cannot be seen as diseases, because they are the normal reaction to pathogens entering
the body. (Lennart Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health: An Action-Theoretic Approach
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987), 30-31.)
162 Boorse’s argument for defining health as “absence of pathology,” meaning a departure
from normal functioning, is considered problematic by many except for some analytic
philosophers and someone like Daniels, who adopts Boorse’s definition because it fits his
overall project. Boorse provides a comprehensive overview of the most important
criticisms of his “biostatistical theory of health,” and a defense thereof, in the lengthy A
Rebuttal on Health (1997) and again in A Second Rebuttal on Health (2014).
163 See footnote 161.
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welfarist account, as some such accounts provide sufficient objectivity to inform decisionmaking at the middle-level.164 Vice versa, and more plausibly, welfarists can adopt
Daniels’s theory of justice for health care. To give a concrete example, Lennart Nordenfelt
defines health as the ability to achieve vital goals, which can be considered relative to
“standard circumstances,” among others, one’s community.165 Nordenfelt’s account can
provide a stable basis for making resource allocation decisions within an institution.
Interestingly, Sridhar Venkatapuram has criticized Nordenfelt precisely for making vital
goals “relative to each community or context.”166 As such, “Nordenfelt's conception of
health faces problems with both socially relative concepts of health and subjectively
defined wellbeing.”167,168 This inspires Venkatapuram to develop his own welfarist
approach based on Nordenfelt’s vital goals account combined with Sen and Martha
Nussbaum’s well-known capabilities approach.169 Venkatapuram’s criticism of Nordenfelt
highlights the tension between the theoretical search for an objective account of health

164

Whether or not Daniels is willing to go this route depends in part on his philosophical
commitment to Rawls, which may lead Daniels to reject welfarist accounts on principle.
165 Nordenfelt defines health as follows: “A is in health if, and only if, A has the ability,
given standard circumstances, to realize his vital goals, i.e. the set of goals which are
necessary and together sufficient for his minimal happiness.” (Emphasis mine.)
(Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health, 97.)
166 Sridhar Venkatapuram, “Health, Vital Goals, and Central Human Capabilities,”
Bioethics 27, no. 5 (June 2013): 272.
167 Venkatapuram, “Health, Vital Goals, and Central Human Capabilities,” 272.
168 In response, Nordenfelt has denied that the contents of vital goals are community- or
context-dependent. (Lennart Nordenfelt, “Standard Circumstances and Vital Goals:
Comments on Venkatapuram's Critique,” Bioethics 27, no. 5 (June 2013): 280.)
Nordenfelt’s response shows his project is close to both Boorse’s in that they both seek
to provide a coherent account of health related concepts within health care and everyday
language.
169 Venkatapuram, “Health, Vital Goals, and Central Human Capabilities.”
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and the institutional practice of making resource allocation decisions. While the former
can inform the latter, the question is whether the sort of objectivity pursued by Boorse
and Venkatapuram-type welfarists is workable,170 or even desirable, when making realworld resource allocation decisions, which inevitably are going to be context-dependent.
Situating the governance of health care resources at the meso-level of health care
institutions allows organizations to operationalize the different approaches to health
(e.g., Boorse, Nordenfelt, Venkatapuram) in order to guide allocation decisions at a level
of analysis where the tensions between the approaches dissipates, and they will plausibly
result in the same resource allocation decisions being made in practice. To have Ostrom
weigh in on the issue, the desire to have one objective account of health guide resource
allocation decisions across the board is a worthwhile pursuit, but the bioethical
equivalent of blueprint thinking (see 2.2 The Ostrom Approach). Of course, this does not
mean the objective accounts are meaningless or negligible. On the contrary, the original,
non-institutional approaches with their strong claims of objectivity remain important at a
higher-level of analysis. Not only can they inform context-dependent, meso-level
decision-making; but they can also conceivably play a role in upstream conflict-resolution
mechanisms (see 2.2.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms). I briefly discussed a key issue in
Daniels’s theory of justice for health care and suggested that making resource allocation
decisions at the meso-level of health care institutions may be able to solve the problem.
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Given Nordenfelt’s denial that vital goals are context-dependent, his approach also
belongs with the Venkatapuram-type welfarist approaches.
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A more thorough discussion, which must draw on a large body of background literature,
is a promising avenue for future research.
Before integrating his account of health needs with Rawls’s primary social goods,
Daniels elaborates on Rawls’s concept of opportunity and his justification of the equal
opportunity principle. “The concept of equal opportunity is meant to ensure that the
terms of competition are fair,”171 that society overall attains procedural justice, which
assures outcomes are fair, even if they are unequal.172 As such, equality of opportunity
functions as a constraint on procedural justice. “If the basic structure of society works to
the advantage of all and in a way that is open to all, then the distributions of goods and
the resulting life prospects for individuals will be the outcome of a fair process.”173 Rawls’s
goal is for the “basic structure of society”174 to work to everyone’s advantage and be open
to everyone. Daniels emphasizes the importance of seeing that Rawls invokes equal
opportunity within a procedural rather than an allocative account of justice. The
principles of justice as fairness apply to society’s basic structure, “constraining its design
and how it works as a process that distributes goods independently of needs.” 175 It is
worth noting that Rawls is keenly aware that his development of a theory of justice is
simultaneously an exercise in institutional design (see 4.7 Conclusion).176 Throughout A
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Daniels, Just Health, 51.
Daniels, Just Health, 51.
173 Daniels, Just Health, 51.
174 Daniels, Just Health, 51.
175 Daniels, Just Health, 51.
176 Rawls uses a nontrivial and narrowly defined notion of institution: “Now by an
institution I shall understand a public system of rules which defines offices and positions
with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify
certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain
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Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls talks about designing “institutions,”177 “rules,”178 “social
arrangements,”179 “systems,”180 “social systems,”181 and “organizations.”182,183 Daniels
stresses the relationship between Rawls’s theory of justice and institutions more heavily
in Just Health Care (1985) than in Just Health (2008), which fits with the overall deemphasis of institutions in the later work (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). Rawls
calls for fair rather than formal equality of opportunity, the former requiring stronger
measures to mitigate the impact of inequalities than the latter.184 He combines the fair
equality of opportunity principle with the difference principle and names the combination
“democratic equality,” as it ensures access to jobs and offices is open to all and allowable
differences between citizens work to everyone’s advantage.185 Rawls argues fair equality
of opportunity and the difference principle together correct for the moral arbitrariness of

penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur. As examples of institutions, or
more generally social practices, we may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments,
markets and systems of property. An institution may be thought of in two ways: first as
an abstract object, that is, as a possible form of conduct expressed by a system of rules;
and second, as the realization in the thought and conduct of certain persons at a certain
time and place of the actions specified by these rules.” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 47-48.)
Rawls discusses institutions and their relationship to justice in detail. (Ibid., 47-52.)
177 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 77, 188, 229, 377.
178 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 49, 75, 314.
179 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 49.
180 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 149.
181 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 74, 243, 247.
182 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 53.
183 In addition, Rawls talks about designing the “basic structure of society,” “societies,”
“social order,” “legal order,” “policies,” “laws,” and “a system for the constitutional
powers of government and the basic rights of citizens.” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 28, 32,
49, 56, 89, 131, 146-147, 155, 157, 172, 258, 327.)
184 Daniels, Just Health, 52.
185 Daniels, Just Health, 53.
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social contingencies (“social lottery”186), such as birth in one family rather than
another.187 Moreover, there is a “natural lottery” for talents and skills, like diligence and
determination, which shapes people’s prospects in life that must also be mitigated, at
least in part.188,189 Even with mitigation, the winners of the social and natural lottery are
likely going to be among the best off, while the losers are likely going to be among the
worst off.190 Nevertheless, the combined force of the equality of opportunity and
difference principles produces a strong “tendency to equality.”191,192 Of course, the
question remains whether Rawls’s arguments carry over to the protection of normal
functioning, i.e., to health and health care?193
As a reminder, Rawls relies on an objective index of primary social goods to
determine who is better and who is worse off for the purposes of justice, but he assumes
people are fully functional over a normal lifespan, thus ignoring variations in health
between people.194,195 How can Daniels’s health (care) needs be integrated with Rawls’s
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Daniels, Just Health, 53.
Daniels, Just Health, 53-54.
188 Daniels, Just Health, 53-55.
189 Rawls’s difference principle treats the distribution of talents and skills as a common
asset, meaning “the benefits people gain from exercising their talents are determined by
rules that distribution of talents work to everyone’s advantage, with priority to those who
are worst off.” (Daniels, Just Health, 54.) In other words, he seems to treat human capital
broadly conceived as a common-pool resource.
190 Daniels, Just Health, 54.
191 Daniels, Just Health, 55.
192 Daniels cites Rawls’s section titled “The Tendency to Equality.” (Rawls, A Theory of
Justice, 86-93.)
193 Daniels, Just Health, 56.
194 Daniels, Just Health, 56.
195 Both Arrow and Sen point out the index is problematic in light of real-world variations
in health status. (Daniels, Just Health, 56.)
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index of primary social goods? One possibility is to add an entry, i.e., health (care), to the
index. However, such a strategy risks generating a long list of primary goods, thus
weakening the shared political conception of the needs of citizens.196 Moreover, adding
items to the index makes it difficult to avoid the problems of interpersonal comparison
faced by broader measures of satisfaction, i.e., welfarist accounts, which is precisely what
Rawls wants to avoid.197 Daniels suggests a more plausible and altogether simpler
approach to integrate health needs with the index of primary social goods, namely
broadening the notion of fair equality of opportunity. Since meeting health (care) needs
has an important impact on the distribution of opportunity, health care institutions
should be governed by “a fair equality of opportunity principle.”198 The proposal ensures
the primary social goods remain general and abstract properties of social arrangements
(e.g., liberties, opportunities, income and wealth). The special importance of health (care)
needs stems from their role in providing equal opportunity, which is the relevant primary
social good. Rawls’s argument to guarantee equality of opportunity in light of the social
and natural lotteries also applies to health:199 the impact of the morally arbitrary “health
lottery” on opportunity ought to be mitigated.200 Therefore, resources must be used to
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Daniels, Just Health, 56.
Daniels, Just Health, 56-57.
198 Daniels, Just Health, 57.
199 Daniels, Just Health, 58.
200 Daniels does not use the term “health lottery,” but the idea fits with his overarching
argument. The health lottery is part social, part natural (e.g. genetic), and part a game of
chance of its own (e.g., the role luck plays in getting cancer or into a car accident). While
Daniels does not explicitly discuss the latter, he briefly touches upon the interplay
between pathology and the social and natural lotteries. (Daniels, Just Health, 58.)
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meet health (care) needs and counter the disadvantages induced by pathology. 201 As
Daniels notes, the expansion of the scope of fair equality of opportunity to include health
does not imply a commitment to eliminating all health differences between persons.
“Meeting health needs has the goal of promoting normal functioning: It concentrates on
a specific class of obvious disadvantages and tries to eliminate them.”202 In other words,
it is not necessary to correct all differences in functioning between people, but only to
keep people functioning normally and ensure them the range of opportunity they would
have in the absence of pathology.203 Daniels goes on to consider several objections
against broadening the notion of opportunity, but they need not be of concern here.204
Daniels shows several key features of justice as fairness are preserved when the
theory is extended to health: (1) Daniels’s extension of justice as fairness to health (care)
elicits an interesting parallel to education, as both are critically important to ensuring fair
equality of opportunity.205 This suggests that Rawls’s argument for public education as a
means to ensure fair equality of opportunity can be broadened to include health (care),206
as the justification for the former extends to the latter, thus preserving “a central line of
argument in justice as fairness.”207 (2) Daniels identifies health needs at a level of
abstraction that fits with Rawls’s theory. The theory of justice as fairness is grounded on
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an account of persons as “essentially free and equal”208 moral agents, the underlying
intuition being that persons are free to revise their life plans. Thus, persons have a vital
interest in maintaining conditions that allow them to revise their plans over the course of
their lives, which means health care should focus on maintaining normal functioning to
allow for such revisions. Daniels concludes, “Protecting fair share of the normal
opportunity range is the reference point compatible with Rawls’s view of persons as free
and equal citizens.”209 (3) Integrating health needs in Rawls’s account of fair equality of
opportunity fits with the original idealization grounding Rawls’s theory, i.e., the concern
with persons “who are fully functional over a normal lifespan.”210 One can conceive of
health policies and institutions as correcting for departures from Rawls’s idealized, fully
functioning persons.211
While Rawls’s early work does not take into consideration health problems, he
later endorses the approach advocated by Daniels.212 Rawls writes,

Provision for medical care, as with primary goods generally, is to meet the needs
and requirements of citizens as free and equal. Such care falls under the general
means necessary to underwrite fair equality of opportunity and our capacity to
take advantage of our basic rights and liberties, and thus to be normal and fully
cooperating members of society over a complete life.213,214
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What does Daniels’s normative argument mean for a theory of justice for the
commons? I do not want to repeat the descriptive suggestions about the special moral
importance of certain commons (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the Special Moral Importance of
Health Care). However, the key move of Daniels’s argument can likely be replicated in the
case of the commons and can be considered a defining feature of common-pool
resources, regardless whether they are natural or artificial. Daniels broadens the notion
of fair equality of opportunity to encompass health care, arguing that meeting health
needs has an important impact on the distribution of opportunity, therefore resources
must be used to counter the disadvantages induced by pathology, which results from the
social, natural, and health lotteries. In the same way, many commons resources impact
the distribution of opportunity, which is the relevant primary social good in Rawls’s
theory. Moreover, the distribution of these resources is often the result of morally
arbitrary natural and social lotteries. Two classic examples being farmers who are lucky
to be upstream in the irrigation system, thus having an abundance of water, and anglers
who are fortunate to fish the richest fishing grounds, thus having an abundance of fish.215
Both examples plausibly fit with Daniels’s health needs, as these communities depend on
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The examples are interesting, because real-world commons institutions designed to
govern such resources often are concerned with ensuring access to the resource to all
members of the commons, thus displaying a concern with justice (and ensuring equality
of opportunity). This concern is reflected in the design of the institutions, which have rules
to mitigate the unfair distribution of resources, among others, an obligation for irrigators
upstream to first let water flow downstream and strictly enforced rotation systems for
fishing grounds (see also 2.4 A Common Scenario). (Elinor Ostrom, Understanding
Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 303.) While the
commons literature discusses these arrangements extensively, they are not considered in
terms of justice.
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water and fish for adequate nutrition (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the Special Moral
Importance of Health Care).
4.4 A4R IN PRACTICE
The argument now changes pace, moving from Daniels’s general theory of justice for the
commons to the accountability for reasonableness (A4R) approach, which he develops in
collaboration with Sabin. I investigate the relationship between Daniels and Sabin’s four
principles of A4R and Ostrom’s eight design principles of successful commons institutions,
suggesting Ostrom’s principles can provide guidance when putting A4R into practice, i.e.,
when designing just health care institutions. While Ostrom’s design principles are based
on the research of commons institutions, they can be adopted by other institutional
arrangements (i.e., state, market, and hybrid institutions). The proposed fit between A4R
and the design principles makes it especially attractive for institutional designers to do so
when moving toward more just health care institutions. After introducing the A4R
approach, I discuss some preliminaries, then explore the congruence between A4R and
Ostrom’s design principles, and finally discuss the principles from A4R in tandem with the
design principles for successful commons.
4.4.1 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR REASONABLENESS (A4R)
While Daniels’s theory or justice for health care provides some “general guidance in the
design of systems that meet health needs,”216 it does not explain how to meet health
(care) needs fairly when they cannot all be met.217 The theory of justice operates at the
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theoretical macro-level, making it “too general and too indeterminate”218 to be of much
practical use when making decisions about the fair governance of health care resources.
Daniels points out the issue of the fair allocation of health care resources cannot be
avoided, as it arises in all health care systems.219 This then leads him to ask: “Under what
conditions do decision-makers have the moral authority to set the limits they impose?”220
To solve the so-called “legitimacy problem,”221 the theory of justice for health care, and
its general principles of justice, must be supplemented with a fair process to setting limits
in such a way that decision makers are held “accountable for the reasonableness of the
limits they set”222 (see also 4.5.6 Solving the Legitimacy Problem). Daniels notes the fair
process must be general enough to apply to different institutional arrangements and
contexts,223 while the details must be worked out on a case-by-case basis.224 A remark I
return to when discussing the fit between Daniels and Sabin’s approach on the one hand
and Ostrom’s research on the other hand (see 4.4.3 Daniels and Ostrom: A Natural Fit?).
Daniels and Sabin summarize their account as follows,

Accountability for reasonableness is the idea that the reasons or rationales for
important limit-setting decisions should be publicly available. In addition, these
reasons must be ones that “fair-minded” people can agree are relevant to
pursuing appropriate patient care under necessary resource constraints.225
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Within the scope of Daniels’s discussion of a theory of justice for health care in Just Health
Care (1985), Daniels and Sabin’s approach raises the following question: Given the special
moral importance of health care, why should limits be imposed to begin with?226 Daniels
and Sabin discuss four reasons to set limits: (1) “health care competes with other
goods,”227 (2) “the limits to resources are real,”228 (3) the existence of inefficiencies does
not remove the need to set limits,229 and (4) the need to set limits does not disappear by
pointing out the presence of profits in health care.230,231 The discussion of the tragedy of
the health care commons complements Daniels and Sabin’s reasons for the need to set
limits (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons).232 Vice versa, Daniels and Sabin’s
reasons to set limits are applicable to many commons.233 Since setting limits is
unavoidable, decisions have to be made about the allocation of resources. These
decisions have two features in commons, “they all rest on value judgments about which
reasonable people may disagree”234 and the ensuing controversies cannot be resolved by
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231 Daniels summarizes these arguments in Just Health (2008). (Daniels, Just Health, 104105.)
232 The tragedy of the health care commons can be conceived as a more intricate take on
Daniels and Sabin’s second reason for setting limits, i.e. that resource limits are real (see
4.4.3 Daniels and Ostrom: A Natural Fit?).
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boundaries.” (Bill Moyers, “Willard Gaylin: Ethics, Biology and Economics,” September 20,
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general principles of justice, like the opportunity principle (see 4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the
Special Moral Importance of Health Care).235 As there is no consensus on principles to
resolve resource allocation problems in health care, a fair process must be found that
leads to outcomes that are accepted as just or fair.236 This appeal to procedural justice
supplements Rawls’s opportunity principle, addressing disputes about the governance of
health care resources that are not resolved by the more general principle.237 Daniels and
Sabin’s account of procedural justice (A4R) relies on four conditions to ensure fair
process: (1) the “publicity condition,”238 (2) the “relevance condition,”239 (3) the “revisions
and appeals condition,”240 and (4) the “regulative condition.”241 Before discussing the
conditions in detail, and relating them to Ostrom’s design principles, I consider some
preliminaries and explore some reasons A4R and Ostrom’s research are a good fit.
4.4.2 A4R AS DESIGN PRINCIPLES
I have already mentioned the four conditions of A4R can be conceived as institutional
design principles (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). I argue this point in some more
detail by exploring four preliminaries: the interpretation of the four conditions of A4R as
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design principles, the relative status of the four conditions of A4R vis-à-vis the other
design principles, the relationship between A4R and Daniels’s theory of justice for health
care, and the possibility of using A4R as principles for the design of procedurally just
commons institutions.
First, while Daniels and Sabin discuss the four conditions of A4R in detail, they do
relatively little in terms of explaining their status qua conditions, i.e., what does it mean
for them to be “four conditions [to] make more precise the notion of accountability for
reasonableness?”242,243 Daniels and Sabin present the conditions as “the central
necessary elements”244 to solve the legitimacy and fairness problems by placing health
care organizations in the role of “contributors to a broader deliberative process that they
embrace.”245 While the explanation clarifies the role the conditions play in ensuring
procedural justice, it does not explain how the conditions operate, or are to be
operationalized. I argue the conditions must be interpreted as institutional design
principles for promoting procedural justice. Such an interpretation is plausible not only
from the perspective of NIE, but also appears justified based on Daniels and Sabin’s work.
As a reminder, Ostrom characterizes the design principles as “an essential element or
condition that helps account for the success of [enduring, self-governing] institutions in
sustaining CPRs.”246 (Emphasis mine.) In addition, she describes the design principles as
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“a set of general principles that increase the performance of an institutional design”247
(see 2.6 The Design Principles for Successful Commons Institutions). Much in the same
way, the conditions of A4R can be thought of as features of just health care institutions
and recommendations for their design, particularly when it comes to resource allocation
decisions.248 Such an interpretation seems justified on the basis of Daniels and Sabin’s
work for several reasons: (1) They state the goal of Setting Limits Fairly (2002) is “to show
in a practical way how institutions can be shaped to make them more accountable for
reasonableness,”249 describing their project as an exercise in institutional design. In Just
Health (2008), Daniels explicitly links the conditions to institutions again, albeit without
explicitly referencing institutional design. He writes,
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Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” in The Commons
in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptation, eds. Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 22.
248 The argument disregards some of the conceptual unknowns surrounding design
principles (e.g., the fact they were conceived as descriptive conditions rather than
normative design principles), which I discuss in more detail in the second chapter (see 2.6
The Design Principles for Successful Commons Institutions). Much like Ostrom’s design
principles, which she calls “conditions,” Daniels and Sabin’s four conditions seem to be
primarily descriptive in nature, as they go on to describe how the conditions are
instantiated in a host of examples. Still, there are strong normative overtones, i.e.,
implementing the conditions results in just organizations. As with Ostrom’s design
principles, A4R’s conditions have been interpreted and used as concrete
recommendations for designing just health care organizations. To give an example,
Mohammed Moosa and his colleagues have used A4R to improve fairness in accessing
dialysis in South Africa. (Mohammed Rafique Moosa, Jonathan David Maree, Maxwell T.
Chirehwa, and Solomon R. Benatar, “Use of the ‘Accountability for Reasonableness’
Approach to Improve Fairness in Accessing Dialysis in a Middle-Income Country,” PLoS
ONE 11, no. 12 (October 2016), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0164201.) A more
thorough analysis of the analogy between Ostrom’s design principles and the conditions
of A4R is a promising avenue for future research.
249 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 11.
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Taken altogether, the four conditions bring decision making about meeting health
needs out of a mysterious black bog […] and make it possible to assess health plan
and public agency decisions in the light of wider societal view about fairness. The
four conditions connect decisions at any institutional level to a broader educative
and deliberative democratic process.250 (Emphasis mine.)

Moreover, Daniels and Sabin’s framing of the conditions as a solution to the legitimacy
and fairness problems makes it plausible to interpret them as design principles, as the
conditions suggest rule changes with the aim of achieving better outcomes (i.e., more just
health care organizations).251 (2) Describing the four conditions in terms of rules may
seem like a cheap trick to move A4R closer to NIE, but in an interesting passage in Setting
Limits Fairly (2002) immediately following the definition of the A4R approach, Daniels and
Sabin compare the delivery of health care to a game with rules, like football, an analogy
that is commonly used in NIE to describe institutions.252,253 The passage brings Daniels and
Sabin’s work uncannily close to NIE, certainly when considered in combination with
Daniels’s remarks from Just Health Care (1985), but nowhere are A4R’s conditions framed
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251 Daniels also describes the conditions as connecting internal decisions to broader public

deliberation. (Daniels, Just Health, 119.)
252 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 44.
253 The full passage reads, “In the “game” of delivering health care, whether in public or
private insurance schemes, fair-minded people will seek reasons (“rules”) they can accept
as relevant to meeting consumers’ or citizens’ needs fairly under resource constraints. As
in football, the rules shape a conception of the common good that is the goal of
cooperation within plans, even when plans compete. In health care delivery, as in football,
some will seek mere advantage by ignoring the rules, or by seeking rules that advantage
only them, and there will be disagreement about how to apply the rules. Still, the fairminded search for mutually acceptable rules narrows the scope of disagreement and
provides the grounds on which disputes can be adjudicated.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting
Limits Fairly, 44-45.) A few sentences earlier, they talk about the choice fair-minded
people have to either accept or change the rules of the game. (Ibid., 44.)
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in terms of institutional design (see also 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). (3) While the
conditions are not presented as institutional design principles, much of the remainder of
both Setting Limits Fairly (2002) and Just Health (2008) reads like the field studies
discussing Ostrom’s design principles in commons research, as Daniels and Sabin cite a
host of cases that illustrate how the four conditions function. In other words, they discuss
how the conditions of A4R are implemented in concrete health (care) organizations, as
such they resemble the design principles in that they are general conditions and/or
recommendations for setting limits fairly.
Second, while I treat the design principles and the conditions of A4R as
conceptually equivalent, there are questions about their relationship, particularly their
relative status. (1) The conditions can straightforwardly be conceived as four additional
design principles addressing issues of justice in institutional design. As such, they are on
par with the design principles and must simply be integrated with them. (2) Because of
their focus on ensuring fair process, the conditions of A4R must be understood as higherlevel design principles that govern the implementation of the other design principles (i.e.,
the institutional design process as a whole). As such, the four conditions of A4R operate
at the collective-choice or constitutional level (see 0.5.3 Rules). There is an additional
reason to designate the conditions of A4R as higher-level design principles, as a concern
for (procedural) justice may enjoy the primacy over other criteria when evaluating
institutional performance and designing institutions (e.g., on the assumption there is a
tradeoff between the institutional performance criteria (see 0.3 A Third Way: The
Commons), designers are only willing to sacrifice so much equitability in striving for
350

increased efficiency and effectiveness). (3) There is the possibility that the first three
conditions (i.e., publicity condition, relevance conditions, and revisions and appeals
condition) must be situated at the operational or collective-choice level, while the fourth
condition (i.e., regulative condition) operates at the collective-choice or constitutional
level respectively (see also 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition). (4) The conditions of A4R
are higher-level design principles, but they do not neatly fit within the distinction between
operational, collective-choice, and constitutional rules (see 0.5.3 Rules). They are metalevel principles for the design of design principles. (5) The relationship between the design
principles and the conditions is dynamic and dependent on the context. To give an
example, the conditions can operate alongside the other design principles when
implemented at the operational level, but can also function at a higher level when
institutional changes are made. So which one of the five interpretations is the most
plausible? Given the characterization of the revised A4R approach as split between the
macro- and meso-level (see 4.2.2 A Meso-Level Approach), the former anchoring the
approach theoretically and the latter implementing the approach in practice, the
conditions must likely be interpreted along the lines of (2), (4), or (5).
Third, the preceding discussions of Daniels’s theory of justice for health care and
A4R raise the following question: to what extent does the A4R approach depend on the
theory of justice for health care? Answering the question is important, because if the
former does not heavily depend on the latter, then A4R can function as a standalone
approach to promote fair process in institutions, which greatly increases its applicability.
Among others, commons institutions can then use A4R as an approach to implement
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procedural justice. In Setting Limits Fairly (1985), as well as Just Health (2008), A4R is
presented as flowing from Daniels’s theory of justice for health care, but neither work
claims any strong dependence of A4R on the theory of justice.254,255 Moreover, both works
go on to discuss A4R with hardly any reference to the theory of justice for health care. In
Setting Limits Fairly (2002), for example, the theory of justice for health care and fair
equality of opportunity, the theory’s key feature, are not mentioned once after their
initial discussion.256 The same division appears to exist in the extensive literature
commenting and building on Daniels and Sabin’s work, which for most part engages with
either the theory of justice or the A4R approach, treating the latter as independent from
the former. While this is hardly a satisfactory discussion of the relationship between
Daniels’s two most influential intellectual achievements,257 it at least supports the
possibility of treating A4R as a standalone approach to procedural justice, as A4R does
not depend on the theory of justice, even though it certainly is inspired by it. 258
Finally, I return to the suggestion that Daniels’s work may be able to provide a
theory of justice for the commons (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for the Commons?). If
A4R can indeed operate independently from the theory of justice for health care, then
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the approach may offer a straightforward account of fair process that can be adopted by
commons institutions, without committing to any particular theory of justice. There are
several virtues to such a strategy: (1) While Ostrom lists equity as one of the criteria to
evaluate institutional performance, she does not elucidate on the criterion (see 0.3 A
Third Way: The Commons). A4R as an account of procedural justice can provide content
to Ostrom’s criterion of fairness, both to evaluate institutional performance and to guide
institutional design. (2) A4R as an account of procedural justice seems to be a particularly
good fit for cooperative governance regimes (see 4.4.3 Daniels and Ostrom: A Natural
Fit?). (3) The four conditions of A4R can be added to Ostrom’s design principles for
successful commons institutions as recommendations for developing fair institutions.
Ostrom is open to new additions to the design principles. The addition of design principles
aimed at developing more just institutions would be an important contribution to
commons research. (4) Daniels and Sabin’s four conditions show that some of Ostrom’s
design principles already address issues of procedural justice, even though they are not
discussed in terms of fairness in the literature, and thus may not have been consciously
developed as improving equitability. The most straightforward example is Ostrom’s sixth
design principle, which suggests the need for conflict-resolution mechanisms, and is
similar to the revisions and appeals condition of A4R (see 4.4.4.3 Revisions and Appeals
Condition). (5) The suggestion that the sixth design principle addresses fairness raises a
different question altogether: how do the design principles relate to the criteria for
institutional performance (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons)? While Dolšak and Ostrom
describe the principles as “general principles that increase the performance of an
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institutional design,”259 commons research does not detail the relationship between the
criteria for institutional performance and the design principles (i.e., the implementation
of which design principles leads to an improvement in what criteria for institutional
performance?). (6) Finally, under the assumption that A4R must be grounded in some
theory of justice, the adoption of the approach by commons research once again draws
attention on the need for a theory of justice for the commons (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of
Justice for the Commons?), or maybe theories of justice for the commons.
4.4.3 DANIELS AND OSTROM: A NATURAL FIT?
The fact that the four conditions of A4R can plausibly be interpreted as design principles
is not the only congruence between the work of Daniels and Ostrom. I briefly highlight a
few other points of agreement between their research projects. In a later section, I briefly
discuss several other ways in which Ostrom’s work can contribute to Daniels and Sabin’s
approach to procedural justice (see 4.5 The Further Institutionalization of A4R).
The primary concern of both commons research and A4R is the governance of
resources. While the former emphasizes the sustainable management of resources, the
latter focuses on the just allocation of resources, but by now it should be clear those
concerns are inextricably linked. Moreover, Ostrom highlights the need for the equitable
governance of resources and Daniels is concerned about sustainability.260 The concern for
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resource management runs deeper, however, as Daniels and Sabin underline the fact that
“many publicly financed health care systems operate under global budgets,” 261 resulting
in tradeoffs between health care expenditures and other public spending (see 1.2 A
Tragedy of the Health Care Commons?).262,263 In other words, they recognize that many
health care resources are CPRs, even if they do not use the term.264 Of course, whether
or not particular health care resources are CRS remains dependent on the context or level
of analysis.
A second commonality is Daniels and Sabin’s focus on institutions, which I discuss
in detail above (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). While Daniels’s use of the concept
is up for debate, the underlying focus on health care institutions in his work is undeniable,
especially in Just Health Care (1985). Interpreting the conditions of A4R as institutional
design principles (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles), which is how the conditions are
used by Daniels (and Sabin) in practice, further strengthens the case for a shared
institutional approach to solving resource governance issues.
Third, Daniels and Sabin frame their approach in terms of cooperation. After
summarizing the A4R approach (see 4.4.1 Accountability for Reasonableness), they go on

sustainable management of health care resources is in his discussion of the sustainability
of institutions and the competition for resources in the context of aging and
intergenerational equity. (Ibid., 166-168.) See also 4.5.4 Institutional Sustainability.
261 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 19.
262 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 19.
263 They also talk about “shared resources from cooperative schemes […] as in public or
private insurance.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 67.)
264 However, Daniels and Sabin do describe copays as “incentives to conserve collective
resources.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 114.) As such, copays are rules to
regulate the behavior of resource users.
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to characterize “‘fair-minded’ people” as persons “who in principle seek to cooperate
with others on terms they can justify to each other,”265 whether they accept the rules of
the game or seek to change them.266 The description is reminiscent of Ostrom’s project
in general and of her description of human beings as conditional cooperators in particular
(see also 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons). Ostrom would be sympathetic to Daniels and
Sabin’s characterization of humans as fair-minded collaborators.267 Daniels and Sabin
stress the importance of cooperation again in their discussion of managing access to
pharmaceuticals.268 In this context, they characterize A4R as taking “the perspective of
the covered population and all stakeholders in cooperative schemes intended to improve
population health fairly within reasonable resource limits.”269 They also talk about the
importance of open deliberation about the fair terms of cooperation in addressing
tensions surrounding copays between employers offering health plans and their
employees.270 While Daniels and Sabin frame their approach in terms of cooperation, they
are skeptical, or unaware, of the possibility to solve resource governance issues at the
meso-level and believe that in the end the state will have to step in to compel
stakeholders to cooperate (see 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition). Commons research
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provides an alternate path to a cooperative solution to manage health care resources
through emergent collaboration at the middle level, further developing the role of
cooperation in Daniels and Sabin’s work.
Fourth, Daniels’s remark that fair process must be general enough to apply to
different institutional arrangements and contexts, while the details need to be worked
out on a case-by-case basis (see 4.4.1 Accountability for Reasonableness),271 fits with
Ostrom’s emphasis on the use of general frameworks that can be adapted to particular
contexts based on local knowledge (see 2.2 The Ostrom Approach).272 From a theoretical
perspective, Daniels’s casual remark on these features of A4R find support in Ostrom’s
research, while Daniels and Sabin’s arguments in favor of deliberative procedures to
resolve resource allocation problems provide additional reasons to be wary of the
uniform application of abstract models to resource governance issues.
Finally, both A4R and commons institutions are positioned vis-à-vis the market as
alternative mechanisms for managing resources. While Ostrom situates her work in
relation to the market-state dichotomy (see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy),
Daniels and Sabin contrast their approach with market accountability.273,274 Without
dismissing the market altogether, both bodies of research originate from a dissatisfaction
with an overreliance on the market and the market failures resulting from it. While a
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273 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 28-30, 44.
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detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this project, there are promising ways in which
these literatures can inform each other. To give an example, Ostrom warns that exclusive
reliance on rational, self-interested actors meeting in the marketplace can undermine
cooperation and result in a tragedy of the commons, an argument that also applies to
health care, and thus pertains to setting limits fairly (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care
Commons). Similarly, Daniels’s argument showing there is a strong moral obligation to
meet medical needs, which is absent when meeting other preferences,275 supports taking
a procedural rather than a market approach to the governance of certain commons that
may be of special moral importance (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the Special Moral
Importance of Health Care).
4.4.4 THE FOUR CONDITIONS
I now discuss the four conditions of A4R (i.e., the publicity condition, the relevance
condition, the revisions and appeals condition, and the regulative condition) in relation
to Ostrom’s design principles for successful commons institutions. While I initially
envisioned a discussion of the ways in which commons research can inform the
implementation of A4R, it quickly became clear the conditions of A4R also suggest
important additions to and revisions of the design principles, similar to how the theory of
justice for health care can plausibly inform a theory of justice for the commons. However,
where the theory of justice for health care is located at the theoretical macro-level,
making it difficult to draw conclusions for the commons without doing considerable work,
the conditions of A4R qua design principles must be situated at the theoretical meso-
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Daniels, Just Health, 111.
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level. Together with the fact they can function independently from the theory of justice
for health care, this makes for a much more straightforward dialogue with commons
research and the design principles.
4.4.4.1 THE PUBLICITY CONDITION276
Daniels and Sabin characterize the first condition as follows,

The publicity condition requires that rationales for decisions such as coverage for
new technologies or the contents of a drug formulary be publicly accessible to
clinicians, patients, and would-be subscribers – or citizens in a publicly
administered system.277,278

In short, “decisions regarding both direct and indirect limits to care and their rationales
must be publicly accessible.”279 They give the example of a health plan placing coverage
restrictions on growth hormone treatments for children, disseminating their decision to
clinicians by means of a letter from the medical director, but without providing a rationale
for restricting coverage to certain categories of patients. This course of action may give
the impression the decision is taken lightly, but this is not the case. The committee
charged with taking the coverage decision deliberated carefully on the matter, relying on
literature reviews and expert opinions to come to their conclusion. So why not make their
reasoning public?280 As Daniels and Sabin note,
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I rely on Daniels and Sabin’s discussion from Setting Limits Fairly (2002), which Daniels
almost integrally repeats in Just Health (2008). (Daniels, Just Health, 119-123.)
277 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 46.
278 The first condition leaves open the level of analysis at which rationales for decisions
must be made publicly accessible, which for certain decisions may only have to happen
locally.
279 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45.
280 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 46-47.
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[B]eing explicit about the underlying reasoning is a chance to demonstrate the
coherence and consistency of an overall policy toward coverage. It is a chance to
demonstrate that there is a commitment to an even-handed appeal to reasons
and principles, so that relevant similarities and differences in particular cases are
attended to.281

In the case of growth hormone therapy, it provides the parents of a child of short stature
who want the treatment but whose child does not fit the criteria with reasons for denying
the treatment.282 Moreover, disseminating the rationale behind the decision provides
clinicians with a readily available resource to discuss the coverage decision with the
parents of young patients. In general, and employing the language of NIE, publicizing the
rationale behind resource governance decisions provides resource users with reasons for
the decision and the ensuing resource allocation rule(s). What counts as good reasons is
the subject of the second condition (see 4.4.4.4 The Relevance Condition).
Daniels and Sabin go on to draw an interesting analogy between making reasons
for coverage decisions public and case law. Over time, they argue, publicizing coverage
decisions will (1) lead “to more efficient, coherent, and fairer decisions”283,284 within
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 47.
Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 47.
283 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 47.
284 Daniels and Sabin do not seem to distinguish between effectiveness (i.e., producing
the desired outcome) and efficiency (i.e., producing the outcome with the least waste in
resources, say, time and money). While discussing efficiency, they point out that case law
“improves the quality of decision making,” an improvement in effectiveness, while also
pointing out an increase in the ease and speed of making decisions (e.g. possibility to
develop checklists), an improvement in efficiency. Thus, both efficiency and effectiveness
belong on this list, which leads to considerable overlap between Daniels and Sabin’s
perceived benefits of publicity (i.e., efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, fairness) and
Ostrom’s criteria to evaluate institutional performance (i.e. efficiency, effectiveness,
fairness, sustainability or robustness). I later argue Ostrom’s emphasis on sustainability is
of interest to Daniels and Sabin (see 4.5.4 Institutional Sustainability). Inversely, Ostrom
282
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institutions committed to the publicity condition and (2) “strengthen broader public
deliberation and contribute to the perceived legitimacy of decision makers.”285 Daniels
and Sabin discuss both points in some detail. (1) Establishing a publicly available body of
resource allocation decisions will plausibly lead to more coherent, and thus fairer,
outcomes as the same reason-based deliberation can be applied to similar cases (i.e., if a
rationale is given to make a certain decision in one case, then it sets a precedent for
subsequent cases).286 Of course, sometimes a subsequent case should not be treated in
the same way, either because it differs “in relevant and important ways” 287 from the
precedent(s) or because the rationale given in the earlier case(s) needs revision.288 The
publicity condition leads to more efficient and effective decision making,289 among
others, because the need to formulate explicit reasons makes for more focused decisionmaking deliberations and the sequence of cases may allow for the development of “a
checklist of key features of coverage decisions.”290,291 Finally, fairer decisions ensue from

likely values coherence in the rules and their outcomes, an interesting point I do not argue
further here.
285 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 47.
286 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 48.
287 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 48.
288 Daniels and Sabin call the need to revise the rationale a “much more disruptive
rebuttal” of the presumption that subsequent cases should be treated similar to earlier
ones. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 48.) Commons research provides a new
way to think about and support their assessment, as a revision of the rationale (i.e., a rule
change) requires a move from the operational level to the collective-choice level. In
contrast, arguing that a new case differs from the precedent(s) should be possible entirely
at the operational level, given rules to do so are in place.
289 See footnote 284.
290 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 48.
291 Daniels and Sabin do relatively little in terms of exploring the relationships between
the four conditions (see also 4.5.2 Institutional Interactions). To give an example, the
increase in fairness that presumably follows from the publicity condition will likely lead to
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a case law approach as publicity promotes the “consistent treatment of similar cases”292
(i.e., more coherence) and the process of specifying reasons in relation to cases promotes
their thoughtful evaluation.293 If the publicity condition leads to fairer decisions, then over
time people will better understand the moral commitments of the institutions making
them.294 Daniels and Sabin write,

If an institution is committed to arriving at fair decisions in a publicly accountable
way, we can expect that people will come to recognize this commitment and will
see the institution as acting (more) fairly.295

(2) Apart from benefits internal to the institutions committed to the publicity condition,
Daniels and Sabin hypothesize there is an external benefit to publicizing the rationale
behind resource allocation decisions. Providing stakeholders with the opportunity to
understand how and why limits are being set offers them the chance to participate in a
“fundamental piece of social governance – the allocation and rationing of services so
important for a fundamental human good.”296,297 As such,

Transparency has the potential for enhancing democratic process by helping our
society learn how to deal more thoughtfully and fairly with health care resource
allocation.298

fewer unjustified appeals (see 5.4.3.4.3 The Revisions and Appeals Condition), thus
increasing efficiency.
292 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49.
293 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49.
294 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49.
295 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49.
296 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51.
297 The level of participation that ensues from the publicity condition is limited, especially
when compared to the level of participation that is the norm in commons institutions.
298 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51.
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I now explore the relationship between the publicity condition and Ostrom’s
design principles, considering ways in which they may inform each other. While the design
principles do not explicitly include publicity as a feature of successful commons
institutions, Ostrom is nonetheless concerned about publicity, as is evidenced by several
of the design principles. First, however, it is worthwhile to consider why Ostrom does not
specify a publicity condition?299 A possible explanation is that the design principles are
based on a limited number of case studies of relatively small commons institutions in
which publicity can be assumed based on the size of the institutions and the broad
participation of their members in the rule- and decision-making process. In a small and
active commons, resource allocation decisions are by default going to be public.300 Thus,
one may speculate that transparency is a feature of commons institutions by virtue of
their basic design as governance systems managed by their members through collectivechoice arrangements (see 2.3 Commons Institutions and 2.6.3 Collective Choice
Arrangements).301 As such, incorporating commons in health care may automatically lead
to more public decision making.

299 Remember, Goodin does include a publicity principle in his shortlist of desirable design

principles (see 2.6 The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions), which may
indicate concerns about publicity primarily originate in political philosophy.
300 To repurpose Daniels and Sabin’s distinction between the internal and the external
benefits of publicity, while resource allocation decisions are transparent for the members
of a small and active commons (i.e., internally), they may be opaque to outsiders (i.e.,
externally).
301 If publicity is indeed a feature of (almost) all commons institutions, this may provide
another explanation as to why there is no design principle recognizing the feature, as
decisions will be public in both successful and unsuccessful commons, thus publicity does
not appear to differentiate between success and failure. Of course, and this points toward
a possible issue with the design principles in general, the fact a feature does not appear
to make the difference between success and failure does not imply that feature is not
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While Ostrom’s list of design principles does not include a publicity condition,
several of them echo a concern about publicity. The first design principle that can be
related to the publicity condition is the need for clearly defined boundaries (see 2.6.1
Clearly Defined Boundaries). The design principle can be understood in two ways, which
roughly align with Daniels and Sabin’s distinction between the internal and external
importance of publicity. (1) The rules must clearly define who has the right to use the
resource (e.g., rules defining coverage restrictions on growth hormone treatment).302,303
To clearly define who is authorized to use the available resources implies publicity, for
otherwise the right to use the resource is not apparent to or understood by resource
users. On this first reading, the design principle operates internally, specifying which
members have a right to withdraw resources and under what circumstances. (2) The
principle states the boundaries of the CPR themselves must be well defined, meaning
users must have a clear understanding of the resource system and its boundaries.304 In
other words, the design principle aims to clarify what is meant by a particular resource

crucial to the success of commons institutions. In other words, there may be design
principles that are key to the success of commons institutions, like publicity, but that go
unnoticed because they do not appear to impact institutional success, however, in
absence of the feature the institution would fail.
302 Elinor Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions: Toward a Revised Theory,”
in Handbook of Agricultural Economics. Volume 2. Part A, eds. Bruce Gardner and Gordon
Rausser (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2002),1330.
303 Coverage restrictions on growth hormone therapy for children are an example of
technology rules, which are a kind of boundary rule (see 2.6.3 The Challenge of
Technological Change). In Just Health (2008), Daniels uses the example of NICE when
discussing the publicity condition, which I also use in the context of technology rules.
(Daniels, Just Health, 120-121.)
304 Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold, Sergio Villamayor Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles
for Community-Based Natural Resource Management,” Ecology and Society 15, no. 4
(2010). http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/ art38/.
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system.305 A broader understanding of the resource system and its boundaries embeds
concrete resource allocation decisions in an overall resource governance approach. As
such, the second reading of the design principle may also be linked to Daniels and Sabin’s
suggestion that providing stakeholders with the opportunity to understand how and why
resource limits are being set offers them the chance to participate in the social
governance process that is the allocation and rationing of health care services. In
summary, Ostrom’s first design principle shows that publicity requires a clear definition
of the resource and its boundaries, which, among others, translates in the need for welldefined boundary rules (e.g., technology rules). Vice versa, Daniels and Sabin’s discussion
of the publicity condition illustrates that Ostrom’s first design principle must also be
understood as ensuring publicity.
Publicity also pertains to monitoring and sanctioning (see 2.6.4 Monitoring and
2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions). While closely related to the resource usage decisions
themselves (e.g., coverage decisions), monitoring and sanctioning are separate activities
to make sure resource users comply with the resource allocation decisions and are
sanctioned when they do not. First, the rationale behind monitoring and sanctioning
processes must be publicly available. While it is clear monitoring and sanctioning take
place to prevent unauthorized use of resources, thus ensuring the sustainability of the
resource and the governance regime, reasons must also be given for the monitoring and
sanctioning practices themselves. Who are the monitors? How does monitoring take
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Elinor Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have
We Learned?” in Property Rights and Land Policies, ed. Gregory Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong
(Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009), 32.
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place? Who determines the sanctions? Why are the sanctions what they are? And so on.
Second, there must be a publicly accessible record of monitoring and sanctioning
activities. Not only does such a record ensure the coherent application of monitoring and
sanctioning rules, but it also serves as a reminder that resource usage is being monitored
and unauthorized activity is sanctioned, which leads to continued compliance with
resource allocation rules.306 Ostrom’s statement that monitors should be accountable to
resource users, or should themselves be resource users, can be interpreted in terms of
publicity.307 Even though accountability does not equate to or imply publicity, the latter
is one way to keep monitors accountable. Moreover, Ostrom’s suggestion to close the
loop between monitors and resource users, requiring the latter to audit the former (see
2.6.4 Monitoring),308 can be realized by subjecting monitoring and sanctioning to a
publicity requirement. Conversely, Daniels and Sabin’s publicity condition can be enacted
by closing the loop between monitors and resource users.
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Ostrom discusses the importance of sharing information about compliance rates in
Governing the Commons (1990). “If no one is discovered breaking the rules, the
appropriator-monitor learns that others comply and that no one is being taken for a
sucker.” (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 97.) If information about compliance is shared
with others in the commons, then the resource users can continue “a strategy of quasivoluntary compliance.” (Ibid.) If the monitor discovers a rule violation and a sanction
ensues, then everyone knows the monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms work, which
again reinforces compliance.
307 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 94.
308 Arun Agrawal, “Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule
Systems and Resource Use,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, eds. Elinor
Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006),
275.
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Finally, Ostrom notes that the activities and outcomes of conflict resolution
mechanisms should be “generally known in the community,”309 i.e., publicly available (see
2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms). Not only does the publicity of the conflict
resolution process assure resource users that the institution works, but it also provides
users with information about the interpretation of the rules, thus resolving the ambiguity
surrounding the rules that (often) lies at the basis of conflicts. Ostrom’s argument for the
publicity of conflict resolution mechanisms also applies to the revisions and appeals
condition as envisioned by Daniels and Sabin (see 4.4.4.3 The Revisions and Appeals
Condition).
In general, Ostrom’s remarks concerning publicity in her discussions of the design
principles highlight the role the publicity condition can play in helping resource users to
improve their understanding of the resource and its governance. Experiments and field
studies have shown that a better understanding of the resource system and the governing
institution increases acceptance of and compliance with allocation rules. Thus, Daniels
and Sabin’s publicity condition does not only lead to more effective, efficient, coherent,
and ultimately fairer resource allocation decisions, but likely also increases compliance
with these decisions. In turn, Daniels and Sabin highlight that fairer decisions lead to a
better understanding of the moral commitments of the institutions making them,310
therefore increasing the likelihood of compliance among those affected by the resource
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allocation rules.311 Unfortunately, organizations all too often take the opposite approach
and obscure resource allocation decisions by hiding them deep in the set of rules.312,313
Beyond the design principles, the publicity condition can build trust. While a
detailed exploration of the relationship is beyond the scope of the current project,
publicizing resource allocation decisions and other institutional processes (e.g.,
monitoring and sanctioning, revisions and appeals) plausibly increases trust among
participants. As Daniels and Sabin write,

Our view is that, as health plans begin to address the legitimacy and fairness
problems by demonstrating that they base limit-setting decisions on a concern for
meeting the needs of patients in a covered population under reasonable resource
constraints (our Publicity and Relevance Conditions), trust will increase, and
litigation – if anything – will go down.314

Daniels and Sabin admit their empirical claim is speculative, as they lack real
evidence.315,316 While commons research does not provide support for this particular
claim either, it does provide general support for their conjecture. To reuse Daniels and
Sabin’s distinction between the internal and external benefits of publicity, the broad
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Daniels and Sabin do not explicitly recognize the possible increase in compliance with
resource allocation decisions that follows from an increase in (perceived) fairness. They
merely point out that resource users recognition of an institutional commitment “to
arriving at fair decisions in a publicly accountable way” leads them to see the institution
as acting more fairly. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49.)
312 Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 111.
313 If a controversial resource allocation decision does become public, then the complexity
of the rules allows policymakers to diffuse blame more easily.
314 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 50.
315 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 50.
316 As Daniels and Sabin point out, some suggest the publicity condition leads to a
decrease in trust. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 50.)
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adoption of the publicity condition likely increases trust within each institution, i.e.
bonding, and in society at large, i.e. bridging, thus helping society “deal more thoughtfully
and fairly with health care resource allocation.”317 Moreover, publicity has the potential
to generate trust “across power or authority gradients,”318 in this case between those
making the resource allocation decisions and the users of the resources.
4.4.4.2 THE RELEVANCE CONDITION
The second condition qualifies the rationales that health care institutions can use, or
ought to use, to explain their resource allocation decisions.319 As such, Daniels and Sabin’s
second design principle operates in tandem with the publicity condition. They specify the
relevance condition as follows,

Specifically, the rationales for coverage decisions should aim to provide (a) a
reasonable construal of (b) how the organization (or public agency) seeks to
provide “value for money” in meeting the varied health needs of a defined
population under reasonable resource constraints.320

I explain both constraints in more detail and discuss their relationship to commons
research. (a) A rationale is considered reasonable when “it appeals to evidence, reasons,
and principles that are accepted as relevant” by fair-minded people who are seeking to
find mutually acceptable terms of cooperation.321,322 In Just Health (2008), Daniels adds
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33, no. 4 (August 2004): 655.
319 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45.
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that where possible “the relevance of reasons should be vetted by stakeholders in these
decisions.”323 A constraint he believes is easier implemented in public than in private
institutions.324 This remark is particularly interesting, because it directly relates the
second condition to institutions, and thus to institutional economics. While Daniels does
not provide support for his claim,325 research suggests public institutions may indeed have
an edge on market institutions when it comes to the broad engagement of stakeholders.
Ostrom’s research suggests that commons institutions may be even better suited to allow
stakeholders to partake in the process of reviewing “reasonable rationales.” As discussed
in the previous chapter, the commons can be integrated in market and state institutions
to create governance regimes amenable to stakeholder input, among others, polycentric
governance regimes (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). In addition,
Daniels and Sabin explicitly characterize the fulfillment of the second condition as a
cooperative endeavor, opening another avenue to relate their work to commons
research.326 They write,
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Daniels, Just Health, 118.
Daniels, Just Health, 118.
325 In Just Health (2008), Daniels points out that public agencies, i.e., state institutions,
often are required to solicit stakeholder input “as part of the administrative process.”
(Daniels, Just Health, 128.) However, the expectation or requirement of stakeholder
participation in and of itself does not make the process any easier. While Daniels regularly
suggests that public institutions are better placed to implement his approach to setting
limits, he does little in terms of providing argument to support his belief. This is a
particularly promising intersection between Daniels’s work and NIE, as institutional
economics provides a more sophisticated way to think about health care institutions as
complex sets of rules. While rules facilitating cooperation may be more common in state
institutions, and an essential feature of commons, they can plausibly be adopted by other
governance regimes (i.e., market).
326 As such, Daniels’s emphasis on the role of stakeholders in the vetting of relevant
reasons in Just Health (2008) builds on earlier ideas in a straightforward manner.
324
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We may think of the goal of meeting the varied needs of patients or citizens under
reasonable resource constraints as a characterization of the common or public
good pursued by everyone engaged in delivering and receiving this care or risk
protection.327,328,329

However, reasoning about this goal must be a cooperative enterprise as well, undertaken
by people disposed to collaborate with one another who accept certain reasons as
relevant (e.g., values, principles).330 The process of giving reasons must respect the moral
diversity of everyone involved in making resource allocation decisions, especially of the
persons affected by the decisions. Thus, the reasons offered must be recognized as
relevant and appropriate by all stakeholders. Put differently, health care institutions must
have an ongoing “conversation” with stakeholders about the suitable reasoning and
reasons for making resource allocation decisions.331 But how should this cooperative
vetting of relevant reasons be implemented? In Setting Limits Fairly (2002), Daniels and
Sabin do little in terms of detailing the envisioned cooperative enterprise of providing
reasons for resource allocation decisions, apart from referencing their discussion of
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51.
It is worth noting that Daniels and Sabin’s enumeration of those involved in
characterizing the common good (i.e., “everyone engaged in delivering and receiving this
care or risk protection”) is analogous to the resource users identified in the introduction
(see 0.5.4 Resource Users). While potential or future patients are not currently receiving
care, they are nonetheless engaged in the “risk protection” scheme, to use Daniels and
Sabin’s words.
329 Interestingly, Dardot and Laval relate the development of the commons to the notion
of the common good in their monograph on the commons. (Pierre Dardot and Christian
Laval, Commun. Essai sur la Révolution au XXIe Siècle (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2014),
21-51.)
330 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51.
331 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51-52.
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deliberative democracy in the chapter prior,332 which hardly provides an adequate answer
to the problem of “vetting the relevance of reasons.”333,334 Instead, they tacitly shift focus
from the process of producing relevant reasons to the reasons themselves. Daniels and
Sabin go on to discuss several examples of reasons they consider relevant. In particular,
they spend a lot of time discussing the criteria used by the medical advisory panel at Blue
Cross/Blue Shield to assess new medical technologies (e.g., technology has received final
approval from the appropriate government regulatory body, technology must improve
net health outcomes).335 While the criteria used by Blue Cross/Blue Shield involve “a
publicly accessible method of reasoning,”336 which falls under Daniels and Sabin’s first
condition, it is not clear the rules are the result of a cooperative enterprise. The same is
true of the two types of reasons that Daniels and Sabin argue everyone should consider
relevant when making comparative resource allocation decisions:337 First, the rules
should consider and protect against “morally objectionable arbitrariness,” i.e., the
dissimilar treatment of patients who are similar in all relevant ways (see also 4.3.2.2.2
Justifying the Special Moral Importance of Health Care). Second, if a resource allocation
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334 Daniels and Sabin’s discussion of deliberative democracy is summary, focusing on the
shortcomings of using “a procedural appeal to majority rule” in health care. (Daniels and
Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 34.) Moreover, the short section concludes by referencing the
four conditions of A4R as ensuring fair process, resulting in an argument that is (at least
in part) circular. (Ibid., 36.)
335 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52-53.
336 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52.
337 Comparative decisions are those in which the needs of one set of patients is weighed
against, and found more important than, those of another set of patients. (Daniels and
Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51.)
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decision disadvantages someone more than they need to be disadvantaged under
available alternatives, this also should be considered relevant by all. However, simply
stating “these criteria are ones that all stakeholders should accept as relevant and
appropriate”338 is precisely the sort of top-down decision-making (i.e., “exercise of
authority”339) about relevant reasons that Daniels and Sabin seem to resist earlier in their
discussion of the relevance condition. In Just Health (2008), Daniels adds a section
addressing the vetting of relevant reasons, possibly in an attempt to remedy the
shortcomings of the earlier work.340 The section is odd in that it promotes stakeholder
participation in determining which reasons count as relevant wherever possible, because
it contributes to the legitimacy of limit-setting decisions by increasing “the likelihood that
a broader range of relevant reasons and rationales will be aired in the decision-making
process”341 and by enhancing transparency, but only in so far that it improves A4R.342 In
other words, stakeholder participation is of instrumental rather than intrinsic importance
to resource allocation decisions.343 Several remarks are in place: (1) In theory, the
relevance condition can be implemented through collective-choice arrangements
specifically aimed at vetting reasoning processes and reasons for resource allocation
decisions (see 2.6.3 Collective Choice Arrangements). Such an implementation of the
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where possible “the relevance of reasons should be vetted by stakeholders in these
decisions.” (Daniels, Just Health, 118.)
341 Daniels, Just Health, 130.
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relevance condition can happen locally, i.e., within a given institution or community. (2)
That being said, I am not sure Daniels envisions the broad and consistent vetting of
rationales through deliberative mechanisms that is inherent to commons institutions,
despite their professed emphasis on cooperation and deliberation. After all, processing
stakeholder input is essential to commons institutions, as it is a determining feature of
their design,344 and stakeholder participation is likely of intrinsic value to many
proponents of the commons.345 Such a strong commitment to stakeholder participation
seems to be at odds with Daniels’s view of participation as instrumentally important in
furthering A4R. (3) Daniels’s concerns about institutional deliberation certainly have
merit. For one, he points out that stakeholder participation in general, and consumer
participation in particular, does not ensure the legitimacy of resource allocation
decisions.346 He also worries about organizational deliberation as an inadequate
substitute for broader democratic deliberation.347 As such, Daniels’s concerns can inform
a criticism of the deliberative processes at the heart of the commons, and fit with
rationalist-liberal concerns about local tyrannies (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle
Level). (4) At the same time, the strong commitment to bottom-up deliberation that sits
at the center of the commons elicits a criticism of Daniels and Sabin’s work, which is
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Of course, the pervasiveness of deliberative processes does not imply broad
stakeholder participation, as deliberation often does not include all those affected by the
decisions, but is limited to the members of the commons institution.
345 Commons researchers do not explicitly state or argue their belief in the intrinsic value
of deliberation, but the commons literature is permeated by a strong implicit belief that
broad and consistent participation are intrinsically valuable.
346 Daniels, Just Health, 129.
347 Daniels, Just Health, 130.
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characterized by a tension between an avowed commitment to stakeholder participation,
and an apparent distrust of broad deliberation. Daniels and Sabin seem to want to have
their cake and eat it too when it comes to deciding upon reasonable rationales for
resource allocation decisions. On the one hand, they suggest the process ought to be a
cooperative enterprise involving all stakeholders, because it shows respect for persons
and “opens a conversation.”348,349 In addition, there are pragmatic reasons to cooperate
on the vetting of reasons for resource governance decisions, as collaboration leads to
increased acceptance and compliance, a hypothesis supported by commons
research.350,351 On the other hand, Daniels and Sabin seem to have already decided upon
certain rationales that they themselves deem reasonable and simply state these are the
criteria all stakeholders should accept as relevant and appropriate. In short, while I
believe Daniels and Sabin’s commitment to broad stakeholder participation is genuine,
they provide enough argumentative ammunition to discredit deliberation when the
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52.
The mention of respect for persons and the opening of a conversation makes it seem
like Daniels (and Sabin) do attribute intrinsic value to deliberation, but they are
referencing the work of Harvard Law Professor Frederick Schauer. Moreover, Schauer
discusses the giving reasons rather than the process of deliberating about the reasons.
Interestingly, Schauer presents the act of giving reasons itself as “a way to bring the
subject of the decision into the enterprise.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52.)
While giving reasons does engage stakeholders, it only does so in the most superficial, or
maybe passive, of ways when compared to having them participate in the deliberative
process. Given Daniels’s emphasis on the instrumental value of deliberation in Just Health
(2008), he seems to take a similar approach to Schauer: there is intrinsic (and
instrumental) value to giving reasons, but only instrumental value to broadly deliberating
about them.
350 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52.
351 See 2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements, 2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions, and 2.6.6
Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms.
349
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outcomes of the process are not the reasons they themselves deem relevant,352 making
their prior support for broad stakeholder participation appear like lip service. (5) While
the tension discussed in the previous point is particularly clear in Daniels and Sabin’s
discussion of the relevance condition, it is present throughout their work. (6) Of course,
none of these critical remarks rule out the use of commons-like deliberation mechanisms
in the way that Daniels and Sabin envision, i.e., in service of A4R rather than as
indispensable processes of intrinsic value. Much like the commons can be integrated with
other governance regimes, the rules that allow for deliberation can be incorporated in
the A4R approach.
I now move to the second constraint stipulated by the relevance condition. (b)
Organizations must seek to provide value for money in meeting the health needs of a
population under reasonable resource constraints. How should the claim that a treatment
is (not) cost-effective be evaluated as a reason?353 Daniels and Sabin note that while
researching their book during the late 1990s there was little explicit discussion of costs,
at least in the United States (e.g., the aforementioned BlueCross/Blue Shield criteria do
not include costs or cost-effectiveness). On the contrary, some organizations avoided to
consider cost-effectiveness even when explicitly asked to weigh costs and benefits.354

352 Daniels and Sabin would likely reply that they provide a criterion

to determine relevant
reasons, namely those rationales appealing to evidence, reasons, and principles that are
accepted as relevant by fair-minded people who are seeking to find mutually acceptable
terms of cooperation. However, fair-minded people seeking to find mutually acceptable
terms of cooperation may decide upon relevant reasons that Daniels and Sabin would
disagree with, which seems to be precisely what Daniels wants to guard against in Just
Health (2008).
353 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 55.
354 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 55.
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Their remark is of more than mere anecdotal value, because it indicates that health care
institutions are suspicious of using cost-effectiveness as a reason for making resource
allocation decisions.355 The claim that a certain technology is too costly almost
automatically invites a demand for clarification from those affected by the decision (e.g.,
patients, physicians, potential patients, and even the public at large).356 That being said,
some cases of cost-effectiveness are more straightforward than others, for example when
weighing one treatment against another with comparable benefits at lower cost, but
outside of that simple case any appeal to cost is controversial, for example when slightly
better benefits come at considerably higher costs.357 The prevailing sentiment among
medical directors and managers of health plans was that decisions about costeffectiveness must be made at the societal rather than the organizational level.358 As
Daniels and Sabin note, “The result is the continued rapid dissemination of technologies
and treatments and escalating costs, which ultimately make the need for comparative
decision-making and rationing greater.”359 In the language of the commons, the result is
an ongoing and creeping tragedy of the health care commons (see 1.2 A Tragedy of the

355

Of course, the widespread refusal to deal with costs, and the resulting deficiencies in
the rules governing resource usage, is precisely what leads to the tragedy of the health
care commons (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons).
356 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 55.
357 Daniels, Just Health, 127.
358 The sentiment provides another illustration of the logic that lies at the basis of the
tragedy of the commons, as individual resource users defer any responsibility for the
overuse of the available resources to society at large. The objection that most medical
directors and health plan managers in the United States are only responsible for their own
CPR falls short, as the attitude still leads to the overuse of the available resources, which
are not their own but ultimately those of their members with as a result, among others,
higher premiums and copays for patients.
359 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 56.
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Health Care Commons?). In Just Health (2008), Daniels discusses NICE as an example of
the use of cost-effectiveness reasoning when making coverage decisions within the NHS,
an approach that is also used by other public systems (e.g., Health Care Knowledge Center
(KCE) in Belgium, Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS) in France). In the United States, however,
both private health plans and the CMS remain reluctant to publicly embrace costeffectiveness reasoning in making resource allocation decisions.360 Of course, the de facto
reluctance of health plans to engage in such reasoning does not imply that appeals to
relative cost-effectiveness do not meet the relevance condition. On the contrary, Daniels
and Sabin argue that “appeals to relative cost-effectiveness or to opportunity costs, such
reasons, appropriately supported, would meet the Relevance Condition.”361 They clarify,

If people share in the goal of meeting the varied medical needs of a population
covered by limited resources, as well as a commitment to justifying limitations by
reference to reasons all can consider appropriate and relevant, then they would
be interested in a reason that said a particular intervention had fallen below some
defensible threshold of cost-effectiveness or relative cost-worthiness.362

While the logic Daniels and Sabin project onto users of health care resources may be
correct, thus justifying the use of cost-effectiveness as a relevant reason, resource users’
realization of the need to accept reasons referencing cost is not sufficient to change
resource governance practices, i.e., the use of cost-effectiveness as a reason when
allocating resources, for the collective-action problem remains.363 Much like the herders
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Daniels, Just Health, 127-128.
Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 56.
362 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 56.
363 While the population of users of health care resources as a whole, as well as many
individual members of the population, would benefit from accepting cost-effectiveness
361
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in Hardin’s scenario, the mere realization that the pasture is being overgrazed does not
lead to a solution of the problem, on the contrary (see 1.3 The Tragedy of the Commons).
The challenge can be understood in terms of the second design principle (see 2.6.2
Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions).
Remember, the principle suggests the need for correspondence between appropriation
and provision rules, which means there must be congruity between the benefits that
members receive and the costs they incur from collective action.364 If members find they
bear considerable costs but enjoy few benefits, then more and more of them become
unwilling to follow the resource allocation rules,365 as the inequity leads them to find the
rules unfair.366 The use of cost-effectiveness as a basis for resource governance decisions
is one way to ensure congruity between benefits and costs. After all, cost-effectiveness
entails the weighing of benefits against costs, ensuring they are proportionate. If

as a relevant reason, the widespread reliance on cost-effectiveness as a criterion carries
an implementation cost that no individuals in the health care arena are willing to bare. To
repurpose an example used by Daniels, private health plans in the United States are
unwilling to publicly rely on cost-effectiveness as a reason, because they do not want to
be the first-mover when it comes to rationing, which carries a cost in terms of bad
publicity and a loss of members, to name just a few. (Daniels, Just Health, 128.) Any
collective action is further complicated by the large number of participants with diffuse
interests in health care. While many resource users each gain a little by considering costs
in some way or another when allocating health care resources, there are influential
groups who would incur significant losses from the inclusion of cost-based reasoning (e.g.,
manufacturers of health care technology, severely ill patients seeking out last-chance
therapies). The former group does not have a strong incentive to push for the
implementation of cost-effectiveness as a reason, while the latter group has a strong
impetus not to implement cost-effectiveness reasoning. The same issue arises in the
context of health care reform.
364 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”
365 Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 150.
366 Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Institutions,” 34.
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members perceive the set of rules overall balances benefits and costs, they are more likely
to see the rules as legitimate and to comply with them. In order to reap these benefits,
most participants must perceive the institution as a whole to balance benefits and costs
at a given level of analysis (e.g., health care system, health plan, hospital). To achieve this,
however, policymakers must design and implement rules that ensure the resource
allocation rules are indeed cost-effective.367 Moreover, policymakers should make sure
that resource users are aware of the rationales being used to allocate resources, and the
reasoning behind those rationales, for the publicity of reasons shapes members’
perception of the institution and communicates its efforts to ensure congruity (see 4.4.4.1
The Publicity Condition). Vice versa, the second design principle provides additional
support for using cost-effectiveness as a relevant reason, for the latter is a way to ensure
resource users perceive the rules as fair, among others, ensuring compliance and
increasing legitimacy.

367

As I noted in the discussion of the second design principle, what matters is the
perception of the resource users. As long as the members of the institution perceive the
rules as ensuring congruity between benefits and costs, they are more likely to find
allocation decisions legitimate and comply with the rules, even if the rules are not in fact
balancing benefits and costs. In other words, policymakers could focus on convincing
resource users there is congruity rather than actually building it into the institution. While
such an approach may be attractive, say, because presenting an image of congruity
through marketing is cheaper than actually implementing the design principle, it is
nonetheless ill-advised. The tactic will backfire when members find out reality differs from
their perception, resulting in a loss of legitimacy and a decline in compliance. Moreover,
resources spent on deceiving resource users could have been better spent on designing
rules that balance benefits and costs.
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4.4.4.3 THE REVISIONS AND APPEALS CONDITION
The revision and appeals condition, also called the “revisability and appeals condition,”368
states mechanisms must be in place “for challenge and dispute resolution regarding limitsetting decisions, and, more broadly, opportunities for revision and improvement of
policies in the light of new evidence or arguments.”369,370 In short, these mechanisms are
“dispute resolution procedures.”371 The aim of the condition is threefold: (1) To provide
members affected by a resource allocation decision with an opportunity to challenge it
(e.g., a patient whose treatment is not covered, a hospital that is denied funds to build a
new facility for proton therapy).372 As such, revisions and appeals rules are “a form of due
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Daniels, Just Health, 131.
Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45.
370 If the two former conditions can be viewed as mere conditions rather than institutional
design principles, which I believe is too limited a reading (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design
Principles), then the third principle is undeniably an institutional design principle. The
term “mechanisms,” regularly used in NIE and by Ostrom, references institutional
features, i.e., rules, that allow for the revisability of resource allocation rules and the
appeal of limit-setting decisions.
371 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58.
372 To give a concrete example, two centers for proton therapy were being built in Belgium
at the time of writing, one in Leuven and the other in Charleroi. While a study by the KCE
acknowledges the usefulness of proton therapy for certain cancers (e.g., children with
brain tumors), the Belgian equivalent of NICE does not recommend extending coverage
of the treatment to six other cancers. The Belgian minister of health follows the
recommendation of the KCE. As a result, the therapy will only be covered for a relatively
small number of patients, all of whom can be treated at the facility in Louvain, while
treatments at the facility in Charleroi, which is being built with private funds, will not be
covered. (Jasper D’Hoore and David Adriaen, “Overheidsadvies haalt beloftevolle
kankertherapie onderuit,” De Tijd, January 24, 2019, https://www.tijd.be/ondernemen/
farma-biotech/Overheidsadvies-haalt-beloftevolle-kankertherapie-nderuit/10090407.)
Based on the revisions and appeals condition, mechanisms should be in place for
stakeholders to challenge the minister’s resource allocation decision. In this case,
stakeholders that immediately come to mind are patients suffering from (one of) the six
cancers treatable by proton therapy that will not be covered, the owners of the facility in
Charleroi, and the company IBA, who are the Belgian world leader in developing the
369
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process through which to attempt to reverse adverse decisions.”373 (2) To improve policy
when it comes to the governance of health care resources,374 as it provides participants
with an opportunity to present their point of view, with the potential for altered and
improved decisions.375 (3) To educate society about the need for resource allocation
decisions in health care and the ways in which they can be taken fairly.376 Daniels and
Sabin distinguish between internal and external roles of the third condition. 377 The first
two roles of revisions and appeals procedures are internal to the institution, while the last
role of these mechanisms is external to the organization.378 That being said, their
distinction is not a hard and fast one, as the first two roles can transcend the bounds of
the organization (e.g., litigation to appeal an organizational limit setting decision,
legislative action based on organizational decisions),379 and the last function can also be
fulfilled within the bounds of the organization. Thus, it may be better to think of the roles

technology and who disagree with the conclusions of the report by the KCE. (David
Adriaen, “IBA: ‘Effectiviteit van protontherapie staat niet ter discussie',” De Tijd, January
24, 2019. https://www.tijd.be/ondernemen/farma-biotech/iba-effectiviteit-van-proton
therapie-staat-niet-ter-discussie/10090820.html.) It is worth noting the recommendation
of the KCE is not based on cost-effectiveness, but rather the effectiveness of proton
therapy regardless of costs.
373 Daniels, Just Health, 131.
374 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58.
375 Daniels, Just Health, 131.
376 Daniels, Just Health, 131.
377 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58-59.
378 Daniels, Just Health, 131.
379 I adopt the two examples from Daniels and Sabin’s discussion of members seeking out
external authorities or organizations to pursue their interests. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting
Limits Fairly, 59.) Their discussion makes their earlier distinction between the internal and
external roles of dispute resolution mechanisms moot, as they implicitly acknowledge the
different roles of the revision and appeals condition can operate both internally and
externally.
382

as more fluid, taking place at different levels of analysis and moving between them. The
third condition operates in tandem with the publicity and relevance condition (see 4.4.4.1
The Publicity Condition and 4.4.4.2 The Relevance Condition). As the reasoning behind the
original decision is publicly accessible and decisions are constrained by relevant reasons,
participants using revisions and appeals mechanisms understand the basis on which the
resource allocation decision was made, and therefore can more effectively and efficiently
engage in dispute resolution.380 Daniels and Sabin’s discussion focuses on the
effectiveness of the dispute resolution procedures.381 They argue the revisions and
appeals condition provides “a visible and public route back into the policy formulation
process,” thus enriching the policy-making process, among others, increasing legitimacy
and leading to fairer outcomes, and contributing to the improvement of quality of
resource allocation decisions.382 Daniels and Sabin do little in terms of discussing the
efficiency of the conflict-resolution process.383 However, Ostrom’s sixth design principle
(see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms) emphasizes the need for efficiency, as she
argues for “rapid access to low-cost local arenas in which to resolve conflict among users
or between users and officials.”384 As such, Ostrom’s design principle complements
Daniels and Sabin’s third condition, and vice versa, since Ostrom does not discuss how
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58.
As a reminder, Daniels and Sabin do not seem to make a clear distinction between
effectiveness and efficiency (see footnote 284).
382 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 59.
383 Daniels and Sabin do point out that deferring conflict resolution to external authorities
is costly, thus acknowledging the importance of efficiency. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting
Limits Fairly, 58.)
384 Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Institutions,” 35.
381

383

conflict-resolution mechanisms can lead to higher quality decision-making. According to
Ostrom, conflict-resolution procedures should have the following features: (1) They
should be rapid, both in allowing members access to the procedures and the ensuing
process of resolving the conflict, as lingering conflicts undermine trust and legitimacy.385
It is worth noting the publicity and relevance conditions contribute to the rapidity of
conflict resolution, as any prior reasoning is publicly available and vetted according to
relevance, making it easier to appeal resource allocation decisions. (2) The conflict
resolution mechanisms should be low-cost, because participants will not bother making
use of the procedures when the cost to enter into the process, and to resolve it, is
prohibitively high. The speed of the revisions and appeals process is only one aspect of
low-cost procedures. However, when the costs of entering into the revisions and appeals
process are too low, this holds the risk of a flood of challenges to resource allocation
decision, which results in significant costs that, in turn, drive up the costs of making an
appeal. Health care, with its impact on life and health, likely is particularly susceptible to
a deluge of challenges. Thus, a balance must be found between ensuring access to the
dispute resolution process on the one hand, and making sure the mechanism is not
overwhelmed on the other hand. Daniels and Sabin’s second condition possibly provides
a way to put constraints on challenges, as it may be able to function as the basis for a
criterion to separate legitimate and futile challenges. As Daniels and Sabin note, the
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Daniels acknowledges the importance of timeliness in Just Health (2008): “These
mechanisms – whatever their specific forms – must function in a timely way so that errors
can be corrected and specific harms to individuals or groups remedied or avoided.”
(Daniels, Just Health, 132.)
384

trifecta of the publicity, relevance, and revisions and appeals conditions does not imply
that every challenge leads to a reconsideration of the resource allocation decision in
question.386 “It does, however, mean that good arguments that plausibly challenge the
original decision are provided a visible and public route back into the policy formulation
process.”387 That being said, Daniels and Sabin do not detail how to distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate appeals. (3) Dispute resolution mechanisms should be “local,”
which can be interpreted as being situated at the appropriate level of analysis. For one,
this means revisions and appeals of resource allocation decisions should first take place
internal to organizations. Daniels and Sabin support resolving disputes internally for a
host of reasons: the broad engagement of stakeholders affected by the decision, the cost
of external procedures, and the fact courts are ill equipped to handle limit-setting
decisions.388 Well-functioning internal dispute resolution mechanisms lead to more
effective and efficient deliberation if a conflict is escalated to an external authority. Then
there is the question of where dispute resolution procedures should be situated within
organizations. There should likely be a variety of mechanisms, both formal and informal,
throughout the organization.389 Commons research suggests that more formal
mechanisms and “last-step internal procedures”390 are best located at the middle-level,
among others, to avoid elite capture and ensure accessibility.391 As always the concrete
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 59.
Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 59.
388 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58-59.
389 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58.
390 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58.
391 Linda Emanuel makes a similar remark discussing the position of ethics offices in health
care organizations: “The reporting structure of the system is also important. This system
387
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answer differs from one organization to the next, since any solution resource users
develop is dependent on the institutional and environmental details (see 2.2 The Ostrom
Approach). For large institutions, a polycentric approach to revisions and appeals, with
nested dispute resolution mechanisms at multiple levels, is likely necessary (see 3.5
Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).392 Local conflict-resolution mechanisms may
lead to more effective (Daniels and Sabin) and more efficient (Ostrom) decision-making,
as they ensure easy access and broad stakeholder input. The lack of accessible, low-cost,

is likely to receive information about unethical activities. The ethics office must be careful
to avoid investigation and compliance functions that do not belong to it, but the office
may receive relevant information that needs to be reported. In order that the entire
organization is held to standards of integrity, reporting needs to be able to go to all levels
directly. It is unlikely and usually undesirable that the ethics office exist at the highest level
of an organizational reporting chart; this would engender a top-down culture of ethics
that is not conducive to good relations or to involving everyone in friendly, supportive, and
rigorous standards of integrity. A better process and structural counterpart might be to
have the ethics office exist at an intermediate level, with normal reporting processes for
routine matters, but have additional reporting rights and obligations that can go to any
place in the organization according to the needs of the case.” (Emphasis mine.) (Linda
Emanuel, “Ethics and the Structures of Healthcare,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare
Ethics 9, no. 2 (April 2000): 162.) The same reasoning can be applied to the
implementation of the revisions and appeals condition.
392 A polycentric approach to resolving disputes and conflicts may also consist of an
independent mediator. The mediator can function as an independent body within an
organization or be conceived as an external body. Weaving a mediator into the
institutional fabric may provide a solution to one of Daniels and Sabin’s main qualms,
namely the escalation of disputes to ill-equipped courts, as the mediating body can
specialize in processing revisions and appeals. The approach is similar to arbitration,
which in recent years is increasingly used in health care settings, but would rely more
heavily on member participation. (Olga Khazan, “How Arbitration Affects Health Care,”
The Atlantic, November 2, 2015. https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/11/
arbitration-medical/413641/.) A possible worry about traditional arbitration is that the
arbitrator will side with the health care organization, as they build a longtime and
mutually beneficial relationship, rather than with the participant filing a dispute. So-called
“arbitration clauses” may be used negatively, i.e., to force participants into arbitration,
rather than positively, i.e., to provide a fair and low-cost conflict-resolution mechanism.
386

and fair conflict-resolution procedures threatens the long-run sustainability of health care
organizations, as lingering or unresolved conflicts undermine trust and the willingness to
cooperate. “If the only kind of conflict-resolution mechanisms available are either so
costly or so biased that most self-governed common-pool resources cannot make use of
them, these conflicts can themselves destroy even very robust institutional
arrangements.”393,394
Daniels and Sabin’s revisions and appeals condition and Ostrom’s design principles
interface in several other ways. I already pointed out the possibility of nested conflictresolution mechanisms in the previous paragraph. Ostrom’s recommendation to organize
governance activities within “multiple layers of nested enterprises”395 is applicable to the
implementation of the revisions and appeals condition in large health care institutions
(see 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises). As Daniels and Sabin point out, in practice such layering of
dispute-resolution mechanisms already takes place,

Typically, internal dispute resolution procedures in health plans range from
informal complaints to ombudsmen, to more formal grievance procedures with
well-defined stages of appeal, to final appeals to panels of medical directors or
other last-step internal procedures.396
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Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 279.
Ostrom’s turn of phrase is a bit odd, as “self-governed common-pool resources” are
unlikely to make use of much of anything at all. The users of the resources are the ones
who must make use of conflict-resolution mechanisms.
395 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 101.
396 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58.
394
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Commons research stresses the need to “match” rules at different levels, both vertically
and horizontally, in order to produce integrated, or “complete,”397 mechanisms for
revisions and appeals.398 An integrated approach to conflict resolution also requires the
minimal recognition of the right to establish and operate dispute-resolution procedures
(see 2.6.7 Recognition of Rights to Organize), both internally and externally. Within
institutions, mechanisms situated at higher levels in the organization should recognize
conflict-resolution procedures functioning at lower levels. In much the same way,
external revisions and appeals procedures should respect efforts to resolve disputes
internally, which implies building on internal efforts when conflicts are escalated to
external authorities. While the recognition of the right to set up conflict-resolution
mechanisms at lower levels is important, mechanisms must be in place to pass issues on
to higher-level authorities if necessary, which is part of creating an integrated approach
to dispute resolution. However, there are benefits to allow those stakeholders involved
in the conflict to try to resolve it locally first (e.g., local knowledge, common interest,
lower cost). Finally, Daniels and Sabin make the following remark,

Internally, the Revisions and Appeals Condition closes the loop between decision
makers and those who are affected by their policies. Done well, it engages a
broader segment of stakeholder in the process of deliberation.399

Their suggestion tags on to Ostrom’s discussion of closing the loop between monitors and
users, in effect turning users into the auditors of the monitors (see 2.6.4 Monitoring),
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Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 101-102.
See 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises for a discussion of the notion “completeness.”
399 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58.
398
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which highlights that conflict-resolution mechanisms are also a form of monitoring, as it
allows participants to appeal resource allocation decisions made at higher-levels in the
organization.400
4.4.4.4 THE REGULATIVE CONDITION
The fourth and final condition states, “There is either voluntary or public regulation of the
process to ensure that conditions 1-3 are met.”401 In other words, the purpose of the
regulative condition is to make sure that institutions meet the conditions of publicity,
relevance, and revisability.402 Daniels and Sabin’s discussion of the fourth condition is
short and does not go much further than suggesting that, ultimately, public regulation will
be required to ensure the implementation of the three prior conditions.403 I find it odd
that the final condition is discussed so briefly.404 After all, it concerns the implementation
of the three preceding conditions, and thus of the A4R approach as a whole. While Daniels
and Sabin acknowledge the final condition is difficult to implement, they attribute this to
the presence of a coordination problem, but otherwise they present the fourth condition
as straightforward to fulfill. I will argue Daniels and Sabin underestimate the problems
surrounding the implementation of the regulative condition, but first I look at their
argument in a bit more detail.
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Agrawal, “Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking,” 275.
Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45.
402 Daniels, Just Health, 133.
403 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 60.
404 The discussion takes up one page in Setting Limits Fairly (2008) and less than a page in
Just Health (2008).
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Daniels and Sabin assert there may be private regulatory mechanisms that can
ensure that institutions abide by the publicity, relevance, and revisions conditions. They
give the example of the standards issued by the National Committee for Quality Insurance
(NCQA) for technology assessments,405 which can conceivably be modified to include the
conditions of A4R.406 By voluntarily adopting A4R, health care institutions would receive
an accreditation that shows they have “incorporated steps toward addressing fairness
and legitimacy problems.”407 A failure to adopt the conditions of A4R voluntarily could
result in public regulation. While Daniels and Sabin’s analysis is neutral between voluntary
private enforcement and public regulation of the conditions they outline, they believe
that, “ultimately, public regulation will be required,”408 due to the presence of a
coordination problem.409 As individual health care organizations rightfully fear to be the
first to take action (e.g., exposure to litigation, bad publicity), they are unwilling to adopt
A4R. All health care organizations, and their members, are worse off as a result.410
Therefore, all organizations need to agree on adopting A4R in order to mitigate the risk
to eliminate the risk for first-movers and to reap the benefits of collective action.411
Strangely enough, Daniels and Sabin conclude the paragraph by stating that health care
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 60.
Daniels, Just Health, 133.
407 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 60.
408 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 60.
409 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 60-61.
410 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 61.
411 The challenge is akin to the collective-action problem haunting the governance of
scarce health care resources in general (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons).
In fact, Daniels and Sabin relate the problem to the prisoner’s dilemma in the chapter’s
endnotes. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 66.)
406
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organizations can gain a competitive advantage by “being open about reasons,”412 which
means early adopters of A4R may in fact benefit from their decision to implement the
approach.413 The statement is at odds with their defense of the claim that public
regulation is likely necessary.414 Moreover, the claim downplays the strengths and
advantages of A4R argued for throughout Setting Limits Fairly (2002) and Just Health
(2008), almost as if Daniels and Sabin do not believe in their own approach. Assuming that
health care organizations and their members indeed benefit from A4R, the voluntary
adoption of the approach by individual organizations to gain a competitive edge may not
be as farfetched as Daniels and Sabin make it seem.415 Consequently, public regulation to
implement the A4R approach might not be a necessity, a suggestion I return to when
discussing a cooperative approach to implementing the regulative condition.
Leaving aside the tension between voluntary and public regulation, Daniels and
Sabin’s argument is short and straightforward, highlighting the coordination problem as
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 61.
The suggestion that organizations can adopt A4R in a way that gives them a
competitive advantage is missing from Just Health (2008), possibly because Daniels
realized it did not sit well with the rest of the discussion. (Daniels, Just Health, 133.)
414 Of course, there is the possibility that individual health care organizations can indeed
benefit from adopting A4R, but wrongly believe that they will not. As a result,
organizations choose not to voluntarily adopt A4R, as they estimate it is not in their best
interest. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 66.)
415 One way to test whether the gradual, voluntary adoption of A4R can be successful is
by measuring and comparing the performance of organizations that have adopted A4R
with the performance of organizations that have not. Of course, both the measurement
and the comparison of institutional performance are nontrivial. To raise just a few issues:
What variables are good measures of institutional performance? How to measure
improvements in justice? How to isolate the influence of A4R? Moreover, are
comparisons between health care institutions even possible? Nonetheless, quantitative
evidence showing the benefit of A4R to health care institutions may lead more
organizations to adopt the approach voluntarily.
413
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the main difficulty toward implementation. Whether they are correct in presenting the
final condition as relatively easy to fulfill depends on the interpretation of the regulative
condition. Daniels and Sabin seem to think of regulation in an uncomplicated manner,
simply requiring organizations to adopt the three prior conditions, whether voluntarily or
through public regulation. Since they believe that public regulation will eventually be
required, the condition can presumably be implemented simply by passing regulations
forcing organizations to adopt A4R. In their view, the regulative condition does not seem
to differ much qualitatively from the three prior conditions. I argue, however, that the
regulative condition can plausible be interpreted as operating at the collective-choice
level (see 2.6.3 Collective Choice Arrangements), while the publicity, relevance, and
conflict-resolution conditions must be situated at the operational level (see 4.4.2 A4R as
Design Principles).416 Simply put, the first three conditions detail the rules for the fair, dayto-day resource allocation decisions; but the regulative condition is concerned with the
making and changing of the operational rules. The final condition operates at a higher
level than the other three conditions, but also serves as their foundation. The publicity,
relevance, and dispute-resolution conditions are instituted and governed over by the
regulative condition. As such, the latter does not simply entail the requirement to
implement the other conditions, but itself is a complex set of rules that must be
developed in detail. To give some examples, what regulations are in place to monitor and
sanction the implementation of A4R? How can the A4R approach be amended if the need
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See 0.5.3 Rules for a discussion of operational, collective-choice, and constitutionalchoice rules.
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arises? And what freedom do institutions have to fill in the institutional details of the prior
conditions? In addition, interpreting the regulative condition as a complex set of rules
operating at the collective-choice level highlights the presence of a second-order
institutional issue, or a recursive meta-level application, since the regulative condition
itself plausibly has to meet the publicity, relevance, and conflict-resolution conditions to
ensure the fairness of the A4R approach. A more detailed exploration of these issues, and
their possible solution, is beyond the scope of the current project. The goal is to show
that Daniels and Sabin may be too optimistic about both content and implementation of
the regulative condition, which likely requires much more than simply stating there is a
need for public regulation.
Several remarks are in place: First, Daniels and Sabin may argue that a more
complex interpretation of the regulative condition is unproblematic, or even superfluous,
because they have laid out the prior conditions in sufficient detail, especially the publicity
and relevance condition. Therefore, the first three conditions indeed are simply in need
of “regulation” in the narrow sense in which they seem to interpret the last condition.
However, Daniels and Sabin have not specified the institutional details, which differ on a
case-by-case basis, and must be decided upon at the collective-choice level through a set
of rules that goes beyond simply requiring the implementation of their approach. This is
especially true of the revisions and appeals condition, which requires a more elaborate
set of rules at the collective-choice level in order to effect institutional change in response
to disputes. Second, and closely related to the previous remark, the regulative condition
can plausibly be situated as operating at several levels of analysis simultaneously. At a
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lower level of analysis, the regulative condition functions in conjunction with the other
conditions as a collective-choice arrangement governing over them. At a higher level of
analysis, the final condition operates as a requirement to implement A4R, much in the
way that Daniels and Sabin envision the regulative condition.417 Third, Daniels and Sabin’s
argument in favor of public regulation hinges on the presence of a coordination problem
precluding the voluntary adoption of A4R. However, coordination problems also arise in
the context of public regulation, health care reform being a prime example. While it may
be easier to implement A4R once there is political agreement, the challenge is to reach
political agreement on the adoption of the approach. In other words, in case of public
regulation the coordination problem shifts from the economic to the political arena, but
it does not disappear. Finally, Daniels and Sabin’s discussion of the regulative condition
falls within the market-state dichotomy, contrasting the voluntary adoption of A4R with
the public regulation of the approach. While they do not explicitly equate voluntary
regulation to the market, their broader argument works within the confines of the
dichotomy (see 4.5.1 Breaking Open the Dichotomy), making it plausible to interpret their
discussion of the regulative condition in terms of market, i.e., voluntary regulation, versus
state, i.e., public regulation. An interpretation that is further supported by the fact Daniels
and Sabin associate voluntary regulation with the idea of competition and the possibility
of gaining a competitive advantage. However, voluntary regulation can also take place
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That being said, even when operating as a high-level requirement, I still think the
regulative condition requires much more institutional details than provided by Daniels
and Sabin in order to perform its function of “ruling in” the three prior conditions.
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within a cooperative rather than a competitive structure.418,419 Individual health care
organizations can organize themselves into commons institutions in order to jointly adopt
the A4R approach. While getting such a collaboration off the ground requires the actors
involved to overcome a coordination problem in its own right, this may be an easier
obstacle to overcome than the coordination problem highlighted by Daniels and Sabin,
i.e., the fear of individual organizations to be the first-mover and the possible competitive
disadvantage associated with it.420 Thus, individuals and organizations convinced of the
merits of A4R may be able to adopt the approach locally after which their efforts can be
scaled up overtime through nesting (see 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises).421 If the goal is to
institute A4R throughout the health care system, then a bottom-up approach offers a
complementary path to achieve system-wide adoption. Of course, and in conclusion, the
implementation of A4R is not a story of either/or, as any of the three institutional models
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The present contrast between cooperation (commons) and competition (market) as
two instances of voluntary regulation provides a good opportunity to once again point
out that, while the three institutional models are often talked about in terms of mutually
exclusive ideals, real-world institutions are mixed and must be situated on a continuum
between the ideals of market, state, and commons (see Figure 0.1: The Institutional
Plane).
419 Moreover, the choice between voluntary and public regulation, as presented by
Daniels and Sabin, is a false dichotomy. Voluntary and public regulation can be blended
in what one might call “coordinated competition,” where the voluntary adoption of A4R
by market actors is facilitated from the top-down, albeit without instituting a hard
requirement (see also 5.5.1 Breaking Open the Dichotomy).
420 Daniels hints at such a cooperative approach in Just Health (2008). He suggests that in
“an intensely competitive environment” associations of organizations may have an easier
time adopting A4R than individual organizations. (Daniels, Just Health, 119.)
421 Moreover, the local adoption of A4R by a range of organizations in a variety of contexts
would result in a large number of parallel institutional experiments, allowing proponents
of the approach to learn what works and what does not when implementing A4R as well
as to refine the approach itself (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments).
395

(i.e., market, states, and commons) may prove successful in promoting the approach. The
best bet to implement A4R successfully is to pursue the approach along the lines of the
three institutional paradigms simultaneously, among others, in the form of hybrid
institutional arrangements (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).422

Both this chapter and section are titled A4R in Practice, but the preceding discussion of
the conditions of A4R in relation to commons research raises the following question: How
practical does Ostrom’s work make Daniels and Sabin’s approach? Commons research
adds to the practicability of A4R by conceiving of the approach’s four conditions as design
principles that must be specified in order to be implemented in concrete organizations
operating in dissimilar local conditions (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles), as is argued
by Ostrom as well as Daniels and Sabin (see 4.4.3 Daniels and Ostrom: A Natural Fit?).
Commons research provides an abstract framework and technical language to think and
to talk about the A4R approach. Moreover, Ostrom’s work provides a theoretical toolkit
rooted in empirical evidence to avoid certain pitfalls when implementing A4R, while at
the same time suggesting new solutions to put the approach in practice. Ultimately, the
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Much depends on the institutional context, public regulation seems the obvious path
to implement A4R in single-payer systems, while a mixed health care system, like that of
the United States, likely requires a multipronged approach (see also 2.2 The Ostrom
Approach). That being said, even in single-payer systems other institutional arrangements
can play a role in promoting A4R. For example, when there is no broad political agreement
on the adoption of A4R, individual organizations or groups of organizations may still be
able to move ahead with the adoption of the approach voluntarily. Of course, more often
than not organizations are not allowed to do so within the confines of a centralized health
care system. Commons research suggests central authorities should grant some
autonomy to subsidiaries (see 2.6.7 Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize), among
others, to promote innovation (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments).
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adoption of A4R must be conceived as a continuous process of institutional change within
a dynamic health care landscape, striving for an as-fair-as-possible allocation of resource
through institutional trial-and-error. The following section highlights some more ways in
which Ostrom’s work is relevant to Daniels and Sabin’s approach beyond elucidating the
four conditions of A4R.
4.5 THE FURTHER INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A4R
NIE in general and commons research in particular interface with the A4R approach in
more ways than can easily be discussed within the confines of the four conditions. I
highlight a few other key ideas from institutional thought and their potential value to
Daniels and Sabin’s work. It is important to note that while the following discussion is
systematic, it is not exhaustive.
4.5.1 BREAKING OPEN THE DICHOTOMY
A4R does not depend on any one institutional arrangement. From the outset, Daniels and
Sabin note the legitimacy problem is common to all health care systems, regardless of the
institutional details, and so is their proposed solution.423 In other words, market, state,
commons, and hybrid institutions alike can adopt the A4R approach. Nevertheless,
Daniels and Sabin’s work is framed by the market-state dichotomy (see 0.2 Market and
State: A False Dichotomy), which exerts a considerable influence on their writing and the
ideas expressed therein. To give just a few examples: Both in the original preface of
Setting Limits Fairly (2002) and in the preface to the second edition (2008), Daniels and
Sabin discuss limit setting in the context of private (market), public (state), and mixed
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 4.
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(market-state) health care systems.424 Of course, their argument is that limit setting must
inevitably take place in all these systems, but the dichotomy nonetheless figures
prominently in the prefaces. The influence of the dichotomy is also noticeable in the first
chapter, where Daniels and Sabin discuss the legitimacy problem in terms of market and
state.425,426 Their discussion of the regulative condition is another example of how the
dichotomy defines their work. The latter example is particularly interesting, because it
shows that while the institutions of market and state often function as mere guide marks,
they nonetheless influence certain key concepts, among others, the regulative condition,
which is construed in terms of voluntary and public regulation, with a clear preference for
the latter (see 4.4.4.3 The Regulative Condition).
As Daniels and Sabin are stuck in the dichotomy’s institutional straightjacket, they
fail to see the possibility of cooperation at the meso-level of health care institutions.
Commons research breaks open the discussion of A4R by introducing an institutional
arrangement that is especially amenable to accounts of procedural justice in general and
the A4R approach in particular. Integrating commons research with A4R retains the
institutional flexibility that Daniels and Sabin are looking for in the development of their
approach, while at the same time providing an adaptable set of concrete institutional
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, vii-xiii.
Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 6-10.
426 Daniels and Sabin contrast the public health care systems of Europe with the mixed
health care system of the United States. Interestingly, they also frame the challenge of
setting limits in health care systems in the developing world in terms of the institutions
of market and state. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 6-10.) While I have not paid
special attention to health care in the developing world, because of particular issues that
arise in the context, the relative weakness of the status quo institutions may make it
easier to set up health care commons in developing countries (see 5.3 Future Research).
425
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design principles for the fair allocation of health care resources. The integration of both
approaches is promising, but if this chapter has shown anything, it is that more work must
be done to incorporate the ideas of Ostrom with those of Daniels and Sabin into a
coherent approach. Pending a more complete integration of both approaches, NIE can
provide another interesting, albeit more modest contribution to A4R by supplying
theoretical tools to think about health care organizations more intricately and
systematically, even within the confines of the market-state continuum.
4.5.2 INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS
Commons research emphasizes the presence and importance of rule interactions, which
matter to Daniels and Sabin’s approach in at least two different ways. First, the four
conditions of A4R are interrelated.427 Moreover, the provisions of A4R interact with
Ostrom’s design principles when combined into an integrated approach. Discussions of
the design principles often underline interactions between them.428 For example, often
the third design principle is discussed in relation to the second design principle, which
suggests the need for congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local
conditions (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements). Similarly, the nesting principle is
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Of course, a relationship between rules does not necessarily imply an interaction, but
often rules do interact with one other. For example, nesting rules influence the
boundaries of the CPR, while any change to the boundary rules will have repercussions
for the nesting of the institution (see 2.6.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries and 2.6.8 Nested
Enterprises).
428 While discussions of individual design principles often mention their relationship to
other principles, the commons literature does not provide a detailed analysis and
mapping of the interactions between the principles. A more systematic treatment of
institutional interactions is a promising avenue for future research, as such interactions
plausibly contribute to the success and failure of institutions.
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at least in part motivated by the first design principle, which calls for clearly defined
boundaries (see 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises). The four conditions of A4R interact with one
another in much the same way. Daniels and Sabin implicitly acknowledge the conditions
are interrelated in their discussion of the regulative condition, which ensures the
adoption of the publicity, relevance, and revisions conditions. However, commons
research suggests the conditions interact with one another beyond the influence exerted
by the regulative condition on the three prior conditions. For example, the publicity
condition must also apply to the regulation of A4R. In the same way, the revisions and
appeals condition, which must allow for institutional change, interacts with the regulative
condition (see 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition). Combining A4R with the design
principles for successful commons institutions results in additional and more complex
interactions, as the number of variables increases. To give just one example, the
regulative condition must include rules for monitoring and sanctioning (see 2.6.4
Monitoring and 2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions), which in turn influence the regulative
condition.
Second, interactions occur between rules operating at different levels of analysis
(see also 2.5 The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework).429 Adopting a set of
rules in one place within an institutional arrangement likely has implications for rules
downstream, upstream, and laterally. To give an example, if one of Kaiser Permanente’s

429 Interactions sit at the center of the IAD framework (see Figure 2.1: The IAD framework).

However, the IAD framework primarily focuses on the effect of interactions between
participants within an action situation on the situation’s outcomes. Granted, the rules-inuse shape the action situation, but interactions between the rules are not the focal point
of the framework or discussions thereof.
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Medical Groups would adopt the A4R approach, then this would have implications for the
rules within that Medical Group (downstream), but it could also affect the rules of other
Medical Groups and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (lateral). In addition, the rules of the
overarching Permanente Foundation impact the adoption of A4R by one of the Medical
Groups (upstream), but these higher-level rules could also change under the influence of
important rule changes with one of the Medical Groups.430 It is worth noting that even in
cases where the relationship between the rules seems unidirectional, say the
downstream implementation of A4R, interactions can still be bi- or multidirectional. To
illustrate, downstream institutional arrangements can resist the introduction of the new
rules, which may result in the need to change the rules during or after implementation.
Moreover, institutions are not closed systems, but are embedded in environments in
which they interact with other discrete institutional entities (e.g., competitors,
stakeholders).431 Thus, rule interactions take place between institutions that at first sight
appear independent from one another. For example, a health care system’s resource
allocation rules are likely influenced by the rules-in-use at competing health care systems.
The last two design principles (see 2.6.7 Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize and
2.6.8 Nested Enterprises) are meant to regulate the relationship between rules at
different loci of analysis, whether vertically or horizontally.
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The example makes abstraction of the intricacies of Kaiser Permanente’s
organizational structure. For example, the Medical Groups are self-governed entities, and
thus they are not full subsidiaries of the Permanente Federation in the way the term is
usually understood (i.e., subordinate to and controlled by). The aim of the example is to
illustrate rule interactions within complex organizations.
431 Institutions are also embedded in, and thus impacted by, more encompassing social,
political, and legal institutions.
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While I have focused on two particular types of institutional interactions, it is
worth keeping in mind that rules interact in a multitude of ways, some of which may be
unexpected. To give an example, the adoption of A4R to set fair limits on resource usage
may influence rules for human resource management, or interfere with norms used by
health care providers when communicating with their patients. When implementing the
A4R approach, or when introducing any other major rule changes, institutional designers
should be conscious of the possibility of rule interactions to ensure institutional success
and sustainability.
4.5.3 THE COST OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
NIE draws attention to the cost of rule changes. While Daniels and Sabin are fully aware
of the difficulty of implementing A4R, they do not explicitly discuss the cost of institutional
change as a significant challenge to the implementation of their approach. This is
especially interesting because Daniels and Sabin’s work centers on the issue of cost in the
context of resource allocation, which motivates their research and figures prominently in
some of their proposed solutions (i.e., a deliberative approach to cost-effectiveness
analysis).432,433 In short, Daniels and Sabin are intimately familiar with the issue of cost in
health care. However, they fail to apply their extensive experience with of cost-based
reasoning to their own approach, particularly the implementation thereof. Any change to
the rules implies costs. This is particularly clear in the case of health care reform, which is
no other than a large-scale overhaul of the rules governing health care. In order to effect
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Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 12, 37-39, 55-57.
Daniels, Just Health, 105-106, 114-117.
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institutional change, a large enough group of actors must see the benefits of adopting the
new set of rules as outweighing the costs of doing so.434 The same cost-benefit reasoning
applies to the implementation of A4R, regardless of whether the approach is adopted by
a local hospital or by a national health care system. I provide three illustrations of how
cost-based reasoning matters when implementing A4R: (1) Institutional design requires
time, effort, and money (e.g., meetings to decide upon the new rules, changes to
guidelines and IT systems, training). Whether the aim is to introduce new rules or to
modify existing ones, institutional change implies considerable upfront costs that are
higher the more complex the institutional setting (e.g., health care system, large
hospital).435 The upfront costs of changing the rules may be so high that they prove
difficult to overcome, even when there are benefits to adopting the new rules. (2) Even
though Daniels and Sabin provide rigorous theoretical arguments and considerable
empirical evidence to support their approach, it is not at all certain the adoption of A4R
by a concrete organization will be successful in terms of the benefits that follow from the
rule change. This uncertainty must be discounted when weighing the costs and benefits
of adopting A4R, making it less likely the approach is implemented. (3) For the sake of the
argument, consider a concrete organization that is in a unique position to adopt A4R
without incurring any of the upfront costs associated with doing so. Moreover, assume
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To say a “large enough group of actors must see the benefit of adopting the new set
of rules” is an oversimplification, as the size of the group of actors is not the only relevant
variable. The influence actors can exert on the decision-making process also matters.
More often than not, a small but powerful group of decision makers are the ones who
decide upon the rule change.
435 The presence of rule interactions adds to the cost of implementing rule changes (see
4.5.2 Institutional Interactions).
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the implementation with certainty would result in a fairer allocation of resources, and
even to a more efficient use of resources.436 Thus, the benefits of adopting the approach
outweigh the costs. Even under these assumptions, the approach still may not be
implemented if the cost-benefit analysis works out differently for key decision-makers
who are disadvantaged by changing the rules, say, because they benefit financially from
the current state of affairs.
NIE’s emphasis on the cost of institutional change is valuable when putting Daniels
and Sabin’s approach into practice, as it can help to guide rule changes. To give an
example, while the benefits of A4R might not outweigh the costs of implementing the
approach at one scale, the cost-benefit calculus may be in favor of the approach at
another scale (e.g., the approach may successfully be implemented within a department
or unit, but not system-wide). Moreover, the focus on the cost of rule changes can enrich
some of Daniels and Sabin’s arguments. For example, the high upfront costs associated
with implementing A4R suggests the need for public regulation (see 4.4.4.3 Regulative
Condition). At the same time, however, NIE’s cost-benefit analysis highlights the challenge
of effecting institutional change from the top down when those at the top do not stand
to benefit from the new rules.
4.5.4 INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY
Ostrom’s work draws attention to the importance of institutional sustainability and the
sustainable management of scarce resources. The two are inextricably linked, as the
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In other words, the two hurdles discussed previously are no longer an impediment to
implementing A4R.
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former is a prerequisite for the latter (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons).437 Moreover,
the sustainability of both the available resources and the institutions managing them is a
precondition for fair resource allocation.438,439 Therefore, institutional sustainability is
relevant to Daniels and Sabin’s work.
To be sustainable, institutions must be adaptable, i.e., able to respond to changing
circumstances. For the A4R approach, as for any set of rules, provisions must be made to
alter the rules in response to changes. Daniels and Sabin foresee a mechanism to change
the operational rules through the inclusion of the revisions and appeals condition (see
4.4.4.3 The Revisions and Appeals Condition). However, they do not discuss the need for
the A4R approach itself to be changeable, at least when put into institutional practice.
Remember, the four conditions themselves are concrete, but high-level requirements
that must be made specific when the approach is implemented (see 4.4.4.4 The
Regulative Condition), i.e., the institutional details need to be filled out. A4R, as an
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I leave aside uncommon scenarios in which the institution collapses and the resource
flourishes as a result. For example, the disappearance of a coastal culture relying on
fishery may lead to an increase in the number of fish. Two remarks are in place: (1) The
example may come across as counterintuitive, because commons research focuses on
situations where the absence of rules leads to the overexploitation and, ultimately, to the
destruction of the resource. (2) Scenarios like the one above may be limited to natural
resources, as it is difficult to imagine artificial resources flourishing in an institutional
vacuum. There may be certain outlandish examples, like a self-sustaining artificial
intelligence or a colony of nanobots, even though those are unique in that they can
plausibly be conceived as corporeal sets of rules (i.e., institutions). For the purpose of the
present discussion, it is sufficient to note that health care resources do not thrive in the
absence of governing institutions.
438 Of course, sustainability in and of itself is not a sufficient condition for equity, but in
order to ensure the fair allocation of resources, the resources and the rules-in-use cannot
collapse.
439 Daniels acknowledges this in his discussion of aging and intergenerational equity.
(Daniels, Just Health, 166-168.)
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approach to deliberative justice, is general enough to remain the same over time, so the
four conditions can remain the same in light of changing circumstances.440 This is not true,
however, of real-world applications of the approach, which must be able to respond to
change. To give a straightforward example, resource allocation decisions can be made
public by sending a physical letter to patients and providers, but technological innovations
allow such decisions to be communicated via email or even social media (e.g., Twitter).
The same applies to the appeals condition, which can require petitioners to file an appeal
in person, or allow them to fill out and submit a form online. In both cases, technological
developments suggest changes to the way in which the publicity and appeals conditions
are implemented respectively. Institutions that utilize the A4R approach must make sure
their implementation is dynamic, allowing changes to be made to the set of rules as
circumstances change.
Interestingly, the idea of institutional sustainability also highlights an unexplored
feature of A4R, as the approach can help to ensure the sustainability of health care
institutions and resources. After all, if their members perceive health care institutions as
unfair, then this can adversely impact the sustainability of rules and resources alike in that
inequity leads to free-rider behavior. In other words, institutions that adopt A4R may, by
doing so, change incentives in a way that discourages free-riding behavior and boosts
sustainability. This is not just true of health care institutions, but of any organization

440

Of course, the level of abstraction of their approach may also explain why Daniels and
Sabin do not deem it necessary to discuss the adaptability of their approach, as the
conditions of A4R as design principles of equitable health care institutions stand
regardless of changes in circumstances. I argue this inalterability does not apply to
concrete A4R implementations, which need to be flexible in light of changes.
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managing scarce resources, whether natural or artificial. This once again highlights the
potential relevance of Daniels and Sabin’s work to commons research (see also 4.3.2.1 A
Theory of Justice for the Commons?).
4.5.5 (RE)ESTABLISHING THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION
Procedural accounts of justice, like A4R, can help to (re)establish the spirit of cooperation
throughout the American health care system.441 As I have discussed at length,
cooperation is advantageous in institutional design, as rules developed with considerable
input of stakeholders result in better performing institutions, among others, because the
set of rules is better adapted to local circumstances and compliance rates are higher.442,443
Beyond the realm of institutions, cooperation can result in improved quality of care and
patient safety, to name just a few potential benefits.444 Then again, an institutionalist
would argue these benefits too are due to improvements in the rules. Regardless, reaping
the benefits of cooperation is difficult when members are primarily committed to the

441 To

say the spirit of cooperation must be “reestablished” makes it seem like health care
must return to some bygone era rife with collaboration. Nostalgia for such a mythical age
of cooperation in health care is misguided, as it likely never existed. In the past, health
care was much less of a collaborative endeavor, among others, due to technological
limitations and a more limited need for resources. That being said, there are reasons why
collaboration on certain health care issues (e.g., health care reform) may have been easier
in the past, for example, because the population was more homogeneous or economic
growth larger.
442 Elinor Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” Journal of Bioeconomics
16 (2014): 13.
443 William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang, and Elinor Ostrom, “Regularities
from the Field and Possible Explanations,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources,
eds. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 2006), 304.
444 Lyndon Morley and Angela Cashell, “Collaboration in Health Care,” Journal of Medical
Imaging and Radiation Sciences 48, no. 2 (June 2017): 208-210.
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pursuit of their self-interest. Strategic behavior results in prospective collaborators being
stuck in the Nash equilibrium of the game, and unable to move toward a mutually
beneficial outcome (see also 1.4 Argument II: Game Theory). Breaking out of such a
vicious circle of defection is a tall order, as is evidenced by the difficulties of effecting
comprehensive health care reform in the United States. Daniels and Sabin’s approach,
and other accounts of procedural justice, can help to (re)establish a spirit of cooperation
in health care through the emphasis on deliberation in making and changing the rules for
allocating health care resources.
Of course, procedural accounts of justice are themselves subject to existing
barriers to collaboration. Daniels and Sabin are implicitly aware of the presence of this
second-order collective-action problem, as is evidenced by, among others, their
acknowledgment of a coordination problem when implementing the regulative condition
(see 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition). Potentially the challenge can be overcome by
reestablishing collaboration from the bottom up, relying on small-scale deliberative
initiatives to build a spirit of cooperation. Such small initiatives can create the social
networks and trust required to collaborate on a larger scale. Both parallel experiments
and polycentric governance systems may play a role in scaling up small institutions for
deliberative justice (see 3. The Polycentric Experiment), or in levering these initiatives to
launch other collaborative endeavors (e.g., health care reform).
A further challenge in establishing cooperation is the threat of elite capture, i.e.,
the possibility that a small group of influential actors hijacks the decision-making process
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and shapes the rules to its.445 Applied to accounts of procedural justice, elite capture
means that a small group of actors takes over and steers the deliberative process to
allocate health care resources. For A4R specifically, the risk is particularly pressing in the
context of the appeals condition and the regulative condition.446 So even if actors
successfully establish cooperation at a lower level of analysis, their efforts can be
thwarted by the self-interested behavior of higher-level actors. In other words, smallscale experiments in deliberative justice may be difficult to expand beyond their
institutional confines, or operate as a basis for expanded collaboration. While
administrators and politicians are the usual suspects when discussing the issue of elite
capture in health care, it is worth noting the threat of elite capture also comes from within
bioethics, as philosophers and bioethicists may want to push their approach to fair
resource governance in the belief that it is correct.447 By virtue of their emphasis on
deliberation when making resource-allocation decisions, accounts of deliberative justice
provide some safety against elite capture, but they are not immune to the threat. In the
case of A4R, for example, experts can limit access to the deliberative process or restrict
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Rawls acknowledges the risk of elite capture in A Theory of Justice. (Rawls, A Theory of
Justice, 207-208.)
446 I touched upon the risk of elite capture in the discussion of the third condition (see
4.4.4.3 The Revisions and Appeals Condition).
447 While not familiar with the notion “elite capture,” Lawson highlights the risk of ethics
experts taking over decision-making processes, for example, through ethics committees.
She cites Myra Christopher, the head of the Midwest Bioethics Center, “"the ethics
committee model empowers a small group of people with knowledge and authority so
that they become a resource pool for others to consult." (Catherin Lawson, “The Second
Stage of Bioethics and Institutional Economics,” Journal of Economic Issues 32, no. 4
(December 1998): 988.) Lawson’s example shows the risk of elite capture in biomedical
beyond the issue of fair resource allocation.
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what counts as relevant reasons in making decisions about resource allocation. I argue
the A4R approach is susceptible to these criticisms elsewhere in the chapter (see also
4.4.4.2 The Relevance Condition).448 The challenge posed by elite capture suggests the
need for broad deliberation and collaboration from the bottom up. Moreover, the issue
once again highlights the need for good institutional design (e.g., monitoring loops)449 in
order to mitigate the threat of elite capture and to promote deliberation and
cooperation.450
4.5.6 SOLVING THE LEGITIMACY PROBLEM
The legitimacy problem is central to Daniels’s argument in favor of A4R, as the approach
aims to legitimize decisions about the governance of health care resources (see 4.4.1
Accountability for Reasonableness). Even though Ostrom is not especially concerned with
legitimacy, she does highlight the importance of legitimacy in making resource allocation
decisions on a number of occasions.451,452 Legitimacy is primarily of instrumental value to
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Commons institutions are not immune to the threat of elite capture either. An elite
group of actors can capture the decision-making process within a commons institution
and powerful commons can take over decision-making within larger institutional
arrangements. A possible, albeit imperfect solution is to situate deliberative processes at
the middle-level of the organization.
449 See 2.6.4 Monitoring for a more detailed discussion of monitoring loops.
450 While the details of “good” institutional design differ from case to case, Ostrom’s
design principles and the conditions of A4R can serve as the basis to design institutions
with a reduced risk of elite capture and an increased incentive for cooperation.
451 Apart from the citations below, see also: Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B.
Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Policansky, “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons,
Global Challenges,” Science 284, no. 5412 (April 1999): 280.
452 Ostrom lists equitability as one of the criteria to evaluate institutional performance
(see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons). While she does not specify the criterion, the
remarks that follow suggest that legitimacy is a key component of an equitable institution.
Tradeoffs between benefits and costs may be another indicator of equitability (see 2.6.2
Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions).
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Ostrom, as it leads to better performing institutions and improved resource management.
She writes,

When appropriators monitor and enforce boundary and authority rules they
consider to be legitimate and effective, they are likely to improve performance in
the CPR. While legitimate and effective rules can come from external sources, our
studies suggest that a more effective source is the appropriators themselves. 453

While the passage focuses on monitoring and sanctioning rules, the same argument
applies to rule making in general, as Ostrom notes when discussing collective-choice
arrangements in Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005).454 Ostrom’s remarks on
legitimacy matter to the A4R approach in at least two ways: First, commons research
provides additional empirical evidence for the claim that stakeholder participation in the
process of allocating resources increases legitimacy, thus backing up Daniels and Sabin’s
approach as well as other deliberative accounts. The evidence suggests more stakeholder
involvement leads to more legitimacy, which is an argument for broad participation in the
decision-making process, despite the issues that arise from involving a large number of
actors (e.g., logistics, disagreement). While Daniels and Sabin argue in favor of broad
participation in the deliberative process, it does seem that they want to limit participation
by certain low-level actors, particularly patients. Second, Ostrom’s discussion of
legitimacy provides another argument in favor of implementing A4R. To recapitulate,
participation in the deliberative process increases legitimacy, which results in rules that
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Blomquist, Schlager, Tang, and Ostrom. “Regularities from the Field and Possible
Explanations,” 304.
454 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 263.
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resources users perceive as fair. Consequently, participants are more willing to comply
with the resource-governance rules, leading to increased institutional performance.455 In
other words, the adoption of deliberative justice approaches in general and A4R in
particular may lead to better performing health care institutions, an important reason for
introducing procedural accounts. This argument also supports Daniels and Sabin’s claim
that health care organizations may be able to gain a competitive advantage by “being
open about reasons”456 and thus may be willing to adopt A4R under a regimen of
voluntary regulation (see 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition).457
In order to increase the legitimacy of resource allocation decisions, it is likely
beneficial to pursue legitimacy for its own sake, i.e., to recognize the intrinsic value of
legitimacy.458 Within the context of deliberative approaches to resource governance,
allocation decisions in large part derive their legitimacy from the opportunity actors have
to participate in the decision-making process, even if a decision does not go their way

455

An increased willingness to comply with rules that are perceived as fair and legitimate
is plausibly the most important contributor to improved institutional performance, but it
is not the only reason institutional performance may improve. Actors may be more willing
to report rule breaches by others if they perceive the rules as fair and legitimate (see 2.6.4
Monitoring). Moreover, rules developed by actors should be better adapted to local
conditions and thus result in improved institutional performance.
456 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 61.
457 The question remains what it means for an institution to perform better. Presumably,
improvements in performance mean that an institution does better in regards to the
criteria used to evaluate institutional performance (i.e., justice, sustainability, efficiency,
effectiveness, and robustness). See 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons.
458 While Ostrom does not explicitly discuss the intrinsic value of legitimacy, a deep
concern for deliberation and its impact on legitimacy that goes beyond its value in
improving institutional performance permeates her work.
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eventually.459 This implies participants should be offered an opportunity to be heard. As
Largent notes,

Expressing one’s views has instrumental value to the extent that this input results
in a better policy. It also has intrinsic value because even if the opportunity to
speak does not ultimately change the outcome, the very existence of the
opportunity implies that one’s opinion is respected and worth hearing.460

At the end of the day, the opportunity to have one’s opinion heard and respected may
contribute most to the legitimacy of resource allocation decisions. A concern for hearing
actors because their input deserves to be taken seriously may go further in legitimizing
resource allocation decisions than hearing actors because doing so would lead to
improved institutional performance, even if the desired outcome were a more equitable
distribution of resources. In other words, institutions that explicitly recognize the intrinsic
value of deliberation may be more likely to reap the benefits of deliberative procedures
than those that adopt such an approach for the sake of improvements in performance. A
few remarks are in place: First, the above claim is hypothetical, as I have no evidence to
back it up. Second, there is the question of how an institution would show that it is
committed to hearing actors’ input? Presumably, an institution can set up its rules to
communicate its commitment to deliberation, e.g., by committing a considerable amount
of resources to deliberative processes in the implementation of the procedural

459

By now, it should be clear that an opportunity to participate is not the only factor in
legitimizing resource allocation decisions, even in deliberative accounts. The procedure
to arrive at resource governance decisions matters beyond providing participants an
opportunity to voice their opinion. The A4R approach, for example, stipulates the relevant
reasons and the need for revisions and appeals mechanism.
460 Largent, “Health Care Organizations and the Power of Procedure,” 51.
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approach.461 Even then, the commitment can be inauthentic or perceived as inauthentic
by participants.
4.6 TOWARD AN ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS
The foregoing discussion suggests that one path to the fair governance of health care
resources is through the development and implementation of deliberative resource
allocation mechanisms at the institutional meso-level. While I have focused on Daniels
and Sabin’s A4R approach, which I show can fruitfully be integrated with Ostrom’s work
on the commons, other procedural accounts exist (e.g., Emanuel, Eddy, Fleck), and they
can plausibly be integrated with NIE as well (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements).462
However, resource-allocation decisions are not the only type of decision that institutions
must make a ruling on that is moral in nature. A host of other decisions is taken at the
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The amount of resources committed to deliberation can plausibly be used as a proxy
to test the hypothesis that a strong commitment to deliberation leads to gains in
legitimacy over a more superficial commitment. For example, a study could compare the
perceived legitimacy of resource-allocation decisions between organizations that expend
a considerable amount of resources on deliberation and organizations that do not.
462 To give an example, Fleck’s account, which draws heavily on Daniels and Sabin’s
approach, appears amenable to integration with commons research, among others,
because he bases his work on that of Daniels and Sabin. He argues “rational democratic
deliberative practices” bring together three moral considerations: (1) For resource
allocation decisions to be fair, they must be rationally justified (see 4.4.4.2 The Relevance
Condition). (2) The deliberative process must be “public, visible, and transparent” (see
4.4.4.1 The Publicity Condition). (3) “[T]he primary virtue of this deliberative democratic
model […] is that all rationing decisions would be self-imposed in a very morally
substantive sense.” The example Fleck provides of this “self-imposed rationing model,” a
thousand factory workers defining a health benefit package, is (similar to) a health care
commons. (Leonard Fleck, Just Caring: Health Care Rationing and Democratic Deliberation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 15-18.) Moreover, Fleck discusses “constitutional
principles of health care justice” that “define the legitimate space of democratic
deliberation,” which closely resemble constitutional-choice rules (see 0.5.3 Rules). (Ibid.,
184-194.) Whether these principles are indeed constitutional-choice rules or metaprinciples for the formulation of constitutional rules is up for debate.
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level of health care institutions that have an ethical component, among others,
surrounding billing practices and the marketing of health care services.463 Moreover,
there are issues like the seemingly arbitrary variations in clinical practice (and outcomes)
between providers, which lie outside of the scope of either economic decision-making
(e.g., resource governance, billing) or research questions, but nonetheless raise ethical
concerns at the institutional level.464 Still other moral issues surround population-based
practice (i.e., gearing health care services to specific populations) and the use of new
health care technologies beyond their cost narrowly conceived (e.g., administrative
coordination of services).465 Each of these issues involve administrative and
organizational considerations that raise new ethical issues, which ought to be addressed
within the scope of a meso-level ethics of health care institutions.466
Interestingly, while bioethics, clinical ethics, professional ethics, and health care
ethics have all become mature and well-developed fields of applied ethics, the ethics of
health care institutions has received surprisingly little attention, especially given the fact
that health care has become increasingly institutionalized since the second half of the
twentieth century.467 The turn of the century saw a brief spike of interest in the ethics of
health care institutions in response to an initiative by Khushf in HEC Forum (1999) in
tandem with a complementary push by Patricia Werhane and Mary Rorty in a special issue

463 George Khushf, “The

Scope of Organizational Ethics,” HEC Forum 10, no. 2 (June 1998):
127.
464 Khushf, “The Scope of Organizational Ethics,” 128-129.
465 Khushf, “The Scope of Organizational Ethics,” 129-130.
466 Khushf, “The Scope of Organizational Ethics,” 131.
467 Patricia H. Werhane and Mary V. Rorty, “Organization Ethics in Health Care,”
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9, no. 2 (April 2000): 145.
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of the Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics (2000).468,469 Around the same time,
Werhane and Rorty, together with Edward Spencer and Dan Mills, published a book titled
Organization Ethics in Health Care (2000).470 Since then, however, efforts to develop a
full-fledged ethics of health care institutions have largely stalled, while the task of
developing a meso-level ethics of health care institutions remains far from complete, and
arguably has only become more urgent. On the contrary, one might say that researchers
have only just commenced with the development of such an ethics, which will require a
long-term and interdisciplinary effort.
Throughout the project, I have explored issues relating to the development of an
ethics of health care institutions, particularly to regulate resource governance (see 4. A4R
in Practice). While the development of a full-fledged ethics of health care institutions is
beyond the scope of the current project, I briefly want to discuss some further
recommendations to develop such an ethics inspired by NIE: (1) An ethics of health care
institutions must roughly be situated at the meso-level, in between the more traditional
and well-developed areas of micro-ethics (i.e., concerned with relationships between
individuals) and macro-ethics (i.e., broad issues of social and economic policy).471 Hence,
Khushf uses the term “inter-ethics.”472 Of course, by now it should be clear that
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George Khushf, “Struggling to Understand the Nature of Organizational Ethics,” HEC
Forum 11, no. 4 (December 1999).
469 Werhane and Rorty, “Organization Ethics in Health Care.”
470 Edward M. Spencer, Ann E. Mills, Mary V. Rorty, and Patricia H. Werhane, Organization
Ethics in Health Care (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
471 George Khushf, “The Two Sides of Inter-Ethics,” HEC Forum 12, no. 3 (September
2000): 187.
472 Khushf, “The Scope of Organizational Ethics,” 133.
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distinctions between the micro-, meso-, and macro-level are seldom clear-cut in practice,
but this conceptual trifecta provides a useful language to think about health care ethics
in the broadest possible sense, including an ethics of health care institutions. (2) The levels
of health care ethics are interdependent. Micro-, meso-, and macro-level ethics interact
with one another in complex ways, much like the actors that these levels represent (i.e.,
individuals, organizations, health systems/states). Fleshing out the conceptual
relationships between these levels is one of the key challenges of the development of a
meso-level ethics of health care institutions, which does not only have to find an ethical
space for itself in between the micro- and macro-level, but has the potential to bridge
these levels.473 To give a concrete example, the tension between the fiduciary duties
providers have towards their patients (micro-level) and the concerns of health care
systems to set fair limits on resource usage (macro-level) can potentially be resolved by
implementing A4R through commons-like arrangements (meso-level) (see 4.4 A4R in
Practice). (3) Any ethics of health care institutions will have to be easily adoptable and
adaptable by concrete health care organizations, among others, because such an ethics
has to be able to operate at different levels of analysis (e.g., group practice, hospital,
health plan) and cope with variations in local context (e.g., religion, design of health care
system). As Pellegrino and Thomasma note, “[I]nstitutional ethics does not imply a single
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As Pellegrino and Thomasma point out, “The problems of institutional morality, those
which emerge from the actions of organized groups, are more complex than those of
individual ethics.” (Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of
Medical Practice. Toward a Philosophy and Ethic of the Healing Professions (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1981), 246.) The increase in complexity becomes clear at the
macro-level and only increases further with the introduction of a meso-level ethics.
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rigid set of principles, uniformly practiced by all hospitals. This is manifestly impossible in
a society with such a wide range of values as ours. Indeed, our moral pluralism may itself
require some declaration by the institution of its values, if the patient’s own values are to
be fully protected.”474,475 In other words, an ethics of health care institutions has to be
sufficiently flexible to account for institutional diversity. (4) That being said, “certain
commonly applicable principles will undoubtedly emerge,”476 which can plausibly be
formulated in terms of design principles for ethical health care institutions (see 2.6 The
Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions and 4.4.2 A4A as Design Principles).
To illustrate, the requirement to be transparent, the presence of conflict-resolution
mechanisms (cf. revision and appeals condition), and the reliance on collective-choice
arrangements (i.e., democratic deliberation) when developing rules can be such
principles. (5) Commons research describes in detail one type of institutional
arrangement that possesses certain features that are amenable to be used as the basis
for, or as a key component of, ethical health care institutions. (6) NIE can provide a
language and conceptual tools that can help bioethicists, philosophers, and others active
in the field of health care ethics with the development of a meso-level ethics of health
care institutions (see 0.4 The Double Aim of the Project). The field’s focus on rules as the
foundational concept an ontology of institutions can serve as the basis for a renewed
attempt to establish an ethics of health care institutions (see also 0.5.2 Organization).
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Pellegrino and Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice, 249.
Of course, Pellegrino and Thomasma understand institution as synonymous to
organization (see 0.1.2 NIE, Bioethics, and Philosophy), but their plea for “institutional
flexibility,” and their example of moral pluralism, apply nonetheless.
476 Pellegrino and Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice, 249.
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In conclusion, I would like to extend a renewed invitation to develop a meso-level
ethics of health care institutions in the knowledge that, since the previous attempts, new
areas of research have come to the forefront that can aide ethicists in the development
of such an ethics. While establishing an inter-ethics remains a nontrivial task, NIE and
commons research suggest new avenues to take up the challenge.
4.7 CONCLUSION
Throughout the chapter, Ostrom’s work on the commons has served as the basis to
interpret, criticize, and enhance Daniels and Sabin’s A4R approach. Ultimately, commons
research has the potential to facilitate the implementation of A4R by conceiving of the
approach’s four conditions as institutional design principles for just health care
institutions. Vice versa, Daniels’ theory of justice has the potential to supply commons
research with a much-needed path to conceptualize and develop justice as a key
component of institutional performance. In addition, Daniels provides a justification for
thinking of certain artificial resources as common-pool resources, bringing them within
the scope of commons research. The synergy between the work of Ostrom and Daniels is
remarkable and deepens our understanding of both bodies of research.
The chapter suggests a few avenues for future research: First, the research of
Ostrom and Daniels overlaps in ways that I have not explored here, but fit within my
project’s overarching argument. For example, Daniels’ lengthy discussion of possible
conflicts between liberty and equality in Just Health Care (1985) can be related to the
discussion of the role of middle-level institutions in ensuring the freedom of health care

419

(see 3.4 Pluralism and the Freedom of Health Care).477 Second, the prior discussion
suggests that it is worthwhile to revisit Rawls’ work because he treats institutions and
their design in a way that is richer than Daniels’ usage of the concepts and closer to NIE
(see footnotes 15 and 176). Rereading Rawls with the confluence between the work of
Ostrom and Daniels in mind may allow for a tighter integration of their respective work.
The recently published monograph Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond
(2012) is a promising secondary source to further integrate the work of Ostrom, Daniels
and Rawls.478 Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009), which provides a critique and revision of
Rawls’ magnum opus, is another possible source, given its focus on institutions.479
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Daniels, Just Health Care, x, 114-220.
Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson eds., Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and
Beyond, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2012.
479 Indeed, Sen explicitly recognizes the similarities between the projects of Rawls and
Ostrom. (Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2009), 204.)
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CONCLUSION
TOWARD THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS
“The reasonable man adapts himself to the world;
the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt
the world to himself. Therefore all progress
depends on the unreasonable man.”1
- George Bernard Shaw -

5.1 PHILOSOPHIZING THE COMMONS, INSTITUTIONALIZING BIOETHICS
The project has taken a twofold approach. On the one hand, I have argued that NIE in
general and commons research in particular are valuable to bioethics, because they
supply a language to talk about health care institutions, and can shed new light on the
issue of allocating scarce health care resources. On the other hand, I have shown the value
of bioethics to commons research, as it can provide the basis for a philosophical reflection
on the commons, and can aide in the development of undertheorized areas of commons
research. Bioethics enables commons researchers to explicitly theorize and justify the
normative commitments integral to the commons framework. In several instances, the
two theses have overlapped, resulting in an interplay between commons research and
biomedical ethics within the same chapter or argument. I hope that the current project is

1

George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman (London: Penguin Books, [1903] 2000), 260.
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only the beginning of a flourishing dialogue between commons research and bioethics, as
I believe a continued back and forth can benefit both of these vibrant fields of inquiry.
The conclusion provides a brief summary of the project emphasizing its most
important contributions (see 5.2 Finding Common Ground: A Summary), followed by a
discussion of four especially promising avenues for future research (see 5.3 Future
Research), and a final reflection on the future of the commons in health care (see 5.4
Toward the Health Care Commons?).
5.2 FINDING COMMON GROUND: A SUMMARY
The project has been the first large-scale, systematic effort to bridge NIE/commons
research and biomedical ethics. The effort has been driven by the conviction that
providing such bridgework can further key debates in both of these areas of inquiry. In
the preceding chapters, I have shown the value of NIE/commons research to bioethics,
and vice versa (see 0.4 The Double Aim of the Project). I summarize the project’s main
contributions to both bodies of literature.
I have argued that NIE in general and commons research in particular are valuable
to biomedical ethics, because they can supply a theoretical language to talk and think
about health care institutions, organizations, and commons (see 0.5 A Glossary of
Commons Terms). Bioethics currently lacks such a language, making it difficult to discuss
institutional issues, as is evidenced by the issues surrounding the development of an
ethics of health care institutions (see 4.6 Toward an Ethics of Health Care Institutions). I
discussed the central strands of Ostrom’s work in relation to health care: First, I suggested
the IAD framework and the design principles of successful commons institutions can be
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used as tools for the design of successful health care institutions (see 2. Ostrom’s Black
Bag). Second, I showed the value of consciously, simultaneously, and continuously
experimenting with different sets of rules in order to find the best possible institutional
arrangement(s) to organize health care in general and to allocate resources in particular
(see 3.3 Parallel Experiments). Third, commons research suggests that health care
commons can play a key role in promoting pluralism in health care, and empowering
actors at the meso-level of the health care system, thus ensuring individual and
institutional liberty in health care (see 3.4 Pluralism and Freedom in Health Care). Finally,
I explored the possibility of developing polycentric governance systems in health care;
arguing in favor of commons, state, and market as complementary institutions rather
than as alternatives (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). Building on these
ideas, I showed that commons research has the potential to further longstanding debates
in biomedical ethics, particularly when it comes to the governance of scarce health care
resources. The project contributed to two arguments: First, I showed that health care is
at risk of suffering from a tragedy of the commons, providing arguments in favor of such
a tragedy and objections against it. Taking seriously the possibility of a tragedy of the
health care commons makes apparent the necessity for setting limits on the use of health
care resources (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons). Second, I applied
Ostrom’s work to Daniels’ theory of justice for health care and the accompanying A4R
approach, arguing that, while Daniels recognizes the need to cooperate when governing
health care resources, he does not fully appreciate the role the institutional meso-level
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can play in doing so. I argued that commons institutions are particularly suitable to put
Daniels’ approach to resource allocation into practice (see 4. A4R in Practice).
I have also provided a philosophical and normative analysis that advances NIE and
commons research. I analyzed some of the central concepts of commons research,
especially the notions of institution, organization, and resources (see 0.5 A Glossary of
Commons Terms). I critically and systematically assessed Ostrom’s principles for the
design of successful commons institutions, which are all too often taken piecewise (see
2.6 The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions). Third, I relied on Jacob
Levy’s work on the role of intermediate groups to argue for the importance of commons
institutions in ensuring the freedom of health care, both at the personal and the
institutional level. I argued that commons institutions are particularly well suited to fulfill
the role of bulwark against overbearing state and market institutions (see 3.4 Pluralism
and Freedom in Health Care). Finally, I assessed Ostrom’s proposal to develop mixed
governance regimes, looking at the advantages of such polycentric institutions (see 3.5
Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). Apart from critical reflection on the commons
and commons research, bioethics can help provide an explicit justified normative
framework implicitly assumed by commons researchers. Bioethics also enables us to
clarify and justify the equity criterion that Ostrom and colleagues use to evaluate success
of a given commons institution. Ostrom lists fairness as one of the criteria for the
evaluation of institutional performance, but she does not develop the criterion in her
work. I showed how Daniels’ theory of justice for health care, based on the work of John
Rawls, could provide Ostrom with an account of justice that is a good fit for her project,
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thus remedying a key shortcoming of commons research (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice
for the Commons?). I suggested the possibility of using the four conditions of the A4R
approach as additional design principles for the development of just commons
institutions (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles).
The project made two more general contributions: First, I discussed the potential
of NIE and commons research to improve the performance of all institutions governing
scarce health care resources, among others, by improving monitoring (e.g., closed
monitoring loops) and sanctioning (e.g., use of small, but visible sanctions). While
commons research has been developed in the context of resource governance,
recommendations like these have the potential to change and improve the design of
health care institutions in ways that impact other aspects of the organization and delivery
of health care (e.g., improve quality of care). Second, I extended an invitation to “learn to
see the commons” in health care. Much like Ostrom did not develop commons
institutions out of thin air, instead basing her analysis primarily on field studies of realworld commons institutions, the health care commons is not a novel idea, but a concept
that is applicable to a host of existing institutional arrangements (e.g., Gawande’s
example of physicians in Grand Junction, collaborative initiatives with Kaiser
Permanente). As such, the health care commons are not new. Commons research simply
helps policymakers, bioethicists, and others to see the commons in health care.
Recognizing existing health care commons is important because it allows researchers to
study them in order to determine what makes them (un)successful, and draw
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generalizable conclusions that potentially can be adapted and applied to other contexts
(see 5.3 Future Research).
Finally, the project has been characterized by a large number of cross-references,
and an even larger number of footnotes. The function of the footnotes has been to clarify,
but also to qualify claims in the body of the text, this in an attempt to do justice to the
complex reality of analyzing and solving institutional puzzles. I want to stress again that
institutional design is a messy affair! The “messiness” of commons research, and by
extension of at least some of the arguments presented here, is the result of tensions
inherent to institutional design in general and to the design of commons institutions in
particular. To give an example, the tension between allowing resource users to extract as
many resources as they need, without having them extract so many it destroys the
resource pool sits at the heart of any commons dilemma, and at any institutional effort
to solve it. The fact that Ostrom tries to do justice to the complexities of institutional
design problems must be regarded as a virtue. To quote Martha Nussbaum, “In general,
tension within a theory does not necessarily show that it is defective; it may simply show
that it is in touch with the difficulty of life."2
5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH
Since this project is the first large-scale effort to bridge two developed bodies of
literature, the prospects for future research are legion, but my work suggests a few
concrete avenues for further inquiry into the health care commons. I briefly discuss four

2

Martha Nussbaum, “The Future of Feminist Liberalism,” Proceedings and Addresses of
the American Philosophical Association 74, no. 2 (November 2000): 78.
426

particularly promising strands: (1) explore how the commons can improve quality of care,
(2) perform empirical studies of existing health care commons, (3) broaden the scope to
health care in the developing world, and (4) expand the philosophical reflection on the
commons.
First, the project has focused on the issue of allocating scarce resources with the
aim of averting a tragedy of the health care commons and setting fair limits. The emphasis
on resource allocation narrowly conceived has shifted attention away from the challenge
of improving quality of care, but the two issues are inextricably related. Ideally,
improvements in resource governance go hand-in-hand with improvements in quality of
care, but the relationships between institutional design, resource management, and
quality of care are complex. Future research should attempt to map these relationships.
A first step is to explore the ways in which commons institutions can positively affect
quality of care, much in the same way I have argued that commons can improve the
governance of health care resources. To give an example, organizing care within smallscale, cooperative institutions may improve health outcomes by improving the
relationship between providers and patients, among others, through increases in trust
and “patient-centeredness.”3,4 In short, the discussion of the health care commons must
be broadened beyond the sphere of resource governance to include improvements in the
quality of care.
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Mary Catherine Beach, Jeanne Keruly, and Richard D. Moore, “Is the Quality of the
Patient-Provider Relationship Associated with Better Adherence and Health Outcomes for
Patients with HIV?” Journal of General Internal Medicine 21, no. 6 (June 2006): 661.
4 Johanna Birkhäuer et al., “Trust in the Health Care Professional and Health Outcome: A
Meta-Analysis,” PLoS ONE 12, no. 2 (2017), https://doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0170988.
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Second, Ostrom repeatedly stresses the need to base policy on theory that is
supported by empirical evidence.5 While I have provided examples throughout the
project, the study of the health care commons would benefit greatly from the
comprehensive study of one or more existing health care commons institutions. The study
of real-world health care commons can shed light on the functioning of these institutions
as compared to the natural resource commons at the center of Ostrom’s research. Among
others, such fieldwork would be able to establish empirically to what extent the design
principles for successful commons institutions (see 2.6 The Design Principles of Successful
Commons Institutions) and the challenges faced by the commons carry over to health care
(see 2.7 Challenges Faced by the Health Care Commons), possibly suggesting new design
principles and identifying new challenges. In addition, the study of existent health care
commons can help to determine where and how such institutions fit within the health
care system as a whole (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?), suggesting
ways to better integrate them in health care’s status quo institutions. Fieldwork is
indispensable to pave the road for the successful large-scale implementation of health
care commons institutions.6 As field studies are the only way to provide sufficient
empirical data to answer the question, “What is the evidence that health care commons

5

Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool
Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 18.
6 A thorough analysis of the failure of the Obamacare cooperatives also fits within such
an empirical approach to the health care commons, much in the same way that Ostrom
discusses both successful and unsuccessful commons to determine the institutional
features that determine whether an institution thrives or fails.
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improve resource allocation decisions and quality of care?”7 At the same time, studying
health care commons in the field can serve as the basis for further theoretical reflection
in the commons literature, among others, regarding the application of the paradigm in
the context of artificial resources.
Third, while health care commons can be adopted by and integrated in developed
health care systems, commons may be a particularly suitable institutional arrangement
for organizing health care in the developing world. In the absence of large and complex
health care institutions, commons have the potential to establish robust institutions for
the local provision of care through emergent, bottom-up cooperation. In such a context,
health care commons may be able to rely on communities’ existing institutions for their
development.8 Moreover, the lack of mature health care institutions means commons
may have an easier time grounding themselves in the institutional landscape, as the status
quo institutions tend to crowd out alternative institutional arrangements chapter (see 1.7
Averting the Tragedy of the Health Care Commons).9 This opens perspective for health

7

The question is inspired by a similar one at the end of Daniels and Sabin’s Setting Limits
Fairly (2008). They recount how a provincial minister of health in China asked them the
following, “What is the evidence that accountability for reasonableness improves the
quality of decision making or leads to greater legitimacy for priority-setting decisions?”
(Norman Daniels and James Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
[2002] 2008), 231.) It is worth pointing out that Ostrom’s laboratory experiments provide
some evidence that approaches like A4R indeed increase the legitimacy of resource
allocation decisions, but more evidence is needed from health care practice.
8 The fact that many of the natural resource commons still existing today, and studied in
the commons literature, are located in the developing world likely is no coincidence.
Successful examples from developed countries are often situated within small, tight-knit
communities (e.g., lobster fisheries in New England, mountain meadows in Switzerland
and Japan).
9 Daniels and Sabin make a tangential point in Setting Limits Fairly (2002) when they point
out the legitimacy problem poses itself more urgently in developing countries, where
429

care commons research, as there is the possibility to design health care commons from
scratch, conduct institutional experiments (see 3. The Polycentric Experiment), and build
up an evidence base. Of course, much of the evidence may not transfer to the context of
developed health care systems, but it does not need to.10 Health care commons have the
potential to serve as the basic institutional building block for health care systems across
the developing world, but much work needs to be done before they can fulfill that role.
Finally, as a nascent area of inquiry, commons research can benefit from more
philosophical reflection. Two issues immediately come to mind: (1) While I have provided
a tentative solution to the issue of conceptualizing the contrast between institutions and
organizations, the problem is deserving of a more systematic philosophical discussion
given that this is a key criticism of NIE as a whole. A matter of social ontology,
philosophers may be able to further ongoing debates surrounding the institutionorganization distinction. (2) Commons institutions raise questions of collective
responsibility, itself a controversial notion, that are not considered in the literature. To
give just a few examples, to what extent can commons institutions be held morally

“public authorities are widely perceived to be untrustworthy and riddled with corruption”
and “the private sector remains unregulated, is itself riddled with corruption, and often
competes with and undermines the public sector.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits
Fairly, 10.) Health care commons can potentially fill the institutional void identified by
Daniels and Sabin.
10 Two remarks: (1) Conducting institutional experiments in developing countries with the
sole aim of building an evidence base that can serve for the development of health care
commons in the developed world is exploitative and would likely lead to more extreme
(i.e., riskier) institutional design. (2) The implementation of health care commons in
developed health care systems faces particular challenges (e.g., integrating them in other
institutional arrangements given the presence of health care’s status quo institutions and
the institutional complexity).
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responsible for the maintenance of the commons? A matter of so-called “forward looking
collective responsibility.”11 What responsibility does the group of resource users have to
bring about a fair allocation of the available resources? And how does this collective
responsibility translate to the responsibility of individual moral actors within the context
of the commons? Vice versa, the vast literature on collective responsibility may be able
to benefit from the commons literature, not only for examples, but also for theoretical
tools. Such intellectual cross-pollination between commons research and philosophy can
benefit both fields beyond questions of collective responsibility, as they can draw on each
other’s conceptual and theoretical apparatus.
5.4 TOWARD THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS?
Avenues for future research abound, the question remains what are the prospects for the
large-scale integration of commons institutions in health care? While I have touted the
advantages of introducing commons in health care at length, I have spent almost as many
words discussing the difficulties of doing so. The challenges that must be overcome are
indeed formidable, from the issue of size over the problem of coordinating cooperation
to the hijacking of the institutional design process by elites, to name just a few. The failure
of the Obamacare cooperatives stands as a testament to the difficulty of introducing a
“new” institutional arrangement into a complex health care system dominated by status

11

Marion Smiley, “Collective Responsibility,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2017 Edition), accessed April 1, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum
2017/entries/ collective-responsibility/.
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quo institutions.12 That being said, health care’s existing institutions likely have a key role
to fulfill in making the health care commons a success. In commons experiments, in the
absence of institutions to foster cooperative behavior, the commons are destroyed in
each scenario where there is a nonnegligible probability of destruction.13 In the time it
takes actors to learn about the resource and how to collaborate, the resource is already
destroyed.14 A result that is not particularly encouraging for real-world commons settings,
which are much more complex. Therefore, health care’s status quo institutions should
foster emergent cooperative initiatives at the meso-level, assisting them with building
knowledge and stimulating collaboration when it is at risk of breaking down. Ultimately,
the goal is to develop polycentric governance systems, which combine features of market,
state, and commons institutions into robust health care institutions able to allocate scarce
resources in a fair, efficient, and sustainable manner.
As a first step toward such an institutional (r)evolution, health care actors must
recognize that resources are limited, and setting limits is necessary in order to avoid a
tragedy of the health care commons, whether a catastrophic collapse or a creeping

12

The Obamacare cooperatives are a particular sort of commons institution in that the
ownership of the resources is shared among all the users. Commons, however, are not
an ownership system, but a governance regime (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons).
13 In the context of commons experiments, institutions that foster cooperation are not
full-fledged market- or state-like institutions, but rather minimal changes to the rules that
promote cooperation (e.g., allowing communication, instating a penalty system).
Experiments show that even such minimal rule changes can encourage cooperation. Of
course, these small changes to the rules are implemented by the organizers of the
experiment, and often “forced” upon the participants (e.g., specific amount of time
during which participants must communicate), thus collaboration is fostered from the
top-down, much in the same way that market or state organizations can stimulate
cooperation.
14 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 141-142.
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failure. The second step requires actors to realize the key role institutions play in
governing resources, and the part they can play in designing these institutions. Neither of
these steps is the responsibility of the few, but requires a broad effort from patients,
providers, hospitals, insurers, governments, and so on. The problem is that the current
set of rules hides the problem of scarcity, and the allocation decisions that are willy-nilly
being taken. Moreover, the status quo institutions preclude many actors (e.g., citizens,
patients, physicians) from directly participating in the rule-making process. Relying on
commons institutions operating at the meso-level makes the necessity for setting limits
more palpable, while at the same time offering a much broader range of actors the
opportunity to participate in the design of the allocation rules through deliberative
processes, among others, increasing the legitimacy of and compliance with resource
allocation rules. Commons research can help health care actors move past previously
learned “institutional heuristics,”15 stimulating the development of new approaches to
the design of health care institutions that do justice to the complex realities of health care
as well as to relevant differences in local context.16
To end on an optimistic note, health care’s status quo institutions have been
remarkably successful in delivering high-quality care at an altogether reasonable cost to
countries’ entire populations, or broad swaths thereof, since World War II. The success of

15

A concrete example of an institutional heuristic is Daniels and Sabin’s decision to
ultimately point toward the state as responsible for the implementation of A4R.
16 The remark is based on a similar remark in Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
(1994), when Ostrom and her colleagues note that individuals often approach
appropriation situations “armed with an array of previously learned heuristics.” (Ostrom,
Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 217.)
433

the status quo institutions serves as evidence that humans are capable of designing set
of rules that generate substantial benefits over an extended period of time, and are able
to change the rules over time in response to changing circumstances. Of course, health
care institutions are not perfect, the health care system in the United States being a prime
example, but it is worth to keep in mind that optimally designed institutions are an
illusion. Instead, the aim is to develop as-good-as-possible institutions, which is a moving
target. The financial impact of new health care technologies, and increasingly the problem
of ageing populations, make the target move faster, putting a strain on the available
health care resources. Thus far, the status quo institutions have proven relatively
successful at meeting the challenges posed by a rapidly changing environment, but for
the past decades health care spending across the developed world has slowly begun to
spiral out of control, a creeping evolution that may turn into a catastrophic tragedy.
Health care institutions have been slow to respond to these developments, among others,
due to the size and complexity of both the challenges and the sets of rules that need to
be changed to mitigate them. While it is possible the status quo institutions will be able
to formulate an adequate response over time, the institutional toolbox could benefit from
a new set of ideas to formulate institutional answers to today’s health care challenges.
Commons institutions, relying on emergent cooperation between resource users to tackle
resource governance issues at the meso-level, are a promising institutional solution to
manage health care resources. Not only do commons confront resource users with the
fact resources are finite, and then engage them in formulating an institutional solution to
allocate the available resources fairly, but they also break down large and unwieldy
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institutional challenges into smaller and more manageable problems to be resolved with
respect to a local context. Of course, the commons paradigm is no silver bullet, but adding
commons institutions to the institutional toolbox increases the likelihood of designing
robust health care institutions. Given the special moral importance of health care, there
is a strong moral obligation to design institutions that govern resources in a sustainable
manner in order for health care’s institutions to continue to provide accessible, highquality care. While this project ends here, the hope is that it can serve as a starting point
for everyone who is committed to cooperate with the aim of improving health care
through the design of better institutions.
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